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Had there been two Max crashes in the US it would not have been from MCAS, so unlikely to be slow and dismissive. US airlines require far more hours to get to the front than the First Officers in both accident planes had.
Other countries grounded after Ethiopia claimed the FAA Emergency AD instructions were followed to the letter, and the FAA knew that could not be true. Other countries believed the Ethiopian narrative.
AFAIK, no one grounded the MAX after the Lion Air report detailed what went right on one day that went wrong on the next and that was within a few weeks. On that score everyone was slow in acting as they all looked at the Emergency AD and that report and decided it was safe. Grounding only happened after the second, misreported, crash.
Other countries grounded after Ethiopia claimed the FAA Emergency AD instructions were followed to the letter, and the FAA knew that could not be true. Other countries believed the Ethiopian narrative.
AFAIK, no one grounded the MAX after the Lion Air report detailed what went right on one day that went wrong on the next and that was within a few weeks. On that score everyone was slow in acting as they all looked at the Emergency AD and that report and decided it was safe. Grounding only happened after the second, misreported, crash.
"....and decided it was safe." But, was it really?
After many exchanges in which you have highlighted (or explained) the failures of the Ethiopian participants in the MAX saga, the "misreporting" factor is one that can be taken at face value, for the sake of..... whatever label applies to back-and-forth on threads (especially when one side is just SLF/attorney).
So is your view that the 737 MAX was fine as it was, that nothing needed to be changed, nothing from the omissions in the manuals, to the single point of failure (the airspeed inputs), to the very fast reaction time required.... I mean, if big changes indeed were needed, what scale or calibration of "safe" was being applied to reach those decisions (that "it was safe")? Or is it the case that the decisions finding "it was safe" were erroneous after all - but the intense and unrelenting attacks on Boeing were way out of proportion, given the true analysis of cause(s) of the Ethiopian crash? And the intense and unrelenting pronouncements and prophecies of both failure and doom of Boeing that those attacks brought forth?
Even mustering up as much cynicism as I can stand, the modifcations resulting from the grounding in order to regain flight status weren't unnecessary, weren't just for appearances..... were they?
After many exchanges in which you have highlighted (or explained) the failures of the Ethiopian participants in the MAX saga, the "misreporting" factor is one that can be taken at face value, for the sake of..... whatever label applies to back-and-forth on threads (especially when one side is just SLF/attorney).
So is your view that the 737 MAX was fine as it was, that nothing needed to be changed, nothing from the omissions in the manuals, to the single point of failure (the airspeed inputs), to the very fast reaction time required.... I mean, if big changes indeed were needed, what scale or calibration of "safe" was being applied to reach those decisions (that "it was safe")? Or is it the case that the decisions finding "it was safe" were erroneous after all - but the intense and unrelenting attacks on Boeing were way out of proportion, given the true analysis of cause(s) of the Ethiopian crash? And the intense and unrelenting pronouncements and prophecies of both failure and doom of Boeing that those attacks brought forth?
Even mustering up as much cynicism as I can stand, the modifcations resulting from the grounding in order to regain flight status weren't unnecessary, weren't just for appearances..... were they?
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My view is that the MAX with the original MCAS was found to be challenge to fly and it was up to the airlines and the CAAs to decide if their pilots could handle the challenge. At no point was either plane in such a condition that they were beyond their control until the pilots had let forces accumulate to 100 pounds of trim over a period of several minutes. It simply exceeded some unexplored factor about transitioning to manual flying with what, in the first case, was seen as a nuisance and not a life-threatening behavior. In the second, the Captain turned over control to thumb through the FCOM and the FO seemed to think that allowing trim force to increase was OK as long as he could stop it for a little bit. I have no explanation for the third.
The original changes proposed after Lion Air were not complicated. Seeing pilots fail to follow the long term procedures and do the opposite of what was required, not to mention failing to follow the new procedures and do the opposite of what was called for meant having to find a solution to pilots acting adversely to the process.
One side trip I came across is that the airport from which ET-302 departed had some incident a few years before where it was determined that there was a habitat that hosted a huge bird population nearby and recommended that the birds be encouraged to be elsewhere. Many airports hire falconers for this task. The ET-302 report made no mention of this and suggested the AoA vane departed for no reason at all, just got tired and left (or some such, don't quote me) and that the vane heater failure was likely the cause and not from the wiring being torn out if the vane hit a bird.
In any case, the CAAs and airlines looked at that report and they decided it was safe and should have taken whatever measures they felt were required to see their pilots could handle that particular challenge. I have found no link to information immediately after that report and before Ethiopian crash that called for the 737 MAX to be grounded on the basis that pilots would certainly do what the ET-302 crew did, particularly after being warned with such detail as the Lion Air report included.
The FAA was confident in their assessment of US airline operations and of their Emergency AD/ FCOM update, and, as far as the procedure change, they were correct. While I have heard of breathless terror about the situation in a simulator, failing to release a video from briefing to attempt suggests that what they said doesn't match the message they implied.
I remain convinced that the correct solution is to alter each SMYD system to not pass along faulty AoA readings as valid data; this would prevent the initially startling (apparently, or so it's been called) false stall warning, from which all ET-302 crew misbehavior stemmed; the flight computer was already programmed to shift to the alternate SMYD in case the primary one failed, so MCAS would never have gotten incorrect AoA readings and never been involved at all. The FAA likely has requirements in place that make sure that fixing the fundamental problem is so lengthy a process that it can't ever be used. The FAA had also approved the company that mis-calibrated the AoA sensor that doomed Lion Air, so making the AoA sensors individually self-validating should also be required. With those in place the original MCAS software would be 100% as it was originally written and ET-302 would be a bird strike on avweb.
The original changes proposed after Lion Air were not complicated. Seeing pilots fail to follow the long term procedures and do the opposite of what was required, not to mention failing to follow the new procedures and do the opposite of what was called for meant having to find a solution to pilots acting adversely to the process.
One side trip I came across is that the airport from which ET-302 departed had some incident a few years before where it was determined that there was a habitat that hosted a huge bird population nearby and recommended that the birds be encouraged to be elsewhere. Many airports hire falconers for this task. The ET-302 report made no mention of this and suggested the AoA vane departed for no reason at all, just got tired and left (or some such, don't quote me) and that the vane heater failure was likely the cause and not from the wiring being torn out if the vane hit a bird.
In any case, the CAAs and airlines looked at that report and they decided it was safe and should have taken whatever measures they felt were required to see their pilots could handle that particular challenge. I have found no link to information immediately after that report and before Ethiopian crash that called for the 737 MAX to be grounded on the basis that pilots would certainly do what the ET-302 crew did, particularly after being warned with such detail as the Lion Air report included.
The FAA was confident in their assessment of US airline operations and of their Emergency AD/ FCOM update, and, as far as the procedure change, they were correct. While I have heard of breathless terror about the situation in a simulator, failing to release a video from briefing to attempt suggests that what they said doesn't match the message they implied.
I remain convinced that the correct solution is to alter each SMYD system to not pass along faulty AoA readings as valid data; this would prevent the initially startling (apparently, or so it's been called) false stall warning, from which all ET-302 crew misbehavior stemmed; the flight computer was already programmed to shift to the alternate SMYD in case the primary one failed, so MCAS would never have gotten incorrect AoA readings and never been involved at all. The FAA likely has requirements in place that make sure that fixing the fundamental problem is so lengthy a process that it can't ever be used. The FAA had also approved the company that mis-calibrated the AoA sensor that doomed Lion Air, so making the AoA sensors individually self-validating should also be required. With those in place the original MCAS software would be 100% as it was originally written and ET-302 would be a bird strike on avweb.
Had there been two Max crashes in the US it would not have been from MCAS, so unlikely to be slow and dismissive. US airlines require far more hours to get to the front than the First Officers in both accident planes had.
Other countries grounded after Ethiopia claimed the FAA Emergency AD instructions were followed to the letter, and the FAA knew that could not be true. Other countries believed the Ethiopian narrative.
AFAIK, no one grounded the MAX after the Lion Air report detailed what went right on one day that went wrong on the next and that was within a few weeks. On that score everyone was slow in acting as they all looked at the Emergency AD and that report and decided it was safe. Grounding only happened after the second, misreported, crash.
Other countries grounded after Ethiopia claimed the FAA Emergency AD instructions were followed to the letter, and the FAA knew that could not be true. Other countries believed the Ethiopian narrative.
AFAIK, no one grounded the MAX after the Lion Air report detailed what went right on one day that went wrong on the next and that was within a few weeks. On that score everyone was slow in acting as they all looked at the Emergency AD and that report and decided it was safe. Grounding only happened after the second, misreported, crash.
Come on man, wake up to nowadays reality.
Hmmmm
Max crashes ... Didn't the fuel/oil heat exchanger need redesign after BA038? Not Boeing's fault? Battery fires grounding the Dream fleet? Stainless steel plus Titanium fire box? Sole source AoA data? Alaska hole plug departure?
Pencil whipped skin inspections Aloha? Very rich target area. One issue clouds newer stuff ups? How technical shall we get
Abandoning monolithic CFRP in favor of mechanical fastening? Build a bigger oven? Dorsal lightning strikes disrupting CFRP continuity ?? How do we retorque buried bolts ??
Personally, I do not favor (pseudo) monocoque plastic airframes.
MCAS...I think the two crashes were flown by pilots who believed they were controlling the Pitch with elevators, not just trimming the tailplane with.them
Pencil whipped skin inspections Aloha? Very rich target area. One issue clouds newer stuff ups? How technical shall we get
Abandoning monolithic CFRP in favor of mechanical fastening? Build a bigger oven? Dorsal lightning strikes disrupting CFRP continuity ?? How do we retorque buried bolts ??
Personally, I do not favor (pseudo) monocoque plastic airframes.
MCAS...I think the two crashes were flown by pilots who believed they were controlling the Pitch with elevators, not just trimming the tailplane with.them
Last edited by BugBear; 14th Jun 2024 at 13:46.
Another QA quality escape.....
Counterfeit Titanium Found In Boeing And Airbus Jets
ByAmelia Walsh
-
Published:June 14, 2024
1
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Spirit AeroSystems, a supplier of fuselages for Boeing and wings for Airbus, are investigating counterfeit titanium found in recently manufactured jets.According to The New York Times, who first reported the news, falsified documents were used to verify the material’s authenticity—prompting concerns about the structural integrity of the airliners. The investigation comes as small holes were found in the material due to corrosion.
The use of fake titanium affects certain Boeing 737 Max and 787 Dreamliner airliners, as well as Airbus A220 jets, according to sources who spoke anonymously to the New York Times. It is unclear how many of the aircraft are in service and which airlines own them.
In a statement, Spirit AeroSystems said, “This is about titanium that has entered the supply system via documents that have been counterfeited. When this was identified, all suspect parts were quarantined and removed from Spirit production.” The company added, “More than 1,000 tests have been completed to confirm the mechanical and metallurgical properties of the affected material to ensure continued airworthiness.”
Both Boeing and Airbus reported their testing of the affected materials has not revealed any issues and airworthiness of their aircraft fleets remain uncompromised.
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Pegase Driver
@ MechEngr :
Are you insinuating that Boeing only make airplanes and procedure for US Pilots ? Then they should not sell it to other countries. As to your remark about FOs difference in experience between teh US and other countries , , from memory in both Lion and Ethiopian cases the PF was the Captain no ? and in the Lion air case the FO had over 5000 h , 4000 of them on 737.
Meanwhile as reported by Reuters :
I find this difficult to believe, especially now, when surely Boeing management know they are under a microscope. Is the training and workers quality so bad and so deep rooted that it can't be fixed ?
Had there been two Max crashes in the US it would not have been from MCAS, so unlikely to be slow and dismissive. US airlines require far more hours to get to the front than the First Officers in both accident planes had.
Meanwhile as reported by Reuters :
...Boeing is investigating a new quality problem with its 787 Dreamliner after discovering that hundreds of fasteners have been incorrectly installed on the fuselages of some undelivered jets, The sources said the affected fasteners had been torqued from the wrong side, using the head instead of the associated nut.
@ MechEngr :
Are you insinuating that Boeing only make airplanes and procedure for US Pilots ? Then they should not sell it to other countries. As to your remark about FOs difference in experience between teh US and other countries , , from memory in both Lion and Ethiopian cases the PF was the Captain no ? and in the Lion air case the FO had over 5000 h , 4000 of them on 737.
Meanwhile as reported by Reuters :
I find this difficult to believe, especially now, when surely Boeing management know they are under a microscope. Is the training and workers quality so bad and so deep rooted that it can't be fixed ?
Are you insinuating that Boeing only make airplanes and procedure for US Pilots ? Then they should not sell it to other countries. As to your remark about FOs difference in experience between teh US and other countries , , from memory in both Lion and Ethiopian cases the PF was the Captain no ? and in the Lion air case the FO had over 5000 h , 4000 of them on 737.
Meanwhile as reported by Reuters :
I find this difficult to believe, especially now, when surely Boeing management know they are under a microscope. Is the training and workers quality so bad and so deep rooted that it can't be fixed ?
It seems to be a variation on Godwin's Law, that every discussion about Boeing's future eventually regresses to dissecting the Max crashes.
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Aft...
Would not have wanted to be seated against the aft bulkhead when the PCU tried to destroy itself...
Low frequency abrupt dis-orientaion of the tail feathers accompanied by a very loud thump thump thump.
Who built the tail, Spirit? Is this the result of the PCU being mounted with missing bolts?
If the PCU is loose in its mount, does the yaw damper logic react to its position relative to the spar? That would lead to a very interesting ride. If the training is feet on floor, is there time to suss pulling yaw damper breaker, then 'wait' for the roll to self damp?
For MechEgr: Are we to be grateful this occurred in the US ??
Rudder hardover deja vu...?
Low frequency abrupt dis-orientaion of the tail feathers accompanied by a very loud thump thump thump.
Who built the tail, Spirit? Is this the result of the PCU being mounted with missing bolts?
If the PCU is loose in its mount, does the yaw damper logic react to its position relative to the spar? That would lead to a very interesting ride. If the training is feet on floor, is there time to suss pulling yaw damper breaker, then 'wait' for the roll to self damp?
For MechEgr: Are we to be grateful this occurred in the US ??
Rudder hardover deja vu...?
Last edited by BugBear; 14th Jun 2024 at 20:31.
"My view is that the MAX with the original MCAS was found to be challenge to fly and it was up to the airlines and the CAAs to decide if their pilots could handle the challenge."
MechEngr, is it your view that the 737 MAX as originally configured, and with the manuals and training program(s) for the variant (including but not limited to "differences" training) as originally written, met all pertinent FAA certification standards fully?
The point could be eluding this SLF/attorney but your argument appears to mean that as long as the safe operation of a given transport category aircraft type and variant can be figured out *despite* certification misstatements, omissions, and other failures of compliance, certification failures are not significant in context of the corporate health and vitality of an aerospace enterprise as large as Boeing. Granted, the certification mischief (at least as I understand it) was revealed after the two crashes. But I think many a knowledgeable engineer and pilot in various threads, with relevant experience, have severely criticized Boeing's fast-and-loose certification gamesmanship (to describe it charitably).
If there was not full compliance with certification requirements, then you appear to be contending that such an outcome is acceptable, because the challenge of flying the aircraft could be met, either safely, or safely enough.
If the answer is, there was full compliance.... well, readers are being asked to believe the saga of the 737 MAX after the two crashes (after, singly and collectively) was a fake-out, for the groundlings and their favored dumb shows and media noise. That's a tough sell, Jedi mind tricks or no tricks at all.
MechEngr, is it your view that the 737 MAX as originally configured, and with the manuals and training program(s) for the variant (including but not limited to "differences" training) as originally written, met all pertinent FAA certification standards fully?
The point could be eluding this SLF/attorney but your argument appears to mean that as long as the safe operation of a given transport category aircraft type and variant can be figured out *despite* certification misstatements, omissions, and other failures of compliance, certification failures are not significant in context of the corporate health and vitality of an aerospace enterprise as large as Boeing. Granted, the certification mischief (at least as I understand it) was revealed after the two crashes. But I think many a knowledgeable engineer and pilot in various threads, with relevant experience, have severely criticized Boeing's fast-and-loose certification gamesmanship (to describe it charitably).
If there was not full compliance with certification requirements, then you appear to be contending that such an outcome is acceptable, because the challenge of flying the aircraft could be met, either safely, or safely enough.
If the answer is, there was full compliance.... well, readers are being asked to believe the saga of the 737 MAX after the two crashes (after, singly and collectively) was a fake-out, for the groundlings and their favored dumb shows and media noise. That's a tough sell, Jedi mind tricks or no tricks at all.
Notice recent Boeing/FAA fireworks to try and drag Airbus into this self-made mess.
Boeing can begin to start the decade it will take to reinvent themselves now; Airbus never had to start so are just waltzing away with superior aircraft. And COMAC are literally laughing at Boeing’s ability to throw the baton under their own wheels. Repeatedly. With the help of the FAA.
The future is A, C, B.
Boeing can begin to start the decade it will take to reinvent themselves now; Airbus never had to start so are just waltzing away with superior aircraft. And COMAC are literally laughing at Boeing’s ability to throw the baton under their own wheels. Repeatedly. With the help of the FAA.
The future is A, C, B.
Last edited by Saab Dastard; 15th Jun 2024 at 18:23. Reason: Personal insults removed
@ MechEngr :
Are you insinuating that Boeing only make airplanes and procedure for US Pilots ? Then they should not sell it to other countries. As to your remark about FOs difference in experience between teh US and other countries , , from memory in both Lion and Ethiopian cases the PF was the Captain no ? and in the Lion air case the FO had over 5000 h , 4000 of them on 737.
Meanwhile as reported by Reuters :
I find this difficult to believe, especially now, when surely Boeing management know they are under a microscope. Is the training and workers quality so bad and so deep rooted that it can't be fixed ?
Are you insinuating that Boeing only make airplanes and procedure for US Pilots ? Then they should not sell it to other countries. As to your remark about FOs difference in experience between teh US and other countries , , from memory in both Lion and Ethiopian cases the PF was the Captain no ? and in the Lion air case the FO had over 5000 h , 4000 of them on 737.
Meanwhile as reported by Reuters :
I find this difficult to believe, especially now, when surely Boeing management know they are under a microscope. Is the training and workers quality so bad and so deep rooted that it can't be fixed ?
Not switching off the electric trim after having to trim ANU 30+ times, for a combined 3+ minutes is very questionable.
The captain then handed over control to the FO, who after every MCAS input only trimmed ANU for a second or two, even though he was pulling on the control column with between 60 and a 100 pounds force. His instruments all indicated correctly, and although several warnings were going off both pilots were aware they had unreliable airspeed, so manually setting pitch power and manual trim inputs are required. Not even trying to trim off any off that load makes me wonder how many hours he had actually flying the airplane, and why he still was an FO at that age with all those hours.
AFAIK see, at no point was there an attempt made to reduce power, and even though both pilots airspeed weel above max flap speed, after the flaps were selected up, they were selected, first to 1, subsequently to 5, without any discussion about flap settings, and not based on any QRH procedure.
For Ethiopian, the captain was the pilot flying. Once the erroneous airspeed indications began, he 3 times tried to engage the AP, not the correct thing to do. While they were climbing out, both airspeed indicators indicated above VMO, airspeed calls were made and acknowledged by both crew members, but no attempt to reduce power was made. When manual trim wasn’t working, they elected to switch electric trim on but did not trim anu, even though they had an over 100 lbs pull on the control. It all happened fast, and they did ditch the trim off, but did nothing else before or after to handle the situation.
There is definitely people at Boeing that in my opinion deserve jail time for the way MCAS was implemented on the 737. MCAS started on a different Boeing with dual AOA input and comparator , QRH procedures and warnings. those were changed to single source, with no warnings and no mention in the manual explicitly to cut training cost. But there is absolutely no way you can overlook the problems with accident rates in some countries compared to others. It isn’t just pilot training, but maintenance as well. The crew that flew the Indonesian aircraft the day before had the same condition, barely avoided a crash, flew a whole leg manually trimming with the stick shaker going off, totally different instrument indications between left and right, several other warnings. and only wrote up that the electronic trim seemed have an issue. Do you honestly believe a well trained union pilot in the USA or Australia or anywhere in Western Europe would have done that?
Hans...
"...Do you honestly believe a well trained union pilot in the USA or Australia or anywhere in Western Europe would have done that?..."
No, I don't. That said, Boeing designed MCAS to protect Max from "third world pilots". In doing so, re departure stall protection, they (knowingly) killed several hundred folks.
Bugfinder
btw... Our pilots we're not pulling to Trim the airplane, they were pulling to control (maneuver) the aircraft. When elevators are TrimTabs, the game is up... Never maneuver with Trim. Does Boeing even know how to control an aircraft?
No, I don't. That said, Boeing designed MCAS to protect Max from "third world pilots". In doing so, re departure stall protection, they (knowingly) killed several hundred folks.
Bugfinder
btw... Our pilots we're not pulling to Trim the airplane, they were pulling to control (maneuver) the aircraft. When elevators are TrimTabs, the game is up... Never maneuver with Trim. Does Boeing even know how to control an aircraft?
"...Do you honestly believe a well trained union pilot in the USA or Australia or anywhere in Western Europe would have done that?..."
No, I don't. That said, Boeing designed MCAS to protect Max from "third world pilots". In doing so, re departure stall protection, they (knowingly) killed several hundred folks.
Bugfinder
No, I don't. That said, Boeing designed MCAS to protect Max from "third world pilots". In doing so, re departure stall protection, they (knowingly) killed several hundred folks.
Bugfinder
MCAS was designed for the US Airforce. Specifically for the KC-46 Pegasus, a 767 derivative. It was redesigned for the 737MAX because of aerodynamic differences from the 737NG, in a way specifically aimed at several US carriers that didn't want extra training for their pilots (single source AOA, no contractor warning). It was never for departure stall protection, it was initially put on to address high speed stability issues, but was later expanded to achieve a US regulatory requirement for back pressure increasing with increased angle of attack at lower speeds. Not even sure where you get the 3rd world pilots "quote" from.
And where did I say the pilots should have controlled the aircraft with trim??? I said they didn't trim while having to pull with all their force to control the aircraft for several minutes...
Last edited by hans brinker; 15th Jun 2024 at 16:22.
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BugBear, Hans Brinker is correct in his post above. MCAS was introduced to meet the certification issue caused by the unwanted aerodynamic effects of the nacelles on the larger engines.
https://skybrary.aero/articles/maneu...on-system-mcas
https://skybrary.aero/articles/maneu...on-system-mcas
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BugBear, Hans Brinker is correct in his post above. MCAS was introduced to meet the certification issue caused by the unwanted aerodynamic effects of the nacelles on the larger engines.
https://skybrary.aero/articles/maneu...on-system-mcas
https://skybrary.aero/articles/maneu...on-system-mcas
MCAS got Boeing a sistered on type Airworthiness Certificate for a fifty hear old design...saving tens of billions of dollars
Without a new type rating, and absent new pilot training, the stage is set.
Regards
Hans...
"And where did I say the pilots should have controlled the aircraft with trim??? I said they didn't trim while having to pull with all their force to control the aircraft for several minutes..."
You didn't... Boeing controls the AC with Trim....in this case, mysteriously, and with fatal results. It is Boeng controlling with Stabiliser "Trim". Calling the HS a trimming device is an invitation to disaster,
qed
"And where did I say the pilots should have controlled the aircraft with trim??? I said they didn't trim while having to pull with all their force to control the aircraft for several minutes..."
You didn't... Boeing controls the AC with Trim....in this case, mysteriously, and with fatal results. It is Boeng controlling with Stabiliser "Trim". Calling the HS a trimming device is an invitation to disaster,
qed