"Safe Airline" vs. Unsafe Culture. We're discussing the wrong thing!
Paxing All Over The World
As Pax for over 48 years, a reader of numerous such threads here and having worked in many different types of company and in different countries:
Only two things will change the Normalisation of Deviance and the complacency of men: Death and Money.
Since we are not going to see politicians tell the aviation industry + regulators to reconsider their actions of the last ten years (i.e. Money) we have to wait for Death to do it for them. Death is also money, of course.
It is a pity that the media waste time taking shots at FR when they should be investigating the regulators.
Only two things will change the Normalisation of Deviance and the complacency of men: Death and Money.
Since we are not going to see politicians tell the aviation industry + regulators to reconsider their actions of the last ten years (i.e. Money) we have to wait for Death to do it for them. Death is also money, of course.
It is a pity that the media waste time taking shots at FR when they should be investigating the regulators.
Spot on! Some " low cost " operators appear to push the legal limits despite circumstances which warrant otherwise. They constantly appear to see what they can get away with. This can only have one consequence, but yet they continue. It's as if they realise it's going to happen, but don't care. Either they arrogantly think they can get away with a hull loss without too much damage to the share price, or the individuals making the policy naively consider that they are protected by the regulations which they follow to the letter.
This is where the regulators have to step in. These company's operations manuals are authorised by the regulators. Slap a 25% contingency fuel figure on them until they show they can come up with a fuel policy which allows the crew to exercise their good judgement. I operate in Asia and the proliferation of this type of operation is clearly having an effect on the safety statistics. I was rather heartened to see that the Phillipine CAA have just suspended the AOC of one of their worst offenders.
Low cost, as we know largely means low overheads to maximise profits. Safety should never be seen as a cost which can be trimmed.
This is where the regulators have to step in. These company's operations manuals are authorised by the regulators. Slap a 25% contingency fuel figure on them until they show they can come up with a fuel policy which allows the crew to exercise their good judgement. I operate in Asia and the proliferation of this type of operation is clearly having an effect on the safety statistics. I was rather heartened to see that the Phillipine CAA have just suspended the AOC of one of their worst offenders.
Low cost, as we know largely means low overheads to maximise profits. Safety should never be seen as a cost which can be trimmed.
Last edited by Dan Winterland; 19th Aug 2013 at 01:33.
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Minimum fuel allows us standard taxi fuel use, 5% extra to destination. missed approach, prompt access to alternate route and an expeditous arrival at alternate, landing with 30 minutes holding intact.
To accept near minimum fuel at departure, the captain needs to be quite confident that above can be reasonably achieved. If the destination is busy and many other aircraft are likely to be also heading for that same alternate, also with minimum fuel, it is not sufficient to rely on a mayday call to make up for the poor departure fuel choice. The mayday calls are evidence that the departure fuels were insufficient!
I do not think there are regulations that indicate the calculated minimum fuel is sufficient for the planned flight. It is simply an amount that cannot be legally reduced. If a captain allows the company to decide that the regulated minimum plus 300Kg (or some other arbitary amount) is the maximum fuel, who is the captain??
The degree of pilot error, if any, in acceptance of the departure fuels should be investigated by regulatory authorities. The authorities have created the potential for further maydays and risk of fuel exhaustion.
To accept near minimum fuel at departure, the captain needs to be quite confident that above can be reasonably achieved. If the destination is busy and many other aircraft are likely to be also heading for that same alternate, also with minimum fuel, it is not sufficient to rely on a mayday call to make up for the poor departure fuel choice. The mayday calls are evidence that the departure fuels were insufficient!
I do not think there are regulations that indicate the calculated minimum fuel is sufficient for the planned flight. It is simply an amount that cannot be legally reduced. If a captain allows the company to decide that the regulated minimum plus 300Kg (or some other arbitary amount) is the maximum fuel, who is the captain??
The degree of pilot error, if any, in acceptance of the departure fuels should be investigated by regulatory authorities. The authorities have created the potential for further maydays and risk of fuel exhaustion.
The mayday calls are evidence that the departure fuels were insufficient!
When you accept flight plan minimum fuel , you are accepting that you will make a clear and concise decision to divert earlier than if you had added discretionary fuel. Either are fine in my view as long as you understand the need to make potentially unpalatable decisions early in the piece.
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Framer, I respect your input and agree that you are correct.
Of course, if crew do actually have sufficient fuel considering all the known and reasonably forseeable circumstances and they operate in a way that does not take account of all these circumstances, then the mayday call is the result of an operating problem of the crew. Either way, it is pilot error.
The following are foreseeable circumstances:
With precious little margin fuel remaining, an aircraft behind, calls a fuel mayday. Even a crew that had an extra 30 minutes because they carried a little extra and diverted from TOD instead of a missed approach, might need to react with their own mayday by this point
Not to claim that all of these forseeable circumstances must be allowed for but let us accept that running out of fuel is sufficiently important that adverse events must be considered in the choice of departure fuel. This brings the question about how much do we allow for? That is why we have a captain, and the answer certainly is not "nothing".
Of course, if crew do actually have sufficient fuel considering all the known and reasonably forseeable circumstances and they operate in a way that does not take account of all these circumstances, then the mayday call is the result of an operating problem of the crew. Either way, it is pilot error.
The following are foreseeable circumstances:
- Weather closes destination.
- Alternate weather causes delays due IFR procedural arrivals.
- Half a dozen aircraft ahead on missed approach / approach / holding now decide to go to the only reasonable alternate. Two of them have no margin fuel and soon declare maydays.
- Expeditious route to alternate not possible due CB
- Due NOTAM and WIP at alternate, must taxy to the end for 180, then long backtrack required to vacate, further slowing arrivals
- ATC language difficulties due normally only local operators
- One of the foreign crew is unfamiliar with the airfield and they did not have access to the NOTAMS. They and the controller struggle with communication and a valuable couple of minutes are wasted vacating the only usable runway.
With precious little margin fuel remaining, an aircraft behind, calls a fuel mayday. Even a crew that had an extra 30 minutes because they carried a little extra and diverted from TOD instead of a missed approach, might need to react with their own mayday by this point
Not to claim that all of these forseeable circumstances must be allowed for but let us accept that running out of fuel is sufficiently important that adverse events must be considered in the choice of departure fuel. This brings the question about how much do we allow for? That is why we have a captain, and the answer certainly is not "nothing".
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With regards to the Ryanair fuel memo posted on a different thread I think it is clear there are various opinions on the minimum fuel and diversion scenario, but what I still find most interesting is the lack of actual facts regarding what happens to someone who takes extra fuel for a reasonable reason.
The memo seeks to (positively) encourage people not to tanker unnecessarily, but all operators request crew to do that.
Posters keep coming back to the 'pressure' not to carry extra fuel, but I see little factual evidence of what happens to someone who puts the safety of the plane ahead of that memo which would always be defended by the company as an instruction not to incur unnecessary costs while not compromising safety.
So, can anyone offer any evidence of actual negative action against someone who basically deviates from the memo because he/she felt safety would be compromised if extra fuel wasn't taken?
The memo seeks to (positively) encourage people not to tanker unnecessarily, but all operators request crew to do that.
Posters keep coming back to the 'pressure' not to carry extra fuel, but I see little factual evidence of what happens to someone who puts the safety of the plane ahead of that memo which would always be defended by the company as an instruction not to incur unnecessary costs while not compromising safety.
So, can anyone offer any evidence of actual negative action against someone who basically deviates from the memo because he/she felt safety would be compromised if extra fuel wasn't taken?
Last edited by south coast; 19th Aug 2013 at 08:30.
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Guys: This thread is being hi-jacked by the fuel debate. It has been done to death in another thread. A.B's original question is about much more broader issues than just fuel. Could we please address those. One could argue that cloned captains with only 4 years in the cockpit (3000hrs)are not as safe as the norm a few years ago of 5000hrs = 8yrs. How's that come about? Reliance on technology and reliability, more radar, more ILS's and an SOP book like an encyclopaedia? Maybe, but the experience levels are without doubt much diluted. The overall cockpit experience could be a s low as 4000hrs which is less than just the captain a few years ago. If to consider 5000hrs fro captain and 1500hrs for F/O then you have about 11 years total experience versus 5 now. An F/O with less than 1 year on a modern jet is a yes man because they know too little, except SOP's, to object/suggest.
What other aspects in the industry have diluted the safety barriers, in your humble opinions?
What other aspects in the industry have diluted the safety barriers, in your humble opinions?
The whole concept of 'hours = quality" is utterly specious. Pick the right people, give them quality training, and you'll have a good pilot. How do you think the military survive with 1000hr pilots in a Typhoon, flying 100-200 hours a year?
There are many, many high hour, low skill pilots in this industry. The most you can say about hours is, only the next one's important!
I have no idea what Ryanair's safety culture is like, but I do know some other worldwide carriers, including one just across the channel, give me far more cause for concern.
This all sounds like Ryanair bashing to me. And from people who seem to think the youth of today somehow aren't up to scratch.
There are many, many high hour, low skill pilots in this industry. The most you can say about hours is, only the next one's important!
I have no idea what Ryanair's safety culture is like, but I do know some other worldwide carriers, including one just across the channel, give me far more cause for concern.
This all sounds like Ryanair bashing to me. And from people who seem to think the youth of today somehow aren't up to scratch.
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That's simple, paying for a job....simple outcome is it devalues the worth of the job if the employer no longer has to pay someone to do that, which means at least a minimum level of respect is required from the employer, but when people will pay for a position, it tells the same employers, this is now a service that can be sold and it has become a money generator and requires little to zero respect from the employer.
The loco's have unarguably latched on to this concept in a massive way!
The loco's have unarguably latched on to this concept in a massive way!
Last edited by south coast; 19th Aug 2013 at 09:33.
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Interesting posts on this thread and far better than the FR bashing mantra elsewhere.
Fuel has always been an emotive issue with pilots, views range from the 'you can never have enough' crowd to fly on fumes junkies, as ever there is a balance and this is variable depending on a great many number of factors.
My own view is that i take what i need, i don't have to justify that in my company, but i would have no problem doing so if required, more often than not that is min plog fuel, i will put extra on for CB's and for sure extra for Spanish ATC in the BCN,ALC,MAD triangle if weather is anything other than stable.
Our company predicted fuel burns are very very accurate and are constantly updated right up to departure time with weather inputs and passenger load, these are uploaded on turnarounds (25 mins turnarounds) this gives me confidence in the figures, my company also allows me to reduce min fuel if i so wish taking into account very short taxy routes or shorter SID/STAR routing (we always use longest SID/STAR at planning stage)
They also provide training on fuel planning and lots of useful stuff on line about fuel saving, THE BIG difference is there is no culture of pressure on our crews, the reporting is open, my base and route structure is that my average sector length on the NG is over 5:30 and up to 7 hours, its not at all unusual to have a min fuel requirement that is at max fuel capacity, ie i can't put any more on even if i wished to !!! so i can only reduce burn by reducing payload in other words off loading passengers or tech stop........
We have lots of ex FR pilots so i don't buy into the clone culture, far from it, they know what the culture is there and what it is here and that's why they vote with their feet, it is a one way strret with zero flow in the opposite direction.
FR count upon the professionalism of their pilots to keep themselves and therefore the company safe.
C4 was a wasted opportunity, it should have started with how successful Ryanair is and why, by dissecting their costs base and should have asked the following very simple question, how is that an airline that pays market price for fuel, aircraft, navigation charges and so on manages to achieve a CASK that is 15 points below any other European operator, its a little like asking how Lance Amrstrong managed to win the TDF 7 times in a row, that would be proper investigative journalism.
Shine a light on the employment structure of its pilots, the ongoing tax investigations of its pilots the national insurance payments, lack of any holiday pay, sick pay, standby pay, zero hour contracts, positioning, crew food or access to food or storage of food onboard, water, out of base hotac, duty travel on days off, sims on days off, of course non of these are safety issues in their own right and FR are right to point to their impressive safety record, but they do seem to be trying to turn the clock back 50 years, but in any event the public are not interested in the plight of pilots who earn $150k moaning about food when the average income in Europe is probably $50k MOL knows this only to well.
Fuel has always been an emotive issue with pilots, views range from the 'you can never have enough' crowd to fly on fumes junkies, as ever there is a balance and this is variable depending on a great many number of factors.
My own view is that i take what i need, i don't have to justify that in my company, but i would have no problem doing so if required, more often than not that is min plog fuel, i will put extra on for CB's and for sure extra for Spanish ATC in the BCN,ALC,MAD triangle if weather is anything other than stable.
Our company predicted fuel burns are very very accurate and are constantly updated right up to departure time with weather inputs and passenger load, these are uploaded on turnarounds (25 mins turnarounds) this gives me confidence in the figures, my company also allows me to reduce min fuel if i so wish taking into account very short taxy routes or shorter SID/STAR routing (we always use longest SID/STAR at planning stage)
They also provide training on fuel planning and lots of useful stuff on line about fuel saving, THE BIG difference is there is no culture of pressure on our crews, the reporting is open, my base and route structure is that my average sector length on the NG is over 5:30 and up to 7 hours, its not at all unusual to have a min fuel requirement that is at max fuel capacity, ie i can't put any more on even if i wished to !!! so i can only reduce burn by reducing payload in other words off loading passengers or tech stop........
We have lots of ex FR pilots so i don't buy into the clone culture, far from it, they know what the culture is there and what it is here and that's why they vote with their feet, it is a one way strret with zero flow in the opposite direction.
FR count upon the professionalism of their pilots to keep themselves and therefore the company safe.
C4 was a wasted opportunity, it should have started with how successful Ryanair is and why, by dissecting their costs base and should have asked the following very simple question, how is that an airline that pays market price for fuel, aircraft, navigation charges and so on manages to achieve a CASK that is 15 points below any other European operator, its a little like asking how Lance Amrstrong managed to win the TDF 7 times in a row, that would be proper investigative journalism.
Shine a light on the employment structure of its pilots, the ongoing tax investigations of its pilots the national insurance payments, lack of any holiday pay, sick pay, standby pay, zero hour contracts, positioning, crew food or access to food or storage of food onboard, water, out of base hotac, duty travel on days off, sims on days off, of course non of these are safety issues in their own right and FR are right to point to their impressive safety record, but they do seem to be trying to turn the clock back 50 years, but in any event the public are not interested in the plight of pilots who earn $150k moaning about food when the average income in Europe is probably $50k MOL knows this only to well.
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Walk around
My interest in fuel based it being something so easy to control, that buys time in flight to sort out other problems.
Another so easy to control item is effective internal and external pre flight checks. Hundreds of times I have observed inadequate checking of operational manuals and essential certificates and also minimum care external checks. All this stuff should be so second nature.
Actual example at Hong Kong Kai Tac some years ago. Night time, pouring rain, crowded tarmac and lots of activity. Pax on board, cargo doors closed. I am wearing disposable rain gear and hearing protection and have a water proof torch with 3 size C alkaline batteries and a halogen bulb. Carefully inspect as much of my A320 as is possible. Especially also looking for any evidence of scrapes or dents from ground vehicles. This is my last chance to pick up damage. Everyone is waiting, for another 6 or 7 minutes but I can justify that.
Another nearby aircraft final walk around is in progress. The crew member has a dinky penlight torch with a couple of little batteries, a tiny bulb and a reflector just bigger than the bulb. Pax are boarding from a bus and baggage is still being loaded. The guy is in a hurry because the APU noise is deafening and he is as wet as shag due no rain gear. His walk around takes 2 minutes and with the driving rain and his crappy torch, there is very little he can see anyway.
I like to think that any collision with my aircraft will be noticed and reported, but I don't just hope. It is unforgivable to find out after airborne, when for such little effort, that risk can be minimised.
Take care my friends.
Another so easy to control item is effective internal and external pre flight checks. Hundreds of times I have observed inadequate checking of operational manuals and essential certificates and also minimum care external checks. All this stuff should be so second nature.
Actual example at Hong Kong Kai Tac some years ago. Night time, pouring rain, crowded tarmac and lots of activity. Pax on board, cargo doors closed. I am wearing disposable rain gear and hearing protection and have a water proof torch with 3 size C alkaline batteries and a halogen bulb. Carefully inspect as much of my A320 as is possible. Especially also looking for any evidence of scrapes or dents from ground vehicles. This is my last chance to pick up damage. Everyone is waiting, for another 6 or 7 minutes but I can justify that.
Another nearby aircraft final walk around is in progress. The crew member has a dinky penlight torch with a couple of little batteries, a tiny bulb and a reflector just bigger than the bulb. Pax are boarding from a bus and baggage is still being loaded. The guy is in a hurry because the APU noise is deafening and he is as wet as shag due no rain gear. His walk around takes 2 minutes and with the driving rain and his crappy torch, there is very little he can see anyway.
I like to think that any collision with my aircraft will be noticed and reported, but I don't just hope. It is unforgivable to find out after airborne, when for such little effort, that risk can be minimised.
Take care my friends.
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The problem of pilots being or feeling unwilling to make decisions freely has doubtless been with us since the first builder employed a pilot to fly his flimsy creation. Ever since then we've generally got better and safer at what we do. We've now reached a point where the technical aspects represent precious little hazard and the safety critical technology of aircraft is probably reaching it's peak.
We have SOPs and procedures that make the flying side pretty safe too, but there is much room for improvement yet. (see the CFIT rates for instance) By far the biggest improvement to flight safety in the last three decades was CRM, or Human Factors as we called it at first. I venture to suggest this has transformed safety in that time.
ATC can certainly be improved, both in more efficient routing, integrated environment (I'm talking Europe in particular - which is what I know), and often better language and controllers (eg Spain, Greece, Italy etc.)
Some of these are not in the purview of the pilots to alter, despite it being in their interest.
What is in the purview of the pilots to alter is the management of the direct environment they work in where it affects safety or their freedom to run a safe operation, and this brings in the Company, because it is the Company that enables or restricts those freedoms.
We all operate under strictly defined AOCs and their relevant manuals which may be viewed by some as excessively detailed (fly-by-numbers) or not, according to your viewpoint. They are, though, pretty bulletproof in their coverage.
But we know, from a CRM point of view, that strict and blind adherence to the manuals and with nothing in addition leaves vast gaps in the safe and smooth conduct of an operation. There's no human aspect, no psychology, no emotion and no judgement. That's vital - and entirely unwritten between the company and the pilots.
Vis crewing/rostering applying rules that were written as individual limits as collective targets - something that the Institute of Aviation Medicine who developed them never considered anyone would be daft enough to do - and for which they are manifestly unsuited. There has to be some human consideration in the rostering policy - telling the crew "Stop complaining, it's legal" when they've got max duty - min rest all month is all very well. It IS legal. But way outside the spirit of the law. And if there is ever an accident down to this the company will indignantly maintain "absolute compliance with European regs" and "all safety rules complied with". Where have we just heard that statement? A TV documentary on the incident won't turn up anything because it WAS legal. It wasn't right, morally honest or, perhaps in reality, safe.
I once worked for a scheduled UK airline of whose fleet not one single aircraft was airworthy. Some had two or three no-despatch faults. There were no defect sheets in any of the tech logs, they just weren't there. Captains wrote a page or two of defects on the back of the Met to hand to the next crew so they knew what was wrong with their crock of shy te. The company culture was that you couldn't sign an aircraft tech without risking your job. That may or may not have been true but declare the a/c tech away from main base and you would have your FO almost in tears begging you not to and an angry, acrimonious interview w/o coffee next day. No pressure then! You flew overloaded ditto. You broke minima as a matter of course. Twin crew aircraft ferried by a single pilot. But they operated like this for years afaik, and every single pilot I've ever met from tis company tells me similar horror stories. Every single one. Over 20 years or so! Yet they never had an accident. (Well, they did, but they never filed the accident report so it never happened, did it...?). Thus they have a 100% safety record...
And they were reported to the CAA repeatedly, and nothing was ever done.
The culture of fear that ruled that dreadful outfit completely overwhelmed the professionalism of every poor sod that got a precious job there until they could get out - we have to eat after all.
But there's no paper-trail there for defects (no paper, see?), no paper-trail to "prove" pressure to fly overloaded because to safeguard your job you fudged it, no paper trail to say you can't sign an aircraft tech - indeed the manager would go ape if such a suggestion was made, and the CP would castigate and ridicule you for unprofessionalism and inexperience for failing to make a landing in 150ft cloudbase from and NDB. There never will be "proof" of this sort of thing, it's existence can only be deduced from circumstances and outcomes. That's why it is so pernicious.
Don't mistake me, I'm not suggesting for a minute this is commonplace, I'm sure it was by far the worst in the UK but echos of that Company mindset still exist here and there. I use that as an example of just how dreadful things can get and yet not be corrected by the system because everything is fine on paper and the management can deny all knowledge and accuse the whistleblowers of being wreckers. Where have we heard that recently?
Now, back to the Madrid/Valencia thing which I again use, please note, merely as a vehicle to illustrate the general point.
It is quite clear that all three crews landed with legally acceptable amounts of fuel. It is equally clear that they made varying efforts to add extra in view of the conditions. It is clear that the commenced their diversions with a legal amount on board. It is thus clear that the Company's statement of full compliance is unimpeachable. But was it safe? Well, no accident ensued ergo it must be.
Yet three crews flew into Europe's worst managed airspace with a PROB40 TS forecast with at most 20 mins extra fuel? They diverted in evidently chaotic ATC environment from a 4 runway intercontinental hub to a single-runway hicksville alternate that struggles to cope with it's own light traffic - two with circa 300Kg in hand, one with 150 unless BOAC wants to correct my figures. Its doesn't seem very imaginative, does it?
It also doesn't seem very likely to me that three crews would all cut themselves so short unless there was some common factor - in those conditions. imho their fuel margins were a fraction of what I'd want to go to VLC under those conditions. So why did this happen?
It certainly wasn't because they liked smashing around in the VIBAS hold for fun.
Something held them, all three, until things were on the brink or close to it even for clear and standard conditions, which was manifestly not the case. But it was all legal, wasn't it? (I'm not criticising the crew, just echoing the spokesman's mantra)
Could it be that all three were on max duty (I don't know if the Skatsta flight could have made a third sector but the others were stuck in VLC if they went there)? That is an indication - just an indication mind you - of a possible company pressure. Not necessarily one expressed at the time but maybe a generic pressure to make the destination at all costs - why else would anyone get to 150Kg of clear wx diversion fuel under those conditions? Whatever it was must have been a powerful influence. But there sure as hell isn't a paper trail! And it was legal. Ergo safe.
As someone said above it doesn't matter how much extra fuel you took, if you declare a fuel mayday you didn't take enough. I'd add to that or you did not correctly manage what you had. The additional fuel uplifted on those three flights strike me (again imo) as - well - unimaginative, shall we say, given the conditions even taking reduced mileage for 18 into account - which is often a recipe for even more chaos than usual at MAD. Please don't think I'm criticising the crew, I'm not. I'm wondering why so little extra was taken. Remember, MAD, July, PROB40 TS. Go figure!
If a company culture can browbeat scores of pilots over many tears to fly unserviceable aircraft, fail to report defects and bust minima as routine is it not plain as daylight that pressure can discourage people from uplifting as much fuel as they wanted? Is the existence of a fuel table - a list of shame - and gritty chittys from the management if you are in the last third all but guaranteed to achieve this? Ask a psychologist, but I've a fair idea of the answer.
You've got buy yer job, no sick pay, no hols, sims on days off etc etc, sacked if you even think of a union (a universal right, isn't it? Except the Company's manufactured a previously un-thought-of employment system to make it all but unworkable)
Add to that whatever verbal and practical "guidance" crews receive in training, initial and recurrent to reduce fuel uplift to minimums and it soon develops a mindset that extra fuel is "wrong" and much extra fuel is "very wrong" . Then this is reinforced by "reasons in writing" which on the face of it is innocuous enough, but in conjunction with the rest is the icing on the cake.
Is it any wonder this sort of thing happens in such a culture of fear?
Right - try to view the above as an abstract illustration rather than referring to a specific incident - it just happens to be a convenient one.
Now - to the point. I know, I've got nothing else to do this afternoon but I think this is important. Is anybody still there?
CRM
Thirty years ago someone came up with the idea that dictatorial and overbearing Trident Captains might be a safety hazard and did something about it. The idea was widely poo-poohed but caught on eventually and I think created one of the biggest improvement in safety ever.
Is there not a dramatic similarity between an overbearing Captain who instils fear and stymies initiative in an FO by bluster, bombast and belittlement
and a company that does the same to all their crew? The difference is in the first you only have a poorly managed aeroplane, in the other it affect the whole fleet.
Many times I've heard people walk into the office and mutter darkly, "Hmpf. CRM stops here!" I've worked for companies where there was almost a visible double red line across the office door and a notice to that effect. That is clearly wrong an needs to be addressed.
All the adherence to all the SOPs in the world does not maximise safety - indeed it will compromise it - if the Captain is an overbearing aggressive and accusatory sob.
Isn't it about time CRM became Company Resource Management and we began to eradicate the Boss and Boy attitude that some companies have developed, just as we work to eradicate it on the flightdeck? CRM2 needs to involve crews (all of them), crewing, rostering, standards, management - the whole company, not just aircrew. If we did that we could see benefits approaching those of CRM1. We could do it - the Authority won't, but we could press for it.
We need to. Before there's a body count. Im sure the beancounters didn't like CRM1, they'll like CRM2 even less when they have to join in, but isn't this the next big thing in flight safety?
It's my view that episodes as I've described above are symptoms of an overbearing management stifling the initiative and good judgement of crews to the extent that it may compromise flight safety. If I am right - and shoot me down if you can, then it needs to be dealt with.
Sadly experience tells us nothing will happen until there is a body count, and a big one too.
Were it not so.
We have SOPs and procedures that make the flying side pretty safe too, but there is much room for improvement yet. (see the CFIT rates for instance) By far the biggest improvement to flight safety in the last three decades was CRM, or Human Factors as we called it at first. I venture to suggest this has transformed safety in that time.
ATC can certainly be improved, both in more efficient routing, integrated environment (I'm talking Europe in particular - which is what I know), and often better language and controllers (eg Spain, Greece, Italy etc.)
Some of these are not in the purview of the pilots to alter, despite it being in their interest.
What is in the purview of the pilots to alter is the management of the direct environment they work in where it affects safety or their freedom to run a safe operation, and this brings in the Company, because it is the Company that enables or restricts those freedoms.
We all operate under strictly defined AOCs and their relevant manuals which may be viewed by some as excessively detailed (fly-by-numbers) or not, according to your viewpoint. They are, though, pretty bulletproof in their coverage.
But we know, from a CRM point of view, that strict and blind adherence to the manuals and with nothing in addition leaves vast gaps in the safe and smooth conduct of an operation. There's no human aspect, no psychology, no emotion and no judgement. That's vital - and entirely unwritten between the company and the pilots.
Vis crewing/rostering applying rules that were written as individual limits as collective targets - something that the Institute of Aviation Medicine who developed them never considered anyone would be daft enough to do - and for which they are manifestly unsuited. There has to be some human consideration in the rostering policy - telling the crew "Stop complaining, it's legal" when they've got max duty - min rest all month is all very well. It IS legal. But way outside the spirit of the law. And if there is ever an accident down to this the company will indignantly maintain "absolute compliance with European regs" and "all safety rules complied with". Where have we just heard that statement? A TV documentary on the incident won't turn up anything because it WAS legal. It wasn't right, morally honest or, perhaps in reality, safe.
I once worked for a scheduled UK airline of whose fleet not one single aircraft was airworthy. Some had two or three no-despatch faults. There were no defect sheets in any of the tech logs, they just weren't there. Captains wrote a page or two of defects on the back of the Met to hand to the next crew so they knew what was wrong with their crock of shy te. The company culture was that you couldn't sign an aircraft tech without risking your job. That may or may not have been true but declare the a/c tech away from main base and you would have your FO almost in tears begging you not to and an angry, acrimonious interview w/o coffee next day. No pressure then! You flew overloaded ditto. You broke minima as a matter of course. Twin crew aircraft ferried by a single pilot. But they operated like this for years afaik, and every single pilot I've ever met from tis company tells me similar horror stories. Every single one. Over 20 years or so! Yet they never had an accident. (Well, they did, but they never filed the accident report so it never happened, did it...?). Thus they have a 100% safety record...
And they were reported to the CAA repeatedly, and nothing was ever done.
The culture of fear that ruled that dreadful outfit completely overwhelmed the professionalism of every poor sod that got a precious job there until they could get out - we have to eat after all.
But there's no paper-trail there for defects (no paper, see?), no paper-trail to "prove" pressure to fly overloaded because to safeguard your job you fudged it, no paper trail to say you can't sign an aircraft tech - indeed the manager would go ape if such a suggestion was made, and the CP would castigate and ridicule you for unprofessionalism and inexperience for failing to make a landing in 150ft cloudbase from and NDB. There never will be "proof" of this sort of thing, it's existence can only be deduced from circumstances and outcomes. That's why it is so pernicious.
Don't mistake me, I'm not suggesting for a minute this is commonplace, I'm sure it was by far the worst in the UK but echos of that Company mindset still exist here and there. I use that as an example of just how dreadful things can get and yet not be corrected by the system because everything is fine on paper and the management can deny all knowledge and accuse the whistleblowers of being wreckers. Where have we heard that recently?
Now, back to the Madrid/Valencia thing which I again use, please note, merely as a vehicle to illustrate the general point.
It is quite clear that all three crews landed with legally acceptable amounts of fuel. It is equally clear that they made varying efforts to add extra in view of the conditions. It is clear that the commenced their diversions with a legal amount on board. It is thus clear that the Company's statement of full compliance is unimpeachable. But was it safe? Well, no accident ensued ergo it must be.
Yet three crews flew into Europe's worst managed airspace with a PROB40 TS forecast with at most 20 mins extra fuel? They diverted in evidently chaotic ATC environment from a 4 runway intercontinental hub to a single-runway hicksville alternate that struggles to cope with it's own light traffic - two with circa 300Kg in hand, one with 150 unless BOAC wants to correct my figures. Its doesn't seem very imaginative, does it?
It also doesn't seem very likely to me that three crews would all cut themselves so short unless there was some common factor - in those conditions. imho their fuel margins were a fraction of what I'd want to go to VLC under those conditions. So why did this happen?
It certainly wasn't because they liked smashing around in the VIBAS hold for fun.
Something held them, all three, until things were on the brink or close to it even for clear and standard conditions, which was manifestly not the case. But it was all legal, wasn't it? (I'm not criticising the crew, just echoing the spokesman's mantra)
Could it be that all three were on max duty (I don't know if the Skatsta flight could have made a third sector but the others were stuck in VLC if they went there)? That is an indication - just an indication mind you - of a possible company pressure. Not necessarily one expressed at the time but maybe a generic pressure to make the destination at all costs - why else would anyone get to 150Kg of clear wx diversion fuel under those conditions? Whatever it was must have been a powerful influence. But there sure as hell isn't a paper trail! And it was legal. Ergo safe.
As someone said above it doesn't matter how much extra fuel you took, if you declare a fuel mayday you didn't take enough. I'd add to that or you did not correctly manage what you had. The additional fuel uplifted on those three flights strike me (again imo) as - well - unimaginative, shall we say, given the conditions even taking reduced mileage for 18 into account - which is often a recipe for even more chaos than usual at MAD. Please don't think I'm criticising the crew, I'm not. I'm wondering why so little extra was taken. Remember, MAD, July, PROB40 TS. Go figure!
If a company culture can browbeat scores of pilots over many tears to fly unserviceable aircraft, fail to report defects and bust minima as routine is it not plain as daylight that pressure can discourage people from uplifting as much fuel as they wanted? Is the existence of a fuel table - a list of shame - and gritty chittys from the management if you are in the last third all but guaranteed to achieve this? Ask a psychologist, but I've a fair idea of the answer.
You've got buy yer job, no sick pay, no hols, sims on days off etc etc, sacked if you even think of a union (a universal right, isn't it? Except the Company's manufactured a previously un-thought-of employment system to make it all but unworkable)
Add to that whatever verbal and practical "guidance" crews receive in training, initial and recurrent to reduce fuel uplift to minimums and it soon develops a mindset that extra fuel is "wrong" and much extra fuel is "very wrong" . Then this is reinforced by "reasons in writing" which on the face of it is innocuous enough, but in conjunction with the rest is the icing on the cake.
Is it any wonder this sort of thing happens in such a culture of fear?
Right - try to view the above as an abstract illustration rather than referring to a specific incident - it just happens to be a convenient one.
Now - to the point. I know, I've got nothing else to do this afternoon but I think this is important. Is anybody still there?
CRM
Thirty years ago someone came up with the idea that dictatorial and overbearing Trident Captains might be a safety hazard and did something about it. The idea was widely poo-poohed but caught on eventually and I think created one of the biggest improvement in safety ever.
Is there not a dramatic similarity between an overbearing Captain who instils fear and stymies initiative in an FO by bluster, bombast and belittlement
and a company that does the same to all their crew? The difference is in the first you only have a poorly managed aeroplane, in the other it affect the whole fleet.Many times I've heard people walk into the office and mutter darkly, "Hmpf. CRM stops here!" I've worked for companies where there was almost a visible double red line across the office door and a notice to that effect. That is clearly wrong an needs to be addressed.
All the adherence to all the SOPs in the world does not maximise safety - indeed it will compromise it - if the Captain is an overbearing aggressive and accusatory sob.
Isn't it about time CRM became Company Resource Management and we began to eradicate the Boss and Boy attitude that some companies have developed, just as we work to eradicate it on the flightdeck? CRM2 needs to involve crews (all of them), crewing, rostering, standards, management - the whole company, not just aircrew. If we did that we could see benefits approaching those of CRM1. We could do it - the Authority won't, but we could press for it.
We need to. Before there's a body count. Im sure the beancounters didn't like CRM1, they'll like CRM2 even less when they have to join in, but isn't this the next big thing in flight safety?
It's my view that episodes as I've described above are symptoms of an overbearing management stifling the initiative and good judgement of crews to the extent that it may compromise flight safety. If I am right - and shoot me down if you can, then it needs to be dealt with.
Sadly experience tells us nothing will happen until there is a body count, and a big one too.
Were it not so.
Last edited by Agaricus bisporus; 19th Aug 2013 at 14:12.
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You can still see today some FO's have to carry their Captain's trolleys and to walk meters behind them. Would they really dare to react to any possible grave mistake by their boss in the air? Are they a true team?
Last edited by Kerosene Kraut; 19th Aug 2013 at 13:04.
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Originally Posted by ab
is it not plain as daylight that pressure can discourage people from uplifting as much fuel as they wanted? Is the existence of a fuel table - a list of shame - and gritty chittys from the management if you are in the last third all but guaranteed to achieve this? Ask a psychologist, but I've a fair idea of the answer.
What on earth is the relevance of 'max duty'? You are doing a gross injustice to the professionalism of the 3 captains involved if you think they 'hung on' around MAD to avoid a night stop (at company expense). I suppose they might have, but I strongly doubt it. There was a lack of appreciation amongst all crews as to where they were and when they should have diverted, as I have said before. I trust this has been addressed by the company training.
We do not really know either what the 'support' from the RHS was. There may have been a reason to 'hang on' - we just do not know (well, some do, I guess). Diverting is hard work and I have done it with the occasional chocolate fireguard in the RHS, and also with a superb, supportive co-pilot or three, but envisaging the young RHS dissolving in tears or panicking does not make life easy in the LHS - been there, done that (except it was the LHS.that 'broke'...
).Liker Rat says, can we leave this fuel thing alone? To summarise - taking PLOG that night would have been fine - instant div on first delay - or earlier even. No, I would not have done it, nor would I recommend it, but it is not UNSAFE as has been pointed out by other highly professional pilots on the other thread. I note that having slated the crews' uplifts (erroneously) you still have not told me what extra you would have taken? (Sorry, Rat)
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Jeez BOAC, for feksake read what I've written will you?
What do you find hard to understand about it being an example to illustrate a point, not a pop at FR??? How many times did I repeat that to try to keep the nitpicking sniping down?
If you aren't interested in the point or it's just too long for your attention-span please don't reply to cherry-picked fragments that you've misread anyway. Just stay under your rock for heaven's sake?
PLOG fuel to MAD in july with PROB40 TS? BOAC, I know you can be outspoken fella but I had no idea you are completely barking mad, or blind drunk. That is the daftest thing I've ever heard! If you can justify that with such a forecast I can't visualise a situation where it would EVER be necessary to take extra fuel...
What do you find hard to understand about it being an example to illustrate a point, not a pop at FR??? How many times did I repeat that to try to keep the nitpicking sniping down?
If you aren't interested in the point or it's just too long for your attention-span please don't reply to cherry-picked fragments that you've misread anyway. Just stay under your rock for heaven's sake?
taking PLOG that night would have been fine - instant div on first delay
Last edited by Agaricus bisporus; 19th Aug 2013 at 14:19.
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"for feksake read what I've written will you?"
"an example to illustrate a point" - trouble is, it doesn't
PS You still haven't educated me on your extra fuel uplift................
"an example to illustrate a point" - trouble is, it doesn't
PS You still haven't educated me on your extra fuel uplift................
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Where are the CAA's (IAA) in all of this?
One would think, if the managements of company X,Y & Z do nothing to promote a good safety culture, then the CAAs would surely be inundated with anonymous letters/emails/calls with examples and concerns.
One would think since there is no come back to the author of any issues raised, the culture of fear within companies X, Y & Z would not be a factor in stopping individuals reporting what may be considered unsafe?
Why would CAAs turn a 'blind eye' to facts of unsafe operations?
Why would crew who fear they are employed within an organisation that does not promote a good safety culture not contact their regulator on mass?
One would think, if the managements of company X,Y & Z do nothing to promote a good safety culture, then the CAAs would surely be inundated with anonymous letters/emails/calls with examples and concerns.
One would think since there is no come back to the author of any issues raised, the culture of fear within companies X, Y & Z would not be a factor in stopping individuals reporting what may be considered unsafe?
Why would CAAs turn a 'blind eye' to facts of unsafe operations?
Why would crew who fear they are employed within an organisation that does not promote a good safety culture not contact their regulator on mass?
Last edited by south coast; 19th Aug 2013 at 17:43. Reason: So it's not about FR specifically
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SC, lets leave the IAA out of this. I've said again and again this thread is not about this specific incident, but using the incident to illustrate another point. If you want to ask specific questions about the IAA there are other FR bashing threads elsewhere. This is not one of them.
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The biggest safety threat comes from a self-made clusterf**k of airline instructors and training captains who are rabid on total automation.
Today's industry produces pilots who have an acute aversion of manual flight; pilots who are challenged when disconnecting A/P & A/T; pilots who, when offered, will decline a visual approach in clear daylight. They won't ever accept a 5 mile base, they insist on flying a full ILS procedure.
Any wonder why pilots stall during cruise mid Atlantic, or hit the sea wall during a non precision approach on a clear day?
It's scary. Real scary.
Today's industry produces pilots who have an acute aversion of manual flight; pilots who are challenged when disconnecting A/P & A/T; pilots who, when offered, will decline a visual approach in clear daylight. They won't ever accept a 5 mile base, they insist on flying a full ILS procedure.
Any wonder why pilots stall during cruise mid Atlantic, or hit the sea wall during a non precision approach on a clear day?
It's scary. Real scary.
To look at engineering (I don't think it has been mentioned yet?):
If you look at Southwest Flt 812 PHX-SMF in 2011 when a structural failure caused a rapid decompression and resulting emergency landing in Yuma, there was no instruction to inspect the fuselage at a certain number of cycles.
Many ADs/SBs come from incidents reported back by operators. In this case, an emergency AD was supplied by the FAA for aircraft that exceeded 30000/C - for most airlines that is 25 years of flying! In Europe certainly there are very few aircraft that would've exceeded this threshold so this occurrence obviously wouldn't have been found.
Would you agree that engineering is very much trial and error? There is no such thing as safe and unsafe.
All airlines have to provide a concise AMP which needs to be rubber stamped by the relevant regulatory authority and obviously after usually 400/H a hangar inspection will carry out a number of airworthiness tasks to maintain high levels of safety.
If you look at Southwest Flt 812 PHX-SMF in 2011 when a structural failure caused a rapid decompression and resulting emergency landing in Yuma, there was no instruction to inspect the fuselage at a certain number of cycles.
Many ADs/SBs come from incidents reported back by operators. In this case, an emergency AD was supplied by the FAA for aircraft that exceeded 30000/C - for most airlines that is 25 years of flying! In Europe certainly there are very few aircraft that would've exceeded this threshold so this occurrence obviously wouldn't have been found.
Would you agree that engineering is very much trial and error? There is no such thing as safe and unsafe.
All airlines have to provide a concise AMP which needs to be rubber stamped by the relevant regulatory authority and obviously after usually 400/H a hangar inspection will carry out a number of airworthiness tasks to maintain high levels of safety.