New Deal for New SQ Pilots
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Easy go Lucky. Well said I too would be out of here before you could count to 3 if they release my Bond money ,pay out the CF for what that is worth!!
Established I see no open door. Those of us who joined in the last 2/3 years have been well and truly shafted. A 6% service increment is paid until I reach the top scale and is not negotiable as far as I was concerned, as in all other Airlines I have ever worked in.
If the company makes less money then that is reflected in the bonus and it should not affect anything else. I also naively assumed that as SIA took $46000 as 5 year bank guarantee for an even larger total guarantee that they in turn would pay me the market rates in return. Am I being unreasonable???
Instead SIA take the view that now they have my money they can shaft me at every opportunity which they do extremely well . So where is this OPEN DOOR???
Established I see no open door. Those of us who joined in the last 2/3 years have been well and truly shafted. A 6% service increment is paid until I reach the top scale and is not negotiable as far as I was concerned, as in all other Airlines I have ever worked in.
If the company makes less money then that is reflected in the bonus and it should not affect anything else. I also naively assumed that as SIA took $46000 as 5 year bank guarantee for an even larger total guarantee that they in turn would pay me the market rates in return. Am I being unreasonable???
Instead SIA take the view that now they have my money they can shaft me at every opportunity which they do extremely well . So where is this OPEN DOOR???
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Singapore Airlines Ltd vXXXXXXXXX
HIGH COURT
HEADNOTES:
This was an appeal by the defendant company ('the company') against the district judge's decision that they were not entitled to claim liquidated damages from the plaintiff upon the termination of the plaintiff's employment with the company. The plaintiff was a pilot with the company. When he was first engaged, the plaintiff was required to undergo a course of training, prior to which he had to sign a training agreement with the company. The plaintiff's employment was governed by the terms of a collective agreement between the Airline Pilots Association Singapore ('the collective agreement'), his letter of appointment and its annexes, and the parts of the training agreement that continued to apply.
Clause 31(1) of the collective agreement provided that either party may terminate the employment on giving three months' notice or on payment of a sum equivalent to three months' salary in lieu. Clause 31(2) further provided that a pilot may be dismissed for misconduct on any of the listed grounds set out there. As for the training agreement, it required the plaintiff to complete the training course and, on completion of the course, to serve the company for a period of five years. Clause 3(g) of the training agreement, which continued to apply, provided that if the plaintiff 'is dismissed or has his services terminated for any reason whatsoever . . . during the period of five (5) years', the plaintiff would be liable to pay the company on demand as liquidated damages the amounts set out in Sch A to the training agreement. Pursuant to cl 10 of the training agreement, the plaintiff provided a bankers' guarantee in the sum of $ 60,000 to secure the performance of his obligations under the agreement. It was provided that the company was at liberty to call on the bankers' guarantee in or towards satisfaction of any liquidated damages payable under the agreement.
On or about 25 July 1997, the plaintiff made a nuisance of himself while travelling as a passenger on an SIA flight. On 4 August 1997, the defendants asked the plaintiff for a written explanation, which the plaintiff provided. On 11 August 1997, the company, with reference to cl 31(1) of the collective agreement, informed the plaintiff that his employment was being terminated with immediate effect by payment of three months' salary in lieu of notice. The company also claimed liquidated damages in the sum of $ 100,000, called in the bankers' guarantee for the entire sum of $ 60,000 and charged the plaintiff the balance sum of $ 40,000. Subsequently, the plaintiff took out an originating summons seeking a declaration that, on a proper construction of the training agreement and other documents referred to above, the company was not entitled to claim liquidated damages against him or to call on the bankers' guarantee.
The district judge was of the view that there were issues of fact to be tried and ordered that the action be continued as a writ action and that pleadings be filed. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court against this finding. The appeal was allowed by the judicial commissioner, who ordered that the case should proceed on the affidavits that had been filed and not by way of a writ action. In reaching his decision, the judicial commissioner further expressed the view that cl 3(g) of the training agreement was 'not a 'fault' clause and termination may be for any reason whatsoever, ie fault or no fault, and for this reason the reasons for the termination of the plaintiff's employment [were] irrelevant'. The matter went back before the same district judge, who considered himself bound by the terms of the order of the judicial commissioner. However, the district judge construed cl 3(g) as a penalty clause because it purported to require the payment of damages in circumstances where there was no breach of contract by the plaintiff. The district judge thus found in favour of the plaintiff. The company appealed against this decision. The main substantive issue that arose on appeal was whether cl 3(g) was applicable where an employee's services were terminated under cl 31(1) of the collective agreement.
Held, dismissing the appeal:
(1) The judicial commissioner did not give the reasons for the view he took on cl 3(g) of the training agreement. As the matter before the judicial commissioner was only an appeal over procedure, it was unclear whether he intended to express a concluded view and whether the finding on the construction of cl 3(g) was a necessary part of the judicial commissioner's decision. The court therefore proceeded on the assumption that it was not constrained by anything the judicial commissioner had expressed about the said clause (see para 16 and 19)
(2) Clause 3(g) must be interpreted in such a manner so as not to give rise to an absurd result. It would be utterly absurd if the company could terminate without cause and then claim to be entitled to liquidated damages from the trainee. It could be assumed that no such absurd result was intended (see para 19).
(3) The court should try to uphold an agreement rather than to undo it. If a sensible meaning could be given to a provision so as to uphold it, the court should try to do so (see para 20).
(4) The court was of the view that the words 'terminated for any reason whatsoever' in cl 3(g) was so uncertain and ambiguous as to be incapable of being given any contractual effect. As the clause worked to the financial detriment of a contracting party, the circumstances in which it was to operate must be stated with sufficient precision. It was not good enough to leave them to conjecture. The company therefore could not rely on this part of the clause to claim damages from the other contracting party, especially where it had terminated the contract without cause (see para 21).
(5) As the company chose to terminate the plaintiff's employment under cl 31(1) of the collective agreement, the termination was thus outside the ambit of cl 3(g) of the training agreement. The company was not entitled to claim damages, liquidated or otherwise, from the plaintiff. There was no necessity to inquire what was the real, underlying reason for the termination (see para 22).
JUDGMENT:
This is an appeal by the defendants, the Singapore Airlines Ltd, against a decision of the learned district judge Mr Phang Hsiao Chung, that the company was not entitled to claim liquidated damages from the plaintiff upon a termination of the plaintiff's employment with the company.
The plaintiff, a US national, was an aeroplane pilot with the company. When he was first engaged in August 1995, however, he was not qualified to fly a Boeing 747 plane. He had to undergo a course of training. Upon the completion of his training in July 1996, he was confirmed as a B-747 captain. The plaintiff's employment was governed by the terms of a collective agreement between the Airline Pilots Association Singapore and the company and his letter of appointment and its annexes. But before he was admitted to training, he had been required to sign, and he signed, an agreement (the 'training agreement') with the company. Parts of the training agreement continued to apply to him after he completed the training. One of the provisions related to the payment of liquidated damages in the event he was dismissed or had his services terminated within a period of five years after completion of his training.
The collective agreement provide in cl 31(1) that either party may terminate the employment on giving three months' notice or on payment of a sum equivalent to three months' salary in lieu. It provides in cl 31(2) that a pilot may be dismissed for misconduct on any of a list of grounds set out there. The clause reads as follows:
31 Period of employment, suspension and dismissal --
(1)(a) A pilot's employment may, except in any case referred to in paragraph (b) of this sub-clause be terminated by either the Company or the pilot giving to the other three months' written notice or by the payment of three months' salary in lieu of such notice . . .
1(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this sub-clause shall not apply in any case of --
(i) termination of employment during initial probation; or
(ii) dismissal under the provisions of sub-clause (2) of this clause.
(2) A pilot may, at the absolute discretion of the Company, be liable to suspension from flying or ground duties with or without salary, or be dismissed by the Company in accordance with the provisions of clauses 72 and 73 in Part VII of this Agreement if he --
(a) wilfully neglects the interests of the Company or damages a Company aircraft through negligence;
(b) consumes spirituous or intoxicating liquors or takes or uses drugs to an extent considered excessive by the Company on medical advice;
(c) consumes any drinks containing alcohol within a period of ten hours prior to commencing flying duties;
(d) consumes any drinks containing alcohol at any time in a public place or consumes any drink in a bar whilst wearing Company uniform including insignia or rank markings;
(e) is guilty of --
(i) disobedience;
(ii) non-compliance with the Company's regulations; or
(iii) any conduct on or off duty which is prejudicial to the interests or good name of the Company;
(f) becomes through his own fault (which shall include refusal or failure to undergo inoculation, vaccination, or other preventive treatment advised by a registered medical practitioner nominated by the Company) --
(i) sick or disabled; or
(ii) otherwise unable to perform his duties properly or to do so without being a nuisance or menace to his colleagues or others; or
(g) as a result of neglect or omission on his part ceases for any period to hold any one of the licences or travel documents necessary to enable him to perform his duties in the rank and grade in which he is employed.
The relevant distinction to be noted for the purpose of these proceedings is that while sub-cl (1) of cl 31 provides for termination on mere notice without assigning any reason, sub-cl (2) provides for suspension or dismissal on the grounds set out in that sub-clause.
Clauses 72 and 73 of the collective agreement provide for detailed procedures for inquiry in the event that it is proposed to dismiss a pilot on any of the grounds in cl 31(2). They are quite elaborate. It is not necessary to set them out.
The training agreement, in brief, required the plaintiff to complete the training course and on completion of the course to serve the company for a period of five years. The provision of the training agreement for the payment of liquidated damages was contained in cl 3, which reads as follows:
It is further agreed and declared that if the trainee in the sole opinion of SIA:
(a) fails to obey directions given by SIA to the trainee or affecting the trainee;
(b) fails to show sufficient application to the said course of training;
(c) by his own misconduct renders himself in the opinion of SIA unsuitable to continue such course of training;
(d) shows himself unlikely to develop or attain the physical and [sol] or mental standard sufficient to enable him to complete the said course of training successfully;
(e) by his own conduct renders himself unsuitable to serve or continue to serve SIA or its SUBSIDIARY (as the case may be) in accordance with the provisions of clause 4 of this Agreement;
(f) resigns or leaves the service of SIA or its subsidiary (as the case may be) either during the course of training or during the period of five (5) years referred to in clause 4 of this Agreement; or
(g) is dismissed or has his services terminated for any reason whatsoever either during the course of training or during the period of five (5) years referred to in clause 4 of this Agreement; then and in every such case the trainee shall be liable for himself, his heirs, executors or assigns to pay SIA on demand as liquidated damages the amounts set out in Schedule A to this Agreement.
Clause 3(g) above will feature prominently in these proceedings. Note the words 'has his services terminated for any reason whatsoever.' The main substantive issue in this case is, simply, whether this clause is applicable in circumstances in which an employee's services are terminated under sub-cl (1) of cl 31 of the collective agreement, set out above.
There was set out in Sch A of the training agreement a sliding scale of the amount of liquidated damages payable under cl 3, pegged to the time when the plaintiff should cease the training or employment with the company after completion of training.
In accordance with cl 10 of the training agreement, the plaintiff provided a bankers' guarantee in the sum of $ 60,000 to secure the performance of his obligations under the agreement. It was provided that the company was at liberty to call on the bankers' guarantee in or towards satisfaction of any liquidated damages payable under the agreement.
On or about 25 July 1997, the plaintiff was travelling as a passenger on an SIA flight from Los Angeles to Singapore. It appears that he had one drink too many. It was reported that he made a nuisance of himself, making disparaging remarks about SIA, the Singapore media and the Singapore government, generally causing embarrassment to his fellow passengers, and so on. He was off-loaded at the next scheduled stop, Tokyo, and had to continue his journey on another flight the next day.
On 4 August 1997, the company asked the plaintiff in writing for an explanation, which the plaintiff provided. Then, on 11 August, the company wrote to the plaintiff referring to cl 31(1) of the collective agreement and telling him that his employment was being terminated with immediate effect by payment of three months' salary in lieu of notice. The company also claimed liquidated damages in the sum of $ 100,000 and called in the bankers' guarantee for the entire sum of $ 60,000. It charged the plaintiff the balance sum of $ 40,000. The letter in part read as follows: This is to inform you that in accordance with cl 31(1) of the Pilots' Collective Agreement, 1995, your employment is hereby terminated by payment of three months' salary in lieu of three months' notice. Your last day of service is today. In accordance with the provision of the bonding agreement signed between you and the Company, you are required to pay SIA as liquidated damages the sum of $ 100,000. As your bank guarantee of $ 60,000 will be forfeited, the liquidated damages is reduced to $ 40,000 . . .
There then followed an account of sums due to and from the company with a net amount of $ 16,889.13 shown as due to the company. The sums include the balance of $ 40,000 of the liquidated damages due to the company, and a sum of $ 31,487.94, the equivalent of three months' salary in lieu of notice, shown as due from the company.
The plaintiff consulted solicitors. They wrote to the company, protesting that the company was not entitled to charge the plaintiff with any liquidated damages as the termination was under cl 31 sub-cl (1). The company disagreed and demanded the sum of $ 16,889.13 (shown in the account above) it claimed to be due from the plaintiff.
Course of proceedings
On 30 September 1997, the plaintiff took out this originating summons seeking a declaration that, on a proper construction of the training agreement and other documents referred to above, the company was not entitled to claim liquidated damages against him or to call on the bank guarantee. The originating summons came before the learned district judge. His Honour took the view that there were issues of fact to be tried, and ordered that the action be continued as a writ action, and that pleadings be filed. The reason for the view that there were issues of fact to be tried was set out in his Honour's ground of decision. He said that cl 31 of the collective agreement served a different function from that of cl 3(g) of the training agreement. Clause 31, he said, was concerned only with the mode of termination, and not the consequences. He said that where the company was of the opinion that a pilot was guilty of misconduct, it might nevertheless choose to terminate his services under cl 31(1) of the collective agreement. This would not prejudice the company's right to recover liquidated damages under cl 3(g). However, if the company wished to recover such damages, the underlying reasons for the termination would be relevant. He then referred to the evidence of the underlying reasons, which he said was not complete. He said therefore there was a triable issue of fact, and so he ordered as he did.
From this decision, the plaintiff appealed to the High Court. Although this was essentially a procedural decision, the resolution of it involved taking a view on the ambit of cl 3(g) of the training agreement. The appeal was heard by Mr Tay Yong Kwang JC. His Honour allowed the appeal. He ordered that the case should proceed on the affidavits that had been filed and not by way of a writ action. His Honour took the view that cl 3(g) is not a 'fault' clause and termination may be for any reason whatsoever, ie fault or no fault, and for this reason the reasons for the termination of the plaintiff's employment are irrelevant.
This statement was embodied in the order that was extracted; the second part of it was added by way of a subsequent amendment agreement between the parties.
The matter then went before the learned district judge again. It is against his decision on this second round that the present appeal has been brought. I think I can summarise his Honour's decision simply as follows. His Honour considered that he was bound by the terms of the order of Tay Yong Kwang JC. He understood the order to mean that cl 3(g) would be applicable whether the cessation of employment was for cause or for no cause at all. If that is so, he says, it is tantamount to requiring the plaintiff to pay damages where there is no breach of contract. A clause that purports to require the payment of damages in circumstances where there is no breach, is clearly a penalty clause. But for the fact that he considered himself to be so bound, I am sure he would have taken a different view. He referred to his judgment in the first round. He said: In my [previous] grounds of decision . . . I reasoned that as liquidated damages are payable only upon the breach of a contract, the circumstances enumerated in cl 3 must refer to circumstances in which the plaintiff is deemed to have breached the terms of the Training Agreement. Each of cll 3(a) to 3(f) of the Training Agreement refers to a situation in which a pilot breaches the terms of the Training Agreement by his conduct. I therefore reasoned that the words 'has his services terminated for any reason whatsoever' in cl 3(g) of the Training Agreement must also refer to a situation where a pilot breached the terms of the Training Agreement by having his services terminated due to some default on his part. If the words 'has his services terminated for any reason whatsoever' are to be read literally, those words will give the defendant a licence to terminate the plaintiff's services and demand liquidated damages without any default on the part of the plaintiff. I sought to avoid this inequitable implication by restricting the ambit of those words to situations where the plaintiff breached the terms of the Training Agreement by having his services terminated due to some default on his part . . .
Proceedings before me
When the matter first came before me, I raised the question with counsel whether the real issue of construction of the clause could be properly considered if the terms of the order made by the learned judicial commissioner were taken as a definitive decision on the effect of the clause and its applicability to the case at hand. There was nothing on record to show the reasons for the learned judicial commissioner apparently taking the view he did on cl 3(g). As the matter before him was only an appeal over procedure, I was not sure whether he really intended to express a concluded view. The construction of cl 3(g) was at the heart of the substantive dispute between the parties. To say that a termination for no cause at all was within the ambit of cl 3(g) would be to go a long way towards deciding the substantive dispute. I was not sure whether the order was a necessary part of the learned judicial commissioner's decision on the purely procedural appeal before him. I therefore invited counsel to make alternative submissions, de novo as it were, on the basis that they were not constrained by any interpretation placed on the clause by the learned judicial commissioner.
Counsel for the company argues that since, as held by the learned judicial commissioner, cl 3(g) could be invoked whether the plaintiff was terminated for fault or no fault, that should conclude the matter; it would not matter whether the plaintiff was terminated under cl 31(1) or (2) of the collective agreement. Counsel submits that the learned district judge was wrong in holding that cl 3(g) was a penalty clause. He points out, among other things, that a contract must be construed against the background of the circumstances in which it was made. Here the company was to incur a substantial cost to put the plaintiff through training. It was reasonable to require the plaintiff to serve the company for a specified period after completion of the training. Counsel points to the provision for amortising the liquidated damages over five years, the damages being proportionately reduced by the length of the plaintiff's services with the company. The burden of showing that cl 3(g) is a penalty clause is on the plaintiff, and he says that it has not been shown.
Counsel for the plaintiff submits that the learned district judge was right in thinking that he was bound by the learned judicial commissioner's order. On that basis, however, he submits that the learned district judge's decision that the clause is a penalty clause is also right. Alternatively, if the terms of the order are not binding, then, he submits, firstly, that a limited meaning must be given to the clause. To give the clause a literal meaning would lead to an unintended result, so that, for instance, a pilot can be asked to pay liquidated damages even if he is retrenched on account of redundancy. It would also mean that the company could wrongfully terminate the employment of the plaintiff and yet claim damages from him. This would be to allow a party to profit from his own wrong. Referring to the ejusdem generis rule of construction, counsel submits that cl 3(g) should be restricted to the situations similar to those set out in the previous sub-clauses. Alternatively, it should be restricted to the dismissal situations provided for in cl 31(2) of the collective agreement.
My views
For the reasons I alluded to earlier, I would proceed on the assumption that I am not constrained by anything the learned judicial commissioner said about the clause. On that basis, I see the position as follows. I think, in the first place, the clause must be construed in such a way as not to give rise to an absurd result. It would be utterly absurd if the company could terminate without cause and then claim to be entitled to liquidated damages from the trainee. The redundancy example cited by plaintiff's counsel is a good one. Interpreting the clause in the broad way suggested is plainly against common sense and reason. It can be assumed that no such absurd result was intended.
The court should try to uphold an agreement rather than to undo it. If a sensible meaning could be given to a provision so as to uphold it, the court should try to do so. The learned editors of Chitty on Contracts (27th Ed) para 12-069 put the position correctly thus: If the words used in an agreement are susceptible of two meanings, one of which would validate the instrument or the particular clause in the instrument, and the other render it void, ineffective or meaningless, the former sense is to be adopted. This rule is often expressed in the phrase ut res magis valeat cum pereat. Thus, if by a particular construction the agreement would be rendered ineffectual and the apparent object of the contract would be frustrated, but another construction, though per se less appropriate looking to the words only, would produce a different effect, the latter interpretation is to be applied, if it can possibly be supported by anything in the contract.
It is suggested that in the general context of the clause as a whole, the words 'terminated for any reason whatsoever' can be given a sensible meaning if one thinks of it as referring to termination for a reason akin to dismissal or for something that connotes a degree of fault or wrongful commission or omission on the part of the trainee, rather than termination for the convenience or at the will of the company. I must say it is an attractive suggestion in that it would help to save the clause. However, although I was attracted to the idea right up to the last minute in the writing of this judgment, I think I must resist it. The suggestion itself shows how uncertain and ambiguous the phrase is. To accept the suggestion is to give validity to a contractual provision which should in all conscience be struck down as void for uncertainty. On a further reflection of the matter, I am indeed driven to the view that this part of cl 3(g) is so uncertain as to be incapable of being given any contractual effect. As the clause works to the financial detriment of a contracting party, the circumstances in which it is to operate must be stated with sufficient precision. It is not good enough to leave them to conjecture. I would for this reason hold that the company cannot rely on this part of the clause to claim damages from the other contracting party, certainly not where it has terminated the contract without cause.
This leads me to the point made by the district judge in the first round that, although the termination of the plaintiff was not expressly for any cause, the court could inquire whether it was in reality for cause. The truth of the matter is that the company acted under cl 31(1) of the collective agreement. It had a choice of proceeding under sub-cl (2) or sub-cl (1). It chose sub-cl (1). The letter of termination clearly said that the company was proceeding under that sub-clause. Sub-clause (1), as I said, gives either party the right to terminate the employment at will. Since this is the clause under which the company professed to act, the termination was clearly outside the ambit of cl 3(g). The company is clearly not entitled to claim damages, liquidated or otherwise, from the plaintiff. On the other hand, as provided in the contract, the company has to pay the pilot three months' salary. That should be the end of the matter. There is no necessity, in my view, to inquire what was the real, underlying, reason for the termination. It cannot be assumed that the package of agreements that governed the plaintiff's employment was intended to be applied in such a tortuous fashion. A simple and straightforward interpretation is more likely to be a correct one.
For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal. I do so, with costs.
[This message has been edited by Sick Squid (edited 13 May 2001).]
HIGH COURT
HEADNOTES:
This was an appeal by the defendant company ('the company') against the district judge's decision that they were not entitled to claim liquidated damages from the plaintiff upon the termination of the plaintiff's employment with the company. The plaintiff was a pilot with the company. When he was first engaged, the plaintiff was required to undergo a course of training, prior to which he had to sign a training agreement with the company. The plaintiff's employment was governed by the terms of a collective agreement between the Airline Pilots Association Singapore ('the collective agreement'), his letter of appointment and its annexes, and the parts of the training agreement that continued to apply.
Clause 31(1) of the collective agreement provided that either party may terminate the employment on giving three months' notice or on payment of a sum equivalent to three months' salary in lieu. Clause 31(2) further provided that a pilot may be dismissed for misconduct on any of the listed grounds set out there. As for the training agreement, it required the plaintiff to complete the training course and, on completion of the course, to serve the company for a period of five years. Clause 3(g) of the training agreement, which continued to apply, provided that if the plaintiff 'is dismissed or has his services terminated for any reason whatsoever . . . during the period of five (5) years', the plaintiff would be liable to pay the company on demand as liquidated damages the amounts set out in Sch A to the training agreement. Pursuant to cl 10 of the training agreement, the plaintiff provided a bankers' guarantee in the sum of $ 60,000 to secure the performance of his obligations under the agreement. It was provided that the company was at liberty to call on the bankers' guarantee in or towards satisfaction of any liquidated damages payable under the agreement.
On or about 25 July 1997, the plaintiff made a nuisance of himself while travelling as a passenger on an SIA flight. On 4 August 1997, the defendants asked the plaintiff for a written explanation, which the plaintiff provided. On 11 August 1997, the company, with reference to cl 31(1) of the collective agreement, informed the plaintiff that his employment was being terminated with immediate effect by payment of three months' salary in lieu of notice. The company also claimed liquidated damages in the sum of $ 100,000, called in the bankers' guarantee for the entire sum of $ 60,000 and charged the plaintiff the balance sum of $ 40,000. Subsequently, the plaintiff took out an originating summons seeking a declaration that, on a proper construction of the training agreement and other documents referred to above, the company was not entitled to claim liquidated damages against him or to call on the bankers' guarantee.
The district judge was of the view that there were issues of fact to be tried and ordered that the action be continued as a writ action and that pleadings be filed. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court against this finding. The appeal was allowed by the judicial commissioner, who ordered that the case should proceed on the affidavits that had been filed and not by way of a writ action. In reaching his decision, the judicial commissioner further expressed the view that cl 3(g) of the training agreement was 'not a 'fault' clause and termination may be for any reason whatsoever, ie fault or no fault, and for this reason the reasons for the termination of the plaintiff's employment [were] irrelevant'. The matter went back before the same district judge, who considered himself bound by the terms of the order of the judicial commissioner. However, the district judge construed cl 3(g) as a penalty clause because it purported to require the payment of damages in circumstances where there was no breach of contract by the plaintiff. The district judge thus found in favour of the plaintiff. The company appealed against this decision. The main substantive issue that arose on appeal was whether cl 3(g) was applicable where an employee's services were terminated under cl 31(1) of the collective agreement.
Held, dismissing the appeal:
(1) The judicial commissioner did not give the reasons for the view he took on cl 3(g) of the training agreement. As the matter before the judicial commissioner was only an appeal over procedure, it was unclear whether he intended to express a concluded view and whether the finding on the construction of cl 3(g) was a necessary part of the judicial commissioner's decision. The court therefore proceeded on the assumption that it was not constrained by anything the judicial commissioner had expressed about the said clause (see para 16 and 19)
(2) Clause 3(g) must be interpreted in such a manner so as not to give rise to an absurd result. It would be utterly absurd if the company could terminate without cause and then claim to be entitled to liquidated damages from the trainee. It could be assumed that no such absurd result was intended (see para 19).
(3) The court should try to uphold an agreement rather than to undo it. If a sensible meaning could be given to a provision so as to uphold it, the court should try to do so (see para 20).
(4) The court was of the view that the words 'terminated for any reason whatsoever' in cl 3(g) was so uncertain and ambiguous as to be incapable of being given any contractual effect. As the clause worked to the financial detriment of a contracting party, the circumstances in which it was to operate must be stated with sufficient precision. It was not good enough to leave them to conjecture. The company therefore could not rely on this part of the clause to claim damages from the other contracting party, especially where it had terminated the contract without cause (see para 21).
(5) As the company chose to terminate the plaintiff's employment under cl 31(1) of the collective agreement, the termination was thus outside the ambit of cl 3(g) of the training agreement. The company was not entitled to claim damages, liquidated or otherwise, from the plaintiff. There was no necessity to inquire what was the real, underlying reason for the termination (see para 22).
JUDGMENT:
This is an appeal by the defendants, the Singapore Airlines Ltd, against a decision of the learned district judge Mr Phang Hsiao Chung, that the company was not entitled to claim liquidated damages from the plaintiff upon a termination of the plaintiff's employment with the company.
The plaintiff, a US national, was an aeroplane pilot with the company. When he was first engaged in August 1995, however, he was not qualified to fly a Boeing 747 plane. He had to undergo a course of training. Upon the completion of his training in July 1996, he was confirmed as a B-747 captain. The plaintiff's employment was governed by the terms of a collective agreement between the Airline Pilots Association Singapore and the company and his letter of appointment and its annexes. But before he was admitted to training, he had been required to sign, and he signed, an agreement (the 'training agreement') with the company. Parts of the training agreement continued to apply to him after he completed the training. One of the provisions related to the payment of liquidated damages in the event he was dismissed or had his services terminated within a period of five years after completion of his training.
The collective agreement provide in cl 31(1) that either party may terminate the employment on giving three months' notice or on payment of a sum equivalent to three months' salary in lieu. It provides in cl 31(2) that a pilot may be dismissed for misconduct on any of a list of grounds set out there. The clause reads as follows:
31 Period of employment, suspension and dismissal --
(1)(a) A pilot's employment may, except in any case referred to in paragraph (b) of this sub-clause be terminated by either the Company or the pilot giving to the other three months' written notice or by the payment of three months' salary in lieu of such notice . . .
1(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this sub-clause shall not apply in any case of --
(i) termination of employment during initial probation; or
(ii) dismissal under the provisions of sub-clause (2) of this clause.
(2) A pilot may, at the absolute discretion of the Company, be liable to suspension from flying or ground duties with or without salary, or be dismissed by the Company in accordance with the provisions of clauses 72 and 73 in Part VII of this Agreement if he --
(a) wilfully neglects the interests of the Company or damages a Company aircraft through negligence;
(b) consumes spirituous or intoxicating liquors or takes or uses drugs to an extent considered excessive by the Company on medical advice;
(c) consumes any drinks containing alcohol within a period of ten hours prior to commencing flying duties;
(d) consumes any drinks containing alcohol at any time in a public place or consumes any drink in a bar whilst wearing Company uniform including insignia or rank markings;
(e) is guilty of --
(i) disobedience;
(ii) non-compliance with the Company's regulations; or
(iii) any conduct on or off duty which is prejudicial to the interests or good name of the Company;
(f) becomes through his own fault (which shall include refusal or failure to undergo inoculation, vaccination, or other preventive treatment advised by a registered medical practitioner nominated by the Company) --
(i) sick or disabled; or
(ii) otherwise unable to perform his duties properly or to do so without being a nuisance or menace to his colleagues or others; or
(g) as a result of neglect or omission on his part ceases for any period to hold any one of the licences or travel documents necessary to enable him to perform his duties in the rank and grade in which he is employed.
The relevant distinction to be noted for the purpose of these proceedings is that while sub-cl (1) of cl 31 provides for termination on mere notice without assigning any reason, sub-cl (2) provides for suspension or dismissal on the grounds set out in that sub-clause.
Clauses 72 and 73 of the collective agreement provide for detailed procedures for inquiry in the event that it is proposed to dismiss a pilot on any of the grounds in cl 31(2). They are quite elaborate. It is not necessary to set them out.
The training agreement, in brief, required the plaintiff to complete the training course and on completion of the course to serve the company for a period of five years. The provision of the training agreement for the payment of liquidated damages was contained in cl 3, which reads as follows:
It is further agreed and declared that if the trainee in the sole opinion of SIA:
(a) fails to obey directions given by SIA to the trainee or affecting the trainee;
(b) fails to show sufficient application to the said course of training;
(c) by his own misconduct renders himself in the opinion of SIA unsuitable to continue such course of training;
(d) shows himself unlikely to develop or attain the physical and [sol] or mental standard sufficient to enable him to complete the said course of training successfully;
(e) by his own conduct renders himself unsuitable to serve or continue to serve SIA or its SUBSIDIARY (as the case may be) in accordance with the provisions of clause 4 of this Agreement;
(f) resigns or leaves the service of SIA or its subsidiary (as the case may be) either during the course of training or during the period of five (5) years referred to in clause 4 of this Agreement; or
(g) is dismissed or has his services terminated for any reason whatsoever either during the course of training or during the period of five (5) years referred to in clause 4 of this Agreement; then and in every such case the trainee shall be liable for himself, his heirs, executors or assigns to pay SIA on demand as liquidated damages the amounts set out in Schedule A to this Agreement.
Clause 3(g) above will feature prominently in these proceedings. Note the words 'has his services terminated for any reason whatsoever.' The main substantive issue in this case is, simply, whether this clause is applicable in circumstances in which an employee's services are terminated under sub-cl (1) of cl 31 of the collective agreement, set out above.
There was set out in Sch A of the training agreement a sliding scale of the amount of liquidated damages payable under cl 3, pegged to the time when the plaintiff should cease the training or employment with the company after completion of training.
In accordance with cl 10 of the training agreement, the plaintiff provided a bankers' guarantee in the sum of $ 60,000 to secure the performance of his obligations under the agreement. It was provided that the company was at liberty to call on the bankers' guarantee in or towards satisfaction of any liquidated damages payable under the agreement.
On or about 25 July 1997, the plaintiff was travelling as a passenger on an SIA flight from Los Angeles to Singapore. It appears that he had one drink too many. It was reported that he made a nuisance of himself, making disparaging remarks about SIA, the Singapore media and the Singapore government, generally causing embarrassment to his fellow passengers, and so on. He was off-loaded at the next scheduled stop, Tokyo, and had to continue his journey on another flight the next day.
On 4 August 1997, the company asked the plaintiff in writing for an explanation, which the plaintiff provided. Then, on 11 August, the company wrote to the plaintiff referring to cl 31(1) of the collective agreement and telling him that his employment was being terminated with immediate effect by payment of three months' salary in lieu of notice. The company also claimed liquidated damages in the sum of $ 100,000 and called in the bankers' guarantee for the entire sum of $ 60,000. It charged the plaintiff the balance sum of $ 40,000. The letter in part read as follows: This is to inform you that in accordance with cl 31(1) of the Pilots' Collective Agreement, 1995, your employment is hereby terminated by payment of three months' salary in lieu of three months' notice. Your last day of service is today. In accordance with the provision of the bonding agreement signed between you and the Company, you are required to pay SIA as liquidated damages the sum of $ 100,000. As your bank guarantee of $ 60,000 will be forfeited, the liquidated damages is reduced to $ 40,000 . . .
There then followed an account of sums due to and from the company with a net amount of $ 16,889.13 shown as due to the company. The sums include the balance of $ 40,000 of the liquidated damages due to the company, and a sum of $ 31,487.94, the equivalent of three months' salary in lieu of notice, shown as due from the company.
The plaintiff consulted solicitors. They wrote to the company, protesting that the company was not entitled to charge the plaintiff with any liquidated damages as the termination was under cl 31 sub-cl (1). The company disagreed and demanded the sum of $ 16,889.13 (shown in the account above) it claimed to be due from the plaintiff.
Course of proceedings
On 30 September 1997, the plaintiff took out this originating summons seeking a declaration that, on a proper construction of the training agreement and other documents referred to above, the company was not entitled to claim liquidated damages against him or to call on the bank guarantee. The originating summons came before the learned district judge. His Honour took the view that there were issues of fact to be tried, and ordered that the action be continued as a writ action, and that pleadings be filed. The reason for the view that there were issues of fact to be tried was set out in his Honour's ground of decision. He said that cl 31 of the collective agreement served a different function from that of cl 3(g) of the training agreement. Clause 31, he said, was concerned only with the mode of termination, and not the consequences. He said that where the company was of the opinion that a pilot was guilty of misconduct, it might nevertheless choose to terminate his services under cl 31(1) of the collective agreement. This would not prejudice the company's right to recover liquidated damages under cl 3(g). However, if the company wished to recover such damages, the underlying reasons for the termination would be relevant. He then referred to the evidence of the underlying reasons, which he said was not complete. He said therefore there was a triable issue of fact, and so he ordered as he did.
From this decision, the plaintiff appealed to the High Court. Although this was essentially a procedural decision, the resolution of it involved taking a view on the ambit of cl 3(g) of the training agreement. The appeal was heard by Mr Tay Yong Kwang JC. His Honour allowed the appeal. He ordered that the case should proceed on the affidavits that had been filed and not by way of a writ action. His Honour took the view that cl 3(g) is not a 'fault' clause and termination may be for any reason whatsoever, ie fault or no fault, and for this reason the reasons for the termination of the plaintiff's employment are irrelevant.
This statement was embodied in the order that was extracted; the second part of it was added by way of a subsequent amendment agreement between the parties.
The matter then went before the learned district judge again. It is against his decision on this second round that the present appeal has been brought. I think I can summarise his Honour's decision simply as follows. His Honour considered that he was bound by the terms of the order of Tay Yong Kwang JC. He understood the order to mean that cl 3(g) would be applicable whether the cessation of employment was for cause or for no cause at all. If that is so, he says, it is tantamount to requiring the plaintiff to pay damages where there is no breach of contract. A clause that purports to require the payment of damages in circumstances where there is no breach, is clearly a penalty clause. But for the fact that he considered himself to be so bound, I am sure he would have taken a different view. He referred to his judgment in the first round. He said: In my [previous] grounds of decision . . . I reasoned that as liquidated damages are payable only upon the breach of a contract, the circumstances enumerated in cl 3 must refer to circumstances in which the plaintiff is deemed to have breached the terms of the Training Agreement. Each of cll 3(a) to 3(f) of the Training Agreement refers to a situation in which a pilot breaches the terms of the Training Agreement by his conduct. I therefore reasoned that the words 'has his services terminated for any reason whatsoever' in cl 3(g) of the Training Agreement must also refer to a situation where a pilot breached the terms of the Training Agreement by having his services terminated due to some default on his part. If the words 'has his services terminated for any reason whatsoever' are to be read literally, those words will give the defendant a licence to terminate the plaintiff's services and demand liquidated damages without any default on the part of the plaintiff. I sought to avoid this inequitable implication by restricting the ambit of those words to situations where the plaintiff breached the terms of the Training Agreement by having his services terminated due to some default on his part . . .
Proceedings before me
When the matter first came before me, I raised the question with counsel whether the real issue of construction of the clause could be properly considered if the terms of the order made by the learned judicial commissioner were taken as a definitive decision on the effect of the clause and its applicability to the case at hand. There was nothing on record to show the reasons for the learned judicial commissioner apparently taking the view he did on cl 3(g). As the matter before him was only an appeal over procedure, I was not sure whether he really intended to express a concluded view. The construction of cl 3(g) was at the heart of the substantive dispute between the parties. To say that a termination for no cause at all was within the ambit of cl 3(g) would be to go a long way towards deciding the substantive dispute. I was not sure whether the order was a necessary part of the learned judicial commissioner's decision on the purely procedural appeal before him. I therefore invited counsel to make alternative submissions, de novo as it were, on the basis that they were not constrained by any interpretation placed on the clause by the learned judicial commissioner.
Counsel for the company argues that since, as held by the learned judicial commissioner, cl 3(g) could be invoked whether the plaintiff was terminated for fault or no fault, that should conclude the matter; it would not matter whether the plaintiff was terminated under cl 31(1) or (2) of the collective agreement. Counsel submits that the learned district judge was wrong in holding that cl 3(g) was a penalty clause. He points out, among other things, that a contract must be construed against the background of the circumstances in which it was made. Here the company was to incur a substantial cost to put the plaintiff through training. It was reasonable to require the plaintiff to serve the company for a specified period after completion of the training. Counsel points to the provision for amortising the liquidated damages over five years, the damages being proportionately reduced by the length of the plaintiff's services with the company. The burden of showing that cl 3(g) is a penalty clause is on the plaintiff, and he says that it has not been shown.
Counsel for the plaintiff submits that the learned district judge was right in thinking that he was bound by the learned judicial commissioner's order. On that basis, however, he submits that the learned district judge's decision that the clause is a penalty clause is also right. Alternatively, if the terms of the order are not binding, then, he submits, firstly, that a limited meaning must be given to the clause. To give the clause a literal meaning would lead to an unintended result, so that, for instance, a pilot can be asked to pay liquidated damages even if he is retrenched on account of redundancy. It would also mean that the company could wrongfully terminate the employment of the plaintiff and yet claim damages from him. This would be to allow a party to profit from his own wrong. Referring to the ejusdem generis rule of construction, counsel submits that cl 3(g) should be restricted to the situations similar to those set out in the previous sub-clauses. Alternatively, it should be restricted to the dismissal situations provided for in cl 31(2) of the collective agreement.
My views
For the reasons I alluded to earlier, I would proceed on the assumption that I am not constrained by anything the learned judicial commissioner said about the clause. On that basis, I see the position as follows. I think, in the first place, the clause must be construed in such a way as not to give rise to an absurd result. It would be utterly absurd if the company could terminate without cause and then claim to be entitled to liquidated damages from the trainee. The redundancy example cited by plaintiff's counsel is a good one. Interpreting the clause in the broad way suggested is plainly against common sense and reason. It can be assumed that no such absurd result was intended.
The court should try to uphold an agreement rather than to undo it. If a sensible meaning could be given to a provision so as to uphold it, the court should try to do so. The learned editors of Chitty on Contracts (27th Ed) para 12-069 put the position correctly thus: If the words used in an agreement are susceptible of two meanings, one of which would validate the instrument or the particular clause in the instrument, and the other render it void, ineffective or meaningless, the former sense is to be adopted. This rule is often expressed in the phrase ut res magis valeat cum pereat. Thus, if by a particular construction the agreement would be rendered ineffectual and the apparent object of the contract would be frustrated, but another construction, though per se less appropriate looking to the words only, would produce a different effect, the latter interpretation is to be applied, if it can possibly be supported by anything in the contract.
It is suggested that in the general context of the clause as a whole, the words 'terminated for any reason whatsoever' can be given a sensible meaning if one thinks of it as referring to termination for a reason akin to dismissal or for something that connotes a degree of fault or wrongful commission or omission on the part of the trainee, rather than termination for the convenience or at the will of the company. I must say it is an attractive suggestion in that it would help to save the clause. However, although I was attracted to the idea right up to the last minute in the writing of this judgment, I think I must resist it. The suggestion itself shows how uncertain and ambiguous the phrase is. To accept the suggestion is to give validity to a contractual provision which should in all conscience be struck down as void for uncertainty. On a further reflection of the matter, I am indeed driven to the view that this part of cl 3(g) is so uncertain as to be incapable of being given any contractual effect. As the clause works to the financial detriment of a contracting party, the circumstances in which it is to operate must be stated with sufficient precision. It is not good enough to leave them to conjecture. I would for this reason hold that the company cannot rely on this part of the clause to claim damages from the other contracting party, certainly not where it has terminated the contract without cause.
This leads me to the point made by the district judge in the first round that, although the termination of the plaintiff was not expressly for any cause, the court could inquire whether it was in reality for cause. The truth of the matter is that the company acted under cl 31(1) of the collective agreement. It had a choice of proceeding under sub-cl (2) or sub-cl (1). It chose sub-cl (1). The letter of termination clearly said that the company was proceeding under that sub-clause. Sub-clause (1), as I said, gives either party the right to terminate the employment at will. Since this is the clause under which the company professed to act, the termination was clearly outside the ambit of cl 3(g). The company is clearly not entitled to claim damages, liquidated or otherwise, from the plaintiff. On the other hand, as provided in the contract, the company has to pay the pilot three months' salary. That should be the end of the matter. There is no necessity, in my view, to inquire what was the real, underlying, reason for the termination. It cannot be assumed that the package of agreements that governed the plaintiff's employment was intended to be applied in such a tortuous fashion. A simple and straightforward interpretation is more likely to be a correct one.
For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal. I do so, with costs.
[This message has been edited by Sick Squid (edited 13 May 2001).]
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Hermie. I cannot make you out. You list youself as flight deck qualified yet also a student with relatives in SQ. Let me tell you it was the locals who voted by a show of drunken hands to reject the recent CA ratification which was expected by the Alpa S to go through without any problems but because of intimidation from senior local Captains many local F/O s did not vote as they wished to or even as their proxy required them to. There will now be just as many locals grumbling as expats I can assure you.
.88M Would you not agree???
.88M Would you not agree???
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Would the captain mentioned in the above post be, by any chance, the one that got totally piss*d between LAX and TYO, had to be off-loaded after having run back and forth between J and F class bringing his son up to F when ever he felt like it, sat next to a Singaporean in F class and then 'slagged off' SIA and Singapore to great length etc. etc. and was/is regarded by most Americans here in Singapore as a complete as*hole anyway?
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Yes he is addinfur. However, since you were not there, your description of the events may or may not be accurate.
A**holes remain to be a**holes no matter where they go. If Mr. xxxxxx was the a**hole you describe (and then take the liberty to represent the rest of the Americans at SIA) he would not make it to the rank of instructor at Mandarin. He is very well liked and respected.
Lastly, it appears that Mandarin might me treating their pilots better than Sakka In Air (SIA) carrier. I do not recall seeing very many if any threads about Mandarin on PPRuNe.
Nevertheless, Mr. xxxxxxx gave SIA a big shaft job and in a Lee-public court. Several appeals were turned down.
My opinion is that the Judge actually shafted SIA and Harry at the same time. The xxxxxxx case was his last judgement before retirement (chances are he is retired in Australia).
In one paragraph the Judge called the SIA employment contract, 'tortuous'.
My dictionary describes this word as:
1. Marked by or having repeated turns and bends: twisting 2. Not straightforward: devious.
Is it not just typical? Lee Con You!
If you buy an item in Singapore, purchase a service, sign a contract, anything that involves money, there is well over 90% chance that you WILL BE CHEATED.
[This message has been edited by Gladiator (edited 14 May 2001).]
[This message has been edited by Sick Squid (edited 14 May 2001).]
A**holes remain to be a**holes no matter where they go. If Mr. xxxxxx was the a**hole you describe (and then take the liberty to represent the rest of the Americans at SIA) he would not make it to the rank of instructor at Mandarin. He is very well liked and respected.
Lastly, it appears that Mandarin might me treating their pilots better than Sakka In Air (SIA) carrier. I do not recall seeing very many if any threads about Mandarin on PPRuNe.
Nevertheless, Mr. xxxxxxx gave SIA a big shaft job and in a Lee-public court. Several appeals were turned down.
My opinion is that the Judge actually shafted SIA and Harry at the same time. The xxxxxxx case was his last judgement before retirement (chances are he is retired in Australia).
In one paragraph the Judge called the SIA employment contract, 'tortuous'.
My dictionary describes this word as:
1. Marked by or having repeated turns and bends: twisting 2. Not straightforward: devious.
Is it not just typical? Lee Con You!
If you buy an item in Singapore, purchase a service, sign a contract, anything that involves money, there is well over 90% chance that you WILL BE CHEATED.
[This message has been edited by Gladiator (edited 14 May 2001).]
[This message has been edited by Sick Squid (edited 14 May 2001).]
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To anyone wanting realalistic, varied and rational background on SIA need not l;ook to Gladiator. He is NOT the norm. He will be unhappy on a good day. He was also a nightmare to fly with.... not a good driver. Never made training or management so is rather bitter.
As usual, Gladis strange thought processes again .... have your 18 days off..you clearly need them as the stress is showing. Sounds like you would be happiest in Fidel's Cuba. Gladis you are and always will be on the edge / fringe - the edge of a breakdown and the lunatic fringe.
You also need to re do your Biology exam! Failed first time I suspect.
Bye 4 Now
LL
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Easy ,Tigers!
I removed the name of the individual in twicepx2's legal post as he is still working in the industry, and identifiable. Some of the comments above make a subjective statements against a named individual and events attached to that individual. Whether or not the outcome of those alleged events is public domain or not, the nature of this bulletin board and indeed this entire internet anonymous discussion medium is such that I feel I have to act to preserve some form of balance.
Therefore, I have simply removed his name, and he is now Captain XXXXXXX. Refer to him as such from now on, please. Gladiator, you should know better... is it not you who refers to his own court case as SIA vs. Gladiator?
Enough. Back to the topic.
Sick Squid
Far East Forum Moderator
I removed the name of the individual in twicepx2's legal post as he is still working in the industry, and identifiable. Some of the comments above make a subjective statements against a named individual and events attached to that individual. Whether or not the outcome of those alleged events is public domain or not, the nature of this bulletin board and indeed this entire internet anonymous discussion medium is such that I feel I have to act to preserve some form of balance.
Therefore, I have simply removed his name, and he is now Captain XXXXXXX. Refer to him as such from now on, please. Gladiator, you should know better... is it not you who refers to his own court case as SIA vs. Gladiator?
Enough. Back to the topic.
Sick Squid
Far East Forum Moderator
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I have been away for a while,but noticed that Gladiator is still as unreliable as before. To me and many others here in the Far East he is still known as the piss poor operator in HKG who should be quitely sitting in the corner, reading "Handling the Big Jets" and keeping a low profile trying to learn something about his flying job. But I take it that it is too late to learn for him, so Gladiator why don't you just quit!!
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Re Gladiator. Personal abuse warranted or not is not helpful re SIA. I do not know him at all but he has at least kept SIA and their mode of operations in the forefront of Pprune so everyone knows what SIA are like and I am sure that those on the 4th Floor do not like SQ being at the constant top of the agenda on this forum and others.
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Usually I would stay out of any tread contributed by Gladiator as the "gun powder" involved in bombarding Singapore and all the "creatures" living in it is soooooooo intense.... I just gotta put in my opinion on this one: Nobody forces anyone to do anything in this country; at least that's how I feel as a citizen here.
When anybody wanna join SQ, he will be properly "explained" on the need to sign a bond for obvious reasons. Just in case anyone may ask, people did leave breaking their bonds despite signing such hugh amount of money away. It really irritated a lot of people when they started using lack of FREEDOM as one of the excuses. You have the freedom NOT to sign the contract, NOT to live in this country and definitely NOT to listen to any politicians if you so choose to.
As for Capt X, I had flown with this great chap before and I wil fly with him again anytime. On what happened to him, there's one thing I would like to comment on Singapore society: we have to learn to be more receptive towards criticisms and not over-react towards them. Capt X made lots of remarks regarding whatever bad points about whatever country/company from his view point and he has every right to do so, BUT he was a SQ Capt and he got drunk and created an unwanted scene for both pax and the company, hence the latter has every right to deal with him too. It's such a pity he had to be shown the exit in this manner by SQ.
Lastly, don't get me wrong that I don't look forward to "polishing my ferrari and having 18days off a month...etc..". Would love to...though at the mean time, life's pretty good here if you know how to ignore certain "commands" or "orders" directed towards those who REALLY need the attentions.
I guess I should be all ready to receive some "kind" comments relatively soon and for furhter info; am not related to anyone with last name LEE.
@Will reply asap after my long trip@
When anybody wanna join SQ, he will be properly "explained" on the need to sign a bond for obvious reasons. Just in case anyone may ask, people did leave breaking their bonds despite signing such hugh amount of money away. It really irritated a lot of people when they started using lack of FREEDOM as one of the excuses. You have the freedom NOT to sign the contract, NOT to live in this country and definitely NOT to listen to any politicians if you so choose to.
As for Capt X, I had flown with this great chap before and I wil fly with him again anytime. On what happened to him, there's one thing I would like to comment on Singapore society: we have to learn to be more receptive towards criticisms and not over-react towards them. Capt X made lots of remarks regarding whatever bad points about whatever country/company from his view point and he has every right to do so, BUT he was a SQ Capt and he got drunk and created an unwanted scene for both pax and the company, hence the latter has every right to deal with him too. It's such a pity he had to be shown the exit in this manner by SQ.
Lastly, don't get me wrong that I don't look forward to "polishing my ferrari and having 18days off a month...etc..". Would love to...though at the mean time, life's pretty good here if you know how to ignore certain "commands" or "orders" directed towards those who REALLY need the attentions.
I guess I should be all ready to receive some "kind" comments relatively soon and for furhter info; am not related to anyone with last name LEE.
@Will reply asap after my long trip@
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thegypsy,
In case you didn't know, if you have more than 20 posts you will become a PPRunNe Flight Deck Qualified. Yes, I am a student as I have described in 'detailed' in my Personal Particulars. I do have quite a number of relatives in SQ but they NEVER talk about this topic posed on PPRuNe at all. They keep on telling me that the TOPICS posted on PPRuNe are in fact just plain lies and advised me not to believe in any of them.
Thanks for the information(thegypsy) by the way, ' I didn't know about that ' !
I wonder hows "Latiff" doing by the way ?
Cheers,
Herman
------------------
Ad Astra Per Aspera
In case you didn't know, if you have more than 20 posts you will become a PPRunNe Flight Deck Qualified. Yes, I am a student as I have described in 'detailed' in my Personal Particulars. I do have quite a number of relatives in SQ but they NEVER talk about this topic posed on PPRuNe at all. They keep on telling me that the TOPICS posted on PPRuNe are in fact just plain lies and advised me not to believe in any of them.
Thanks for the information(thegypsy) by the way, ' I didn't know about that ' !
I wonder hows "Latiff" doing by the way ?
Cheers,
Herman
------------------
Ad Astra Per Aspera
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I am still waiting for the date of the ghost Hong Kong flight.
Piss poor driver? If so then that truly represents SIA's finest training and recruitment. Was a piss poor driver the best SIA could do?
Gladiator is bitter, twisted, bad news, etc? Or may be David kicked Goliath's rear in court. Goliath had to change policy, lose face, lose millions, and has trouble manning flights due to lack of pilots.
It appears that the word Gladiator is bad news at SIA, specially the 4th floor. Sorry guys, you drew first blood, had plenty of notice as to the outcome, but decided to roll the dice, got arrogant and under estimated the information in hand. You fell on your own double edge sword.
The 4th floor people are amongst us here in PPRuNe, easily identifiable by the strong emotions and resentment towards Gladiator. I can't blame you, you are only human and doing your job per the LKY programme.
I have always said, "you can run, but you can't hide". By now it is evident that employment at SIA is the worst in the industry.
Also as previously mentioned, whistleblowers are good for the industry. We enhance safety as well as inform potential pilot candidates of the real picture. You are now welcome to take more pot shots.
Sick Squid, you are correct and I do know better. However I do have Mr. XXX's permission but nevertheless will comply with your requirement.
Piss poor driver? If so then that truly represents SIA's finest training and recruitment. Was a piss poor driver the best SIA could do?
Gladiator is bitter, twisted, bad news, etc? Or may be David kicked Goliath's rear in court. Goliath had to change policy, lose face, lose millions, and has trouble manning flights due to lack of pilots.
It appears that the word Gladiator is bad news at SIA, specially the 4th floor. Sorry guys, you drew first blood, had plenty of notice as to the outcome, but decided to roll the dice, got arrogant and under estimated the information in hand. You fell on your own double edge sword.
The 4th floor people are amongst us here in PPRuNe, easily identifiable by the strong emotions and resentment towards Gladiator. I can't blame you, you are only human and doing your job per the LKY programme.
I have always said, "you can run, but you can't hide". By now it is evident that employment at SIA is the worst in the industry.
Also as previously mentioned, whistleblowers are good for the industry. We enhance safety as well as inform potential pilot candidates of the real picture. You are now welcome to take more pot shots.
Sick Squid, you are correct and I do know better. However I do have Mr. XXX's permission but nevertheless will comply with your requirement.
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Hermie Thanks for explanation re Flight Deck qualified.
You really are a very naughty boy for dropping in on all these lies on Pprune!!
I am surprised you admit to it to your relatives.
There is no smoke without fire Confucius said or was it someone else. I cannot remember as it is a long time ago when I too was a student.
You really are a very naughty boy for dropping in on all these lies on Pprune!!
I am surprised you admit to it to your relatives.
There is no smoke without fire Confucius said or was it someone else. I cannot remember as it is a long time ago when I too was a student.
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Well Glad it didn't take long for the venom and vitriol to start again, once you returned from leave, did it?! Unfortunately, your failure, and INexperience working as an expatriate doesn't qualify YOU to make comparisons of SIA with other employers of expats on contracts.
SQ may have been a tough boss, but during my tenure with them - 5 years and 7 months - they did NOT break any of the clauses in my contract. The same cannot be said for two other Asian carriers I have worked for, one of which was through PARC (who "acknowledge" the breaches, but do sfa).
Now off you run, and when you've finished polishing your Ferrari (with KY??), remember to put it up high on the display cabinet where the kids can't reach it with their grubby little fingers!!
SQ may have been a tough boss, but during my tenure with them - 5 years and 7 months - they did NOT break any of the clauses in my contract. The same cannot be said for two other Asian carriers I have worked for, one of which was through PARC (who "acknowledge" the breaches, but do sfa).
Now off you run, and when you've finished polishing your Ferrari (with KY??), remember to put it up high on the display cabinet where the kids can't reach it with their grubby little fingers!!
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You got what you wanted Kaptin M. You often fuel the fire for entertainment value, hence the thread, 'what happened to Gladiator...., etc'.
Even when on leave I still read PPRuNe. I will always be here unless SIA buys PPRuNe. Your comments are not new, you pop up in every subject with only one aim, entertainment.
As usual Far East forum/ SIA threads accuratly represent employment and human relations at SIA. Resentment, resentment and more resentment.
Even when on leave I still read PPRuNe. I will always be here unless SIA buys PPRuNe. Your comments are not new, you pop up in every subject with only one aim, entertainment.
As usual Far East forum/ SIA threads accuratly represent employment and human relations at SIA. Resentment, resentment and more resentment.