"Safe Airline" vs. Unsafe Culture. We're discussing the wrong thing!

[Agaricus bisporus]

Having studied the IAA report, the reserve fuel carried by the affected aircraft seems to me to be entirely in line with EASA requirements.

My point exactly (correct in the fair weather case - which this wasn't), except for the item missed out;
Extra Fuel. As deemed necessary by the commander according to circumstances.

So if they ran short of fuel they either planned and executed a flight profile but with insufficient uplift, or, they planned and uplifted correctly for a given flight profile but then modified modified the profile in flight to one that left them short.

Both are wrong. The point is, why did this happen to not just one, but three aircraft simultaneously? It looks far more like six individuals making three separate decisions from the met and route data (which to my knowledge has not been questioned) and all three made a similar error.

imo flying into forecast TS with minimum EASA fuel is NOT good judgement. It may not be "wrong" as it complies with EASA as stated above, but that's only half the story isn't it? The rest of the story, that word we don't mention any more, isn't in the manual.

This is surely one of the clearest examples we've yet had of the mentality that says "if the book say's can, might or must it's compulsory", if the book doesn't mention it then it's forbidden.

It is a far from unusual take amongst modern cadets.

One would hope that it doesn't take a three figure bodycount to confirm the dangers of fly-by-numbers but I fear it may. And the toothless poodle of the IAA most certainly won't be any help there.

I'm not bashing FR here, just using them as an example as it is topical, there are others out there. It could be any of them.

[BOAC]

Originally Posted by ag bis

My understanding was that they took a hundred or two extra - maybe I'm wrong.

- that is where you are wrong. It is always a good idea to have the facts at hand when you start an Oozlum bird fuel flap again. To save you the boredom of actually reading the facts, the extra uplifts were:
613kg
293kg (calculated 400kg over requirement due PLOG arrival runway allocation) and
892kg.

imo flying into forecast TS with minimum EASA fuel is NOT good judgement

- irrelevant, but agreed. So, who did?

So,

why did this happen to not just one, but three aircraft simultaneously? I

a) It didn't - there were separated in time. Why three RYs?
b) Well, three happened to arrive in the critical 'window'. Why did Lan Chiole lose an engine on diversion to VLC - some say it ran out of fuel? How many other a/c diverted that evening?

I do not think you can criticise 892 kg or 613 kg extra - or can you? I'd be interested to hear if so. I do not for one minute accept excessive 'pressure' on fuel uplifts, nor do I like the way MOL runs things, but it does not look as if this was relevant, does it? As said, it is all about what you do with your extra 1 hours fuel when you arrive at dest. IF you hold for 1 hour and then divert, why did you not take 2 hours...................

This is surely one of the clearest examples we've yet had of the mentality that says "if the book say's can, might or must it's compulsory",

- no it is not, is it? How much would YOU have loaded extra and how long would you have held?

[J.O.]

AB:

Finally, someone has found the touchstone that should be the focus of the debate. Thank you for bringing some sense and logical perspective to the issue.

All the finger waving at individual pilots and regulators does nothing to address the root cause, which is that deeply engrained cultures have a momentum that is difficult to overcome. That is why pilots who've become accustomed to adding fuel whenever they want, often "just because", and who are accustomed to being able to make that call without question, now rail at the notion that they may have to justify their decision - a decision which comes with a cost that is statistically proven to be unnecessary - most of the time. That is also why a management style that punishes decisions based on airmanship and experience is one which is destined to fail - eventually. If you kick a dog enough times, it eventually either bites back or simply runs away. But the billionaire owners and shareholders - who use a punitive management style to maximize shareholder value - only care about being able to milk the system as long as possible. When that inevitable day comes, they won't be the ones left unemployed and on the street, or worse, laying in a morgue. They'll continue to flit about in their private jets from mansion to mansion, thumbing their noses at the fools who helped to line their pockets.

Cultures tend only to change when they get a severe shock to the system. The question is whether that shock will come in the form of a serious accident, or something such as a pilot group acting in solidarity and saying enough is enough. Sadly, I think the former is more likely than the latter.

[BOAC]

Quite right, JO - but it is unfortunately the 'regulators' who we need to address. Not only does the FTL monster need to be paraded publicly, but the ?airline management driven? gradual 'approved' eating away at 'contingency fuel' towards some sort of useless 'statistical' figure should be reversed.

[south coast]

That would mean arriving at the alternate without final reserve - which would be illegal.

Agreed, which is why I asked at the beginning of my post if their final reserve was intact?

Apologies BEagle, the bit you highlighted should have also included 'plus final reserves'...it was meant to highlight having zero buffer when diverting.

[Agaricus bisporus]

I do not think you can criticise 892 kg or 613 kg extra - or can you? I'd be interested to hear if so. I do not for one minute accept excessive 'pressure' on fuel uplifts, nor do I like the way MOL runs things, but it does not look as if this was relevant, does it? As said, it is all about what you do with your extra 1 hours fuel when you arrive at dest. IF you hold for 1 hour and then divert, why did you not take 2 hours...................

BOAC, had you actually read what I'd written you'd see that's merely parroting it...Same goes for most of the rest of your ill-thought out post.
Sorry you seem so anti Airman....I thought you were made of sterner stuff.

[BOAC]

Parrots AND Oozlum birds now. This is what I read

Originally Posted by ag bis

So if they ran short of fuel they either planned and executed a flight profile but with insufficient uplift, or, they planned and uplifted correctly for a given flight profile but then modified modified the profile in flight to one that left them short.

Can we agree your facts were wrong, anyway?

Originally Posted by south coast

Agreed, which is why I asked at the beginning of my post if their final reserve was intact?

- again - it is in the report! Not for two. 75kg and 41kg below. and all three were quite correct to declare MAYDAY, especially with LanChile in the sky and Spanish ATC sounding very stressed at VLC in particular.

[Agaricus bisporus]

BOAC, don't you know the difference between "if" and "as" ? Do please take the trouble to read what is actually written, not just what you want to fulminate about this afternoon.

Try reading it again and get the point I'm making rather than setting out to pedantically dismantle the odd detail put in for illustration.

[RAT 5]

Guys, Please let's not turn this thread into a repeat of the 'other thread' that is re-hashing and thrashing this fuel issue to death. Agaricus Bisporus's point is about wider industry issues & safety cultures than just fuel. It is fact that some pilots are living pretty piss-poor lifestyles for not a lot of remuneration. Due to travelling in supposed off duty time they are not as fully rested and recharged, both mentally & physically, as their roster would suggest. Their remuneration package does not include many normal items that an income of €100,000pa would usually include. This has a deeper psychological effect than perhaps we realise. Lack of faith & trust in your leaders/managers also has the same effect. Reduced sleep over a few days with too little time to fully recover; a disruptive and unbalanced family life due to time away; All these, in accumulation, will have a detrimental effect on your performance and decision making, eventually.
It is on these issues that IMHO we should be focusing, not a side issue of one element of an operation. Look at the bigger picture and see the wood beyond the trees.
Sadly, as long as there are rules, and the companies & authorities can confirm everything is within the rules, then nothing will happen. The 'spirit' of the rules has been abused for years; the strict auditing of the rules has on occasions been scant. The debate needs to be much more thorough and open. How? AH the $64,000 question. If the unions try to open peoples' eyes they are shouted down by the financial minded companies. The XAA's seem to have deaf ears and blind eyes.
Unions have not brought down airlines; managers have. Remember that when the accusation of greed is levelled at you. The employees have a longer term interest in the health of a company than any manager. Not many top cats stay there for 30 years. Wanting a pay rise after 5 years, with increasing work & productivity, does not seem harsh or greedy: wanting a pension scheme does not seem greedy: wanting some health insurance and regular income does not seem greedy: wanting to be treated with respect and appreciation as a €100,000pa earning ambassador for your company does not seem greedy. Until these things are the norm IMHO there will always be an underlying resentment and dis-satisfaction and that can not be a positive thing regarding safety.

[Heathrow Harry]

Unions are as much to blame as management in many cases - things like scope clauses in the USA were clearly in pilots interests but no-one elses...........

[aguadalte]

FPFMM ICAO DOC9976

The newly released amendment 36 to ICAO Annex 6 Part I, complemented by ICAO DOC 9976 Fuel Planing and Fuel Management Manual (FPFMM), although apparently keeping the same requirements for Fuel Planing and Fuel Management, bring to light an all new philosophy for Contingency Fuel and Trip Fuel needs. It brings also an all new philosophy in re to the substitution of ETOPS for Extended Diversion Time Ops (that now apply to all aircraft, including 2+ engined ones.
But to keep in line with this thread, Trip Fuel must now account for expected weather deviations/delays as well as ATC delays:

Annex 6, Part I, 4.3.6.2 states:
4.3.6 Fuel requirements
4.3.6.2 The amount of usable fuel to be carried shall, as a minimum, be based on:
a) the following data;
1) current aeroplane-specific data derived from a fuel consumption monitoring system, if
available; or
2) if current aeroplane-specific data is not available, data provided by the aeroplane
manufacturer; and
b) the operating conditions for the planned flight including:
1) anticipated aeroplane mass;
2) Notices to Airmen;
3) current meteorological reports or a combination of current reports and forecasts;
4) air traffic services procedures, restrictions and anticipated delays; and
5) the effects of deferred maintenance items and/or configuration deviations.

Annex 6, Part I, 4.3.6.3 states:
4.3.6 Fuel requirements
4.3.6.3 The pre-flight calculation of usable fuel required shall include:
a) taxi fuel, which shall be an amount of fuel expected to be consumed before take-off;
b) trip fuel, which shall be the amount of fuel required to enable the aeroplane to fly from take-off or
the point of in-flight re-planning until landing at the destination aerodrome taking into account the
operating conditions of 4.3.6.2 b);
c) contingency fuel, which shall be the amount of fuel required to compensate for unforeseen
factors. It shall be 5 per cent of the planned trip fuel or of the fuel required from the point of in
flight re-planning based on the consumption rate used to plan the trip fuel but in any case shall
not be lower than the amount required to fly for five minutes at holding speed at 450 m (1 500 ft)
above the destination aerodrome in standard conditions;
Note.— Unforeseen factors are those which could have an influence on the fuel consumption to the
destination aerodrome, such as deviations of an individual aeroplane from the expected fuel consumption
data, deviations from forecast meteorological conditions, extended taxi times before take-off, and
deviations from planned routings and/or cruising levels/altitudes.
d) destination alternate fuel, which shall be:
1) where a destination alternate aerodrome is required, the amount of fuel required to enable
the aeroplane to:
i) perform a missed approach at the destination aerodrome;
ii) climb to the expected cruising altitude;
iii) fly the expected routing;
iv) descend to the point where the expected approach is initiated; and
v) conduct the approach and landing at the destination alternate aerodrome; or
2) where two destination alternate aerodromes are required, the amount of fuel, as calculated in
4.3.6.3 d) 1), required to enable the aeroplane to proceed to the destination alternate
aerodrome which requires the greater amount of alternate fuel; or
3) where a flight is operated without a destination alternate aerodrome, the amount of fuel
required to enable the aeroplane to hold for 15 minutes at 450 m (1 500 ft) above destination
aerodrome elevation in standard conditions; or
4) where the aerodrome of intended landing is an isolated aerodrome:
i) for a reciprocating engine aeroplane, the amount of fuel required to fly for 45 minutes
plus 15 per cent of the flight time planned to be spent at cruising level, including final
reserve fuel, or two hours, whichever is less; or
4‐26
ii) for a turbine engine aeroplane, the amount of fuel required to fly for two hours at normal
cruise consumption above the destination aerodrome, including final reserve fuel;
e) final reserve fuel, which shall be the amount of fuel calculated using the estimated mass on
arrival at the destination alternate aerodrome or the destination aerodrome, when no destination
alternate aerodrome is required:
1) for a reciprocating engine aeroplane, the amount of fuel required to fly 45 minutes, under
speed and altitude conditions specified by the State of the Operator; or
2) for a turbine engine aeroplane, the amount of fuel to fly for 30 minutes at holding speed at
450 m (1 500 ft) above aerodrome elevation in standard conditions;
f) additional fuel, which shall be the supplementary amount of fuel required if the minimum fuel
calculated in accordance with 4.3.6.3 b), c), d) and e) is not sufficient to:
1) allow the aeroplane to descend as necessary and proceed to an alternate aerodrome in the
event of engine failure or loss of pressurization, whichever requires the greater amount of fuel
based on the assumption that such a failure occurs at the most critical point along the route;
i) fly for 15 minutes at holding speed at 450 m (1 500 ft) above aerodrome elevation in
standard conditions; and
ii) make an approach and landing;
2) allow an aeroplane engaged in EDTO to comply with the EDTO critical fuel scenario as
established by the State of the Operator
3) meet additional requirements not covered above;
Note 1.— Fuel planning for a failure that occurs at the most critical point along a route
(4.3.6.3 f) 1)) may place the aeroplane in a fuel emergency situation based on 4.3.7.2.
Note 2.—Guidance on EDTO critical fuel scenarios are contained in Attachment D;
g) discretionary fuel, which shall be the extra amount of fuel to be carried at the discretion of the
pilot-in-command.

4.19 Pre-flight fuel planning – trip fuel
Traditionally trip fuel was the fuel required to fly from the Origin aerodrome to the Destination
aerodrome. Amendment 36 to Annex 6 Part I further expands on the required foreseen factors
such as meteorological conditions, and air traffic delays that need to be included when
calculating trip fuel. Provision 4.3.6.3 b) requires the consideration of operating conditions
described in 4.3.6.2 b) when computing trip fuel.

[BOAC]

Rat - I fully agree - it is just that the erroneous comments needed correcting - yet again, just as on the original thread.

Now to the 'other' 50% of his post - and to yours. Where we are is where we are and it is not easily going to change. As long as there is a queue of young keen things waiting to pay and fly, very little will change at the 'lower levels' of aviation. Only a 'supply and demand' mismatch will drive up T&C and all the other bits you mention BUT the problem is that the young keen thing is not too bothered by most of that. Burning midnight oil? Easy - do it all the time. Pension - way ahead, worry later. Commuting in 'my time' and uniform at my expense - no real family life to upset, and hey! It's a jet job!

You see 'Barking Mad' conducting a vociferous campaign against fatigue - how much support is he getting, for example?

AB also said "It is the likelihood of an accident that affects safety..." - and how is that avoided? A good safety culture, good SOPs and good training plus quality crews will go a long way to mitigate, whereas a cowboy operation with good T&C and paying good money and allowing full freedom for Captains may well be 'unsafe' - perhaps poor maintenance, weak training, gash SOPs etc. As AB said, it is almost impossible to determine the classification. A 'safe' airline is only 'safe' until proven otherwise. A long-time aviation insurance broker once told me the tale of KLM, several years ago, asking for an advantageous renewal of their policy on the basis of 'xx years of a good safety record'. They were refused, as their broker said "I think you are due for an accident". Guess what happened. One relieved man.

I firmly believe, and have done for a long time, that the glut of cosy 'self-regulation' we see needs to be terminated. We need enquiring and picky Flt Ops inspectors, not bedazzled by all the company HQs and systems and management structures, but asking pertinent questions and taking aboard genuine crew concerns. As Barking says, for all the laudable efforts of CHIRP, PT and the team, the answers are very often anaemic and ineffective.

(Back to fuel) The latest amendment to fuel planning Annex 6 goes some way to the aim, but gives plenty of scope for management to determine 'what is reasonable' - and still knock back contingency - and STILL does not include contingency in alternate fuel. Once again, the great arbiter on how much fuel one is 'allowed' to take is to take PLOG if that is what is wanted (or PLOG+300) - and divert if need be at a suitable point. It is not 'dangerous' and diversions soon sharpen the views of the 'suits'. I saw great reluctance to not add "xxx kg for Granny" in my time and I think this thoughtless excess has contributed to where we are now.

PS Maybe an appropriate place to ask - what happens to a RY crew who divert and need HOTAC? Who pays?

[Al Murdoch]

Last time I diverted in Ryanair, the company paid for the hotel. And jolly nice it was too.

[lomapaseo]

That would mean arriving at the alternate without final reserve - which would be illegal.

Could we have a statutory fuel-related definition of what is meant by arriving at a diversion airport?

I believe these kind of judgments do have some basis in regulation. Best we not play the same game as the newspapers in bringing in shock and horror after the fact.

[Sober Lark]

Safe Airline vs. unsafe culture. The only real problem with air travel these days is that it has become so statistically safe that it creates another problem called complacency.

[J.O.]

While that may be true, it's the management types who suffer from complacency far more than the front line employees. It's called normalization of deviance and it's as much a management problem as a technical one. It's just that when the front liners suffer form it, the consequences are often more severe.

[BEagle]

Could we have a statutory fuel-related definition of what is meant by arriving at a diversion airport?

In my opinion, arriving at the holding fix with Σ (final reserve) + (approach fuel).

Some FCOMs assume a VFR approach; however, it would surely be prudent to assume an IFR approach.

[homerj]

Agaricus , I hope this thread gets the interest it deserves because you've hit the nail on the head

[McBruce]

Converting lts to kgs - its been known for skippers to do a bit of fudging to eek a few 100kgs ontop of the 300kgs that was previously allowed.... Why? Well it could be debated about given the current topic. Why not just record it correctly as per the manual?

[4468]

I agree with the poster who says the policy regarding the carriage of extra fuel is simply a commercial issue. It only becomes a safety issue if the crews make the wrong calculations whilst airborne. That decision can be as safe or as dangerous as you want it to be. It can be dangerous with an extra 5 tonnes, or safe with minimums. In this instance I would contend they took timely decisions which ultimately delivered them, and their passengers, safely to their alternate airfield. Whether or not they were ALL correct to declare a mayday is probably the only point worthy of discussion here. IIRC at least one landed with more than reserve fuel. So what's the problem?

TBH the issue of 'committing' to a destination is probably more contentious, and that happens day in, day out at LHR.

Obviously it doesn't help that the OP seemed unaware of how much extra was being carried by the subjects of his outburst.

Would it help if I add I've been flying for 30 odd years, and therefore not a child of the magenta line? Whatever that's supposed to mean.