Polish Presidential Flight Crash Thread
Second Il-76 approach. I mixed here the controller channel transcript and the the open micro channel from controllers room (marked with *).
To be short, R stands for Ryzhenko, P stands for Plyusnin and K for col. Krasnokutsky. I'm giving just the most importanty parts. To compare with Tu transcript. Something more tangible to discuss, than newspapers.
Everything starts 10 km from threshold
9:36:31 - (Il-76) On glideslope, 8-17
9:36:58 - (R) 8-17, distance 8, 50 right (if I'm correct), on glideslope
9:37:01 - (Il-76) four hundred
9:37:17 - (R) 7, on course, on glideslope
9:37:22 - (R) altitude control
9:37:32 - (R) 6, on course, on glideslope
9:37:35 - (Il-76) - confirms crossing OM, etc
9:37:39 - (R) landing conditionally, 8-17
9:37:41 - (Il-76) conditionally, 8-17 --> in the same situation Tu-answer was Thank you, meaning he didn't understood the meaning of "landing conditionally". Russian fraseology.
9:37:45 - (R) - Be ready for GA, 120, 2 m (wind data)
9:37:49 - (Il-76) Acknowledge, 8-17
9:37:50 - (R) 5, on course, on glideslope
9:38:02 - (R) 4, on course, on glideslope
9:38:17 - (R) 3, on course, on glideslope
9:38:33 - (R) 2, on course, on glideslope
9:38:35 - (Il-76) 130 (altitude)
9:38:47 - (R) 1, on course, on glideslope
9:38:55 - (K) Calm down*
9:39:02 - (P) Send him away*
9:39:07 - (P) Execute GA
9:39:13 - (K) You should calm down*
9:39:30 - (Anonymous) but the Pole was able to land here...(uncomprehensible)*
From 400 m to 130 m Il average descent rate was almost exactly 3 m/s.
It was already mentioned in this thread. Landing conditionally means a descent to minimum altitude, confirmation od RWY visibility by the crew followed by a possible authorisation to land by ATC, else GA.
Arrakis
To be short, R stands for Ryzhenko, P stands for Plyusnin and K for col. Krasnokutsky. I'm giving just the most importanty parts. To compare with Tu transcript. Something more tangible to discuss, than newspapers.
Everything starts 10 km from threshold
9:36:31 - (Il-76) On glideslope, 8-17
9:36:58 - (R) 8-17, distance 8, 50 right (if I'm correct), on glideslope
9:37:01 - (Il-76) four hundred
9:37:17 - (R) 7, on course, on glideslope
9:37:22 - (R) altitude control
9:37:32 - (R) 6, on course, on glideslope
9:37:35 - (Il-76) - confirms crossing OM, etc
9:37:39 - (R) landing conditionally, 8-17
9:37:41 - (Il-76) conditionally, 8-17 --> in the same situation Tu-answer was Thank you, meaning he didn't understood the meaning of "landing conditionally". Russian fraseology.
9:37:45 - (R) - Be ready for GA, 120, 2 m (wind data)
9:37:49 - (Il-76) Acknowledge, 8-17
9:37:50 - (R) 5, on course, on glideslope
9:38:02 - (R) 4, on course, on glideslope
9:38:17 - (R) 3, on course, on glideslope
9:38:33 - (R) 2, on course, on glideslope
9:38:35 - (Il-76) 130 (altitude)
9:38:47 - (R) 1, on course, on glideslope
9:38:55 - (K) Calm down*
9:39:02 - (P) Send him away*
9:39:07 - (P) Execute GA
9:39:13 - (K) You should calm down*
9:39:30 - (Anonymous) but the Pole was able to land here...(uncomprehensible)*
From 400 m to 130 m Il average descent rate was almost exactly 3 m/s.
It was already mentioned in this thread. Landing conditionally means a descent to minimum altitude, confirmation od RWY visibility by the crew followed by a possible authorisation to land by ATC, else GA.
Arrakis
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Except for a tiny little problem that this guy is far more qualified to express opinions on what went wrong than any member of that so called "commission", because:
1. He was the commander of the 36th Special Air Regiment for many years, longer than anybody else.
2. He used to train everybody there before things went… "south?"
3. He flew the Tu-154 with VIPs longer than anybody else in Poland
4. He knows all the Russian procedures better than anybody else flying VIPs.
1. He was the commander of the 36th Special Air Regiment for many years, longer than anybody else.
2. He used to train everybody there before things went… "south?"
3. He flew the Tu-154 with VIPs longer than anybody else in Poland
4. He knows all the Russian procedures better than anybody else flying VIPs.
- well, that's what people say...
- yeah, well probably Szczyglo said no Russians will sit on this plane
...etc
It won't hurt you to read this thing. Among other things, he states he never even allowed anybody (main passenger included) to decide where to land. He had a flight plan with alternates, and if necessary he would decide to go to alternate of his choosing, upon which he would tell the stewardess to inform the "main passenger".
I don’t think he would raise the issue if it wasn't for the latest Kaczynski "President not cargo, can decide where to land" revelations. The core of the issue is IDIOTS getting rid of competent people and micro-managing and meddling with things they have no clue about. I see it every day in Poland.
Meanwhile, there is a little struggle at the "Polish commission" which wants to kick out Edmund Klich for not being… assertive enough with the Russians. Meaning, they actually are trying to keep all their BS alive – and this is what forces the people in the know to finally start talking. They don't want us to be any more embarrassed.
Thought you were out for good, but I see you are still hovering around chiming in from time to time with irrelevant misinformation
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9:38:35 - (Il-76) 130 (altitude)
9:38:47 - (R) 1, on course, on glideslope
9:38:55 - (K) Calm down*
9:39:02 - (P) Send him away*
9:39:07 - (P) Execute GA
9:39:13 - (K) You should calm down*
9:39:30 - (Anonymous) but the Pole was able to land here...(uncomprehensible)*
From 400 m to 130 m Il average descent rate was almost exactly 3 m/s.
It was already mentioned in this thread. Landing conditionally means a descent to minimum altitude, confirmation od RWY visibility by the crew followed by a possible authorisation to land by ATC, else GA.
Arrakis
9:38:47 - (R) 1, on course, on glideslope
9:38:55 - (K) Calm down*
9:39:02 - (P) Send him away*
9:39:07 - (P) Execute GA
9:39:13 - (K) You should calm down*
9:39:30 - (Anonymous) but the Pole was able to land here...(uncomprehensible)*
From 400 m to 130 m Il average descent rate was almost exactly 3 m/s.
It was already mentioned in this thread. Landing conditionally means a descent to minimum altitude, confirmation od RWY visibility by the crew followed by a possible authorisation to land by ATC, else GA.
Arrakis
Quote:
RetiredF4:Sorry to say that, but the thread is again drifting from facts to speculation and assumption.
All Quotes janeczku
If you would know, how to fly an aircraft with deliberate thought below the minimum to the threshold and land out of it, you would also know, that you are then not ending up high at the runway threshold, because you already descended low before the missed approach point and therefore approach the threshold low already.
Being high over the threshold comes from flying towards the threshold after passing the point where the decision height intersects the glidepath, without further descent, therfore ending up high on glidepath. The time when you pickup the lighting system (in this case the beacons left and right of the threshold, which had been explicitely mentioned by the Yak-Crew), the descent ends in a long touchdown.
The YAK does not use the words "by all means", that is your wording here. YAK crew gives a site report, an own expierience, which has actually no official value. If the weather would have been reported better than the official weather, it would have had again no official value either. The only legal weather is from the met-office. The approach itself can not violate minimas, only the pilot can do it by continuing the approach to beyond the published minima without runway reference (for example approach lights).
Again, to commence the approach down to the minimum is no violation of regs and rules. It is not legal however to continue such un approach beyond the published minimums without field environment in sight.
There are a lot of reasons to do so, beginning from the practice to gain for the aircrew, to the good will show for the president, to the final objective to land out of it, if the field is in sight.
What do you know from flying such an approach, from developing weather to good or worse? Fog comes and fog goes, in local areas sometimes within minutes. might be thick like in london or it might be thin and patchy. If you are already there and wish to land, why not give it a try? Performed correctly and not lower than allowed minimum it is safe.
To assume, that every crew, who starts such an approach is a insane minimum buster is far feetched.
We have elaborated over this long time ago. Using R-altitude instead of B-altitude, wrong setup of Pics B-altimeter, target fixation outside, the behavior of ATC with "on glidepath all the time until 25 meters above threshold (where first warning "horizon" happened...... i repeat myself, but those are facts out of the MAC report and no speculations.
If you wouuld ever have done a contour flying with radar altimeter even in a agile aircraft and not in a plump hen like the TU154 you would know, that it would exactly be vice versa. The radar altimeter is the least exact instrument in hilly terrain, it jumps and it lags and it shows only altitude reference, which is already history (because it is just passing below you)
You set in the correct ressure on all available barometric instruments and crosscheck them against each other. Then you would take the lowest indicating as reference and adjust the others accordingly. Now you are on the safe side.
So your assumption is not logical, it is nonsense.
see my point of view from sstatements above. You are assuming again......
Wrong asumption again. CVR states exactly, that they agreed to do the go around in automatic mode with the go around button. That one however was not active due to no glidepath guidance, therefore it would not disengage the autopilot and it would not advance the throttles. It also shows, that the crew had no intention to manually disengage the autopilot and to manually increase the thrust, it was intended to let the automatics do the work.
If you allow me a speculationh here (which i´m very reluctant, but i might be entiteled to one assumption also), it might show the attempt to go around with the button, as it is located on the steering horn. Speculating further, one attempt by the pilot, the other one from the FO. And it could not show on the FDR, because the FDR only records the activation of the mode, but not the pressing of the inactive button.
Did you really read the MAK report? The autopilot was never disconnected manually. The pilot pulled with more than 15 Kg of force on the steering column and did a force disconnect on the autopilot simultaneously applying full power. That was a panic reaction and no deliberate act. MAK even states correctly, that this was not the normal method to disconect the automatics by the appropriate buttons.
It proves, that nobody in the aircraft cockpit was aware at all about their situation until it was too late.
Whatever hard facts and evidence you see, the conclusion out of them is nothing but speculation.
Fact being, they did a lot of mistakes from beginning to end, and those had been enough already to lead to the outcome. You dont need any intention for a scud run or for busting a minimum to crash that aircraft with such a "green" crew when doing such a bunch of mistakes.
The agenda of the scud run may serve the political intentions, but these political aspects have no weight in the occurance of the accident.
franzl
RetiredF4:Sorry to say that, but the thread is again drifting from facts to speculation and assumption.
All Quotes janeczku
Eh eh, i dont think so! Considering all hard facts, the scud dive theory is based on strong evidence and not speculations:
1. It has been officially confirmed (by PAF investigation) that Jak-40 busted their minimas going below 100m and conducted landing too high above the treshold. Given the absence of technical failures and glidepath guidance by NDB and ATC, this is evidence "e contrario" that they were conducting a "scud" or "rat dive".
1. It has been officially confirmed (by PAF investigation) that Jak-40 busted their minimas going below 100m and conducted landing too high above the treshold. Given the absence of technical failures and glidepath guidance by NDB and ATC, this is evidence "e contrario" that they were conducting a "scud" or "rat dive".
Being high over the threshold comes from flying towards the threshold after passing the point where the decision height intersects the glidepath, without further descent, therfore ending up high on glidepath. The time when you pickup the lighting system (in this case the beacons left and right of the threshold, which had been explicitely mentioned by the Yak-Crew), the descent ends in a long touchdown.
2. The Jak-40 pilot informs the TU-154, that there is a cloud base "well below 50 meters", but in the same breath tells them they should try by all means to land. Thus he suggested an approach that would violate the airport, planes and pilots minimas. This is evidence for the kind of "esprit de corps" that prevailed in the PAF special regiment. - eg giving a damn about "cumbersome" rules.
3. Tu-154 were well aware of the limited visibility and the cloud base, that would in no way allow them to get visual at MDA. Nevertheless, 20 seconds after receiving this information from Jak-40, they decided to try an approach.
This decision would only make sense if they intended to bust minimas trying to establish visual below the MDA.
It is hardly believable that they expected to have even a slightly change to get visual at MDA with a cloud base "well below 50m" and "visibility of 200m".
To assume, that every crew, who starts such an approach is a insane minimum buster is far feetched.
4. It is proven by the FDR and CVR recordings that they didnt call for or conducted a go-around at 120 or even 100m, neither did they get visual ("Voice in cockpit: You can't see a thing"). Instead they kept descending below MDA.
5. They used radar alt from 300m, which was their SOP on Jak-40 in a landing configuration. If they had have had the intention to do an approach by the book, means descending to MDA and then decide on landing they would in now way have used the radar alt. Given the decision to bust minimas, it seems logical for them to use the radar alt, because of - ironically - better ground level seperation indication in a hilly terrain.
You set in the correct ressure on all available barometric instruments and crosscheck them against each other. Then you would take the lowest indicating as reference and adjust the others accordingly. Now you are on the safe side.
So your assumption is not logical, it is nonsense.
6. The last message from Jak-40 ("Visibility now 200") shortly before final didnt lead to any reaction in the cockpit. They knew that with this visibilty, there is no chance of getting visual at MDA. Nevertheless they continued to final approach, which is evidence that they had plans to do their approach the polish way, busting the MDA (Poles are both known for and proud of their ability to "kombinowac", which means to wangle sth not by the book under difficult circumstances).
7. FDR shows, that as of the height of 80 meters pull force was applied to the control column two times within 4 seconds, leading to counter push of the still engaged autopilot, because the force was not enough to override it. It is not known if that was done by the PIC or the FO. There are two possible explanations for this:
a) An attempt of the FO to conduct a go-around. Highly unprobable, as go-around thrust was not applied and autopilot not disconnected!
a) An attempt of the FO to conduct a go-around. Highly unprobable, as go-around thrust was not applied and autopilot not disconnected!
If you allow me a speculationh here (which i´m very reluctant, but i might be entiteled to one assumption also), it might show the attempt to go around with the button, as it is located on the steering horn. Speculating further, one attempt by the pilot, the other one from the FO. And it could not show on the FDR, because the FDR only records the activation of the mode, but not the pressing of the inactive button.
b) An attempt of the PIC to level out the A/C at an (still safe) altitude of around 50m trying to get visual in horizontal flight. When, 3 seconds after the first pull of the control column, the autopilot pushed back and plane didnt level out, the PIC realized something went wrong and initiated go-around, disconnecting AP and applying go-around thrust.
Quite probable! And also proove that they were actually still aware how to do a go around on this plane!
Whatever hard facts and evidence you see, the conclusion out of them is nothing but speculation.
Fact being, they did a lot of mistakes from beginning to end, and those had been enough already to lead to the outcome. You dont need any intention for a scud run or for busting a minimum to crash that aircraft with such a "green" crew when doing such a bunch of mistakes.
The agenda of the scud run may serve the political intentions, but these political aspects have no weight in the occurance of the accident.
franzl
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RockShock
Yet, being such an expert he resorts to stating 'facts' using words like:
- well, that's what people say...
- well, that's what people say...
How is this relevant at all? He didn't involve the passenger, the others did - I don't see how this applies at the accident we are discussing...
Certainly a pilot of the squadron who quit in 1999 is 'in the know' - damn right looking at this interview!
Now, what is interesting, he never liked Kaczynskis because they canned him for some never determined improprieties as seems to be the re-occurring scheme for them. Someone does not kiss their ass, he must be a Russian agent or something, they smear him, destroy him, and at the end this proves to be yet another Kaczynski fantasy (See Doctor G., Blida stories and many others).
RockShock,
this is from the second approach.
Regarding the so called near crash during the first approach, we just know that Smolensk ATC guys were shaken a little bit, but nothing more (transcript). The rest is just "news".
What do you mean ?
Arrakis
this is from the second approach.
Regarding the so called near crash during the first approach, we just know that Smolensk ATC guys were shaken a little bit, but nothing more (transcript). The rest is just "news".
Now, what is interesting, he never liked Kaczynskis because they canned him for some never determined improprieties as seems to be the re-occurring scheme for them
Arrakis
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ARRAKIS
Some time ago I read that Kaczynski (then in capacity of head of NIK) forced that dude (Płk Robert Latkowski) to resign claiming some massive financial improprieties.
No charges were ever filed but rumors of financial improprieties at the 36th regiment continue and escalate till today – see news.
Now Latkowski is one of the authors of a book about Smolensk disaster, key hated expert whom Kaczynski throws threats against, so it is safe to say he will be contributing to the story for a while.
As you can see, I am willing to share info even if it can be used to discredit my point of view.
No charges were ever filed but rumors of financial improprieties at the 36th regiment continue and escalate till today – see news.
Now Latkowski is one of the authors of a book about Smolensk disaster, key hated expert whom Kaczynski throws threats against, so it is safe to say he will be contributing to the story for a while.
As you can see, I am willing to share info even if it can be used to discredit my point of view.
Some time ago I read that Kaczynski (then in capacity of head of NIK) forced that dude (Płk Robert Latkowski) to resign claiming some massive financial improprieties.
Arrakis
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ARRAKIS
You understand - in capacity as head of NIK - as in Kaczynski went after Latkowski as head of NIK long, long time agou?
Regardless if it makes sense or not - I am only telling you that because this is one of the stories being put out by Kaczynski camp - Kaczynski tried to catch Latkowski which led to him being forced to resign – ergo, he is evil, biased, etc, etc.
Some of the interesting charges Kaczynski levied at Latkowski as head of 36th was that Latkowski assigned planes to politicians HIMSELF and had little regard for what politicians wanted. I guess, with him gone, Kaczynski did get what he wanted.
Regardless if it makes sense or not - I am only telling you that because this is one of the stories being put out by Kaczynski camp - Kaczynski tried to catch Latkowski which led to him being forced to resign – ergo, he is evil, biased, etc, etc.
Some of the interesting charges Kaczynski levied at Latkowski as head of 36th was that Latkowski assigned planes to politicians HIMSELF and had little regard for what politicians wanted. I guess, with him gone, Kaczynski did get what he wanted.
You understand - in capacity as head of NIK - as in Kaczynski went after Latkowski as head of NIK long, long time agou?
Sorry for that OT.
Speculating further, one attempt by the pilot, the other one from the FO. And it could not show on the FDR, because the FDR only records the activation of the mode, but not the pressing of the inactive button.
Arrakis
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@RetiredF4
You do make a lot of sense in your posting and i dont question your experience as a military pilot. But:
1. There is no "decision height" in a non-precision approach. You probably mean the point where MDA intersects the glidepath, which was the missed approach point according to charts.
2. So what you suggesting is that they leveled out at MDA and got themselfs above the glidepath past missed approach point? Quite probable but that still would mean that they intentionally busted minimas because at the MAP they were required to execute go around but didnt!
You do make a lot of sense in your posting and i dont question your experience as a military pilot. But:
passing the point where the decision height intersects the glidepath
Being high over the threshold comes from flying towards the threshold after passing the point where the decision height intersects the glidepath, without further descent, therfore ending up high on glidepath.
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A blogger in Smolensk forum, who seems to be an ex-Severny employee, that is, not "employee" but with the military there (and wrote knows both Plusnin and Krasnokutsky; said does not know Ryzhkov) wrote a post protecting Yak a bit, in his view Yak "didn't bust all minima-s as journalists say, those journalists", "come on, guys, the weather was much better then; Yak got a go-around command from the ATC only because they materialised too high over the runway treshold."
Latkowski's claim that Protasiuk declined to fly to Severny because of the weather and had to be ordered to do so does not correspond with the MAK report.
According to MAK the flight departed without the crew obtaining a METAR or TAF for Severny. Even if they had obtained a forecast it would have been wrong. The fog took the forecasters by surprise. Its severity did not become apparent at Severny until shortly before the time the flight was getting airborne. The crew found out when en route.
Protasiuk may have made some representations about the lack of a valid destination forecast. He would have been entirely right to do so. But we don't know this happened.
According to MAK the flight departed without the crew obtaining a METAR or TAF for Severny. Even if they had obtained a forecast it would have been wrong. The fog took the forecasters by surprise. Its severity did not become apparent at Severny until shortly before the time the flight was getting airborne. The crew found out when en route.
Protasiuk may have made some representations about the lack of a valid destination forecast. He would have been entirely right to do so. But we don't know this happened.
janeczku
1. There is no "decision height" in a non-precision approach. You probably mean the point where MDA intersects the glidepath, which was the missed approach point according to charts.
1. There is no "decision height" in a non-precision approach. You probably mean the point where MDA intersects the glidepath, which was the missed approach point according to charts.
2. So what you suggesting is that they leveled out at MDA and got themselfs above the glidepath past missed approach point? Quite probable but that still would mean that they intentionally busted minimas because at the MAP they were required to execute go around but didnt!
Otherwise thank you for recognizing my post as you did.
franzl
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ARRAKIS,
As far sa I can understand, it's impossible to find any material proof of pressing unarmed button. I have rised this question about УХОД button before, as well here as on aviaforum.ru, and common opinion is that without arming approach mode on АБСУ, all this buttons are not even powered. Also it's not tumbler / toggle switch, which make loud noise when toggled from one side to other.
I wonder, if it will be possible to hear it on the CVR. That's, as I understand it, one of the main goals of the tests with the second aircraft. To hear what was pressed/switched/etc...
Yes, there will be nothing recorded on the FDR. This is why the analysis of sounds recorded by the VCR will be a part of the test flight, but outside parties involved no one really know exactly what will be the extent of the experiment.
Regarding VCR tape analysis, there were 3 separate teams working on them, and I wonder, what will be the final findings.
Newertheless, most of the missing answers are in my opinion to be found in the regiment itself.
Arrakis
Regarding VCR tape analysis, there were 3 separate teams working on them, and I wonder, what will be the final findings.
Newertheless, most of the missing answers are in my opinion to be found in the regiment itself.
Arrakis
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Targon
Latkowski's claim that Protasiuk declined to fly to Severny because of the weather and had to be ordered to do so does not correspond with the MAK report.
- Let's start from the beginning. The first friction occurred even before the departure. It was reported that the commander of the crew, captain Protasiuk, did not want to fly after receiving the weather forecast. And that's why the crew's readiness was reported to the President by the commander of the Polish Air Force. Did he count on the favor of the president, to help him to obtain an assignment in NATO?
- That's what they say.
- Or maybe the crew had no precise weather forecast? Maybe Warsaw has not known that the fog thickened in Smolensk?
- Sir, Pyry houses the Air Operations Center. In my days it was called the Central Command Station. The bosses of Hydrometeorological Service of Air Force are there. Meteorologists work there, experts on the weather. They provide weather forecast for the regiment. And what, the pilots did not have it?
- But, their superior decided about the departure.
- That's what they say.
- Or maybe the crew had no precise weather forecast? Maybe Warsaw has not known that the fog thickened in Smolensk?
- Sir, Pyry houses the Air Operations Center. In my days it was called the Central Command Station. The bosses of Hydrometeorological Service of Air Force are there. Meteorologists work there, experts on the weather. They provide weather forecast for the regiment. And what, the pilots did not have it?
- But, their superior decided about the departure.
Now, suppose what Latkowski says is true and they must have had the forecast for Severny. Why would the crew pretend they did not, how would they do it on their own initiative?
Note that some Polish military ATC testified that "fixing" weather reports so that VIP flights could take place was a commonplace with the VIPs at question. That's the situation now. All starts to fit.
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Given the transient nature of fog I think the weather report argument is being overblown here.
As far as I understood the fog caught the Russian meterologists by surprise. The yak40 managed to land in marginal conditions approx. 1 hour before the crash - already after the Tu had departed from Warsaw. So how could have Protasiuk argued that the conditions in Smolensk are inapproproate for landing prior to his departure from Warsaw?
Besides - this was a VIP flight, which are governed by somewhat different - let's call it economics - than commercial aviation. A commercial operator will always prefer to stay put at the base until the destination is clear, especially on such a short haul flight. On a VIP flight it may be preferable to depart and hold until conditions clear at destination or divert, refuel and fly back - because for VIP flights cost is of secondary importance.
Both options (hold & divert/flyback) were available to the flight. A 3 hour delay (which is what a Moscow diversion & refuel would probably amount to at the most) would not have ruined the Katyn event. (BTW, has anyone asked: How much reserve fuel did the Tu 134 have on board for holding? Was this the max possible given the load? Why not?)
No conspiracies, no pressure. The guys wanted to do a descent to MDA to judge the situation /perhaps they took it as a point of honour to 'try' after their friends in the Yak advised them to 'try'?/ - and then the lack of airmanship kicked in. Come on - you say this guy didn't want to fly as he felt it is so so risky, but then he just tries this 'trial approach' without a proper crew briefing on his intentions. It does not add up.
Golf-Sierra
It was reported that the commander of the crew, captain Protasiuk, did not want to fly after receiving the weather forecast.
Or maybe the crew had no precise weather forecast? Maybe Warsaw has not known that the fog thickened in Smolensk?
Or maybe the crew had no precise weather forecast? Maybe Warsaw has not known that the fog thickened in Smolensk?
As far as I understood the fog caught the Russian meterologists by surprise. The yak40 managed to land in marginal conditions approx. 1 hour before the crash - already after the Tu had departed from Warsaw. So how could have Protasiuk argued that the conditions in Smolensk are inapproproate for landing prior to his departure from Warsaw?
Besides - this was a VIP flight, which are governed by somewhat different - let's call it economics - than commercial aviation. A commercial operator will always prefer to stay put at the base until the destination is clear, especially on such a short haul flight. On a VIP flight it may be preferable to depart and hold until conditions clear at destination or divert, refuel and fly back - because for VIP flights cost is of secondary importance.
Both options (hold & divert/flyback) were available to the flight. A 3 hour delay (which is what a Moscow diversion & refuel would probably amount to at the most) would not have ruined the Katyn event. (BTW, has anyone asked: How much reserve fuel did the Tu 134 have on board for holding? Was this the max possible given the load? Why not?)
No conspiracies, no pressure. The guys wanted to do a descent to MDA to judge the situation /perhaps they took it as a point of honour to 'try' after their friends in the Yak advised them to 'try'?/ - and then the lack of airmanship kicked in. Come on - you say this guy didn't want to fly as he felt it is so so risky, but then he just tries this 'trial approach' without a proper crew briefing on his intentions. It does not add up.
Golf-Sierra
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Boring misrepresentation. He says "It's what they say" and he means "It's what they[the crew] say[in the cockpit]". (See transcript 10:03:22). But, you cannot even figure it out and assume that "they" means overheard hearsay and you twist your translation that way. One might say you were a little "biased" or something.
It's EXTREMELY relevant because if they have issues with alternate airport choices then perhaps they should resolve them BEFORE flight plan is made, before boarding the plane and not run all around the cockpit during flight as was the norm with Kaczynskis on board. See Kaczynski interview again for details.
He was not just a pilot, he was the commander of the 36th Air Regiment for over 12 years and, lost no planes. At that time, it was also assumed that the commander of that Regiment was the best pilot, whose duties also included flying the President on important missions, which he did. Afterwards, they increasingly preferred political appointees as commanders with almost zero experience, which he discusses in detail.
What's more, he contradicts himself saying in same part of an interviev:
- he was not allowed to even start the descent from cruise height over Belarus on hearing the met info
- and in next sentence he says that he mustn't have descended below 100m
- in almost every sentence he uses 'probably', 'maybe', the pilot 'idled' and was not capable of performing any actions
I need to congratulate you on the selection of 'experts' you are having to support your misleading job on this forum.
Now, what is interesting, he never liked Kaczynskis because they canned him for some never determined improprieties as seems to be the re-occurring scheme for them. Someone does not kiss their ass, he must be a Russian agent or something, they smear him, destroy him, and at the end this proves to be yet another Kaczynski fantasy (See Doctor G., Blida stories and many others).