Part 3, Singapore Airlines vs. Gladiator, how the case started.
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Interrogatory No. 11: Describe in detail and not in summary the specific basis for your claim in paragraph 27 of your conterclaims that SIA breached its contracts with you by requiring you to act and perform the duties of a flight crewmember without an ATPL license appropriate to such duties.
Answer to No. 11: See General objection C and answer to Interrogatory No. 10.
Interrogatory no. 12: Decsribe in detail and not in summary the specific basis for your claim in paragraph 27 of your counterclaim that SIA breached its contracts with you by requiring you to perform duties beyond that of a First Officer, for which you were not licensed or qualified.
Answer to No. 12: See General Objection C and answer to Interrogatory No. 10.
Interrogatory No. 13: Decsribe in detail and not in summary the specific basis for your claim in paragraph 20 of your answer and paragraph 27 of your counterclaims that SIA breached its contracts with you by implementing and failing to correct unsafe airline operating procedures.
Answer to No. 13: See General Objection C. Subject to and without waiving this objection, XXX answers as follows:
SIA breached its contracts with XXX by implementing and failing to correct unsafe airline operations in at least the following respects:
(a) See answer to Interrogatory No. 6
(b) SIA compelled XXX to engage in commercial air transport below minimum ICAO safety standards (see answer to Interrogatory No. 10).
(c) SIA utilized procedures that allowed the pilot-in-command to leave his duty station for reasons other than absence necessary for (1) the performance of duties in connection with the operation of the aeroplane, or (2) physiological needs.
(d) SIA ignored the application of ICAO safety Standards, Identified in Annex 1 and Annex 6, Part 1, which are recognized as necessary for the safety of internatiuonal air navigfation, including without limitation the following:
Annex 6, OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT
Part 1, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT - AEROPLANES
Seventh edition of Part 1
4.2 Operational certification and supervision
4.2.1 The air operator certificate
4.2.1.3 The issue of an air operator certificate or equivalent document by the State of the Operator shall be dependent upon the operator demonstrating an adequate organization, method of control and supervision of flight operations, training program and maintenance arrangements consistent with the nature and extent of the operations sprcified.
4.4.4 Flight crewmembers at duty stations
4.4.4.2 En Route. All flight crewmembers required to be on flight deck duty shall remain at their stations except when their absence is necessary for the performance of duties in connection with the operation of the aeroplane or for physiological needs.
9.3 Flight crewmember training programs
9.3.1 An operator shall establish and maintain a ground and flight training programme, approved by the State of the Operator, which ensures that all flight crewmembers are adequately trained to perform their assigned duties.
The training programme shall consist of ground and flight training in the type(s) of aeroplane on which the flight crewmember serves, and shall include proper flight crew coordination and training in all types of emergency or abnormal situations or procedures caused by powerplant, airframe or system malfunctions, fire or other abnormalities.
9.4.4 Pilot proficiency checks
An operator shall ensure that piloting technique and the ability to execute emergency procedures is checked in such a way as to demontrate the pilot's competence.
(SIA co-pilots occupying the left hand seat, pilot-in-command duty station, with no training for emergency procedures or recovery from unusual attitudes. The B747-400 systems requires the left hand seat to be Pilot flying in certain situations without the availability of the autopilot).
(e) SIA's failure to provide an acceptable level of safety oversight regarding licensing, training and qualifications during 3-pilot operations (One Captain, two co-pilots) resulted in unsafe airline operations. SIA's failures include without limitation:
More to follow.
Answer to No. 11: See General objection C and answer to Interrogatory No. 10.
Interrogatory no. 12: Decsribe in detail and not in summary the specific basis for your claim in paragraph 27 of your counterclaim that SIA breached its contracts with you by requiring you to perform duties beyond that of a First Officer, for which you were not licensed or qualified.
Answer to No. 12: See General Objection C and answer to Interrogatory No. 10.
Interrogatory No. 13: Decsribe in detail and not in summary the specific basis for your claim in paragraph 20 of your answer and paragraph 27 of your counterclaims that SIA breached its contracts with you by implementing and failing to correct unsafe airline operating procedures.
Answer to No. 13: See General Objection C. Subject to and without waiving this objection, XXX answers as follows:
SIA breached its contracts with XXX by implementing and failing to correct unsafe airline operations in at least the following respects:
(a) See answer to Interrogatory No. 6
(b) SIA compelled XXX to engage in commercial air transport below minimum ICAO safety standards (see answer to Interrogatory No. 10).
(c) SIA utilized procedures that allowed the pilot-in-command to leave his duty station for reasons other than absence necessary for (1) the performance of duties in connection with the operation of the aeroplane, or (2) physiological needs.
(d) SIA ignored the application of ICAO safety Standards, Identified in Annex 1 and Annex 6, Part 1, which are recognized as necessary for the safety of internatiuonal air navigfation, including without limitation the following:
Annex 6, OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT
Part 1, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT - AEROPLANES
Seventh edition of Part 1
4.2 Operational certification and supervision
4.2.1 The air operator certificate
4.2.1.3 The issue of an air operator certificate or equivalent document by the State of the Operator shall be dependent upon the operator demonstrating an adequate organization, method of control and supervision of flight operations, training program and maintenance arrangements consistent with the nature and extent of the operations sprcified.
4.4.4 Flight crewmembers at duty stations
4.4.4.2 En Route. All flight crewmembers required to be on flight deck duty shall remain at their stations except when their absence is necessary for the performance of duties in connection with the operation of the aeroplane or for physiological needs.
9.3 Flight crewmember training programs
9.3.1 An operator shall establish and maintain a ground and flight training programme, approved by the State of the Operator, which ensures that all flight crewmembers are adequately trained to perform their assigned duties.
The training programme shall consist of ground and flight training in the type(s) of aeroplane on which the flight crewmember serves, and shall include proper flight crew coordination and training in all types of emergency or abnormal situations or procedures caused by powerplant, airframe or system malfunctions, fire or other abnormalities.
9.4.4 Pilot proficiency checks
An operator shall ensure that piloting technique and the ability to execute emergency procedures is checked in such a way as to demontrate the pilot's competence.
(SIA co-pilots occupying the left hand seat, pilot-in-command duty station, with no training for emergency procedures or recovery from unusual attitudes. The B747-400 systems requires the left hand seat to be Pilot flying in certain situations without the availability of the autopilot).
(e) SIA's failure to provide an acceptable level of safety oversight regarding licensing, training and qualifications during 3-pilot operations (One Captain, two co-pilots) resulted in unsafe airline operations. SIA's failures include without limitation:
More to follow.
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(i) Licensing - XXX should not have been required to operate on the B747-400 with only a CPL; an ATPL or a CPL with ATPL written exams was required for any capacity.
(ii) Training - XXX was not adequately trained to operate the B-747 or B747-400 aircraft as either pilot flying or pilot not flying from the pilot-in-command duty station, (the LHS); nor was he adequately trained to operate the aircraft as pilot flying in co-pilot's duty station (the RHS) while another unqualified co-pilot occupied the pilot-in-command's duty station, (the LHS).
(iii) Qualifications - The person acting as pilot-in-command relief must meet the same qualifications as the pilot-in-command. XXX did not possess the qualifications of pilot-in-command.
(f) SIA ignored safety concerns relating to 3-pilot (One Captain, two co-pilots) expressed by other SIA crewmembers during fleet meetings, including significant concerns regarding the inadequate qualifications of co-pilots occupying the pilot-in-command's duty station during the time the pilot-in-command takes inflight relief and/or rest. Concerns ranged from total flight time experience to training in the actual pilot-in-command duty station, the LHS.
(g) SIA ignored XXX's safety concerns, which were communicated to the Director of Flight Operations, Captain Maurice De Vaz, through dozens of anonymous letters sent directly to him.
(h) SIA continued to operate with the knowledge that Captains take inflight relief and/or rest in the bunkroom during 3-pilot operations (One Captain, two co-pilots).
(i) SIA allowed the cockpit door to remain unlocked during flight time, thereby jeopardizing the safety and security of XXX, the flight, and the passengers.
(j) SIA allowed passengers to enter the cockpit, thereby breaching the safety and security of XXX, the flight, and the passengers.
(k) SIA allowed passengers to enter the cockpit after having consumed alcohol, thereby breaching the safety and security of XXX, the flight, and the passengers.
(l) SIA failed to implement safety procedures in the use of oxygen above 25,000 feet by a flight crewmember left at the controls, while the other crewmember leaves the cockpit. SIA also allowed flight crewmembers to operate with beards (oxygen masks will no longer seal on the face). These practices threatened the safety of XXX, the flight, and the passengers.
(m) SIA failed to respond to XXX's report of a hazardous condition involving a ladder in a cargo area.
(n) In contravention of Article 14 of the ICA Convention, SIA failed to take effective measures to prevent the spread by means of air navigation of communicable disease, such as the plague in India in 1994.
(o) In contravention of Singapore employment law, CAP 122 (15), SIA failed to take effective measures to prevent the spread by means of work environment as well as air navigation of communicable diseases such as the plague and tuberculosis.
(p) SIA and CAAS failed to provide required notification, pursuant to Article 38 of the ICA Convention, of departures from ICAO international safety standards and procedures.
Interrogatory No. 14: Describe in detail and not in summary the specific basis for your counterclaim that you did not receive adequate or competent training from SIA.
Answer to No. 14: See General Objection C. Subject to and without waiving this objection, XXX answers as follows:
(a) See answer to Interrogatory Nos. 10, 13.
(b) SIA did not ensure that piloting technique and the ability to execute emergency procedures were checked in such a way as to demonstrate pilot's competence as required by ICAO Annex 6, Part 1, and CAAS Rules (Ninth Schedule) Part B, Crew Training and Tests, (2) Pilots.
(c) XXX was trained as a co-pilot in the B-747 and B747-400 from the co-pilot's duty station, the RHS. XXX's training included:
(i) Normal procedures. Training, checkrides, recurrent training conducted from the RHS.
(ii) Non-normal procedures. Training, checkrides, recurrent training conducted from the RHS.
(iii) Emergency procedures. TRaining, checkrides, recurrent training conducted from the RHS.
If XXX was expected to perform pilot duties from the pilot-in-command's duty station, the LHS, XXX should have (i) received training for normal, non-normal, and emergency procedures from the LHS as well as the RHS; (ii) received checkrides from the LHS as well as the RHS; and (iii) received recurrent training from the LHS as well as the RHS. Adequate training and currency requirements in both the LHS and RHS is necessary to achieve an acceptable level of flight crewmember competency and safety.
(d) Due to motoe skill manipulation differences, aircraft control wheel manipulation with the left hand and the thrust levers with the right hand when seated at the left cockpit duty station, as compared to the manupulation of the same controls with opposite hands when seated at the right cockpit duty station, are different tasks requiring training in the particular seat, if an operator intends to achieve an acceptable level of safety.
(e) Certain emergencies would require the pilot occupying the pilot-in-command's duty station, (the LHS) to manually manipulate the controls. For example, certain *electrical failures which would render the RHS instruments unusable. Therefore, if an operator substitutes flight crewmembers in cockpit duty positions for which the crewmember normally does not occupy, an operator's failure to consider motor skill manipulation differences as different tasks, requiring training in the particular seat would create unnecessary risks and an unacceptable level of safety.
*B747-400 operating on the Stdby Bus.
(f) Training and ability to conduct emergency procedures from the RHS does not assure the same level of performance and competency from the LHS.
Studies in ergonomics has shown that training from the respective seat to be critical, otherwise during an emergency, specially multiple failures, this could result in potential improper, untimely, or non-execution of safety measures or emergency procedures.
More to follow.
(ii) Training - XXX was not adequately trained to operate the B-747 or B747-400 aircraft as either pilot flying or pilot not flying from the pilot-in-command duty station, (the LHS); nor was he adequately trained to operate the aircraft as pilot flying in co-pilot's duty station (the RHS) while another unqualified co-pilot occupied the pilot-in-command's duty station, (the LHS).
(iii) Qualifications - The person acting as pilot-in-command relief must meet the same qualifications as the pilot-in-command. XXX did not possess the qualifications of pilot-in-command.
(f) SIA ignored safety concerns relating to 3-pilot (One Captain, two co-pilots) expressed by other SIA crewmembers during fleet meetings, including significant concerns regarding the inadequate qualifications of co-pilots occupying the pilot-in-command's duty station during the time the pilot-in-command takes inflight relief and/or rest. Concerns ranged from total flight time experience to training in the actual pilot-in-command duty station, the LHS.
(g) SIA ignored XXX's safety concerns, which were communicated to the Director of Flight Operations, Captain Maurice De Vaz, through dozens of anonymous letters sent directly to him.
(h) SIA continued to operate with the knowledge that Captains take inflight relief and/or rest in the bunkroom during 3-pilot operations (One Captain, two co-pilots).
(i) SIA allowed the cockpit door to remain unlocked during flight time, thereby jeopardizing the safety and security of XXX, the flight, and the passengers.
(j) SIA allowed passengers to enter the cockpit, thereby breaching the safety and security of XXX, the flight, and the passengers.
(k) SIA allowed passengers to enter the cockpit after having consumed alcohol, thereby breaching the safety and security of XXX, the flight, and the passengers.
(l) SIA failed to implement safety procedures in the use of oxygen above 25,000 feet by a flight crewmember left at the controls, while the other crewmember leaves the cockpit. SIA also allowed flight crewmembers to operate with beards (oxygen masks will no longer seal on the face). These practices threatened the safety of XXX, the flight, and the passengers.
(m) SIA failed to respond to XXX's report of a hazardous condition involving a ladder in a cargo area.
(n) In contravention of Article 14 of the ICA Convention, SIA failed to take effective measures to prevent the spread by means of air navigation of communicable disease, such as the plague in India in 1994.
(o) In contravention of Singapore employment law, CAP 122 (15), SIA failed to take effective measures to prevent the spread by means of work environment as well as air navigation of communicable diseases such as the plague and tuberculosis.
(p) SIA and CAAS failed to provide required notification, pursuant to Article 38 of the ICA Convention, of departures from ICAO international safety standards and procedures.
Interrogatory No. 14: Describe in detail and not in summary the specific basis for your counterclaim that you did not receive adequate or competent training from SIA.
Answer to No. 14: See General Objection C. Subject to and without waiving this objection, XXX answers as follows:
(a) See answer to Interrogatory Nos. 10, 13.
(b) SIA did not ensure that piloting technique and the ability to execute emergency procedures were checked in such a way as to demonstrate pilot's competence as required by ICAO Annex 6, Part 1, and CAAS Rules (Ninth Schedule) Part B, Crew Training and Tests, (2) Pilots.
(c) XXX was trained as a co-pilot in the B-747 and B747-400 from the co-pilot's duty station, the RHS. XXX's training included:
(i) Normal procedures. Training, checkrides, recurrent training conducted from the RHS.
(ii) Non-normal procedures. Training, checkrides, recurrent training conducted from the RHS.
(iii) Emergency procedures. TRaining, checkrides, recurrent training conducted from the RHS.
If XXX was expected to perform pilot duties from the pilot-in-command's duty station, the LHS, XXX should have (i) received training for normal, non-normal, and emergency procedures from the LHS as well as the RHS; (ii) received checkrides from the LHS as well as the RHS; and (iii) received recurrent training from the LHS as well as the RHS. Adequate training and currency requirements in both the LHS and RHS is necessary to achieve an acceptable level of flight crewmember competency and safety.
(d) Due to motoe skill manipulation differences, aircraft control wheel manipulation with the left hand and the thrust levers with the right hand when seated at the left cockpit duty station, as compared to the manupulation of the same controls with opposite hands when seated at the right cockpit duty station, are different tasks requiring training in the particular seat, if an operator intends to achieve an acceptable level of safety.
(e) Certain emergencies would require the pilot occupying the pilot-in-command's duty station, (the LHS) to manually manipulate the controls. For example, certain *electrical failures which would render the RHS instruments unusable. Therefore, if an operator substitutes flight crewmembers in cockpit duty positions for which the crewmember normally does not occupy, an operator's failure to consider motor skill manipulation differences as different tasks, requiring training in the particular seat would create unnecessary risks and an unacceptable level of safety.
*B747-400 operating on the Stdby Bus.
(f) Training and ability to conduct emergency procedures from the RHS does not assure the same level of performance and competency from the LHS.
Studies in ergonomics has shown that training from the respective seat to be critical, otherwise during an emergency, specially multiple failures, this could result in potential improper, untimely, or non-execution of safety measures or emergency procedures.
More to follow.
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Interrogatory No. 15: Describe in detail and not in summary the specific damages you have suffered as a result of your counterclaim that SIA breached its contracts with you.
Answer to No. 15: See General Objection C. Subject to and without waiving this objection, XXX answers as follows:
(a) XXX’s departure from SIA caused his loss of 6.5 years of seniority. Seniority is a number assigned AT THE TIME A PILOT OFFICIALLY BECOMES AN EMPLOYEE OF AN AIRLINE. Career advancement in the airline pilot ranks is dependant on one’s seniority. The most important career advancement of an airline pilot is promotion from the rank of First Officer (co-pilot) to rank of Captain (pilot-in-command), which once again is predicated on pilot’s seniority.
(b) XXX’s breach of contracts forced XXX’s resignation. XXX has returned to the bottom of the seniority ladder at his present employment.
(c) XXX has also had to take a substantial pay cut. According to SIA’s payroll stubs from Nov 96 to Oct 97, XXX’s take home pay was average of 8,337.67 Singapore dollars per month. In addition to this amount he contributed 1,200 Singapore dollars per month to his provident fund. SIA also contributed 1,200 Singapore dollars per month contribution to XXX’s provident fund making a total of 2,400 Singapore dollars a month contribution to XXX’s provident fund. That places XXX’s income per month at SIA at an average of 10,737.67 Singapore dollars per month, which is approximately 7,405.28 US dollars witht the exchange rate in 96/97. XXX’s starting salary at his present employment was take home pay of 2,550 US dollrs per month. XXX’s combined income for 1998 was 41,728 US dollars (family of four). This demonstrates that XXX obtained no financial or career gain from leaving SIA. Indeed, he has sustained substantial losses.
(d) XXX has suffered further losses by paying legal expenses in this litigation.
Discussion (not part of legal documents) – It is important to note that promotions at SIA in fact do not depend on seniority. In fact seniority nothing depends on seniority and it is a worthless number in the SIA system. However since the trial would require experts to testify, the seniority system was explained.
Interrogatory No. 16: Describe in detail and not in summary the specific basis for your affirmative defense as asserted in Paragraph 22 of your answer that SIA's claims are barred by its failure to exercise reasonable care to provide a proper and safe system of work for you and other pilots on international flights.
Answer to No. 16: See General Objection C. Subject to and without waiving this objection, XXX answers as follows:
(a) See answers to Interrogatories No. 6,7,9,10,11,12,13, and 14.
(b) SIA's implementation and use of unsafe operating practices and procedures were in violation of public policy.
(c) SIA was negligent in failing to take adequate safety precautions for XXX's safety and the safety of other pilots on international flights.
(d) SIA required XXX and other pilots to perform acts that were unsafe and rendered their workplace dangerous. it is SIA's responsibility as an employer to provide and maintain a safe system of work for XXX and it's pilots. (A contract which tends to be potentially injurious to the employee or to the public or against the public good is
invalidated on the grounds of public policy.)
(e) XXX terminated his contract of service with SIA without notice because XXX reasonably believed his life and the life of passengers were in danger, and because SIA had breached his contracts.
More to follow.
Answer to No. 15: See General Objection C. Subject to and without waiving this objection, XXX answers as follows:
(a) XXX’s departure from SIA caused his loss of 6.5 years of seniority. Seniority is a number assigned AT THE TIME A PILOT OFFICIALLY BECOMES AN EMPLOYEE OF AN AIRLINE. Career advancement in the airline pilot ranks is dependant on one’s seniority. The most important career advancement of an airline pilot is promotion from the rank of First Officer (co-pilot) to rank of Captain (pilot-in-command), which once again is predicated on pilot’s seniority.
(b) XXX’s breach of contracts forced XXX’s resignation. XXX has returned to the bottom of the seniority ladder at his present employment.
(c) XXX has also had to take a substantial pay cut. According to SIA’s payroll stubs from Nov 96 to Oct 97, XXX’s take home pay was average of 8,337.67 Singapore dollars per month. In addition to this amount he contributed 1,200 Singapore dollars per month to his provident fund. SIA also contributed 1,200 Singapore dollars per month contribution to XXX’s provident fund making a total of 2,400 Singapore dollars a month contribution to XXX’s provident fund. That places XXX’s income per month at SIA at an average of 10,737.67 Singapore dollars per month, which is approximately 7,405.28 US dollars witht the exchange rate in 96/97. XXX’s starting salary at his present employment was take home pay of 2,550 US dollrs per month. XXX’s combined income for 1998 was 41,728 US dollars (family of four). This demonstrates that XXX obtained no financial or career gain from leaving SIA. Indeed, he has sustained substantial losses.
(d) XXX has suffered further losses by paying legal expenses in this litigation.
Discussion (not part of legal documents) – It is important to note that promotions at SIA in fact do not depend on seniority. In fact seniority nothing depends on seniority and it is a worthless number in the SIA system. However since the trial would require experts to testify, the seniority system was explained.
Interrogatory No. 16: Describe in detail and not in summary the specific basis for your affirmative defense as asserted in Paragraph 22 of your answer that SIA's claims are barred by its failure to exercise reasonable care to provide a proper and safe system of work for you and other pilots on international flights.
Answer to No. 16: See General Objection C. Subject to and without waiving this objection, XXX answers as follows:
(a) See answers to Interrogatories No. 6,7,9,10,11,12,13, and 14.
(b) SIA's implementation and use of unsafe operating practices and procedures were in violation of public policy.
(c) SIA was negligent in failing to take adequate safety precautions for XXX's safety and the safety of other pilots on international flights.
(d) SIA required XXX and other pilots to perform acts that were unsafe and rendered their workplace dangerous. it is SIA's responsibility as an employer to provide and maintain a safe system of work for XXX and it's pilots. (A contract which tends to be potentially injurious to the employee or to the public or against the public good is
invalidated on the grounds of public policy.)
(e) XXX terminated his contract of service with SIA without notice because XXX reasonably believed his life and the life of passengers were in danger, and because SIA had breached his contracts.
More to follow.
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Interrogatory No. 17: Describe in detail and not in summary the full and complete extent of your commercial flying experience, flight training, and pilot certifications that you possessed prior to your first day of employment with SIA.
Answer to No. 17:
(a)Pilot certificates
(i)FAA
Airline Transport Pilot
Multi-engine Land
Commercial privileges Single Engine Land & Sea
Type ratings, CE500 (Citation)
ii)FAA
Flight Instructor
Airplane Single and Multi-engine Land
Instrument Airplane
(b)Commercial Flying experience
(i)FAA Part 141 Flight training school flight instructor
(ii)FAA Part 61 Flight training school flight instructor
(iii)FAA Part 135 Air Carrier Captain, C-207
(iv)FAA Part 135 Air Carrier Captaib, PA23-250
(v)FAA Part 135 Air Carrier first officer, SA-227, C212
(c)Flight training
(i)See answer to Interrogatory No. 17.
(ii)FAA requirements for:
(1)Private Pilot Certificate, Single Engine Land
(2)Commercial Pilot Certificate, Single Engine land
(3)Instrument Pilot Certificate
(4)Commercial Pilot Certificate Single Engine Sea-plane
(5)Commercial Pilot Certificate Multi-engine land
(6)Certified Flight Instructor Single Engine land
(7)Certified Flight Instructor Instrument
(8)Certified Flight Instructor Multi-Engine land
(9)Airline Transport Pilot Certificate Multi-engine Land
(10)CE500 Type Rating (PIC)
(iii)FAA requirements for employment with:
(1)Part 135 Air carrier training C-207
(2)Part 135 Air carrier training on SA-227
(3)Part 135 Air carrier training on PA23-250
(4)Part 135 Air carrier training on C212
(d)Total Flight Time experience
Total Time: 2855
Total SEL: 1537
Total SES: 19
Total MEL: 1299
Interrogatory No. 18: Describe in detail and not in summary the full and complete extent of all your commercial flying experience, flight training, and pilot certifications that you possessed on the date you tendered your resignation to SIA, october 27, 1997.
(a)Pilot certificates
(i)Same as Interrogatory 17 (a) (i) and (ii)
(ii)Singapore
Commercial Pilot License
Single & Multi-engine Land
Co-pilot priviledges B747-300/400
Instrument Aeroplane
(b)Commercial flying experience
(i)See Interrogatory No. 17 (b)
(ii)Singapore Airlines B747-300/400 Co-pilot/ Captain’s relief*
*Was required to act as Captain’s relief without the proper qualifications, license and training.
(c)Flight training
(i)See Interrogatory No. 17 (c).
(ii)Civil Aviation Authority Singapore (“CAAS”
requirements for:
1)B-747 Restricted to co-pilot, and co-pilot duties only.
2)B747-400 Restricted to co-pilot, and co-pilot duties only.
(e)Total Flight Time experience
Total Time: 7223
Total SEL: 1537
Total SES: 19
Total MEL: 5667
Interrogatory No. 19: Describe in detail and not in summary your commercial flying experience since you tendered your resignation to SIA, together with any additional flight training and pilot certifications you have received since that date.
Answer to No. 19:
(a)Pilot certification
None
(b) Commercial flying experience
(i)FAA Part 121 Air carrier First Officer MD-80
(ii)FAA Part 121 Air carrier First Officer B-737
(c)Flight Training
(i)FAA requirements for employment with:
1)Part 121 Air carrier training on MD-80
2)Part 121 Air carrier training on B-737
More to follow.
[This message has been edited by Gladiator (edited 21 October 2000).]
Answer to No. 17:
(a)Pilot certificates
(i)FAA
Airline Transport Pilot
Multi-engine Land
Commercial privileges Single Engine Land & Sea
Type ratings, CE500 (Citation)
ii)FAA
Flight Instructor
Airplane Single and Multi-engine Land
Instrument Airplane
(b)Commercial Flying experience
(i)FAA Part 141 Flight training school flight instructor
(ii)FAA Part 61 Flight training school flight instructor
(iii)FAA Part 135 Air Carrier Captain, C-207
(iv)FAA Part 135 Air Carrier Captaib, PA23-250
(v)FAA Part 135 Air Carrier first officer, SA-227, C212
(c)Flight training
(i)See answer to Interrogatory No. 17.
(ii)FAA requirements for:
(1)Private Pilot Certificate, Single Engine Land
(2)Commercial Pilot Certificate, Single Engine land
(3)Instrument Pilot Certificate
(4)Commercial Pilot Certificate Single Engine Sea-plane
(5)Commercial Pilot Certificate Multi-engine land
(6)Certified Flight Instructor Single Engine land
(7)Certified Flight Instructor Instrument
(8)Certified Flight Instructor Multi-Engine land
(9)Airline Transport Pilot Certificate Multi-engine Land
(10)CE500 Type Rating (PIC)
(iii)FAA requirements for employment with:
(1)Part 135 Air carrier training C-207
(2)Part 135 Air carrier training on SA-227
(3)Part 135 Air carrier training on PA23-250
(4)Part 135 Air carrier training on C212
(d)Total Flight Time experience
Total Time: 2855
Total SEL: 1537
Total SES: 19
Total MEL: 1299
Interrogatory No. 18: Describe in detail and not in summary the full and complete extent of all your commercial flying experience, flight training, and pilot certifications that you possessed on the date you tendered your resignation to SIA, october 27, 1997.
(a)Pilot certificates
(i)Same as Interrogatory 17 (a) (i) and (ii)
(ii)Singapore
Commercial Pilot License
Single & Multi-engine Land
Co-pilot priviledges B747-300/400
Instrument Aeroplane
(b)Commercial flying experience
(i)See Interrogatory No. 17 (b)
(ii)Singapore Airlines B747-300/400 Co-pilot/ Captain’s relief*
*Was required to act as Captain’s relief without the proper qualifications, license and training.
(c)Flight training
(i)See Interrogatory No. 17 (c).
(ii)Civil Aviation Authority Singapore (“CAAS”
requirements for:1)B-747 Restricted to co-pilot, and co-pilot duties only.
2)B747-400 Restricted to co-pilot, and co-pilot duties only.
(e)Total Flight Time experience
Total Time: 7223
Total SEL: 1537
Total SES: 19
Total MEL: 5667
Interrogatory No. 19: Describe in detail and not in summary your commercial flying experience since you tendered your resignation to SIA, together with any additional flight training and pilot certifications you have received since that date.
Answer to No. 19:
(a)Pilot certification
None
(b) Commercial flying experience
(i)FAA Part 121 Air carrier First Officer MD-80
(ii)FAA Part 121 Air carrier First Officer B-737
(c)Flight Training
(i)FAA requirements for employment with:
1)Part 121 Air carrier training on MD-80
2)Part 121 Air carrier training on B-737
More to follow.
[This message has been edited by Gladiator (edited 21 October 2000).]
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Interrogatory No. 29: Provide the sprcific dates and flights in which the incidents alleged in Paragraph 21 of your counterclaims occurred (relating to the cockpit door being unlocked and passengers having consumed alcohol being allowed into the cockpit).
Answer to No. 20: XXX objects to SIA's use of a paraphrased, version of paragraph 21 of defendant's Answer, whivh states:
"Safety on SIA's flights is further compromised by the airline's practices of: (a) not requiring that the cockpit door remain locked during flight, placing the security of the flight at risk; and (b) allowing passengers into the cockpit of the aircraft after having consumed alcoholic beverages (psychoactive substance) during all phases of the flight, including the critical phase, take-off and landing, creating a further security and safety risk."
Subject to and without waiver of this objection, XXX answers as follows:
(a) Cockpit door being unlocked during flight
(i) All B-747 and B747-400 flights
(ii) On the B747-400, SIA had the practise of placing an eye shade (a device normally provided to passengers for the purpose of creating darkness while sleep) over the locking mechanism of the cockpit door. The purpose of this practice was to ensure that the cockpit door lock mechanism does not engage, which would create a clicking sound as the cockpit door was opened and closed. (Flight attendents open and close the cockpit door when they enter and exit the cockpit.) This clicking sound disturbed the crew sleeping in the bunkroom. The cockpit door lock mechanism is connected to the bunkroom wall.
(iii) SIA received various complaints from passengers regarding the strange looking device covering the cockpit door lock mechanism. After XXX left SIA's employment, SIA has now modified the cockpit door locks on many of the B747-400 aircraft. The door mechanism now looks normal, but the locking mechanism will no longer engage.
(iv) Not keeping the cockpit door locked creates a very serious and safety risk. In the past there has been many incidents and accidents resulting in fatalities from unauthorized entry into the cockpit of commercial air transport.
(v) One incident occured in 1997, when a Cathay Pacific B-747 flight which originated in Singapore was on final approach into Bangkok airport. A passenger gained unauthorized access into the cockpit while the cockpit door was left unlocked. This passenger attempted to strangle the Captain while the B-747 was on the critical phase of the flight, on short final (close to the ground and almost near landing). Other passengers intervened, creating a Western bar style brawl in the cockpit in which one of the intervening passengers broke his hand. This incident could have ended in disaster.
(vi) In another incident occuring in 1999, a passenger gained unauthorized access into the cockpit of a All Nippon Airways B-747 and stabbed the Captain to death.
(vii) An Ethiopean B-757 crashed with dozens of fatalities when unauthorized entry into the cockpit created a hijacking. The co-pilot was beaten unconsious.
Discussion item - After the All Nippon Airways incident, the Japanese Civil Aviation Authority implemented the same regulation as the FAA, no passenger is allowed in the cockpit, and the cockpit door remains locked.
More to follow.
Answer to No. 20: XXX objects to SIA's use of a paraphrased, version of paragraph 21 of defendant's Answer, whivh states:
"Safety on SIA's flights is further compromised by the airline's practices of: (a) not requiring that the cockpit door remain locked during flight, placing the security of the flight at risk; and (b) allowing passengers into the cockpit of the aircraft after having consumed alcoholic beverages (psychoactive substance) during all phases of the flight, including the critical phase, take-off and landing, creating a further security and safety risk."
Subject to and without waiver of this objection, XXX answers as follows:
(a) Cockpit door being unlocked during flight
(i) All B-747 and B747-400 flights
(ii) On the B747-400, SIA had the practise of placing an eye shade (a device normally provided to passengers for the purpose of creating darkness while sleep) over the locking mechanism of the cockpit door. The purpose of this practice was to ensure that the cockpit door lock mechanism does not engage, which would create a clicking sound as the cockpit door was opened and closed. (Flight attendents open and close the cockpit door when they enter and exit the cockpit.) This clicking sound disturbed the crew sleeping in the bunkroom. The cockpit door lock mechanism is connected to the bunkroom wall.
(iii) SIA received various complaints from passengers regarding the strange looking device covering the cockpit door lock mechanism. After XXX left SIA's employment, SIA has now modified the cockpit door locks on many of the B747-400 aircraft. The door mechanism now looks normal, but the locking mechanism will no longer engage.
(iv) Not keeping the cockpit door locked creates a very serious and safety risk. In the past there has been many incidents and accidents resulting in fatalities from unauthorized entry into the cockpit of commercial air transport.
(v) One incident occured in 1997, when a Cathay Pacific B-747 flight which originated in Singapore was on final approach into Bangkok airport. A passenger gained unauthorized access into the cockpit while the cockpit door was left unlocked. This passenger attempted to strangle the Captain while the B-747 was on the critical phase of the flight, on short final (close to the ground and almost near landing). Other passengers intervened, creating a Western bar style brawl in the cockpit in which one of the intervening passengers broke his hand. This incident could have ended in disaster.
(vi) In another incident occuring in 1999, a passenger gained unauthorized access into the cockpit of a All Nippon Airways B-747 and stabbed the Captain to death.
(vii) An Ethiopean B-757 crashed with dozens of fatalities when unauthorized entry into the cockpit created a hijacking. The co-pilot was beaten unconsious.
Discussion item - After the All Nippon Airways incident, the Japanese Civil Aviation Authority implemented the same regulation as the FAA, no passenger is allowed in the cockpit, and the cockpit door remains locked.
More to follow.
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(b) Passengers being allowed into the cockpit, as well as passengers being allowed into the cockpit after consumption of alcohol (psychoactive substance).
(i) For the purpose of public relations, SIA allows regular passengers to visit the cockpit during the flight's critical phase, take-off and landing, and while in cruise flight.
(ii) The cockpit visits are at the dsicretion of the captain. The passengers requests a visit through a flight attendant. The flight attendant informs the Captain, which then gives approval for the visit.
(iii) There are no provisions or policies in the SIA's training manual or Flight Administration Manual instructing flight attendants or crewmembers not to allow cockpit visits by passengers who have consumed alcohol.
(iv) SIA flight attendants have no formal security training in passenger profiling.
(v) Any passenger can gain unauthorized access to the cockpit while the aircraft is in flight. This practice threatened the safety and security of XXX and the passengers.
(vi) Visitation to the cockpit by passengers occurs frequently. Alcohol is served free of charge to all passengers.
(vii) SIA has had many alcohol related incidents in the passenger cabin that required intervention of law enforcement upon arrival at the destination. These passengers have access to the cockpit at any time.
(c) Listed below are some of the specific dates and flights on which passengers were allowed into the cockpit, some after consumption of alcohol:
Nov 15, 1991, NRT to SIN
Jan 11, 1992, YVR to SEL
May 30, 1992, SEL to SIN
Jun 28, 1992, HNL to LAX
Jan 02, 1993, TPE to SEL
Apr 25, 1993, JNB to SIN (Video available)
Feb 09, 1994, BNE to SIN (Passenger, the Captain's son, occupied the First Officer seat while the First Officer (XXX) was absent from his duty station due to physiological needs.
Jun 08, 1994, SEL to YVR
Jan 26, 1995, SIN to SYD
Feb 15, 1995, LHR to SIN (Picture available)
Dec 05, 1995, PER to SIN
Mar 22, 1996, LHR to SIN
Date missing. SIN to Australia. Capt. XXX was dismissed from SIA. On the way home to Australia, he was in the cockpit after consumption of large amounts of alcohol.
Interrogatory No. 21: Identify all persons to whome you reported any incident referred to in Interrogatory no. 20.
Answer to No. 21: XXX did not report the incidents identified in Interrogatory 21 because (a) he was reasonably concerned that he would never receive a promotion; (b) there are no whistleblower laws in Singapore to protect the employee; and (c) Singapore culture does not encourage such reports.
Interrogatory No. 22: Identify all expert witnesses you intend to call at trial, and as to each person state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify and the substance of the facts and opinions to which the exprt is expected to testify, and provide a summary of the grounds for each of the expert's opinions.
Answer to No. 22: See General Objection B. Not yet determined.
Interrogatory No. 23: Describe in detail and not in summary your current citizenship status in the United States and describe your efforts to obtain or maintain any visa and permanent resident status in the United States.
Answer to No. 23: XXX is a United States citizen. Therefore, there was no effort to obtain or maintain any visa and permanent resident status in the United States.
End of Interrogatories. Next will be Request for Production (documents) followed by Request for Admission.
More to follow.
(i) For the purpose of public relations, SIA allows regular passengers to visit the cockpit during the flight's critical phase, take-off and landing, and while in cruise flight.
(ii) The cockpit visits are at the dsicretion of the captain. The passengers requests a visit through a flight attendant. The flight attendant informs the Captain, which then gives approval for the visit.
(iii) There are no provisions or policies in the SIA's training manual or Flight Administration Manual instructing flight attendants or crewmembers not to allow cockpit visits by passengers who have consumed alcohol.
(iv) SIA flight attendants have no formal security training in passenger profiling.
(v) Any passenger can gain unauthorized access to the cockpit while the aircraft is in flight. This practice threatened the safety and security of XXX and the passengers.
(vi) Visitation to the cockpit by passengers occurs frequently. Alcohol is served free of charge to all passengers.
(vii) SIA has had many alcohol related incidents in the passenger cabin that required intervention of law enforcement upon arrival at the destination. These passengers have access to the cockpit at any time.
(c) Listed below are some of the specific dates and flights on which passengers were allowed into the cockpit, some after consumption of alcohol:
Nov 15, 1991, NRT to SIN
Jan 11, 1992, YVR to SEL
May 30, 1992, SEL to SIN
Jun 28, 1992, HNL to LAX
Jan 02, 1993, TPE to SEL
Apr 25, 1993, JNB to SIN (Video available)
Feb 09, 1994, BNE to SIN (Passenger, the Captain's son, occupied the First Officer seat while the First Officer (XXX) was absent from his duty station due to physiological needs.
Jun 08, 1994, SEL to YVR
Jan 26, 1995, SIN to SYD
Feb 15, 1995, LHR to SIN (Picture available)
Dec 05, 1995, PER to SIN
Mar 22, 1996, LHR to SIN
Date missing. SIN to Australia. Capt. XXX was dismissed from SIA. On the way home to Australia, he was in the cockpit after consumption of large amounts of alcohol.
Interrogatory No. 21: Identify all persons to whome you reported any incident referred to in Interrogatory no. 20.
Answer to No. 21: XXX did not report the incidents identified in Interrogatory 21 because (a) he was reasonably concerned that he would never receive a promotion; (b) there are no whistleblower laws in Singapore to protect the employee; and (c) Singapore culture does not encourage such reports.
Interrogatory No. 22: Identify all expert witnesses you intend to call at trial, and as to each person state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify and the substance of the facts and opinions to which the exprt is expected to testify, and provide a summary of the grounds for each of the expert's opinions.
Answer to No. 22: See General Objection B. Not yet determined.
Interrogatory No. 23: Describe in detail and not in summary your current citizenship status in the United States and describe your efforts to obtain or maintain any visa and permanent resident status in the United States.
Answer to No. 23: XXX is a United States citizen. Therefore, there was no effort to obtain or maintain any visa and permanent resident status in the United States.
End of Interrogatories. Next will be Request for Production (documents) followed by Request for Admission.
More to follow.
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Gladiator,
You, no doubt, have some opinions regarding the SQ006 incident. I'm interested. How goes flying for Wolfman Jack? Saw a picture of the new paint scheme. Dark. Is that a one time thing or fleet repaint?
You may know I left my instructor position at Alaska for an A320 job. New airline is a good one with people oriented management. It is as if I've died and gone to pilot heaven. Captain's stripe is next summer. I'll be looking for passage to Singapore about then to do some well earned gloating.
Reading through this stuff, I wonder how much could have applied to my situation. Obviously, the A310 did not use "cruise captains". So my safety issues were not as consistently apparent. My issues were well buried for that matter. CMC data on the barrel roll, etc. are long gone.
One thing you said resonated very well, they try to out last the financial ability of the opponent.
I have a question for you though. Does your outrage for training contracts carry over to you current employer? The Air Group bonds pilots of Horizon Air for three or six thousand be it the Dash 8 or Fokker. They are terribly uneven in their handling of training contract enforcement. Alaska ALPA MEC does a "see no evil" with this matter. And the Teamster efforts for a contract are virtually fruitless. Does your integrity motivate you to end this practise in your own backyard? If so, contact Steve Bass (AS F/O) at [email protected] and ask how you can help.
Mike
You, no doubt, have some opinions regarding the SQ006 incident. I'm interested. How goes flying for Wolfman Jack? Saw a picture of the new paint scheme. Dark. Is that a one time thing or fleet repaint?
You may know I left my instructor position at Alaska for an A320 job. New airline is a good one with people oriented management. It is as if I've died and gone to pilot heaven. Captain's stripe is next summer. I'll be looking for passage to Singapore about then to do some well earned gloating.
Reading through this stuff, I wonder how much could have applied to my situation. Obviously, the A310 did not use "cruise captains". So my safety issues were not as consistently apparent. My issues were well buried for that matter. CMC data on the barrel roll, etc. are long gone.
One thing you said resonated very well, they try to out last the financial ability of the opponent.
I have a question for you though. Does your outrage for training contracts carry over to you current employer? The Air Group bonds pilots of Horizon Air for three or six thousand be it the Dash 8 or Fokker. They are terribly uneven in their handling of training contract enforcement. Alaska ALPA MEC does a "see no evil" with this matter. And the Teamster efforts for a contract are virtually fruitless. Does your integrity motivate you to end this practise in your own backyard? If so, contact Steve Bass (AS F/O) at [email protected] and ask how you can help.
Mike
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Thank you everyone for your e-mails and support. I have not ignored you, I am taking a few days off from posting details of the case. I will continue the posts in a few days.
Dear Mike, sorry to see you leave Wolfman Jack/Bob Marley airline. I hope you will be fed plenty of grapes and wine in the new pilot heaven.
To answer your question about my back yard, I have never been against training contracts, I am however against unfair/unsafe practices. Since I am not familiar with details of QX I can not give you any comments. As for AS there is no training contract.
Dear Mike, sorry to see you leave Wolfman Jack/Bob Marley airline. I hope you will be fed plenty of grapes and wine in the new pilot heaven.
To answer your question about my back yard, I have never been against training contracts, I am however against unfair/unsafe practices. Since I am not familiar with details of QX I can not give you any comments. As for AS there is no training contract.
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Next are documents requested by SIA to be presented as evidence.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 1: Produce all documents relating to your claims that the plaintiff violated air safety regulations of either the United States, Singapore or any other international regulatory authority or international convention.
RESPONSE to No. 1: XXX objects to this request on the grounds that it is overly broad and burdensome.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 2: Produce each and every Commercial Pilots License ("CPL") issued by any aviation authority in the world that you have held in the last 20 years.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTIUON No. 3: Produce all documents relating to your past and current authority to operate any aircraft, specifically including, but not limited to, licenses, permits, records of training, flying logs, for every type of aircraft you are licensed or otherwise qualified to operate.
RESPONSE to No. 3: XXX objects on the grounds that it is overly broad and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery and admissible evidence.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 4: Produce all documents relating to your claim that your CPL did not qualify you to relieve the Pilot in Command of any version of the B-747 aircraft.
RESPONSE to No. 4: XXX objects to this request to the extent it calls for production of documents that are available to or in the possession of SIA.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 5: Produce all documents in your possession relating to the authority of a co-pilot or First Officer to operate aircraft under the laws of any jurisdiction, entity or treaty.
RESPONSE to No. 5: Same objection as Request for Production No. 4.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 6: Produce all documents relating to your allegation in paragraph 13 of your answer that the B-747 aircraft were being "phased out."
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 7: Produce all documents relating to SIA's alleged breaches of its contract with you as discussed in Interrogatories No. 10-15.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 8: Produce all documents relating to any of your alleged safety concerns about the operation of SIA aircraft that you provided to any person or entity during the past ten years, including but not limited to SIA, the Singapore Civil Aviation Authority (CAAS), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Singapore Chapter of International Airline Pilots Association or any other union that you were a member of during your employment with SIA.
RESPONSE to No. 8: XXX objects to this request to the extent that it seeks documents generated after the termination of XXX's employment at SIA on the grounds that the request is overly broad and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 9: Produce all documents relating to any "fleet" meetings that you attended while an employee of SIA, including but not limited to any notes taken by you or distributed to you during or after any fleet meetings, any and all newsletters entitled "Megaflash", and copies or originals of any questions that you ever submitted to any SIA officials prior to any "fleet" meetings.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No 10: Produce all documents reflecting any communication between you and any other person regarding alleged safety concerns about the operation of SIA aircraft.
RESPONSE to No. 10: XXX objects to this request to the extent it seeks discovery of documents generated after the termination of XXX's emplyment, on the grounds that the request is overly broad and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 11: Produce any documents related to any effort by you to obtain emplyment with any entity since your resignation from SIA on October 27, 1997, including but not limited to letters, application forms and resumes.
DISCUSSION: In regards to the above request for production, in meetings with SIA lawyers, it became evident that SIA could not understand why I was not seeking a B-747 job. They were (not anymore after many of their pilots left for KAL, CAL in 2000) actually convinced that they pay well. The lawyer said, "you are flying a B-737 until the SIA case is over, and then are going to look for a B-747 job".
The facts are actually that after 3.5 years at my present employment I would be making more as a B-737 F/O than a SIA B-777 Captain.
Quality of life concept (most important for me) is not understood by a Singaporean.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 12: Produce all documents relating to any agreement you have entered with any entity regarding employment during the past two years.
RESPONSE to No. 12: No such document exist.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 13: Produce all documents relating to your employment with SIA, including, but not limited to all documents relating to the employment application process, documents you received while an employee, documents you received in connection with safety and flight training, and documents relating to or which you received after termination of your employment with SIA.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 14: Produce all documents relating to damages you have suffered as a result of any alleged act or omission by the plaintiff.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 15: Produce all documents provided to or received from each and every expert witness you intend to call, including, but not limited to, a current resume and list of publications, if any.
RESPONSE to No. 15: XXX objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks discovery of work product and exeeds the scope of discovery under Fed R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 16: Produce all documents identified in or relating to your responses to plaintiff's First Interrogatories that have not been otherwise produced.
End of Request for Production of documents. Next will be REQUEST FOR ADMISSION.
More to follow.
P.S. Nobody likes Whistleblowers.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 1: Produce all documents relating to your claims that the plaintiff violated air safety regulations of either the United States, Singapore or any other international regulatory authority or international convention.
RESPONSE to No. 1: XXX objects to this request on the grounds that it is overly broad and burdensome.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 2: Produce each and every Commercial Pilots License ("CPL") issued by any aviation authority in the world that you have held in the last 20 years.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTIUON No. 3: Produce all documents relating to your past and current authority to operate any aircraft, specifically including, but not limited to, licenses, permits, records of training, flying logs, for every type of aircraft you are licensed or otherwise qualified to operate.
RESPONSE to No. 3: XXX objects on the grounds that it is overly broad and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery and admissible evidence.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 4: Produce all documents relating to your claim that your CPL did not qualify you to relieve the Pilot in Command of any version of the B-747 aircraft.
RESPONSE to No. 4: XXX objects to this request to the extent it calls for production of documents that are available to or in the possession of SIA.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 5: Produce all documents in your possession relating to the authority of a co-pilot or First Officer to operate aircraft under the laws of any jurisdiction, entity or treaty.
RESPONSE to No. 5: Same objection as Request for Production No. 4.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 6: Produce all documents relating to your allegation in paragraph 13 of your answer that the B-747 aircraft were being "phased out."
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 7: Produce all documents relating to SIA's alleged breaches of its contract with you as discussed in Interrogatories No. 10-15.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 8: Produce all documents relating to any of your alleged safety concerns about the operation of SIA aircraft that you provided to any person or entity during the past ten years, including but not limited to SIA, the Singapore Civil Aviation Authority (CAAS), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Singapore Chapter of International Airline Pilots Association or any other union that you were a member of during your employment with SIA.
RESPONSE to No. 8: XXX objects to this request to the extent that it seeks documents generated after the termination of XXX's employment at SIA on the grounds that the request is overly broad and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 9: Produce all documents relating to any "fleet" meetings that you attended while an employee of SIA, including but not limited to any notes taken by you or distributed to you during or after any fleet meetings, any and all newsletters entitled "Megaflash", and copies or originals of any questions that you ever submitted to any SIA officials prior to any "fleet" meetings.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No 10: Produce all documents reflecting any communication between you and any other person regarding alleged safety concerns about the operation of SIA aircraft.
RESPONSE to No. 10: XXX objects to this request to the extent it seeks discovery of documents generated after the termination of XXX's emplyment, on the grounds that the request is overly broad and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 11: Produce any documents related to any effort by you to obtain emplyment with any entity since your resignation from SIA on October 27, 1997, including but not limited to letters, application forms and resumes.
DISCUSSION: In regards to the above request for production, in meetings with SIA lawyers, it became evident that SIA could not understand why I was not seeking a B-747 job. They were (not anymore after many of their pilots left for KAL, CAL in 2000) actually convinced that they pay well. The lawyer said, "you are flying a B-737 until the SIA case is over, and then are going to look for a B-747 job".
The facts are actually that after 3.5 years at my present employment I would be making more as a B-737 F/O than a SIA B-777 Captain.
Quality of life concept (most important for me) is not understood by a Singaporean.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 12: Produce all documents relating to any agreement you have entered with any entity regarding employment during the past two years.
RESPONSE to No. 12: No such document exist.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 13: Produce all documents relating to your employment with SIA, including, but not limited to all documents relating to the employment application process, documents you received while an employee, documents you received in connection with safety and flight training, and documents relating to or which you received after termination of your employment with SIA.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 14: Produce all documents relating to damages you have suffered as a result of any alleged act or omission by the plaintiff.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 15: Produce all documents provided to or received from each and every expert witness you intend to call, including, but not limited to, a current resume and list of publications, if any.
RESPONSE to No. 15: XXX objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks discovery of work product and exeeds the scope of discovery under Fed R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 16: Produce all documents identified in or relating to your responses to plaintiff's First Interrogatories that have not been otherwise produced.
End of Request for Production of documents. Next will be REQUEST FOR ADMISSION.
More to follow.
P.S. Nobody likes Whistleblowers.
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The following are SIA request for admission by XXX. It is going to get good.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 1: Admit that the document attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of a letter dated June 18, 1991, from Singapore Airlines, Ltd. to you, offering you employment with Singapore Airlines, Ltd.
Response to No 1: Admit
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 2: Admit that on June 28, 1991 you signed Singapore Airline's, Ltd's offer letter (Exhibit 1) thereby accepting employment with Singapore Airlines, Ltd.
Response to No. 2: See General Objections 2 and 3. This request for admission calls for legal conclusions concerning "accepting employment", as well as the documents constituting the contractual agreement between the parties. Subject to and without waiving these objections, XXX answers as follows:
XXX admits that he signed the June 18, 1991 offer letter (Exhibit 1) on June 28, 1991, confirming his acceptance of employment. See answer to Request for Admission No. 3.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 3: Admit that by signing the offer letter (Exhibit 1) you agreed to accept employment with Singapore Airlines, Ltd. under the terms and conditions set forth in the offer letter.
Response to No. 3: See general Objections 2 and 3. Subject to and without waiving these objections, XXX answers as follows:
Deny. XXX accepted employment as a Cadet Pilot for training and qualification as a First Officer (Co-pilot) only, under the terms and conditions of the offer letter (Exhibit 1) and Agreement for a Course of Training (Exhibit 2), the 1995 Agreement between Singapore Airlines and ALPA-Singapore, and the CPL issued to XXX by Civil Aviation Authority Singapore ("CAAS").
XXX's employment was also governed by applicable avaiation safety laws and standards, (including, without limitation, international safety standards embodied in Annex 1 and Annex 6, Part 1 to the ICA Convention, and FAA regulations).
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 4: Admit that one of the terms and conditions in the offer letter (Exhibit 1), provided for you to enter into an agreement with Singapore Airlines, Ltd. providing, among other things, for you to remain in the service of Singapore Airlines, Ltd. for a minimum period of seven years from the date of your employment as a First Officer by Singapore Airlines, Ltd.
Response to No 4: See General Objections 2 and 3> This request for admission calls for legal conclusion concerning contractual terms and conditions. Subject to and without waiving these objections, XX answers as follows:
Admit that XXX agreed to remain in service at
SIA for seven years after his appointment as a First officer, provided that SIA complied with its contractual duties, Singapore employment laws and applicable avaiation safety laws and standards (including, without limitation, international safety standards embodied in Annex 1 and Annex 6, Part 1 to the ICA Convention, and FAA regulations.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 5: Admit that the offer letter (Exhibit 1) provided that disputes between you and Singapore Airlines, Ltd. over your employment were to be governed by the laws of Singapore.
Response to No. 5: See General Objections 2 and 3. This request for admission calls for legal conclusion relating to the interpretation of the offer letter, (Exhibit 1). Subject to and without waiving these objections, XXX answers as follows:
Deny. Paragraph 6 of Exhibit 1 does not mention disputes. It states that "The applicable law for the purpose of your contract of employment will be the laws of Singapore".
Issues and disputes regarding SIA's unsafe operating unsafe operating practices are governed by applicable aviation laws and standards, (including without limitation, international safety standards embodied in Annex 1 and Annex 6, Part 1 to the ICA Convention, and FAA regulations.)
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 6: Admit that the document attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of a contract entitled "AN AGREEMENT FOR A COURSE OF TRAINING AT THE EXPENSE OF SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED" (hereinafter "Cadet Pilot Training Agreement") in which you are referred to as "The Trainee".
Response to No. 6: Admit
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 7: Admit that on or about december 27, 1991 you signed the Cadet Pilot Training Agreement (Exhibit 2).
Response to No. 7: Admit
More to follow.
[This message has been edited by Gladiator (edited 27 November 2000).]
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 1: Admit that the document attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of a letter dated June 18, 1991, from Singapore Airlines, Ltd. to you, offering you employment with Singapore Airlines, Ltd.
Response to No 1: Admit
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 2: Admit that on June 28, 1991 you signed Singapore Airline's, Ltd's offer letter (Exhibit 1) thereby accepting employment with Singapore Airlines, Ltd.
Response to No. 2: See General Objections 2 and 3. This request for admission calls for legal conclusions concerning "accepting employment", as well as the documents constituting the contractual agreement between the parties. Subject to and without waiving these objections, XXX answers as follows:
XXX admits that he signed the June 18, 1991 offer letter (Exhibit 1) on June 28, 1991, confirming his acceptance of employment. See answer to Request for Admission No. 3.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 3: Admit that by signing the offer letter (Exhibit 1) you agreed to accept employment with Singapore Airlines, Ltd. under the terms and conditions set forth in the offer letter.
Response to No. 3: See general Objections 2 and 3. Subject to and without waiving these objections, XXX answers as follows:
Deny. XXX accepted employment as a Cadet Pilot for training and qualification as a First Officer (Co-pilot) only, under the terms and conditions of the offer letter (Exhibit 1) and Agreement for a Course of Training (Exhibit 2), the 1995 Agreement between Singapore Airlines and ALPA-Singapore, and the CPL issued to XXX by Civil Aviation Authority Singapore ("CAAS").
XXX's employment was also governed by applicable avaiation safety laws and standards, (including, without limitation, international safety standards embodied in Annex 1 and Annex 6, Part 1 to the ICA Convention, and FAA regulations).
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 4: Admit that one of the terms and conditions in the offer letter (Exhibit 1), provided for you to enter into an agreement with Singapore Airlines, Ltd. providing, among other things, for you to remain in the service of Singapore Airlines, Ltd. for a minimum period of seven years from the date of your employment as a First Officer by Singapore Airlines, Ltd.
Response to No 4: See General Objections 2 and 3> This request for admission calls for legal conclusion concerning contractual terms and conditions. Subject to and without waiving these objections, XX answers as follows:
Admit that XXX agreed to remain in service at
SIA for seven years after his appointment as a First officer, provided that SIA complied with its contractual duties, Singapore employment laws and applicable avaiation safety laws and standards (including, without limitation, international safety standards embodied in Annex 1 and Annex 6, Part 1 to the ICA Convention, and FAA regulations.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 5: Admit that the offer letter (Exhibit 1) provided that disputes between you and Singapore Airlines, Ltd. over your employment were to be governed by the laws of Singapore.
Response to No. 5: See General Objections 2 and 3. This request for admission calls for legal conclusion relating to the interpretation of the offer letter, (Exhibit 1). Subject to and without waiving these objections, XXX answers as follows:
Deny. Paragraph 6 of Exhibit 1 does not mention disputes. It states that "The applicable law for the purpose of your contract of employment will be the laws of Singapore".
Issues and disputes regarding SIA's unsafe operating unsafe operating practices are governed by applicable aviation laws and standards, (including without limitation, international safety standards embodied in Annex 1 and Annex 6, Part 1 to the ICA Convention, and FAA regulations.)
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 6: Admit that the document attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of a contract entitled "AN AGREEMENT FOR A COURSE OF TRAINING AT THE EXPENSE OF SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED" (hereinafter "Cadet Pilot Training Agreement") in which you are referred to as "The Trainee".
Response to No. 6: Admit
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 7: Admit that on or about december 27, 1991 you signed the Cadet Pilot Training Agreement (Exhibit 2).
Response to No. 7: Admit
More to follow.
[This message has been edited by Gladiator (edited 27 November 2000).]
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 8: Admit that the cadet Pilot Training Agreement (Exhibit 2) provides that in exchange for receiving a course of training as cadet pilot at Singapore airlines, Ltd's expense, you agreed to remain in the service of singapore Airlines, Ltd. for a minimum period of seven years from the date you were appointed a first Officer by Singapore Airlines, Ltd.
Response to No. 8: See answer to Request for Admission No. 3.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 9: Admit that the Cadet Pilot Training Agreement (Exhibit 2) provides for sureties to consign the agreement and be held jointly and severally liable on the agreement.
Response to No. 9: See General Objections 2 and 3. XXX further objects on the grounds that the phrase "liable on the agreement" is vague and ambiguous, and the request for admission calls for a legal conclusion regarding alleged surety liability. Subject to and without waiving these objections XXX answers as follows:
Deny. The surety provision is set forth in paragraph 7 of Exhibit 2. Any alleged liability of the sureties was discharged by SIA's breaches of contracts and negligence.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 10: Admit that XXX and XXX signed the cadet )Pilot Agreement (Exhibit 2) as your sureties.
Response to No. 10: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 11: Admit that the clause Seven of the Cadet Pilot Training Agreement (Exhibit 2) provides for a schedule of liquidated damages to be paid to Singapore Airlines, Ltd. by you or the sureties in the event that you were to leave the service of Singapore Airlines, Ltd. without permission prior to seven years after you completed your cadet pilot training and became a First Officer.
Response to No. 10: XXX objects to this Request for Admission because it calls for a legal conclusion regarding the interpretation and legal effect of the liquidated damages clause.
Subject to and without waiving these objections, XXX answers as follows:
Deny. The liquidated damages clause does not apply to XXX's termination of employment due to (a) his being compelled to perform duties beyond those of a First Officer (co-pilot); (b) SIA's unsafe airline operations in violation of aviation safety laws and standards; and/or (c) SIA's wilful and material breaches of contract.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 12: Admit that the Cadet Pilot Training Agreement (Exhibit 2) provides that any disputes between you and Singapore Airlines, Ltd. concerning the agreement are to be governed by the laws of Singapore.
Reponse to No. 12: See Objections 2 and 3, and answer to Request for Admission No. 5. Subject to and without waiving these objections, XXX answers as follows:
Deny. The Cadet Pilot Training agreement states that the "Agreement shall be governed by and construed in an accordance with "Singapore laws". Safety issues and disputes relating to SIA's aircraft are governed by applicable aviation safety laws and standards (including, without limitation, international safety standards embodied in Annex 1 and Annex 6, Part 1 to the ICA Convention, and FAA regulations).
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 13: Admit that on or about February 11, 1993 you successfully completed your cadet pilot Training and were promoted to the rank of First Officer on boeing 747 ("B-747") aircraft.
Response to No. 13: Admit that XXX was promoted to the rank of First Officer (Co-pilot), trained and qualified to perform co-pilot duties only from the right hand seat ("the RHS") of the B-747 aircraft.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 14: Admit that the document attached hereto as exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of a contract entitled "AN AGREEMENT FOR A COURSE OF CONVERSION TRAINING" (hereafter "Conversion Training Agreement") in which you are referred to as "the pilot".
DISCUSSION No. 14: The issue is that the contract stated First Officer (co-pilot). SIA utilized XXX as Captain (pilot-in-command) relief. In admission No. 14 above, SIA is trying hard to play with words, hence, admit that the contract referred to XXX as "the pilot" as apposed to "co-pilot". Therefore it is OK for him to have been other than "co-pilot", he could have been, "Captain relief", etc.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 15: Admit that on or about December 19, 1994 you signed the Conversion Training Agreement (Exhibit 3).
Response to No. 15: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 16: Admit that the Conversion Training Agreement (Exhibit 3) provided that you would undertake a course of training that would, upon completion, qualify you to fly a Boeing 747-400 aircraft.
Response to No. 16: See General Objection 2 and 3. XXX admits that he undertook a course of conversion training on the B747-400 aircraft, to operate only in the capacity of First officer (co-pilot) in the RHS. XXX denies that he undertook a course of training to operate in the capacity of pilot-in-command, or inflight relief assuming the duties of the pilot-in-command on the b747-400 aircraft.
XXX denies that he was qualified to act as a flight crewmember on the B747-400 in any capacity engaged in commercial air transport operations, because he held a Singapore CPL without the demonstrated level of knowledge appropriate to the privileges granted to the holder of an airline transport pilot license ("ATPL") as determined by CAAS. See XXX's answer to Interrogatory No. 6.
DISCUSSION No. 16: In Feb 2000 the FAA summoned CAAS to explain CAAS and SIA's alleged non-compliance of ICAO's minimum international safety standards in regards to pilot licenses as well as other unsafe operations.
Gladiator was present in that meeting held at FAA's international field office in Singapore. Ken Toft represented SIA and CAAS.
CAAS and SIA's responses were:
1- Pilot license issue (80 co-pilots without ATPL or CPL without ATPL exams passed):
"they cannot pass the test, what are we suppose to do with them, fire them?"
2- Co-pilots with CPL only assuming pilot-in-command duties in the LHS during cruise while Captain in the bunkroom:
"what's wrong with that?".
More to follow.
[This message has been edited by Gladiator (edited 28 November 2000).]
Response to No. 8: See answer to Request for Admission No. 3.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 9: Admit that the Cadet Pilot Training Agreement (Exhibit 2) provides for sureties to consign the agreement and be held jointly and severally liable on the agreement.
Response to No. 9: See General Objections 2 and 3. XXX further objects on the grounds that the phrase "liable on the agreement" is vague and ambiguous, and the request for admission calls for a legal conclusion regarding alleged surety liability. Subject to and without waiving these objections XXX answers as follows:
Deny. The surety provision is set forth in paragraph 7 of Exhibit 2. Any alleged liability of the sureties was discharged by SIA's breaches of contracts and negligence.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 10: Admit that XXX and XXX signed the cadet )Pilot Agreement (Exhibit 2) as your sureties.
Response to No. 10: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 11: Admit that the clause Seven of the Cadet Pilot Training Agreement (Exhibit 2) provides for a schedule of liquidated damages to be paid to Singapore Airlines, Ltd. by you or the sureties in the event that you were to leave the service of Singapore Airlines, Ltd. without permission prior to seven years after you completed your cadet pilot training and became a First Officer.
Response to No. 10: XXX objects to this Request for Admission because it calls for a legal conclusion regarding the interpretation and legal effect of the liquidated damages clause.
Subject to and without waiving these objections, XXX answers as follows:
Deny. The liquidated damages clause does not apply to XXX's termination of employment due to (a) his being compelled to perform duties beyond those of a First Officer (co-pilot); (b) SIA's unsafe airline operations in violation of aviation safety laws and standards; and/or (c) SIA's wilful and material breaches of contract.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 12: Admit that the Cadet Pilot Training Agreement (Exhibit 2) provides that any disputes between you and Singapore Airlines, Ltd. concerning the agreement are to be governed by the laws of Singapore.
Reponse to No. 12: See Objections 2 and 3, and answer to Request for Admission No. 5. Subject to and without waiving these objections, XXX answers as follows:
Deny. The Cadet Pilot Training agreement states that the "Agreement shall be governed by and construed in an accordance with "Singapore laws". Safety issues and disputes relating to SIA's aircraft are governed by applicable aviation safety laws and standards (including, without limitation, international safety standards embodied in Annex 1 and Annex 6, Part 1 to the ICA Convention, and FAA regulations).
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 13: Admit that on or about February 11, 1993 you successfully completed your cadet pilot Training and were promoted to the rank of First Officer on boeing 747 ("B-747") aircraft.
Response to No. 13: Admit that XXX was promoted to the rank of First Officer (Co-pilot), trained and qualified to perform co-pilot duties only from the right hand seat ("the RHS") of the B-747 aircraft.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 14: Admit that the document attached hereto as exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of a contract entitled "AN AGREEMENT FOR A COURSE OF CONVERSION TRAINING" (hereafter "Conversion Training Agreement") in which you are referred to as "the pilot".
DISCUSSION No. 14: The issue is that the contract stated First Officer (co-pilot). SIA utilized XXX as Captain (pilot-in-command) relief. In admission No. 14 above, SIA is trying hard to play with words, hence, admit that the contract referred to XXX as "the pilot" as apposed to "co-pilot". Therefore it is OK for him to have been other than "co-pilot", he could have been, "Captain relief", etc.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 15: Admit that on or about December 19, 1994 you signed the Conversion Training Agreement (Exhibit 3).
Response to No. 15: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 16: Admit that the Conversion Training Agreement (Exhibit 3) provided that you would undertake a course of training that would, upon completion, qualify you to fly a Boeing 747-400 aircraft.
Response to No. 16: See General Objection 2 and 3. XXX admits that he undertook a course of conversion training on the B747-400 aircraft, to operate only in the capacity of First officer (co-pilot) in the RHS. XXX denies that he undertook a course of training to operate in the capacity of pilot-in-command, or inflight relief assuming the duties of the pilot-in-command on the b747-400 aircraft.
XXX denies that he was qualified to act as a flight crewmember on the B747-400 in any capacity engaged in commercial air transport operations, because he held a Singapore CPL without the demonstrated level of knowledge appropriate to the privileges granted to the holder of an airline transport pilot license ("ATPL") as determined by CAAS. See XXX's answer to Interrogatory No. 6.
DISCUSSION No. 16: In Feb 2000 the FAA summoned CAAS to explain CAAS and SIA's alleged non-compliance of ICAO's minimum international safety standards in regards to pilot licenses as well as other unsafe operations.
Gladiator was present in that meeting held at FAA's international field office in Singapore. Ken Toft represented SIA and CAAS.
CAAS and SIA's responses were:
1- Pilot license issue (80 co-pilots without ATPL or CPL without ATPL exams passed):
"they cannot pass the test, what are we suppose to do with them, fire them?"
2- Co-pilots with CPL only assuming pilot-in-command duties in the LHS during cruise while Captain in the bunkroom:
"what's wrong with that?".
More to follow.
[This message has been edited by Gladiator (edited 28 November 2000).]
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 17: Admit that pursuant to Clause 4 of the Conversion Training Agreement (Exhibit 3), you agreed to remain in the service of Singapore Airlines, Ltd. for a period of 3 years after you became qualified to fly the Boeing 747-400 aircraft.
Response to No. 17: See General Objections 2 and 3. The request for admission calls for legal conclusion regarding the Conversion Training Agreement. Subject to and without waiving these objections, XXX answers as follows:
Deny. The Conversion Training Agreement states that XXX shall remain in the service of SIA for a period of seven years from the date that his license was endorsed to allow him to operate in the appropriate capacity. XXX was never qualified to act as a flight crewmember on the B747-400 aircraft, and was not trained or qualified to operate in a capacity beyond that of a First Officer (co-pilot) trained in the RHS.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 18: Admit that Clause 5 of the Conversion Training Agreement (Exhibit 3) sets forth a schedule of liquidated damages to be paid by you to Singapore Airlines Ltd. in the event that you were to leave the service of Singapore Airlines, Ltd. before the end of the 3 year period identified in Clause 4 of the Conversion Training Agreement.
Response to No. 18: See General Objections 2 and 3. The request for admission calls for legal conclusion regarding the liquidated damages provision. Subject to and without waiving these objections, XXX answers as follows:
Deny. The liquidated damages clause only applied to XXX’s leaving his service as First officer (co-pilot) prior to seven years after his appointment. XXX denies that the liquidated damages applies to a voluntary resignation due to (a) his being compelled to perform duties beyond those of a First Officer (co-pilot); (b) SIA’s unsafe airline operations in violation of applicable aviation laws and standards (including, without limitation, international safety standards embodied in Annex 1, and Annex 6, Part 1 to the ICA Convension and FAA regulations); and/or (c) SIA’s wilful and material breaches of contract.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 19: Admit that you completed your training under the Conversion Training Agreement (Exhibit 3).
Response to No. 19: XXX admits that he undertook the course of conversion training on the Boeing B747-400 aircraft, but only in the capacity of First Officer (co-pilot) operating from the RHS, and only to undertake co-pilot responsibilities. XXX denies that he was qualified to act as a flight crewmember in any capacity on the B747-400 commercial air transport operations, and further denies that he was trained or qualified to assume the duties of pilot-in-command without supervision. See XXX’s answer to Interrogatory No. 6.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 20: Admit that on January 12, 1995 your pilot’s license was endorsed to allow you to fly the Boeing 747-400 aircraft.
Response to No. 20: Deny. The endorsement of XXX’s Singaporean CPL license to fly the B747-400 was invalid because the endorsement was not in accordance with Annex 1 (Personnel Licensing) of ICAO. In order to operate as a flight crewmember, on the B747-400 aircraft, XXX was required to possess (1) a Singaporean CPL with ATPL exams as accepted by CAAS, or (2) a Singaporean ATPL.
Moreover, XXX was trained and qualified only to operate as a First Officer (co-pilot), performing co-pilot duties only in the RHS. See XXX’s answer to Interrogatory No. 6.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 21: Admit that the document attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a waiver (hereinafter “Waiver” pertaining to the Conversion Training Agreement (Exhibit 3).
Response to No. 21: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 22: Admit that you signed the “Waiver” (Exhibit 4) on or about November 22, 1994.
Response to No. 22: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 23: Admit that by the signature on the Waiver (Exhibit 4), you requested that Singapore Airlines, Ltd. waive any requirements providing for sureties to cosign your Conversion Training Agreement (Exhibit 3).
Response to No. 23: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 24: Admit that the date of your resignation was less than seven years from the date that you were initially appointed as a First Officer by Singapore Airlines, Ltd.
Response to No. 24: Deny. Due to SIA’s wilful and material breaches of contract, and violation of applicable aviation safety laws and standards, XXX exercised his rights under Singapore employment law to terminate his contracts of service without notice less than seven years from the date he was initially appointed as First Officer by SIA.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 25: Admit that the date of your resignation was less than three years from the date January 12, 1995.
Response to No. 25: Deny. Due to SIA’s wilful and material breaches of contract, and violation of applicable aviation laws and standards, XXX exercised his rights under Singapore employment law to terminate his contracts of service without notice less than three years from January 12, 1995.
More to follow.
Response to No. 17: See General Objections 2 and 3. The request for admission calls for legal conclusion regarding the Conversion Training Agreement. Subject to and without waiving these objections, XXX answers as follows:
Deny. The Conversion Training Agreement states that XXX shall remain in the service of SIA for a period of seven years from the date that his license was endorsed to allow him to operate in the appropriate capacity. XXX was never qualified to act as a flight crewmember on the B747-400 aircraft, and was not trained or qualified to operate in a capacity beyond that of a First Officer (co-pilot) trained in the RHS.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 18: Admit that Clause 5 of the Conversion Training Agreement (Exhibit 3) sets forth a schedule of liquidated damages to be paid by you to Singapore Airlines Ltd. in the event that you were to leave the service of Singapore Airlines, Ltd. before the end of the 3 year period identified in Clause 4 of the Conversion Training Agreement.
Response to No. 18: See General Objections 2 and 3. The request for admission calls for legal conclusion regarding the liquidated damages provision. Subject to and without waiving these objections, XXX answers as follows:
Deny. The liquidated damages clause only applied to XXX’s leaving his service as First officer (co-pilot) prior to seven years after his appointment. XXX denies that the liquidated damages applies to a voluntary resignation due to (a) his being compelled to perform duties beyond those of a First Officer (co-pilot); (b) SIA’s unsafe airline operations in violation of applicable aviation laws and standards (including, without limitation, international safety standards embodied in Annex 1, and Annex 6, Part 1 to the ICA Convension and FAA regulations); and/or (c) SIA’s wilful and material breaches of contract.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 19: Admit that you completed your training under the Conversion Training Agreement (Exhibit 3).
Response to No. 19: XXX admits that he undertook the course of conversion training on the Boeing B747-400 aircraft, but only in the capacity of First Officer (co-pilot) operating from the RHS, and only to undertake co-pilot responsibilities. XXX denies that he was qualified to act as a flight crewmember in any capacity on the B747-400 commercial air transport operations, and further denies that he was trained or qualified to assume the duties of pilot-in-command without supervision. See XXX’s answer to Interrogatory No. 6.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 20: Admit that on January 12, 1995 your pilot’s license was endorsed to allow you to fly the Boeing 747-400 aircraft.
Response to No. 20: Deny. The endorsement of XXX’s Singaporean CPL license to fly the B747-400 was invalid because the endorsement was not in accordance with Annex 1 (Personnel Licensing) of ICAO. In order to operate as a flight crewmember, on the B747-400 aircraft, XXX was required to possess (1) a Singaporean CPL with ATPL exams as accepted by CAAS, or (2) a Singaporean ATPL.
Moreover, XXX was trained and qualified only to operate as a First Officer (co-pilot), performing co-pilot duties only in the RHS. See XXX’s answer to Interrogatory No. 6.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 21: Admit that the document attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a waiver (hereinafter “Waiver”
pertaining to the Conversion Training Agreement (Exhibit 3).Response to No. 21: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 22: Admit that you signed the “Waiver” (Exhibit 4) on or about November 22, 1994.
Response to No. 22: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 23: Admit that by the signature on the Waiver (Exhibit 4), you requested that Singapore Airlines, Ltd. waive any requirements providing for sureties to cosign your Conversion Training Agreement (Exhibit 3).
Response to No. 23: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 24: Admit that the date of your resignation was less than seven years from the date that you were initially appointed as a First Officer by Singapore Airlines, Ltd.
Response to No. 24: Deny. Due to SIA’s wilful and material breaches of contract, and violation of applicable aviation safety laws and standards, XXX exercised his rights under Singapore employment law to terminate his contracts of service without notice less than seven years from the date he was initially appointed as First Officer by SIA.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 25: Admit that the date of your resignation was less than three years from the date January 12, 1995.
Response to No. 25: Deny. Due to SIA’s wilful and material breaches of contract, and violation of applicable aviation laws and standards, XXX exercised his rights under Singapore employment law to terminate his contracts of service without notice less than three years from January 12, 1995.
More to follow.
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION No. 26: Admit that due to the training given to you by Singapore Airlines, Ltd., at the expense of Singapore Airlines, Ltd., you became qualified to fly the B747-300 aircraft and the Boeing 747-400 aircraft.
Response to No. 26: XXX objects to the use of the term “fly”, without reference to the capacity or duty station, as vague and ambiguous. Subject to and without waiving this objection, XXX answers as follows:
XXX admits that he became qualified to fly B-747 )200/300) aircraft only in the capacity of First Officer (co-pilot) from the co-pilot’s duty station, the RHS only, with a Singaporean CPL and a restricted type rating. XXX undertook a course of training to operate on the B747-400 aircraft as a co-pilot from the RHS only, but was never qualified to act as a crewmember on the B747-400 for commercial air transport operations because he only held a Singaporean CPL and a restricted type rating. Annex 1 of ICAO (Personnel Licensing) to the ICA Convention requires the co-pilot on B747-400 to hold CPL with ATPL exams as accepted by CAAS, or a Singaporean ATPL. See XXX’s answer to Interrogatory No. 6.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 27: Admit that without the training given to you by Singapore Airlines, Ltd., and at Singapore Airlines, Ltd.’s expense, you would not have been able to flt B747-300 or B747-400 aircraft for Singapore Airlines, Ltd.
Response to No. 27: XXX objects to the use of the term “fly”, without reference to the capacity or duty station, as vague and ambiguous. Subject to and without waiving this objection, XXX answers as follows:
Admit that SIA required XXX to train on the aircraft with which SIA conducts commercial air transport operations. SIA trained XXX to operate the B-747 (200/300) as First officer (co-pilot) from the co-pilot’s duty station, the RHS only. SIA required XXX to undertake a course of training on the b747-400 as first officer (co-pilot), from the RHS only, but XXX was never qualified to act as a crewmember on the B747-400 because he only held a singaporean CPL with a restricted type rating. Annex 1 of ICAO (personnel Licensing) required XXX to have held a Singaporean CPL with ATPL exams as accepted by CAAS, or a Singaporean ATPL. See XXX’s answer to Interrogatory No. 6.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 28: Admit that the document attached hereto as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of the resignation letter you submitted to Singapore Airlines, Ltd. on or about October 27, 1997.
Response to No. 28: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 29: Admit that in submitting the document attached hereto as Exhibit 5 to Singapore Airlines, Ltd., you told Singapore Airlines, Ltd that you were resigning from Singapore Airlines, Ltd. due to personal circumstances.
Response to No. 29: See general Objections 2 and 3. Subject to and without waiving these objection, XXX answers as follows:
Admit that Exhibit 5 advised SIA that XXX was resigning due to personal circumstances, which were as follows:
XXX was not willing to continue operating SIA aircraft engaging in unsafe aircraft and commercial air transport operations, or to perform duties beyond his capacity as First Officer (co-pilot) operating in the RHS.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 30: Admit that the document attached hereto as Exhibit 5, says nothing about any of your alleged safety concerns related to the operation of Singapore Airlines, Ltd. aircraft.
Response to No. 30: See General Objection 3. XXX further objects to the phrase “says nothing about” as vague and ambiguous. Subject to and without waiving these objections, XXX answers as follows:
Deny. See XXX’s answer to Interrogatory No. 6.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 31: Admit that the document attached hereto as Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of a letter dated October 29, 1997 that you received from Singapore Airlines, Ltd.
Response to No. 31: Admit.
DISCUSSION No. 31: Exhibit 6 is a letter from SIA. The letter says, “Pay money to us, pay us US$ 105,000”. Basically PAP (Pay And Pay).
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 32: Admit that the document attached hereto as Exhibit 7 is a true and correct copy of a letter dated December 2, 1997 that you received from Singapore Airlines, Ltd.
Response to No. 32: Admit (more PAP letters).
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 33: Admit that the document attached hereto as Exhibit 8 is a true and correct copy of a letter dated February 18, 1998 that you received from Singapore airlines, Ltd.
Response to No. 33: Admit (more PAP letters).
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 34: Admit that in each of Exhibits 6, 7 and 8 attached hereto, Singapore Airlines, Ltd. requested that you pay to it sums owed by you to Singapore Airlines, Ltd. under the cadet Pilot Training Agreement and the Conversion Training Agreement.
Response to No. 34: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 35; Admit that you have never requested that the sureties to the Cadet Pilot Training Agreement (Exhibit 2) make payments to Singapore Airlines, Ltd. under that agreement.
Response to No. 35: Admit.
More to follow.
Response to No. 26: XXX objects to the use of the term “fly”, without reference to the capacity or duty station, as vague and ambiguous. Subject to and without waiving this objection, XXX answers as follows:
XXX admits that he became qualified to fly B-747 )200/300) aircraft only in the capacity of First Officer (co-pilot) from the co-pilot’s duty station, the RHS only, with a Singaporean CPL and a restricted type rating. XXX undertook a course of training to operate on the B747-400 aircraft as a co-pilot from the RHS only, but was never qualified to act as a crewmember on the B747-400 for commercial air transport operations because he only held a Singaporean CPL and a restricted type rating. Annex 1 of ICAO (Personnel Licensing) to the ICA Convention requires the co-pilot on B747-400 to hold CPL with ATPL exams as accepted by CAAS, or a Singaporean ATPL. See XXX’s answer to Interrogatory No. 6.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 27: Admit that without the training given to you by Singapore Airlines, Ltd., and at Singapore Airlines, Ltd.’s expense, you would not have been able to flt B747-300 or B747-400 aircraft for Singapore Airlines, Ltd.
Response to No. 27: XXX objects to the use of the term “fly”, without reference to the capacity or duty station, as vague and ambiguous. Subject to and without waiving this objection, XXX answers as follows:
Admit that SIA required XXX to train on the aircraft with which SIA conducts commercial air transport operations. SIA trained XXX to operate the B-747 (200/300) as First officer (co-pilot) from the co-pilot’s duty station, the RHS only. SIA required XXX to undertake a course of training on the b747-400 as first officer (co-pilot), from the RHS only, but XXX was never qualified to act as a crewmember on the B747-400 because he only held a singaporean CPL with a restricted type rating. Annex 1 of ICAO (personnel Licensing) required XXX to have held a Singaporean CPL with ATPL exams as accepted by CAAS, or a Singaporean ATPL. See XXX’s answer to Interrogatory No. 6.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 28: Admit that the document attached hereto as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of the resignation letter you submitted to Singapore Airlines, Ltd. on or about October 27, 1997.
Response to No. 28: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 29: Admit that in submitting the document attached hereto as Exhibit 5 to Singapore Airlines, Ltd., you told Singapore Airlines, Ltd that you were resigning from Singapore Airlines, Ltd. due to personal circumstances.
Response to No. 29: See general Objections 2 and 3. Subject to and without waiving these objection, XXX answers as follows:
Admit that Exhibit 5 advised SIA that XXX was resigning due to personal circumstances, which were as follows:
XXX was not willing to continue operating SIA aircraft engaging in unsafe aircraft and commercial air transport operations, or to perform duties beyond his capacity as First Officer (co-pilot) operating in the RHS.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 30: Admit that the document attached hereto as Exhibit 5, says nothing about any of your alleged safety concerns related to the operation of Singapore Airlines, Ltd. aircraft.
Response to No. 30: See General Objection 3. XXX further objects to the phrase “says nothing about” as vague and ambiguous. Subject to and without waiving these objections, XXX answers as follows:
Deny. See XXX’s answer to Interrogatory No. 6.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 31: Admit that the document attached hereto as Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of a letter dated October 29, 1997 that you received from Singapore Airlines, Ltd.
Response to No. 31: Admit.
DISCUSSION No. 31: Exhibit 6 is a letter from SIA. The letter says, “Pay money to us, pay us US$ 105,000”. Basically PAP (Pay And Pay).
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 32: Admit that the document attached hereto as Exhibit 7 is a true and correct copy of a letter dated December 2, 1997 that you received from Singapore Airlines, Ltd.
Response to No. 32: Admit (more PAP letters).
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 33: Admit that the document attached hereto as Exhibit 8 is a true and correct copy of a letter dated February 18, 1998 that you received from Singapore airlines, Ltd.
Response to No. 33: Admit (more PAP letters).
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 34: Admit that in each of Exhibits 6, 7 and 8 attached hereto, Singapore Airlines, Ltd. requested that you pay to it sums owed by you to Singapore Airlines, Ltd. under the cadet Pilot Training Agreement and the Conversion Training Agreement.
Response to No. 34: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 35; Admit that you have never requested that the sureties to the Cadet Pilot Training Agreement (Exhibit 2) make payments to Singapore Airlines, Ltd. under that agreement.
Response to No. 35: Admit.
More to follow.
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 36: Admit that you never expressed any safety concerns or issues related to the operation of Singapore airlines, Ltd. aircraft to any person or entity prior to your resignation from Singapore Airlines, Ltd. on October 27, 1997.
Response to No. 36: Deny. As described in XXX’s answer to Interrogatory No. 9, XXX expressed safety concerns and issues to SIA on numerous occasions.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 37: Admit that you never expressed safety concerns or issues related to the operation of singapore airlines, Ltd. aircraft to any official affiliated with the Singapore Chapter of the International Airline Pilots Association or any other union of which you were a member while employed by Singapore Airlines, Ltd.
Response to No. 37: Admit that XXX did not complain to officials of any union due to lack of whistleblower protection laws for pilots in Singapore.
DISCUSSION No. 37: ALPA-Singapore is a joke. ALPA-Singapore gives the impression of a union and democracy, however it is only for show.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 38: Admit that Singapore Airlines, Ltd. pilots regularly had an opportunity to raise any issues, including safety concerns, with Singapore Airlines, Ltd. through written questions or written comments submitted to Singapore Airlines, Ltd. officials prior to “fleet meetings” and through verbal questions or comments at fleet meetings.
Response to No. 38: XXX objects to the term “opportunity” as vague and ambiguous. Subject to the objection, XXX answers as follows:
Deny. Under Singapore culture and system, criticism, even though constructive is not welcome. Confidentiality is not respected within the system. Raising safety issues would have eliminated the possibility of any future promotions at SIA, particularly since XXX was a foreigner. As a foreigner, XXX did not even have voting privileges in the union. Criticizing the SIA system would have undermined XXX’s merit. If he had refused to fly due to safety concerns, he would have been diciplined, or terminated. See “Agreement between Singapore Airlines and ALPA-Singapore 1995” (Page 7).
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 39: Admit that if you had submitted written comments or questions to Singapore Airlines, Ltd. prior to “fleet meetings” you could have done so anonymously.
Response to No. 39: Admit. XXX did, in fact, submit comments regarding safety concerns to the Director of Flight Operations. See answer to Interrogatory No. 9.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 40: Admit that the document attached hereto as Exhibit 9 is a true and correct copy of a letter dated December 10, 1998 that you wrote to Mr. XXX (SIA lawyer).
Response to No. 40: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 41: Admit that on Singapore Airlines, Ltd. flights in which you were member of a “two pilot crew,” the flight crew consisted of a Captain and First officer.
Response to No. 41: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 42: Admit that on Singapore Airlines, Ltd. flights in which you were a member of a “three pilot” crew, the flight crew consisted of a Captain and two First Officers or two Captain and a First officer.
Response to No. 42: Deny. A “three pilot crew” consists of one Captain and two First Officers (co-pilots). An “augmented crew” consists of two Captains and one First Officer (co-pilot).
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 43: Admit that the flights listed in your letter to XXX (SIA lawyer) (Exhibit 9) were all flights that operated with “3-pilot crews”.
Response to No. 43: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 44: Admit that on all the flights listed in Exhibit 9, the Captain normally sat in the left-hand seat in the cockpit and the co-pilot sat in the right-hand seat in the cockpit.
Response to No. 44: Deny. The Captain (pilot-in-command) went to the bunkroom for 1/3 of the flight time, while another co-pilot occupied the Captain’s (pilot-in-command) duty station, the LHS.
More to follow.
Response to No. 36: Deny. As described in XXX’s answer to Interrogatory No. 9, XXX expressed safety concerns and issues to SIA on numerous occasions.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 37: Admit that you never expressed safety concerns or issues related to the operation of singapore airlines, Ltd. aircraft to any official affiliated with the Singapore Chapter of the International Airline Pilots Association or any other union of which you were a member while employed by Singapore Airlines, Ltd.
Response to No. 37: Admit that XXX did not complain to officials of any union due to lack of whistleblower protection laws for pilots in Singapore.
DISCUSSION No. 37: ALPA-Singapore is a joke. ALPA-Singapore gives the impression of a union and democracy, however it is only for show.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 38: Admit that Singapore Airlines, Ltd. pilots regularly had an opportunity to raise any issues, including safety concerns, with Singapore Airlines, Ltd. through written questions or written comments submitted to Singapore Airlines, Ltd. officials prior to “fleet meetings” and through verbal questions or comments at fleet meetings.
Response to No. 38: XXX objects to the term “opportunity” as vague and ambiguous. Subject to the objection, XXX answers as follows:
Deny. Under Singapore culture and system, criticism, even though constructive is not welcome. Confidentiality is not respected within the system. Raising safety issues would have eliminated the possibility of any future promotions at SIA, particularly since XXX was a foreigner. As a foreigner, XXX did not even have voting privileges in the union. Criticizing the SIA system would have undermined XXX’s merit. If he had refused to fly due to safety concerns, he would have been diciplined, or terminated. See “Agreement between Singapore Airlines and ALPA-Singapore 1995” (Page 7).
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 39: Admit that if you had submitted written comments or questions to Singapore Airlines, Ltd. prior to “fleet meetings” you could have done so anonymously.
Response to No. 39: Admit. XXX did, in fact, submit comments regarding safety concerns to the Director of Flight Operations. See answer to Interrogatory No. 9.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 40: Admit that the document attached hereto as Exhibit 9 is a true and correct copy of a letter dated December 10, 1998 that you wrote to Mr. XXX (SIA lawyer).
Response to No. 40: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 41: Admit that on Singapore Airlines, Ltd. flights in which you were member of a “two pilot crew,” the flight crew consisted of a Captain and First officer.
Response to No. 41: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 42: Admit that on Singapore Airlines, Ltd. flights in which you were a member of a “three pilot” crew, the flight crew consisted of a Captain and two First Officers or two Captain and a First officer.
Response to No. 42: Deny. A “three pilot crew” consists of one Captain and two First Officers (co-pilots). An “augmented crew” consists of two Captains and one First Officer (co-pilot).
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 43: Admit that the flights listed in your letter to XXX (SIA lawyer) (Exhibit 9) were all flights that operated with “3-pilot crews”.
Response to No. 43: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 44: Admit that on all the flights listed in Exhibit 9, the Captain normally sat in the left-hand seat in the cockpit and the co-pilot sat in the right-hand seat in the cockpit.
Response to No. 44: Deny. The Captain (pilot-in-command) went to the bunkroom for 1/3 of the flight time, while another co-pilot occupied the Captain’s (pilot-in-command) duty station, the LHS.
More to follow.
Guest
Posts: n/a
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 45: Admit that on the flights listed in Exhibit 9, if the Captain vacated the left hand seat or the cockpit, the co-pilot situated in the right hand seat became the pilot flying the aircraft during the captain’s absence.
Response to No. 45: Deny. On the flights listed in Exhibit 9, when the Captain (pilot-in-command) vacated the LHS, he did so for the purpose of taking inflight rest and/or relief in the bunkroom. During the Captain’s absence, another co-pilot occupied the pilot-in-command’s duty station, the LHS.
SIA’s Flight Administration Manual page 3.39.1 states:
“In the event of an emergency, the third pilot, if he is in the left hand seat, shall be the pilot not flying”.
Therefore, according to SIA’s Flight Administration Manual, the co-pilot in the LHS can be the pilot flying unless there is an emergency, in which case the co-pilot in the pilot-in-command’s duty station, the LHS, would be the pilot not flying, and would therefore carry out the emergency procedures from a seat in which he has not received emergency procedure training.
DISCUSSION No. 45: In all the legal paper work having gone back and forth, SIA has denied and or avoided the issue of co-pilots in the Captain (pilot-in-command) seat/duty station. Watch how they avoid it again in request for admission No. 46.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 46: Admit that on the flights listed in Exhibit 9, if the Captain vacated the left-hand seat or the cockpit, the third pilot could assist the co-pilot in monitoring the flight and operations of the aircraft from the Observer’s seat.
Response to No. 46: XXX objects to the term “could” as calling for speculation. Subject to and without waiving these objections, XXX answers as follows:
On the flights listed in Exhibit 9, during 3-pilot crew operations, when the Captain (pilot-in-command) vacated his duty station, the LHS, for a period equal to 1/3 of the flight time, the third pilot (another co-pilot), then occupied the Captain’s (pilot-in-command) duty station, the LHS, and performed duties of the pilot-in-command while the Captain took rest and/or relief in the bunkroom.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 47: Admit that on the Singapore Airlines, Ltd. flights listed in Exhibit 9, if the Captain vacated the left-hand seat or the cockpit, the third could, at the Captain’s discretion, sit in the left hand seat, while assisting the co-pilot in monitoring the flight and operations of the aircraft.
Response to No. 47: Deny. On the flights listed in Exhibit 9, the Captain (pilot-in-command) vacated his duty station, the LHS, and left the cockpit or went into the bunkroom for the purpose of rest and/or relief, for a period equal to 1/3 of the flight time. The third pilot, another co-pilot, then occupied the Captain’s (pilot-in-command) duty station, the LHS, and performed duties of the pilot-in-command while the Captain took rest and/ or relief in the bunkroom.
DISCUSSION No. 47: SIA now does not allow co-pilots to occupy the Captain’s (pilot-in-command) duty station, the LHS. More on this later.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 48: Admit that under Singapore airlines, Ltd. operating procedures, if the Captain vacates the left-hand seat or the cockpit, the co-pilot seated in the right-hand seat becaomes the pilot flying the aircraft in the Captain’s absence regardless of whether there is another pilot in the left hand seat in the cockpit or in the First Observer’s seat.
Response to No. 48: Deny. The co-pilot seated in the RHS becomes the pilot flying the aircraft, only if the Captain’s (pilot-in-command) absence from duty station, the LHS, is due to: (a) physiological needs (not including rest and/ or relief outside the cockpit or in the bunkroom); or (b) the performance of duties in connection with the operation of the aeroplane.
See answer to Interrogatory No. 13 and Annex 6, Part 1 to the ICA Convention.
According to SIA’s Flight Administration Manual, if the Captain (pilot-in-command) vacates his duty station, the LHS, for any purpose other than items (a) and (b) above, the co-pilot seated in the RHS is only the pilot flying the aircraft during an emergency. In any event, whether the co-pilot in the RHS becomes the pilot flying during an emergency or not, he has been delegated the responsibility for the operation and safety of the aircraft without the supervision of the pilot-in-command.
RESQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 49: Admit that on the flights listed in Exhibit 9, when the Captain took in-flight relief and vacated the left-hand seat or the cockpit, there was always a co-pilot seated in the right-hand seat of the cockpit.
Response to No. 49: Deny. In the flight listed in Exhibit 9, while the Captain (pilot-in-command) was taking rest and or relief in the bunkroom during the period equal to 1/3 of the flight time, the co-pilot in the RHS were also absent from their duty station, the RHS, sometimes due to physiological needs.
On the flight from SIN to MEL on Dec 21, 1992 (not listed in Exhibit 9), XXX, while only a Second Officer (for North American readers, a S/O at SIA is a F/O under line training as apposed to a Flight Engineer) occupied the First Officer’s (co-pilot) duty station, the RHS, and the flight’s First Officer occupied the pilot-in-command’s duty station, the LHS. (See picture produced by XXX).
On the flight from MEL to SIN on Apr 14, 1993, (also not listed in Exhibit 9), XXX was required to occupy the pilot-in-command’s duty station, the LHS, while another Second Officer occupied the First Officer (co-pilot) duty station, the RHS.
DISCUSSION No. 49: In the above examples of flights on Dec 21, 1992, and Apr 14, 1993, neither pilot behind the controls of the B747-300 were qualified in the duty station occupied.
More to follow.
Response to No. 45: Deny. On the flights listed in Exhibit 9, when the Captain (pilot-in-command) vacated the LHS, he did so for the purpose of taking inflight rest and/or relief in the bunkroom. During the Captain’s absence, another co-pilot occupied the pilot-in-command’s duty station, the LHS.
SIA’s Flight Administration Manual page 3.39.1 states:
“In the event of an emergency, the third pilot, if he is in the left hand seat, shall be the pilot not flying”.
Therefore, according to SIA’s Flight Administration Manual, the co-pilot in the LHS can be the pilot flying unless there is an emergency, in which case the co-pilot in the pilot-in-command’s duty station, the LHS, would be the pilot not flying, and would therefore carry out the emergency procedures from a seat in which he has not received emergency procedure training.
DISCUSSION No. 45: In all the legal paper work having gone back and forth, SIA has denied and or avoided the issue of co-pilots in the Captain (pilot-in-command) seat/duty station. Watch how they avoid it again in request for admission No. 46.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 46: Admit that on the flights listed in Exhibit 9, if the Captain vacated the left-hand seat or the cockpit, the third pilot could assist the co-pilot in monitoring the flight and operations of the aircraft from the Observer’s seat.
Response to No. 46: XXX objects to the term “could” as calling for speculation. Subject to and without waiving these objections, XXX answers as follows:
On the flights listed in Exhibit 9, during 3-pilot crew operations, when the Captain (pilot-in-command) vacated his duty station, the LHS, for a period equal to 1/3 of the flight time, the third pilot (another co-pilot), then occupied the Captain’s (pilot-in-command) duty station, the LHS, and performed duties of the pilot-in-command while the Captain took rest and/or relief in the bunkroom.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 47: Admit that on the Singapore Airlines, Ltd. flights listed in Exhibit 9, if the Captain vacated the left-hand seat or the cockpit, the third could, at the Captain’s discretion, sit in the left hand seat, while assisting the co-pilot in monitoring the flight and operations of the aircraft.
Response to No. 47: Deny. On the flights listed in Exhibit 9, the Captain (pilot-in-command) vacated his duty station, the LHS, and left the cockpit or went into the bunkroom for the purpose of rest and/or relief, for a period equal to 1/3 of the flight time. The third pilot, another co-pilot, then occupied the Captain’s (pilot-in-command) duty station, the LHS, and performed duties of the pilot-in-command while the Captain took rest and/ or relief in the bunkroom.
DISCUSSION No. 47: SIA now does not allow co-pilots to occupy the Captain’s (pilot-in-command) duty station, the LHS. More on this later.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 48: Admit that under Singapore airlines, Ltd. operating procedures, if the Captain vacates the left-hand seat or the cockpit, the co-pilot seated in the right-hand seat becaomes the pilot flying the aircraft in the Captain’s absence regardless of whether there is another pilot in the left hand seat in the cockpit or in the First Observer’s seat.
Response to No. 48: Deny. The co-pilot seated in the RHS becomes the pilot flying the aircraft, only if the Captain’s (pilot-in-command) absence from duty station, the LHS, is due to: (a) physiological needs (not including rest and/ or relief outside the cockpit or in the bunkroom); or (b) the performance of duties in connection with the operation of the aeroplane.
See answer to Interrogatory No. 13 and Annex 6, Part 1 to the ICA Convention.
According to SIA’s Flight Administration Manual, if the Captain (pilot-in-command) vacates his duty station, the LHS, for any purpose other than items (a) and (b) above, the co-pilot seated in the RHS is only the pilot flying the aircraft during an emergency. In any event, whether the co-pilot in the RHS becomes the pilot flying during an emergency or not, he has been delegated the responsibility for the operation and safety of the aircraft without the supervision of the pilot-in-command.
RESQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 49: Admit that on the flights listed in Exhibit 9, when the Captain took in-flight relief and vacated the left-hand seat or the cockpit, there was always a co-pilot seated in the right-hand seat of the cockpit.
Response to No. 49: Deny. In the flight listed in Exhibit 9, while the Captain (pilot-in-command) was taking rest and or relief in the bunkroom during the period equal to 1/3 of the flight time, the co-pilot in the RHS were also absent from their duty station, the RHS, sometimes due to physiological needs.
On the flight from SIN to MEL on Dec 21, 1992 (not listed in Exhibit 9), XXX, while only a Second Officer (for North American readers, a S/O at SIA is a F/O under line training as apposed to a Flight Engineer) occupied the First Officer’s (co-pilot) duty station, the RHS, and the flight’s First Officer occupied the pilot-in-command’s duty station, the LHS. (See picture produced by XXX).
On the flight from MEL to SIN on Apr 14, 1993, (also not listed in Exhibit 9), XXX was required to occupy the pilot-in-command’s duty station, the LHS, while another Second Officer occupied the First Officer (co-pilot) duty station, the RHS.
DISCUSSION No. 49: In the above examples of flights on Dec 21, 1992, and Apr 14, 1993, neither pilot behind the controls of the B747-300 were qualified in the duty station occupied.
More to follow.
Guest
Posts: n/a
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No.50: Admit that under Singapore Airlines, Ltd. training procedures, a First Officer flying as a co-pilot is trained to handle any non-normal or emergency procedures without a Captain's assistance, and while seated in the LHS, in the event the Captain is incapacitated or unavailable.
Response to No. 50: Deny. Under SIA's training procedures, a First Officer's capacity cannot be anything other than a co-pilot. Assuming the co-pilot's license complies with Annex 1 of ICAO (Personnel Licensing), under SIA's training procedures, co-pilots such as XXX are not trained to handle any non-normal and/or emergency procedures without the Captain's assistance in the event the Captain is incapacitated or unavailable.
The Captain incapacitation training did not include non-normal and/or emergency procedures and training. XXX was not trained to execute non-normal and or emergency procedures during Captain (pilot-in-command) incapacitation training/exercises.
Under SIA's training procedures, XXX was trained to handle the aircraft without the assistance of the Captain (pilot-in-command) only while the aircraft operated without any non-normal or emergency condition, and within the airport traffic area only (approximately a 5 nautical mile radius of the airport).
Captain incapacitation training included a normal takeoff, during which time the Captain becomes incapacitated during the latter part of the take-off roll or shortly after liftoff. The co-pilot then takes over the controls, declares an emergency with air traffic control, follows radar vectors (compass headings given by air traffic control), and makes a circuit in order to return and land.
During this time, the co-pilot calls the lead flight attendant to the cockpit, asks the flight attendant to lock the Captain's seat belt strap (so the Captain will not be able to lean forward by the force of gravity and interfere with the controls). No part of the pilot incapacitation training included non-normal or emergency procedures.
SIA did not ensure that XXX's piloting technique and his ability to execute non-normal and/or emergency procedures during Captain incapacitation were checked from the co-pilot's duty statiom, the RHS, in such a way as to demostrate XXX's competence. Nor did SIA ensure that XXX's piloting technique and his ability to execute normal, non-normal and/or emergeny procedures was checked from the pilot-in-command's duty station, the LHS, in such a way as to demonstrate XXX's competence.
More to follow.
Response to No. 50: Deny. Under SIA's training procedures, a First Officer's capacity cannot be anything other than a co-pilot. Assuming the co-pilot's license complies with Annex 1 of ICAO (Personnel Licensing), under SIA's training procedures, co-pilots such as XXX are not trained to handle any non-normal and/or emergency procedures without the Captain's assistance in the event the Captain is incapacitated or unavailable.
The Captain incapacitation training did not include non-normal and/or emergency procedures and training. XXX was not trained to execute non-normal and or emergency procedures during Captain (pilot-in-command) incapacitation training/exercises.
Under SIA's training procedures, XXX was trained to handle the aircraft without the assistance of the Captain (pilot-in-command) only while the aircraft operated without any non-normal or emergency condition, and within the airport traffic area only (approximately a 5 nautical mile radius of the airport).
Captain incapacitation training included a normal takeoff, during which time the Captain becomes incapacitated during the latter part of the take-off roll or shortly after liftoff. The co-pilot then takes over the controls, declares an emergency with air traffic control, follows radar vectors (compass headings given by air traffic control), and makes a circuit in order to return and land.
During this time, the co-pilot calls the lead flight attendant to the cockpit, asks the flight attendant to lock the Captain's seat belt strap (so the Captain will not be able to lean forward by the force of gravity and interfere with the controls). No part of the pilot incapacitation training included non-normal or emergency procedures.
SIA did not ensure that XXX's piloting technique and his ability to execute non-normal and/or emergency procedures during Captain incapacitation were checked from the co-pilot's duty statiom, the RHS, in such a way as to demostrate XXX's competence. Nor did SIA ensure that XXX's piloting technique and his ability to execute normal, non-normal and/or emergeny procedures was checked from the pilot-in-command's duty station, the LHS, in such a way as to demonstrate XXX's competence.
More to follow.
Guest
Posts: n/a
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 51: Admit that any First Officer or Captain flying as a co-pilot and seated in the right-hand seat of the cockpit is trained to handle all non-normal or emergency procedures from the right-hand seat of the aircraft.
Response to No. 51: Deny. XXX was not trained as a Captain, and therefore lacks knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny that a Captain flying as co-pilot and seated in the RHS of the cockpit is trained to handle all non-normal and emergency procedures, however during XXX's training on the B747-400, the Captain that trained with XXX from the Captain's (pilot-in-command) duty station, the LHS, did not receive training for no-normal and emergency procedures from the First Officer's (co-pilot) duty station, the RHS. Neither did SIA ensure that (the Captain's) piloting technique and the ability to execute non-normal and emergency procedures in the RHS is checked in such a way as to demonstrate his competence.
XXX also denies this request for admission with respect to his employment as First officer. XXX was trained as First officer (co-pilot) in the RHS on both the B-747 and the B747-400 aircraft to handle all normal, non-normal, and emergency procedures, but only with assistance from the Captain (pilot-in-command) and while the Captain (pilot-in-command) is seated in the pilot-in-command's duty station, the LHS. XXX was not trained to handle any non-normal or emergency procedures while seated in the First Officer (co-pilot) duty station, the RHS, by himself. XXX's training on the B-747 and B747-400 was sufficient to handle normal procedures only from the First Officer (co-pilot) duty station, the RHS, without the assistance of the Captain (pilot-in-command), for a maximum period necessary for the following conditions: (a) physiological needs (excludes rest and or relief outside the cockpit or in the bunkroom); or (b) due to connection with duties necessary for the performance of the aircraft.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 52: Admit that Captains and First Officers are trained to the same standards when training to handle non-normal or emergency situations on Singapore Airlines, Ltd. aircraft.
Response to No. 52: Deny. Captains (pilot-in-command) and First Officers (co-pilots) are not trained to the same standards. Captains receive training in circling maneuvers, co-pilots do not. Captains receive some training in the RHS, the co-pilots do not receive any training whatsoever in the LHS.
Captains (pilots-in-command) and First Officers (co-pilot) are trained in normal, non-normal and emergency procedures, but only from their respective duty stations: (Captain from the LHS, and First Officer (co-pilot) from the RHS), and only with the assistance of the other pilot. That is, First Officer (co-pilot) with the assistance of the Captain (pilot-in-command) seated in the LHS, and the Captain (pilot-in-command) with the assistance of the First Officer (co-pilot) seated in ther RHS.
DISCUSSION No. 51 and 52: As mentioned before, at the time of this post on PPRuNe, SIA no longer allows First Officers (co-pilots) to occupy the Captain's (pilot-in-command) duty station, the LHS. Why is that I wonder?
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 53: Admit that you are a citizen or permanent resident of the United States.
Response to No. 53: Admit.
This concludes all the discovery material requested by SIA.
Next will be discovery material requested from SIA.
Response to No. 51: Deny. XXX was not trained as a Captain, and therefore lacks knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny that a Captain flying as co-pilot and seated in the RHS of the cockpit is trained to handle all non-normal and emergency procedures, however during XXX's training on the B747-400, the Captain that trained with XXX from the Captain's (pilot-in-command) duty station, the LHS, did not receive training for no-normal and emergency procedures from the First Officer's (co-pilot) duty station, the RHS. Neither did SIA ensure that (the Captain's) piloting technique and the ability to execute non-normal and emergency procedures in the RHS is checked in such a way as to demonstrate his competence.
XXX also denies this request for admission with respect to his employment as First officer. XXX was trained as First officer (co-pilot) in the RHS on both the B-747 and the B747-400 aircraft to handle all normal, non-normal, and emergency procedures, but only with assistance from the Captain (pilot-in-command) and while the Captain (pilot-in-command) is seated in the pilot-in-command's duty station, the LHS. XXX was not trained to handle any non-normal or emergency procedures while seated in the First Officer (co-pilot) duty station, the RHS, by himself. XXX's training on the B-747 and B747-400 was sufficient to handle normal procedures only from the First Officer (co-pilot) duty station, the RHS, without the assistance of the Captain (pilot-in-command), for a maximum period necessary for the following conditions: (a) physiological needs (excludes rest and or relief outside the cockpit or in the bunkroom); or (b) due to connection with duties necessary for the performance of the aircraft.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 52: Admit that Captains and First Officers are trained to the same standards when training to handle non-normal or emergency situations on Singapore Airlines, Ltd. aircraft.
Response to No. 52: Deny. Captains (pilot-in-command) and First Officers (co-pilots) are not trained to the same standards. Captains receive training in circling maneuvers, co-pilots do not. Captains receive some training in the RHS, the co-pilots do not receive any training whatsoever in the LHS.
Captains (pilots-in-command) and First Officers (co-pilot) are trained in normal, non-normal and emergency procedures, but only from their respective duty stations: (Captain from the LHS, and First Officer (co-pilot) from the RHS), and only with the assistance of the other pilot. That is, First Officer (co-pilot) with the assistance of the Captain (pilot-in-command) seated in the LHS, and the Captain (pilot-in-command) with the assistance of the First Officer (co-pilot) seated in ther RHS.
DISCUSSION No. 51 and 52: As mentioned before, at the time of this post on PPRuNe, SIA no longer allows First Officers (co-pilots) to occupy the Captain's (pilot-in-command) duty station, the LHS. Why is that I wonder?
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No. 53: Admit that you are a citizen or permanent resident of the United States.
Response to No. 53: Admit.
This concludes all the discovery material requested by SIA.
Next will be discovery material requested from SIA.
