A fearful pilot unable to cope with a strong crosswind in a 737.
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A fearful pilot unable to cope with a strong crosswind in a 737.
From the Curt Lewis and Associates website (USA).
Air India Express pilot flirts with danger 4 times, grounded
MUMBAI: It was a quartet of mistakes that could have had disastrous consequences. In the course of landing an aircraft in a strong crosswind, an Air India Express commander took four erroneous decisions, one after another, endangering a Boeing 737 aircraft and its 87 passengers. Luckily, it all ended with damage done only to the aircraft and the commander's flying record.
The potentially fatal incident occurred on November 3 on the Cochin-Salalah Air India Express flight IX 441 when it landed after three attempts at 9.45am, local time. After a very rough touchdown, the Boeing 737 aircraft hurtled down the runway only to jerk sharply as two tyres burst. One wing almost scraped the runway surface and the landing gear was damaged before the aircraft came to a halt near the runway end. The commander was so flustered that even after the plane stopped, he kept the engines running and did not release his foothold on the brakes for about 15-20 minutes till an engineering team arrived to tow away the aircraft.
Confirming the incident, the Air India Express spokesperson said: "The landing was not in keeping with our standard operating procedures. It indicated a disregard for the SOP by the commander."
The Directorate General of Civil Aviation is investigating the matter.
The series of faulty decisions began when the flight reached Salalah ( Oman) airspace and the pilots were informed by the Omani air traffic controller that the wind speed on the ground was 25 knot (46 kmph) gusting (sudden bursts of high-speed wind) to 35 knot (65 kmph). "The aircraft should not have attempted a landing in Salalah as the crosswind (wind blowing across the runway) speed was about 35 knot," said a source. The SOP manual disallows a landing when the surface wind speed is beyond 25 knot, and in this case, it was not only about the wind speed but also about wind direction. Landing in a crosswind is more difficult, as an aircraft is prone to drifting laterally as it approaches the runway.
At this point, the commander should have diverted the aircraft to Abu Dhabi, the alternate airport listed in the flight plan. An aircraft is flown to an alternate airport if the commander perceives that a safe landing is not possible at the destination airport (it is mandatory to carry enough fuel to fly to the alternate). There are instances where experienced commanders have managed to land safely in a strong wind and taken care to ensure that the flight safety department of the airline concerned was not informed about it. "But the best of pilots follow the norms. If a landing is in violation of an air safety norm, it is not done," said a senior commander.
The AI Express commander too tried to land in Salalah, but had to abort the landing. After the first failed attempt, he took the aircraft up 6,000 feet and after 10 minutes attempted a second landing, only to fail again. Finally, he decided to divert to Abu Dhabi, which is one hour, 15 minutes away. But that wasn't the end of the matter. "The commander entered the wrong data into the Flight Management System and it threw up a scare," said the source. "It showed that only six minutes of flying time would be left on reaching Abu Dhabi, which was insufficient to make a landing." In reality, the aircraft had 4.7 tonnes of fuel on board, and the fuel needed to reach and land safely in Abu Dhabi was 4.5 tonnes. But since the commander was under the impression that the aircraft was short on fuel, he panicked and decided to return to Salalah.
It was now the commander's third attempt at landing in Salalah in poor weather, which is something air safety experts warn against. Several airlines worldwide have banned a third attempt at landing at an airport in poor weather and made a diversion mandatory. Air India, however, does not have such a policy yet-the airline spokesperson said this was "under review".
During the third attempt, the commander decided to do an autoland although the cockpit crew was not trained to do so. In an autoland, the aircraft directly takes inputs from ground-based navigation instruments that give guidance to an aircraft on descent profile and horizontal manoevering. But there are wind speed restrictions for autoland, and a 35-knot crosswind is way above the permissible limit for a B737. "The commander also disregarded the limitations by Boeing Company for autoland operation," said the airline spokesperson. "The matter is under investigation by our air safety department."
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Air-India-Express-pilot-flirts-with-danger-4-times-grounded/articleshow/10760907.cms
Comment: Simulator training on strong crosswind landings is often ignored in training syllabus. The result is most crosswind landings in the simulator are 10-15 knots and pilots never get time to practice and become totally confident and competent with 30-35 knots of crosswind component. From reading between the lines it seems the captain was scared stiff of strong crosswinds. This is an indictment of the training system in that airline.
Air India Express pilot flirts with danger 4 times, grounded
MUMBAI: It was a quartet of mistakes that could have had disastrous consequences. In the course of landing an aircraft in a strong crosswind, an Air India Express commander took four erroneous decisions, one after another, endangering a Boeing 737 aircraft and its 87 passengers. Luckily, it all ended with damage done only to the aircraft and the commander's flying record.
The potentially fatal incident occurred on November 3 on the Cochin-Salalah Air India Express flight IX 441 when it landed after three attempts at 9.45am, local time. After a very rough touchdown, the Boeing 737 aircraft hurtled down the runway only to jerk sharply as two tyres burst. One wing almost scraped the runway surface and the landing gear was damaged before the aircraft came to a halt near the runway end. The commander was so flustered that even after the plane stopped, he kept the engines running and did not release his foothold on the brakes for about 15-20 minutes till an engineering team arrived to tow away the aircraft.
Confirming the incident, the Air India Express spokesperson said: "The landing was not in keeping with our standard operating procedures. It indicated a disregard for the SOP by the commander."
The Directorate General of Civil Aviation is investigating the matter.
The series of faulty decisions began when the flight reached Salalah ( Oman) airspace and the pilots were informed by the Omani air traffic controller that the wind speed on the ground was 25 knot (46 kmph) gusting (sudden bursts of high-speed wind) to 35 knot (65 kmph). "The aircraft should not have attempted a landing in Salalah as the crosswind (wind blowing across the runway) speed was about 35 knot," said a source. The SOP manual disallows a landing when the surface wind speed is beyond 25 knot, and in this case, it was not only about the wind speed but also about wind direction. Landing in a crosswind is more difficult, as an aircraft is prone to drifting laterally as it approaches the runway.
At this point, the commander should have diverted the aircraft to Abu Dhabi, the alternate airport listed in the flight plan. An aircraft is flown to an alternate airport if the commander perceives that a safe landing is not possible at the destination airport (it is mandatory to carry enough fuel to fly to the alternate). There are instances where experienced commanders have managed to land safely in a strong wind and taken care to ensure that the flight safety department of the airline concerned was not informed about it. "But the best of pilots follow the norms. If a landing is in violation of an air safety norm, it is not done," said a senior commander.
The AI Express commander too tried to land in Salalah, but had to abort the landing. After the first failed attempt, he took the aircraft up 6,000 feet and after 10 minutes attempted a second landing, only to fail again. Finally, he decided to divert to Abu Dhabi, which is one hour, 15 minutes away. But that wasn't the end of the matter. "The commander entered the wrong data into the Flight Management System and it threw up a scare," said the source. "It showed that only six minutes of flying time would be left on reaching Abu Dhabi, which was insufficient to make a landing." In reality, the aircraft had 4.7 tonnes of fuel on board, and the fuel needed to reach and land safely in Abu Dhabi was 4.5 tonnes. But since the commander was under the impression that the aircraft was short on fuel, he panicked and decided to return to Salalah.
It was now the commander's third attempt at landing in Salalah in poor weather, which is something air safety experts warn against. Several airlines worldwide have banned a third attempt at landing at an airport in poor weather and made a diversion mandatory. Air India, however, does not have such a policy yet-the airline spokesperson said this was "under review".
During the third attempt, the commander decided to do an autoland although the cockpit crew was not trained to do so. In an autoland, the aircraft directly takes inputs from ground-based navigation instruments that give guidance to an aircraft on descent profile and horizontal manoevering. But there are wind speed restrictions for autoland, and a 35-knot crosswind is way above the permissible limit for a B737. "The commander also disregarded the limitations by Boeing Company for autoland operation," said the airline spokesperson. "The matter is under investigation by our air safety department."
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Air-India-Express-pilot-flirts-with-danger-4-times-grounded/articleshow/10760907.cms
Comment: Simulator training on strong crosswind landings is often ignored in training syllabus. The result is most crosswind landings in the simulator are 10-15 knots and pilots never get time to practice and become totally confident and competent with 30-35 knots of crosswind component. From reading between the lines it seems the captain was scared stiff of strong crosswinds. This is an indictment of the training system in that airline.
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Tee Emm, perhaps a bit of a harsh judgement. While you read between the lines, perhaps you might also consider subtle incapacitation, chronic fatigue, illness, marriage problems and many other possible causes. To also comment on another airline's training system based on one incident, is also not really appropriate.
Come on chaps, we saw this with the recent Munich SQ incident. This is supposed to be a professional forum. Yes I know someone will respond that it's a rumour forum, but please let's not be too quick to criticise others until we have the facts.
Come on chaps, we saw this with the recent Munich SQ incident. This is supposed to be a professional forum. Yes I know someone will respond that it's a rumour forum, but please let's not be too quick to criticise others until we have the facts.
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AVIATORS? AIRMEN? A simple poor example of the judgment as expected from the capitalized definitions. Understanding the pressure the PIC may have been under from what I have heard here of his company I understand his human decisions. Hell, should not have attempted the first if the crosswind coefficient exceeded the aircraft's abilities and had plenty of fuel for alternate. On the other hand you know what we all say about a good landing.
parallel thread on flight deck forum/rumour and news
While the commercial and operational pressures are stressors to decision making, the underlying issue is one of competency and standards. This is another example of the race to the bottom of operational standards, lack of care by the regulators towards public in discharging their oversight, and the disinterest in the general public towards their own safety (incidental issue to this event).
While the commercial and operational pressures are stressors to decision making, the underlying issue is one of competency and standards. This is another example of the race to the bottom of operational standards, lack of care by the regulators towards public in discharging their oversight, and the disinterest in the general public towards their own safety (incidental issue to this event).
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I don't believe anything reported by the Indian media, even
remotely connected to aviation, one iota - they're well known
globally as a bunch of inept overexaggerating clowns.
Does anyone have a reliable reporting source on this incident?
remotely connected to aviation, one iota - they're well known
globally as a bunch of inept overexaggerating clowns.
Does anyone have a reliable reporting source on this incident?
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Hell, should not have attempted the first if the crosswind coefficient exceeded the aircraft's abilities
In terms of Boeing published limitations the section only lists wind components for the autoland case i.e the final approach that was made. Again, the article accurately describes this was a Boeing limitation rather than company.
The SOP limit value of just 25 knots crosswind for normal ops and the apparent in house inertia in adopting the very common 2 approach attempts only then divert policy are absolutely worthy of discussion. In the light of competency based accidents and incidents now completely dominating the statistics no matter what part of the world we have to think long and hard on how we are training and the part company cultures and SOP's are playing in this.
Rob
PS Pedants corner: Aware of the 2 knot reduction for wingletted airframes but that's a relatively uncommon landing technique triggering it.
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No surprises here. None.
Whilst this screams repercussions of modern airline standards, it also screams louder of AI / AIE, as well as the DGCA. Pilots are not taught, instructed or evaluated to fly the aircraft at and within it's limits. Sim checks & procedures are ticked as completed when no such exercise(s) were completed.
Aviation academics now label pilots' abilities to hand fly an aircraft as "resilience", and it is now used to define standards at airlines as well (Flt Inlt a few weeks ago....). "Resilience"?? And to think the inability to pilot an aircraft in such a way as mentioned here, or as Capt make such rudimentary decisions was called "unemployed" or "fired" for being not up to standard.....
Re-training required? YES. Will it happen or will the poorly trained pilot be hung out to dry as a result of an airline's woeful and (criminally) negligent standards?? No. And then when we have another Mangalore it'll be: "Who saw this coming??"
Whilst this screams repercussions of modern airline standards, it also screams louder of AI / AIE, as well as the DGCA. Pilots are not taught, instructed or evaluated to fly the aircraft at and within it's limits. Sim checks & procedures are ticked as completed when no such exercise(s) were completed.
Aviation academics now label pilots' abilities to hand fly an aircraft as "resilience", and it is now used to define standards at airlines as well (Flt Inlt a few weeks ago....). "Resilience"?? And to think the inability to pilot an aircraft in such a way as mentioned here, or as Capt make such rudimentary decisions was called "unemployed" or "fired" for being not up to standard.....
Re-training required? YES. Will it happen or will the poorly trained pilot be hung out to dry as a result of an airline's woeful and (criminally) negligent standards?? No. And then when we have another Mangalore it'll be: "Who saw this coming??"
Capt should be put back to F/O and F/O do some training.
737 is a baby in X-winds compared to some.
It seems some of these companies have serious standards problems.
737 is a baby in X-winds compared to some.
It seems some of these companies have serious standards problems.
I think there are three separate issues here.
The first is a pilot who apparently doesn't know the limits set by the company and tries to land although the weather is beyond company limits. That in itself is not a good sign.
The second issue is of course a company limit that is extremely low and is just as high as the normal autoland crosswind limit. Which indicates that the company runs an awful training department and tries to compensate that by very low wind limits.
The third issue is of course a pilot that cannot land in winds that are well below boeing provided guidelines, which kinda proves the companies self assessment about its own training department. Of course he busted the company limits in the first place and therefore is beyond the scope of its training, still a bad sign though.
The first is a pilot who apparently doesn't know the limits set by the company and tries to land although the weather is beyond company limits. That in itself is not a good sign.
The second issue is of course a company limit that is extremely low and is just as high as the normal autoland crosswind limit. Which indicates that the company runs an awful training department and tries to compensate that by very low wind limits.
The third issue is of course a pilot that cannot land in winds that are well below boeing provided guidelines, which kinda proves the companies self assessment about its own training department. Of course he busted the company limits in the first place and therefore is beyond the scope of its training, still a bad sign though.
it would be useful to know if the wind was 25 G35 or the side wind komponent was 25-35 .
a side wind komponent of up to 35 knots indeed may be an eye opener on flare . nevertheless of course the whole situation was poor airmanship.
a side wind komponent of up to 35 knots indeed may be an eye opener on flare . nevertheless of course the whole situation was poor airmanship.
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Actually, I should take back my previous comment, the way that newspaper report reads, we don't appear to have facts to base a discussion of the incident on. Much of the report seems to be somebody's dubious opinion.
