Falling for Traps...the sucker hole and others

[AirRabbit]

RAT 5 -- I'd always thought that, as a basic philosophy, it would be a requirement for an operator to be able to control the system manually when the automatic control failed. It's called manual over-ride. …. The annual test criteria do not address the real modern issues. An engine failure is easy: a subtle loss of some automatics/nav systems etc. is less so. It is this type of failure that leads to many incidents/accidents; yet these are not tested nor even trained. Thus the original premise is not satisfied.
I still say that the pax expect pilots to be their last insurance policy and when necessary it pays out in full. Is that viable today? Ask yourself? Can you do it?

I think your comments are headed in the correct direction … and if I may … I think they should go a bit further. Of course there are a lot of malfunctions that are not tested annually – however the larger problem is that there are a lot of malfunctions that are possible but never trained. Why? Simply because training or checking all of the potential malfunctions would require something like 8 months of training each year to prepare for whatever the examiner might throw at you … and that would be only if he/she had the whole repertoire of potential malfunctions available – realistic presentations available – in the simulator … unless, of course, the plan is to do such training or testing in the airplane (uh … good luck – I’ll watch from the ground, thank you).

I think the issue is more fundamental than that. It is rare that a flight crew has to figure out what happened to get the airplane into the situation that is the focus of all the attention in the cockpit – and determining “what happened” is nowhere near as important at that specific moment as is continuing to, or returning to, flying the airplane. Said another way … it is almost insignificant to know the “why” and critically important to be able to know the “now what.” And I use “almost” as a very, itty bitty, small exception that may crop up every thousand years or so.

Any time the airplane changes condition, position, attitude, flight path, or energy state, when the pilot at the controls did not desire that specific change … it is the responsibility of the pilot at the controls to use those controls (pitch, bank, yaw, power, and/or flaps - speed brakes) to put the airplane back into a condition, position, attitude, flight path, AND energy state that is appropriate and safe. As a pilot, you are always at a given point in space defined by those listed parameters, but where do you want the airplane to be in the next second, the next minute, etc. AND you have to know what you need to do to ensure that the airplane will really be at, or in, those parameters at that point in time. To do that, you need to be able to recognize your current set of parameters, and know what controls to use, in what order they need to be used, and the magnitude of those control positions that will be necessary to achieve the desired set of parameters.

Pilot behaviors (and yes, there are more than one) fall into three basic categories or behavior “sets:” 1) skill-based behaviors; 2) rules-based behaviors; and 3) knowledge-based behaviors. Each of these behavior sets encompasses both strengths and weaknesses and developing an understanding of and an appreciation for these strengths and weaknesses in each of these behavior sets can assist in providing a strong basis for informed decision making when operating an airplane. This forum is likely not the place to go into the kinds details that are necessary to present and discuss these basic behavior sets. But you can certainly research this information on your own – and you should – as should all aviators. The focus and discipline of using rules-based behaviors provides the most solid framework to integrate and apply both skill-based and knowledge-based behaviors. Without skills, it is impossible to successfully fly an airplane; without knowledge it becomes extremely difficult to select the correct procedure to apply under various conditions, but without the foundation of rules-based behaviors we would be operating essentially “on our own,” without an interest or a respect of what is or should be expected of a pilot. It would essentially be like driving our automobiles around without an understanding of or an adherence to the meaning of traffic lights or other traffic regulating signs and indications – and would result in chaos … and THAT is something you want to avoid when piloting an airplane!

So … the bottom line is likely a set of meaningful, complete, and understandable regulations that cover all of the tasks that a flight crew would be required to master to ensure their ability to gain, and keep, control of their airplane – and if something were to interrupt that control – what they have learned will allow them to regain control. In addition to this, the rules should address all of the events that will be regularly seen during operations – takeoffs, climbs, cruise, descents, approaches, and landings; but not just these, they should also include all the variations of these tasks as could be expected by the authorizations granted to the operator as well as the kinds of non-normal situations that have been known to develop. There is likely that no set of such regulations, even if followed to minute detail, will guarantee flawless operation. We are dealing with human beings – and humans make mistakes – but allocating “control” of the airplane to a series of computers (which, by the way, were designed, manufactured, programmed, and installed by humans) will not ensure any increase in the flawless operation that we all strive to achieve.