Passenger Evacuation slowed by checklist reading.
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Passenger Evacuation slowed by checklist reading.
Scenario. Aborted take off due engine fire warning with ATC calling that they can see a fire around an engine. Captain rejects and comes to a stop.
Now is it really true that the current Boeing procedure is to have the first officer actually read out a checklist and action his areas of responsibility before the captain eventually picks up his microphone and orders an Evacuation? Sounds all very professional of course - all this calm reading and responding to a checklist while the fires burn ever hotter and maybe even penetrate the aircraft skin - while the passengers sit and sweat waiting for the checklist reading up the sharp end to finish with the triumphant phrase " Evacuation Checklist...COMPLETE. Then - and only then a hurried but firm voice announces "Evacuate. " Too late, the smoke has poured into the cabin and panic sets in and lives are lost because of the inordinate delay caused by fumbling for and reading of THE CHECKLIST.
Surely it is not too much to expect that the captain and first officer take immediate action from memory to get the people out before it is too late and not have to rely on the printed page to tell them what to do next? What prompts Boeing (and Airbus, too) to make such a drastic change to an emergency procedure that has so successfully stood the test of time? The ever threat of litigation perhaps?
Now is it really true that the current Boeing procedure is to have the first officer actually read out a checklist and action his areas of responsibility before the captain eventually picks up his microphone and orders an Evacuation? Sounds all very professional of course - all this calm reading and responding to a checklist while the fires burn ever hotter and maybe even penetrate the aircraft skin - while the passengers sit and sweat waiting for the checklist reading up the sharp end to finish with the triumphant phrase " Evacuation Checklist...COMPLETE. Then - and only then a hurried but firm voice announces "Evacuate. " Too late, the smoke has poured into the cabin and panic sets in and lives are lost because of the inordinate delay caused by fumbling for and reading of THE CHECKLIST.
Surely it is not too much to expect that the captain and first officer take immediate action from memory to get the people out before it is too late and not have to rely on the printed page to tell them what to do next? What prompts Boeing (and Airbus, too) to make such a drastic change to an emergency procedure that has so successfully stood the test of time? The ever threat of litigation perhaps?
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Depends upon your companies SOP really.
Our Evac procedure is a memory item for both crew members, with a follow up via the checklist.
ie: CHECK LIST
not: DO LIST
If your company says READ AND DO then that’s it, if it is a CHECK LIST, then memory items and complete the evacuation, if there is no threat to life then follow up actions with the check list, confirm cabin is empty (if possible) and the captain is the last one out
(in principal)
Our Evac procedure is a memory item for both crew members, with a follow up via the checklist.
ie: CHECK LIST
not: DO LIST
If your company says READ AND DO then that’s it, if it is a CHECK LIST, then memory items and complete the evacuation, if there is no threat to life then follow up actions with the check list, confirm cabin is empty (if possible) and the captain is the last one out
(in principal)
I guess that there are a couple of things to consider here.
1. if you did initiate the evacuation command before you actioned the checklist, will the passengers sucked into the running engines thank you?
2. If you do an analysis of the number of flights per year, and the number of uncontrollable engine/airframe fires - particularly those that end in a pax evacuation, I suspect that you would find that it is a discussion that isnt worth having
3. why second guess the procedures as specified by your company? what makes you think that the people that wrote the procedures are dopes that missed the obvious?
To answer your question about why change the procedure - it is a fact that recall checklists, when conducted under the stress of a real emergency, are more often than not carried incorrectly - in many cases it might be only a minor deviation, but nevertheless incorrectly.
Changing those procedures to "read and do" forces people to slow down and think about what it is they are trying to achieve, and provides an opportunity for a means to stop people missing things in the heat of the moment.
The sim isnt a real test of reactions in the real situation - regardless of the fidelity of the sim people still know there is no risk....
1. if you did initiate the evacuation command before you actioned the checklist, will the passengers sucked into the running engines thank you?
2. If you do an analysis of the number of flights per year, and the number of uncontrollable engine/airframe fires - particularly those that end in a pax evacuation, I suspect that you would find that it is a discussion that isnt worth having
3. why second guess the procedures as specified by your company? what makes you think that the people that wrote the procedures are dopes that missed the obvious?
To answer your question about why change the procedure - it is a fact that recall checklists, when conducted under the stress of a real emergency, are more often than not carried incorrectly - in many cases it might be only a minor deviation, but nevertheless incorrectly.
Changing those procedures to "read and do" forces people to slow down and think about what it is they are trying to achieve, and provides an opportunity for a means to stop people missing things in the heat of the moment.
The sim isnt a real test of reactions in the real situation - regardless of the fidelity of the sim people still know there is no risk....
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How long does it take to 'read and do'? 10s? 20s? How much would you wish you could have those 20s again, if you were the Captain who ballsed up the evacuation?
Seen the procedure spectacularly ruined in the sim, when there is no 'real' pressure on, all because of too much haste and people thinking they 'knew' the drills.
I am well aware of how likely I am to c*ck up (very), and also how much I really, really don't want to c*ck up an evac!
Seen the procedure spectacularly ruined in the sim, when there is no 'real' pressure on, all because of too much haste and people thinking they 'knew' the drills.
I am well aware of how likely I am to c*ck up (very), and also how much I really, really don't want to c*ck up an evac!
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In a 2-person cockpit, it likely takes longer to FIND the checklist than to "check" or DO it! In the case of an RTO, the checklist will not likely be at hand, so it will take longer than an inflight fire.
Dehavillanddriver has a good point -- What happens if the FO gets on the PA and yells "Evacuate" before the engines are shut down? If the FA also fails (or is unable) to check the engine, [s]he might open the front door, only to have the slides sucked into the engine.
Might a few seconds make a difference? Absolutely! However, we must take into consideration that rushing may have adverse consequences, and the risk is greater than a few seconds' delay.
Dehavillanddriver has a good point -- What happens if the FO gets on the PA and yells "Evacuate" before the engines are shut down? If the FA also fails (or is unable) to check the engine, [s]he might open the front door, only to have the slides sucked into the engine.
Might a few seconds make a difference? Absolutely! However, we must take into consideration that rushing may have adverse consequences, and the risk is greater than a few seconds' delay.
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3. why second guess the procedures as specified by your company? what makes you think that the people that wrote the procedures are dopes that missed the obvious
One thing sometimes ignored - and especially if the crew are busy reading and doing - is the possibility of the cabin crew initiating an evacuation if they perceive an inordinate delay in communications from the flight deck. A door warning light illuminating in the cockpit may indicate an evacuation taking place without being ordered by the captain. In that case the engines should be closed down immediately rather than wait until that item is read from the evacuation checklist.
Boeing standard procedure is that the "Passenger evacuation" checklist is a recall item.
Do it from memory, then read the checklist.
personally if we've done it by recall and the ships burning down/ sinking around me I'm not waiting to read the checklist.
Do it from memory, then read the checklist.
personally if we've done it by recall and the ships burning down/ sinking around me I'm not waiting to read the checklist.
2. If you do an analysis of the number of flights per year, and the number of uncontrollable engine/airframe fires - particularly those that end in a pax evacuation, I suspect that you would find that it is a discussion that isnt worth having (emphasis added)
When something happens often Recognition Primed Decision Making (we've done this many times, therefore we know what to do) makes it unlikely that we will flamingo up (like the c*ck up specified above only worse).
When something happens that we have never dealt with before, there is no RPDM and therefore it is far more likely to be flamingoed up. This is why training / discussion should be concentrated here.
The other half of the equation is high risk. If you try to cover all the low frequency events without regard to their merit will result in an astronomical training program doomed to failure. An event that could lead to fatalities is the epitome of high risk, and therefore requires training.
This is why discussion and recurrent training should be concentrated on high risk, low frequency events like fires, and not relegated to "it won't happen to me". They do happen, and because they don't happen that often, we need to think about them.
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Interesting that you went for something obvious like an enging fire.
Suppose it was something else that caused the reject, smoke from unknown source, major electrical failure (lets not do the should you or should'nt you stop thing).
You may not initially go for the evacuation and then find you need to.
No confusion, no doubts....... just grab the QRH and read and do.
It takes a few seconds and you can make the call.
Also, on the Airbus, it's all the down to the FO to switch everything off and fire the extinguishers. The Captain is supposed to be gathiring info and assessing the situation so he's not directly monitoring the FO to ensure his memory is working under great stress. I know mine doesn't
Suppose it was something else that caused the reject, smoke from unknown source, major electrical failure (lets not do the should you or should'nt you stop thing).
You may not initially go for the evacuation and then find you need to.
No confusion, no doubts....... just grab the QRH and read and do.
It takes a few seconds and you can make the call.
Also, on the Airbus, it's all the down to the FO to switch everything off and fire the extinguishers. The Captain is supposed to be gathiring info and assessing the situation so he's not directly monitoring the FO to ensure his memory is working under great stress. I know mine doesn't
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Boeing standard procedure is that the "Passenger evacuation" checklist is a recall item.
The only "Immediate recall" items we have are to prevent abnormal occurrences from becoming major emergencies, e.g., Engine overtemp on ground, Aborted start...
Last edited by Intruder; 14th Oct 2007 at 21:13.
We go through the "on ground emergency" drill for the first flight of the crew of the day and it is recall followed by reading the QRH. The evacuation command is the last recall item and it's done after retracting the lift dumpers, shutting the engines and shooting the fire extinguisher bottles. (Fokker 70/100)
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It's written on the control column in big letters on the 737! You still need to memorise it in case you are in thick smoke and can't see it.
Both Pilots action there parts simultaneously - the Captain closes the start levers to shut the engines down THEN orders evacuate. Meanwhile the FO puts the flaps to 40, stows the speedbrake, opens the window and pulls the engine fire handles which would also shut down the engines.
Both Pilots action there parts simultaneously - the Captain closes the start levers to shut the engines down THEN orders evacuate. Meanwhile the FO puts the flaps to 40, stows the speedbrake, opens the window and pulls the engine fire handles which would also shut down the engines.
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Interesting and very important topic.
In the sim,I would say follow your company SOP.
In real life,do what must be done.Its an emergency and should be done by recall.Time is key but ordering an evac with engine(s) running/ac not depressurized is bad news.If TWO pilots cant handle the half dozen or so recall items,then they shouldnt really be there in the first place.Changing the procedure to read and do to preclude missed items isnt the answer.Devote more sim time until the recall items are 100% perfect would be the better way to go.After all,whats the sense in curing one problem but creating another one in the process?Never understood that logic.
Things to bear in mind...FO never gives the command.The skipper shuts the engines and so he must give the command.FO can use the time during the reject to action a few recall items.However,his primary duty is to monitor the skipper and coordinate with ATC.Its not foolproof,but the manner in which ATC express their concern is a good indicator.If they're shouting at you,you just know you dont want to set the parking brake and call for the evac nnc.
Some say dont put the fire downwind.9 times out of 10 it wont matter.However,if you act as if it were catastrophic(ie.fuselage breach)every time,then you cant go wrong,so do it.
Remember this..SOP's wont ever save you,only good judgement and airmanship.
The Company will thank you for remembering that when the story breaks on CNN.
In the sim,I would say follow your company SOP.
In real life,do what must be done.Its an emergency and should be done by recall.Time is key but ordering an evac with engine(s) running/ac not depressurized is bad news.If TWO pilots cant handle the half dozen or so recall items,then they shouldnt really be there in the first place.Changing the procedure to read and do to preclude missed items isnt the answer.Devote more sim time until the recall items are 100% perfect would be the better way to go.After all,whats the sense in curing one problem but creating another one in the process?Never understood that logic.
Things to bear in mind...FO never gives the command.The skipper shuts the engines and so he must give the command.FO can use the time during the reject to action a few recall items.However,his primary duty is to monitor the skipper and coordinate with ATC.Its not foolproof,but the manner in which ATC express their concern is a good indicator.If they're shouting at you,you just know you dont want to set the parking brake and call for the evac nnc.
Some say dont put the fire downwind.9 times out of 10 it wont matter.However,if you act as if it were catastrophic(ie.fuselage breach)every time,then you cant go wrong,so do it.
Remember this..SOP's wont ever save you,only good judgement and airmanship.
The Company will thank you for remembering that when the story breaks on CNN.
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Correction
I think if you look at the "Boeing" QRH for the 777 you will find that yes it is on the back cover of the QRH, but it is also on the front of the QRH where all the memory checklists are listed and thus becomes it a "Quick Action" item. I realize that many airlines work to modify this along their respective agency overight. In the case of most Part 121 operators here in the US, many have this checklist posted in a conspicous place where it can be referenced quickly.
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Recall items
Not so. There are numerous recall items in the current Boeing Non-Normal checklists. Those Recall items are annotated with a # sign next to them on the appplicable checklist. Example would be ENG SVR DAMAGE/SEP L,R
#Autothrottle Arm Switch Off
#Thrust Lever Close
#Fuel Control Switch Off
#Engine Fire Switch Pull
After which you reference the checklist and complete it as required.
#Autothrottle Arm Switch Off
#Thrust Lever Close
#Fuel Control Switch Off
#Engine Fire Switch Pull
After which you reference the checklist and complete it as required.
Spooky 2 is correct.
Boeing have NOT done away with memory "recall" items.
One of the more "time critical" memory items is "CABIN ALT"
You would be dead if you took the time to read the book.
Let me see..........oxy mask.............................oops I just passed out.
Boeing have NOT done away with memory "recall" items.
One of the more "time critical" memory items is "CABIN ALT"
You would be dead if you took the time to read the book.
Let me see..........oxy mask.............................oops I just passed out.
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With flames shooting up the side of the fuselage passengers will not stay in their seats until told what to do. That's why I tell the senior cabin crewmember, under compelling circumstances, to initiate evacuation as soon as the airplane has come to a full stop and advise us. From the upper deck cockpit, the crew is not in a position to instantly assess the severity of the smoke/fire downstairs. Precious seconds would be lost for the cabin crew first to describe the fiery situation and then for the captain to think and to make an evac decision; besides, pax would already be unglued from their seats. Cabin crews are trained to make the distinction between localized flames from an engine fire and smoke/flames from a catastrophic airframe/undercarriage fire.
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Correction
I will have to back away from this statement as I have upon further research learned that this is NOT a Recall Item inspite of being listed on the front cover where other Recall items have been annotated. Seems logical that it would be, but that is not the case. Sorry for the confusion on my part!
