AF447 wreckage found
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poor safety record
Air France is going to have a very hard time explaining this one and I am sure the victim's Lawyers are going to have a field day at the Courts.
If the Air France "Juggernaut" was not one of the "heavyweights" of Europe and if it's safety standards were appraised by the same criteria as the smaller airlines it would definitely be included in the infamous European "Black List".
This airline has the worst safety record in Europe.
If the Air France "Juggernaut" was not one of the "heavyweights" of Europe and if it's safety standards were appraised by the same criteria as the smaller airlines it would definitely be included in the infamous European "Black List".
This airline has the worst safety record in Europe.
Trash du Blanc
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4 minutes is a very long time. How can 3 highly qualified pilots persist in maintaining a stall for so long without someone figuring out that they have got it wrong.
I'd like to see the data for roll angle. At Roselawn the stall was coupled with wild, violent roll oscillations. The pilots did not recognize a stalled condition.
In Air France's case, with that kind of sink rate their pitch angle was 16 degrees or less, and roll was tossing through 40 degrees each way. They were sitting at 100% thrust. Perhaps they were thinking of structural problems or something else - but they must not have recognized the stall....
The airplane’s pitch attitude did not exceed 15 degrees and the engines’ N1’s were close to 100%. The airplane was subject to roll oscillations that sometimes reached 40 degrees.
Whatsalizad: it would appear that the aircraft was stalled for most (if not all) of the descent, so maybe it wasn't a dive. With the THS (as reported) remaining a 13 deg nose up, how do you dive? 
Huck:
Is this a symptom of a deep stall?
15 deg nose up and falling at 10,000 fpm strikes me as an extremely uncomfortable, and disorienting feeling. Does Unusual Attitude training cover this case?
(Hmm, from what folks have posted in the other threads, Sims probably don't have the data points for it ... )
Huck:
The airplane’s pitch attitude did not exceed 15 degrees and the engines’ N1’s were close to 100%. The airplane was subject to roll oscillations that sometimes reached 40 degrees.
15 deg nose up and falling at 10,000 fpm strikes me as an extremely uncomfortable, and disorienting feeling. Does Unusual Attitude training cover this case?
(Hmm, from what folks have posted in the other threads, Sims probably don't have the data points for it ... )
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Could it be possible that the pilots thought they were in a nose-down attitude?
They probably had no external visual reference, and with the deceleration of the plane, even with the slight nose-up attitude, it would have felt like they were in a nose-down attitude. Faced with an altimeter spinning backwards, and thinking that they were in a nose-down attitude, the last thing on their minds would have been to push the nose down any further...
Sorry if this is a silly suggestion, but as a non-pilot I am struggling to understand how three pilots could not figure out that their plane was stalled.
They probably had no external visual reference, and with the deceleration of the plane, even with the slight nose-up attitude, it would have felt like they were in a nose-down attitude. Faced with an altimeter spinning backwards, and thinking that they were in a nose-down attitude, the last thing on their minds would have been to push the nose down any further...
Sorry if this is a silly suggestion, but as a non-pilot I am struggling to understand how three pilots could not figure out that their plane was stalled.
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Don't know anything about flying an Airbus or anything above 5700kg for that matter..so happy to be told to to poke off.
However, it's dark, turbulent and something frighteningly strange is happening to a 42 tonne aircraft that is causing a rapid descent. Maybe it just doesn't feel natural to take a deep breath and shove the joystick forwards..
However, it's dark, turbulent and something frighteningly strange is happening to a 42 tonne aircraft that is causing a rapid descent. Maybe it just doesn't feel natural to take a deep breath and shove the joystick forwards..
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The Ancient Greek writes:
I agree with this assessment. I think it nullifies the idea that there was a "startle" factor due to "bells and whistles". A professionally trained pilot is not startled for four minutes. A few seconds, yes; four minutes no.
The critical question that now needs to be answered. For essentially four minutes he rode the stick right into the ocean. Why? Something caused him to do that. Training? Confusion?
Another poster:
If they did not know the plane was stalled, why?
or
If they knew the plane was stalled and handled it wrong, why?
The report as it stands doesn't answer this questions (nor should it).
4 minutes is a very long time.
The critical question that now needs to be answered. For essentially four minutes he rode the stick right into the ocean. Why? Something caused him to do that. Training? Confusion?
Another poster:
but as a non-pilot I am struggling to understand how three pilots could not figure out that their plane was stalled.
or
If they knew the plane was stalled and handled it wrong, why?
The report as it stands doesn't answer this questions (nor should it).
strake, you may be right ... but if the attitude reference system (attitude display) is still working, your primary scan first goes to attitude gyro/attitude reference/artificial horizon, and you set an attitude.
I would think that's pretty basic "unusual attitude" instrument flight training.
I would think that's pretty basic "unusual attitude" instrument flight training.
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Two incidents worth reading in light of this report
L1011 Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 in 1972 - CRM
Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
B727 TWA Flight 841 in 1979 - Recovery from rapid uncontrolled rate of descent
TWA 727
L1011 Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 in 1972 - CRM
Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
B727 TWA Flight 841 in 1979 - Recovery from rapid uncontrolled rate of descent
TWA 727
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Regarding the attitude - one would hope at least one of the pilots ignored his senses and trusted the instruments. It seems from the report that (from the lack of reference otherwise) all three ADIs (both PFDs and ISIS) were reading very similar values, so regarding reference to level flight, they shouldn't have had a problem.
Knowing the aircraft to be reasonably upright, but with a screaming altimeter, knowing you are over the ocean with nothing to hit, a pitch-over would seem a far better alternative to not trying stall recovery at all?
As was written above: maybe there was some conflict in data resulting in the pitch-up action?
We need the complete FDR data - too many questions, so few answers.
ECAM Actions.
Knowing the aircraft to be reasonably upright, but with a screaming altimeter, knowing you are over the ocean with nothing to hit, a pitch-over would seem a far better alternative to not trying stall recovery at all?
As was written above: maybe there was some conflict in data resulting in the pitch-up action?
We need the complete FDR data - too many questions, so few answers.
ECAM Actions.
Thing is we now know in hindsight that the altimeters and VSI were ( apparently) working correctly so full stall recovery is a "no brainer" to us, right? But the AF crew had already lost IAS and now the altimeters was winding down at a rate they'd probably ever seen in a simulator reset. OTOH the aircraft is rocking and rolling, buffeting, but in a vaguely sensible attitude and with full power applied...added to which they're being bombarded with compelling electronic warnings demanding immediate attention......
Human beings like you and me, not perfect, short of reliable information, overloaded, at saturation point and in some form of denial?
Human beings like you and me, not perfect, short of reliable information, overloaded, at saturation point and in some form of denial?
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Northwest 705
Probably very similar:
Northwest 705 air crash
Regards,
GCGB
Northwest 705 air crash
It appeared that the aircraft did not break up until the crew apparently tried to recover when passing through 10,000ft. The question then was what caused the aircraft to get into such an unusual condition. The answer came in the fact that the aircraft has an inherit tendency to 'weathervane' into gusts. So, when the initial updraft caught the aircraft, it would have an initial tendency to nose down into the gust. This apparently prompted Almquist to give nose-up inputs, which would actually worsen the overall situation. The same effect worked in the downdraft which followed. It is also important to note that, although it appears full up elevator was used in the recovery attempt, full nose-down trim was still wound in from the prior encounter with the updraft.
Regards,
GCGB
Did anyone spot an over-speed alert at any time (I could not) ?
If not I really can't understand their insistence to keep the nose up - there is no way they could not feel the stall.
Very perplexing...
If not I really can't understand their insistence to keep the nose up - there is no way they could not feel the stall.
Very perplexing...
Looks like the aircraft was held in the stall, for over 3 minutes; question is, why?
Fitting an AoA gauge seems like a good idea.
I await more info on whether the AH, VSI, altimeter etc were displaying correctly.
Do you airline types get taught/practise limited panel anymore?
I don't think vast numbers of hours help. My IF1 in the RAF was in wave activity in the Vale of York. Max rate climb selected and going down 1 minute, power off glide and going up the next minute - you just need an excellent instructor (mine was ex-CFS A1).
Fitting an AoA gauge seems like a good idea.
I await more info on whether the AH, VSI, altimeter etc were displaying correctly.
Do you airline types get taught/practise limited panel anymore?
I don't think vast numbers of hours help. My IF1 in the RAF was in wave activity in the Vale of York. Max rate climb selected and going down 1 minute, power off glide and going up the next minute - you just need an excellent instructor (mine was ex-CFS A1).
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Official AF reaction to today's news -- the aircraft's instruments failed and the pilots reacted completely professionally.
Air France - Corporate : AF 447 - Air France
AF 447 - Air France’s reaction to the BEA’s information report
Friday 27 May 2011
On the eve of second anniversary of the AF447 tragedy, Air France and its staff are turning their thoughts to the families of the passengers and crew and wish to express their full solidarity.
The perserverance of the authorities, Airbus and Air France has led to the flight recorders and parts of the aircraft being found after a two-year search. The French Accident Investigation Bureau (BEA) is now able to reveal the sequence of events leading to the crash of flight AF447 from Rio to Paris on 1 June 2009.
This description of the facts therefore replaces the assumptions that have been made over the past two years.
It appears that the flight deck crew was monitoring the changing weather conditions and thus altered the flight path, that the initial problem was the failure of the speed probes which led to the disconnection of the autopilot and the loss of the associated piloting protection systems, and that the aircraft stalled at high altitude. It also appears that the flight captain quickly interrupted his rest period to regain the cockpit. The crew, made up of three skilled pilots, demonstrated a totally professional attitude and were committed to carrying out their task to the very end and Air France wishes to pay tribute to them.
All the data collected must now be analyzed. It will only be at the end of this complex task, which requires patience and precision, that the BEA will be able to establish the causes that led to the disaster.
We can already see that the authorities, the manufacturer and the airline have taken measures to avoid the repetition of such an accident.
Air France hopes that everyone has the patience to wait for the interim report that the BEA will publish in a few weeks, no doubt along with additional recommendations. The safety of the global air transport industry will be even stronger.
Air France - Corporate : AF 447 - Air France
AF 447 - Air France’s reaction to the BEA’s information report
Friday 27 May 2011
On the eve of second anniversary of the AF447 tragedy, Air France and its staff are turning their thoughts to the families of the passengers and crew and wish to express their full solidarity.
The perserverance of the authorities, Airbus and Air France has led to the flight recorders and parts of the aircraft being found after a two-year search. The French Accident Investigation Bureau (BEA) is now able to reveal the sequence of events leading to the crash of flight AF447 from Rio to Paris on 1 June 2009.
This description of the facts therefore replaces the assumptions that have been made over the past two years.
It appears that the flight deck crew was monitoring the changing weather conditions and thus altered the flight path, that the initial problem was the failure of the speed probes which led to the disconnection of the autopilot and the loss of the associated piloting protection systems, and that the aircraft stalled at high altitude. It also appears that the flight captain quickly interrupted his rest period to regain the cockpit. The crew, made up of three skilled pilots, demonstrated a totally professional attitude and were committed to carrying out their task to the very end and Air France wishes to pay tribute to them.
All the data collected must now be analyzed. It will only be at the end of this complex task, which requires patience and precision, that the BEA will be able to establish the causes that led to the disaster.
We can already see that the authorities, the manufacturer and the airline have taken measures to avoid the repetition of such an accident.
Air France hopes that everyone has the patience to wait for the interim report that the BEA will publish in a few weeks, no doubt along with additional recommendations. The safety of the global air transport industry will be even stronger.
Last edited by SeenItAll; 27th May 2011 at 18:06. Reason: Adding actual text
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Questions regarding disintegration
Dear ppruners,
from early reports after the incident,
I remember indications of disintegration
of parts (tail) - from the location pattern
of the debris found.
If, in the middle of a heavy thunderstorm
with massive alternating +/- G forces
(updraft/downdraft, compare Northwest 705)
working on the airframe, what would you think
what the PF would notice if some tail parts
are gone?
(I'm only an "armchair pilot", sorry if the
question doesn't make sense.)
Thanks & regards
GCGB
from early reports after the incident,
I remember indications of disintegration
of parts (tail) - from the location pattern
of the debris found.
If, in the middle of a heavy thunderstorm
with massive alternating +/- G forces
(updraft/downdraft, compare Northwest 705)
working on the airframe, what would you think
what the PF would notice if some tail parts
are gone?
(I'm only an "armchair pilot", sorry if the
question doesn't make sense.)
Thanks & regards
GCGB
More bang for your buck
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If not I really can't understand their insistence to keep the nose up - there is no way they could not feel the stall.
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Chris VJ
No you do not use rudder to control roll in an airliner. The rudder pedals are, in effect, footrests apart from crosswind landings and engine failure. In fact, if you are in a stall the use of rudder will be a singularly bad idea as it may lead to a spin. A planned spin entry involves approaching the stall and inputting full aft stick and full rudder. The consequences of the incorrect use of rudder to correct roll were demonstrated when an airbus and its fin seperated over New York.
Of course if you fly air comat or aerobatics then rudder at slow speed to augment roll can be very usefull.
No you do not use rudder to control roll in an airliner. The rudder pedals are, in effect, footrests apart from crosswind landings and engine failure. In fact, if you are in a stall the use of rudder will be a singularly bad idea as it may lead to a spin. A planned spin entry involves approaching the stall and inputting full aft stick and full rudder. The consequences of the incorrect use of rudder to correct roll were demonstrated when an airbus and its fin seperated over New York.
Of course if you fly air comat or aerobatics then rudder at slow speed to augment roll can be very usefull.