Latest Boeing News
The problem Boeing has is that any significant accident that has causal factors linked to design or manufacturing failures by Boeing will be an extinction level event for Boeing.
If the door plug had come off at FL360 instead of 16,000 feet the airplane and everybody in would likely have been lost, so only luck saved Boeing on that “quality escape”. There is no question in my mind if the airplane had been lost due to the door plug blow out the MAX would still be grounded and Boeing would be in its death throes.
The “Latest News from Boeing” seems to be missing an understanding and acknowledgement that they are now runway limited. They have used up all their room for maneuver and simply can’t afford another egregious Fu*k Up, therefore immediate steps need to be taken to address the systemic issues in design and production even if it results in a short to medium term hit to profitability and share price.
If the door plug had come off at FL360 instead of 16,000 feet the airplane and everybody in would likely have been lost, so only luck saved Boeing on that “quality escape”. There is no question in my mind if the airplane had been lost due to the door plug blow out the MAX would still be grounded and Boeing would be in its death throes.
The “Latest News from Boeing” seems to be missing an understanding and acknowledgement that they are now runway limited. They have used up all their room for maneuver and simply can’t afford another egregious Fu*k Up, therefore immediate steps need to be taken to address the systemic issues in design and production even if it results in a short to medium term hit to profitability and share price.
I don't think that is realistic or even desirable and I say that as as someone who used to work for an aviation regulator. The reality is that the expertise exists in industry not the FAA, especially in this era of rapid technological advancements. The problem was regulatory capture of the ODA by Boeing. That, that was happening should have been obvious to the FAA and they should have taken action.
Congress legislates the function of the FAA and oversees the funding of the FAA and has not been providing the funding required to keep the FAA attractive enough to hire enough people skilled enough to do the job they are expected to do.
FAA has always had a divided charter - to promote the aviation industry and to promote aviation safety. Clearly the FAA cannot do both and be effective at both.
I remain unconvinced that FAA would have noticed the potential that pilots would not trim an airplane because the stall warning was sounding at the same time. ODA or not, that problem was going to remain. FAA already accepted that a false stall warning could be sounded and stick shaker enabled when there was no stall.
Greater oversight by the FAA on the factory floor would very likely have called a halt to production out of Spirit a long time ago, avoiding the door departing due to out-of-sequence re-work, but that's a Congressional funding issue for not having enough FAA inspectors vs supporting Boeing and Boeing customers getting the planes sold and used to promote aviation.
Accepting so much discrepant material seems the bigger problem and it seems unreasonable that instead of Boeing inspectors in Wichita they had Spirit re-work teams in Renton.
FAA has always had a divided charter - to promote the aviation industry and to promote aviation safety. Clearly the FAA cannot do both and be effective at both.
I remain unconvinced that FAA would have noticed the potential that pilots would not trim an airplane because the stall warning was sounding at the same time. ODA or not, that problem was going to remain. FAA already accepted that a false stall warning could be sounded and stick shaker enabled when there was no stall.
Greater oversight by the FAA on the factory floor would very likely have called a halt to production out of Spirit a long time ago, avoiding the door departing due to out-of-sequence re-work, but that's a Congressional funding issue for not having enough FAA inspectors vs supporting Boeing and Boeing customers getting the planes sold and used to promote aviation.
Accepting so much discrepant material seems the bigger problem and it seems unreasonable that instead of Boeing inspectors in Wichita they had Spirit re-work teams in Renton.
That being said, the FAA is still obligated to consider the 'cost effectiveness' of its various dictates. For example, if you look at proposed (and issued) Airworthiness Directives, it has a section where it estimates the costs of compliance with the intent of the AD.
I completely agree with Global about the delegation vs. ODA. The FAA has used delegation for many decades (DERs and DARs being just one example). The difference being that a DER reported directly to the FAA (I was a DER for nearly 20 years before Boeing went ODA). DERs were selected by the FAA, and I had an FAA advisor that I could contact whenever I had a question or concern. With ODA, everything had to go through the Boeing compliance office - which not only had little knowledge of the intricacies of Propulsion), I was specifically bared from unilaterally contacting the FAA without going through the Boeing compliance office.
It also dumped far more responsibility on the ARs - along with the potential for 'undo pressure' from management. Personally I never experienced undo pressure as an AR (although, interestingly, I did as a DER - my case actually went into the development of the rules regarding undo pressure when Boeing went ODA) - and even had a Supervisor tell an engine manufacture to stop pressuring me when I raised concerns about functionality of a new FADEC s/w that I was responsible for certifying.
I don't know how much of it was the concept of ODA being fundamentally flawed, and how much was just the horrid Boeing implementation, but many of us raised concerns that the Boeing ODA was flawed and bound to fail.
tdracer, The delegated examining system worked well in Britain back in the 1980s when I was a flight training manager (I have no idea what it is like now). And I always emphasised to the instructors that when, they were conducting pilot tests, they were working on behalf of the CAA and, by extension, the safety of the travelling public.
Equally, when we did CofA air tests on aircraft, we were acting on behalf of the ARB and later the CAA.
Delegation works well so long as the integrity of the process is maintained.
Equally, when we did CofA air tests on aircraft, we were acting on behalf of the ARB and later the CAA.
Delegation works well so long as the integrity of the process is maintained.
Seattle times has an interesting response from Boeing to the 787 whistleblower claims. Google ‘Seattle Times Boeing’. Two comments:
Boeing engineer says ‘at normal loads’: I thought the acceptance criteria was ‘good for the design load at end of life’? A much tougher acceptance criteria.
And we are asked to believe Boeing redesigned the assembly process and delayed deliveries, at significant cost, to address a non problem?
This gentlemen may have a point.
Boeing engineer says ‘at normal loads’: I thought the acceptance criteria was ‘good for the design load at end of life’? A much tougher acceptance criteria.
And we are asked to believe Boeing redesigned the assembly process and delayed deliveries, at significant cost, to address a non problem?
This gentlemen may have a point.
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It was changed after the ValuJet crash. Remember ValueJet? The Critter? Way back before Y2K and all that? The dual mandate was removed with the passage of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996.
I am not ignorant of aviation, thanks very much. The political reason FAA exists is to reassure the flying public that aircraft and aviation are safe, not primarily to ensure that aircraft are safe. They removed it from the charter as it was a visible conflict of interest, not because they were changing their attitude about it.
More people die in the USA every year under FAA management in GA crashes than in the two 737 MAX crashes. Ever see the FAA demand before Congress more authority to decrease those deaths? Nope. Because makers of general aviation equipment want the public to remain confident in their products and operations and their lobbyists are in Congressional offices. So FAA papers over the flaws and reassures the flying public.
More people die in the USA every year under FAA management in GA crashes than in the two 737 MAX crashes. Ever see the FAA demand before Congress more authority to decrease those deaths? Nope. Because makers of general aviation equipment want the public to remain confident in their products and operations and their lobbyists are in Congressional offices. So FAA papers over the flaws and reassures the flying public.
@ MechEngr "More people die in the USA every year under FAA management in GA crashes than in the two 737 MAX crashes. Ever see the FAA demand before Congress more authority to decrease those deaths? Nope. Because makers of general aviation equipment want the public to remain confident in their products and operations and their lobbyists are in Congressional offices. So FAA papers over the flaws and reassures the flying public."
Your Fox News view of the world is jaundiced.
Your Fox News view of the world is jaundiced.
I never watch the pro-Putin, Mudoch news. I'm also skeptical, not jaundiced.
I am not ignorant of aviation, thanks very much. The political reason FAA exists is to reassure the flying public that aircraft and aviation are safe, not primarily to ensure that aircraft are safe. They removed it from the charter as it was a visible conflict of interest, not because they were changing their attitude about it.
More people die in the USA every year under FAA management in GA crashes than in the two 737 MAX crashes. Ever see the FAA demand before Congress more authority to decrease those deaths? Nope. Because makers of general aviation equipment want the public to remain confident in their products and operations and their lobbyists are in Congressional offices. So FAA papers over the flaws and reassures the flying public.
More people die in the USA every year under FAA management in GA crashes than in the two 737 MAX crashes. Ever see the FAA demand before Congress more authority to decrease those deaths? Nope. Because makers of general aviation equipment want the public to remain confident in their products and operations and their lobbyists are in Congressional offices. So FAA papers over the flaws and reassures the flying public.
On whether FAA's role and responsibilities for safety in any and all sectors of aviation in the United States is infected and corrupted by conflict of interest, I'd pay good hard-earned lowly cabdriver money to watch a moderated discussion between someone advocating the viewpoint you articulated about conflict of interest and, say, a recent or current Administrator. Maybe recent would be better, because unconstrained by political static and signals in D.C. (Part of your viewpoint refutes itself. FAA doesn't need or want to "promote" aviation, because the armies of lobbyists have that task list constantly "in work", as you contend.)
Insofar as commercial aviation has an excellent safety record in the United States, why would anyone think FAA needs to reassure the public of something that has become a cliche - flying on an airliner is safer than any other form of transportation. It's a cliche, and it's the truth, too, is it not?
As to GA, what solution would be recommended? No to product liability law reform, or, bring on the trial lawyer bar? Tight up licensing rules so fewer persons who shouldn't be operating an aircraft cannot do so?
Just in case, totally just contingency - anyone who regards you as ignorant is a complete fool.
Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 17th Apr 2024 at 18:31.
AP on today Senate hearings https://apnews.com/article/boeing-wh...7cd74b9ea264e3
And about Boeing statements rejecting some allegations
One of the witnesses, MIT aeronautics lecturer - - - - - - -, lost his sister when a Boeing 737 Max 8 crashed in Ethiopia in 2019. - - - - commented on the disconnect between Boeing management’s words about safety and what workers observe on the factory floor.
“They hear, ‘Safety is our number one priority,’” he said. “What they see is that’s only true as long as your production milestones are met, and at that point it’s ‘Push it out the door as fast as you can.’” In talking to Boeing workers, - - - - - - said he heard “there was a very real fear of payback and retribution if you held your ground.”
“They hear, ‘Safety is our number one priority,’” he said. “What they see is that’s only true as long as your production milestones are met, and at that point it’s ‘Push it out the door as fast as you can.’” In talking to Boeing workers, - - - - - - said he heard “there was a very real fear of payback and retribution if you held your ground.”
A second Senate hearing Wednesday will feature a Boeing engineer who claims that sections of the skin on 787 Dreamliner jets are not properly fastened and could eventually break apart.
Also scheduled to testify before a Senate investigations subcommittee Wednesday is - - - - - - - , a former manager on the Boeing 737 program. Two other aviation technical experts are on the witness list as well.
AP on today Senate hearings https://apnews.com/article/boeing-wh...7cd74b9ea264e3
AP article very helpfully includes link to [correction: letter to Boeing CEO from Chair and Ranking Member of Permanent Investigations Subcomm.] - which cites letter to FAA Admin. from Mr. Salehpour's attorney.
(FWIW, any attorney can slap a brief or pleading together but correspondence to official addressees and subject matter of high importance - something of a lost art in most offices, though fortunately for Mr Salehpour, not in his law firm representation.)
AP article very helpfully includes link to [correction: letter to Boeing CEO from Chair and Ranking Member of Permanent Investigations Subcomm.] - which cites letter to FAA Admin. from Mr. Salehpour's attorney.
(FWIW, any attorney can slap a brief or pleading together but correspondence to official addressees and subject matter of high importance - something of a lost art in most offices, though fortunately for Mr Salehpour, not in his law firm representation.)
Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 17th Apr 2024 at 18:35.
AP on today Senate hearings https://apnews.com/article/boeing-wh...7cd74b9ea264e3
AP article very helpfully includes link to [correction: letter to Boeing CEO from Chair and Ranking Member of Permanent Investigations Subcomm.] - which cites letter to FAA Admin. from Mr. Salehpour's attorney.
(FWIW, any attorney can slap a brief or pleading together but correspondence to official addressees and subject matter of high importance - something of a lost art in most offices, though fortunately for Mr Salehpour, not in his law firm representation.)
AP article very helpfully includes link to [correction: letter to Boeing CEO from Chair and Ranking Member of Permanent Investigations Subcomm.] - which cites letter to FAA Admin. from Mr. Salehpour's attorney.
(FWIW, any attorney can slap a brief or pleading together but correspondence to official addressees and subject matter of high importance - something of a lost art in most offices, though fortunately for Mr Salehpour, not in his law firm representation.)
I seem to have missed Sully's interview on MSNBC from end of March
He probably was applying metal knowledge and did assume that composite fuselage stress works the same
They initially took it serious but too many experts contradicted him. Even two company engineers (not known what leadership level) came forward to defend it as safe in public.
I think too many people were tired of Sam S. stubborn sticking to the issue although proven wrong.
They then transferred him to the more conventional 777 - wait a minute - is the 777x still conventional, apart from the skin?
For the benefit for him I hope I'm wrong, but this needs to be looked at with open mind, what's the truth.
I'm not fully convinced of Sam S. worries regarding 787 fuselage tolerances. I speculate:
He probably was applying metal knowledge and did assume that composite fuselage stress works the same
They initially took it serious but too many experts contradicted him. Even two company engineers (not known what leadership level) came forward to defend it as safe in public.
I think too many people were tired of Sam S. stubborn sticking to the issue although proven wrong.
They then transferred him to the more conventional 777 - wait a minute - is the 777x still conventional, apart from the skin?
For the benefit for him I hope I'm wrong, but this needs to be looked at with open mind, what's the truth.
He probably was applying metal knowledge and did assume that composite fuselage stress works the same
They initially took it serious but too many experts contradicted him. Even two company engineers (not known what leadership level) came forward to defend it as safe in public.
I think too many people were tired of Sam S. stubborn sticking to the issue although proven wrong.
They then transferred him to the more conventional 777 - wait a minute - is the 777x still conventional, apart from the skin?
For the benefit for him I hope I'm wrong, but this needs to be looked at with open mind, what's the truth.
Witnesses: Dr. Javier de Luis (lecturer at MIT Dep't of Aeronautics and Astronautics);
Dr. Tracy Dillinger (Manager for Safety Culture and Human Factors, NASA); and
Dr. Najmedin Meshkati (Professor, USC School of Engineering, Aviation Safety and Security Program).
link for Chair Sen. Maria Cantwell (D. Wash.) opening statement:
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2024...safety-culture
It almost never fails to amaze me how a hearing before a legislative committe can be mistaken for, or viewed as, the equivalent of full fact discovery in civil litigation in federal district court. I mean, to cut this short without stomping on parts of it to make it fit together, there is no equivalent of obligation to produce all relevant information, and nothing equivalent to cross-examination (partisan rotation of questioning, no, that's not cross).
I won't prejudge the individual whistleblowers' stories on the merits of what they've said and are saying. I will, however, say that their respective recitations depend on their having first painted a picture in which they not only are doing the right thing in the specific situation, and doing it in reasonable ways, but every action taken by company management in response is malevolently directed against them. Sometimes that picture turns out to be true, correct and valid. But it is far from the default setting, and cannot be taken as the default merely by reciting "whistleblower". Perhaps too much paper chasing of billable hours has turned this SLF/attorney cynical (or even, jaundiced).
Whatever the actual facts pertaining to each individual's situation turn out to be, do their stories really add content of significance to what already is known about Boeing's drift away from engineering first and down to bean-counter depths? Is it really new, does it add information not already assimilated into the overall set of facts? I guess we'll find out. The Subcommittee chaired by Senator Blumenthal is for Permanent Investigations, part of the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee. If this were a dispute between two labor organizations over which one has jurisdiction of the work (the subject matter), I think Senate Commerce and its Aviation Subcomm would win, hands and gavels down. But then, over at Senate Commerce, Senator Cantwell and Senator Cruz were in charge of a hearing (see above) with less p.r. drama, just the Expert Texpert Choking Smokers Panel stuff. (name the Beatles song, 50 points)
Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 18th Apr 2024 at 02:07. Reason: various proof-reading corrections
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