Historical research regarding Master Warnings/Cautions & associated bells & whistles

[BoeingDriver99]

Hi all,

This is a pretty esoteric question: When Mr. Boeing and Monsieur Airbus were designing and building their modern flight decks was much thought given to the Master Warnings and Cautions and how they were presented audibly? I am going to assume they thought about it a lot. But where would I start to get the data on that? The historic or current take on how to design alarms and warnings?

Any thoughts appreciated

[safetypee]

BD 99, valid assumptions:

SAE Committee S-7, Flight Deck and Handling Qualities Standards for Transport Category Aircraft. https://www.sae.org/publications/tec...ontent/801165/

Considerable international cooperation in the 60s-70s, major manufacturers (A, B, BAe, Fokker), discussion with operators, US/World airline groupings, unions, regulators, etc.
Wide ranging discussions generally resulted in operator wish lists vs practical realities. Thus manufacturers did their own thing, which depended on clean sheet approach (A) vs development / retrofit (B), also driven by philosophy.

Notable operational inputs from Higgins, Ziegler, and Wilson.

https://www.dropbox.com/s/g1vzpdie1z...2B%2B.pdf?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/s/bb5zgcnubf...B%20c.pdf?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/s/21i32mrc5o...09410.pdf?dl=0

Much of this thinking is the basis of the relevant sections of FAR / CS 25.1322, AMC 25-11 Electronic Flight Deck Displays, et al

[BoeingDriver99]

Thank you kindly, much to chew on!

[BoeingDriver99]

Safetypee, would you have anything that looks in more detail at design of stimuli in the flight deck environment?

EASA produced an excellent paper on the Startle Effect and it’s referenced at the end of a great article on Skybrary: https://skybrary.aero/articles/startle-effect

I’m working on designing an experiment that can test for startle effect on subjects via computer versus a full STD.

Thanks for your assistance

[safetypee]

BD99, I do not have anything with more detail. I suspect that most of the stimulus aspects were researched by NASA or RAE; their findings were then incorporated in the certification requirements - FAR 25.

Re Startle, I would urge caution.
First differentiate between the cognitive aspects of surprise and fundamental surprise, and a physical reflex action of startle.

Using accident findings to conclude human behaviour is always subjective - after the event.

Similar cautions in use of simulation. It is possible to induce surprise in simulators - a mismatch between awareness and reality, an unexpected sequence, but plausible. Whereas fundamental surprise is not ‘plausible’, it’s unimaginable.

In simulation it is alway possible to dismiss fundamental surprise as a simulator glitch, even if such situations can be simulated - they are just as unimaginable by the instructor, not knowing what or how to simulate a situation.
This is a basis of ‘you don't die in simulation’. Conversely in an aircraft, you can die, thus encountering fundamental surprise a startle reflex is possible, at least until the intensity of surprise is reduced: e.g. updated awareness - the aircraft is still flyable, but still without knowing why.

There is significant doubt that simulation can provide the intensity of surprise for meaningful training.

Surprise, (in RE video after the ads) for info - https://www.adaptivecapacitylabs.com...-in-5-minutes/

Resilient Engineering an interesting possibility for alleviating some surprise or minimising startle.

[Rt Hon Jim Hacker MP]

Flown both. But would love to meet the idiot in Airbus that set up a red warning with all the bells and whistles for lav smoke. Scared the **** out of me mid Atlantic the first time I heard it.