Latest Boeing News
The Alaska door plug incident blew the DPA subject matter area wide open again, occurring as it did so close to the end-date of the DPA time period. There were quite pointed objections from some observers about DOJ (FBI) treating the door plug incident as a criminal matter and investigating it as such. It was clear, at that point, that the DOJ's view had become that whether Boeing had fulfilled the DPA's conditions was, at best and giving the Company a substantial benefit of the doubt, an open question.
There also is the complication that the federal appellate court ruled that the two 737 MAX crash victims' families had been incorrectly denied the opportunity, in federal district court in which the DPA had been entered as a matter of record, to exercise their rights under the federal Crime Victim' Rights Act. To venture further case status comments would lead this SLF/attorney into finer points of federal criminal procedure, a terra incognita. But I can say that the fact the crash victims' families will have their literal "day in court" is part of the context for what DOJ will do with the DPA now.
DOJ isn't contemplating "suing" Boeing; this isn't a civil matter. My own view is that, first of all, the DOJ will press Boeing to agree to (for lack of more precise terminology) a DPA-2.0, with another time period dovetailing to where the first DPA ended, and - this would be the more difficult part - a new set of conditions. Some months ago I posted the perhaps scatter-brained idea of putting Boeing into federal regulatory receivership, a term I just made up. But look, Boeing has shown itself to be bankrupt, or nearly so, in many metrics (or qualitative assessments) of quality assurance as well as corporate strategy. Receivership for financial bankruptcy is pretty familiar territory. Isn't part of the legacy of the 737 MAX MCAS disasters the idea that safety in civil aviation design, and honesty and integrity in the certification process, are attributes that don't - or at least should not - have price tags or cost accounting rules?
A criminal matter against Boeing now, even if it could be formally charged and prosecuted, would not be something for the DOJ to brag about, given the rather serious challenges Boeing now confronts. So a respectable best-guess prediction is that DOJ will leverage the threat of such a prosecution in order to force Boeing to agree to another DPA term of, say, three (3) years and some additionally imposing conditions for staying out of legal trouble. . . this time.
Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 4th Jun 2024 at 13:06.
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You're referring to the result of DOJ's review of the status and potential resolution or conclusion of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA). At the risk of some oversimplification the DPA is an agreement by which DOJ defers an actual prosecution against Boeing on criminal charges based on conduct to which Boeing admitted in the DPA; the deferral is conditioned on Boeing not breaking the law during the time period covered by the DPA.
The Alaska door plug incident blew the DPA subject matter area wide open again, occurring as it did so close to the end-date of the DPA time period. There were quite pointed objections from some observers about DOJ (FBI) treating the door plug incident as a criminal matter and investigating it as such. It was clear, at that point, that the DOJ's view had become that whether Boeing had fulfilled the DPA's conditions was, at best and giving the Company a substantial benefit of the doubt, an open question.
There also is the complication that the federal appellate court ruled that the two 737 MAX crash victims' families had been incorrectly denied the opportunity, in federal district court in which the DPA had been entered as a matter of record, to exercise their rights under the federal Crime Victim' Rights Act. To venture further case status comments would lead this SLF/attorney into finer points of federal criminal procedure, a terra incognita. But I can say that the fact the crash victims' families will have their literal "day in court" is part of the context for what DOJ will do with the DPA now.
DOJ isn't contemplating "suing" Boeing; this isn't a civil matter. My own view is that, first of all, the DOJ will press Boeing to agree to (for lack of more precise terminology) a DPA-2.0, with another time period dovetailing to where the first DPA ended, and - this would be the more difficult part - a new set of conditions. Some months ago I posted the perhaps scatter-brained idea of putting Boeing into federal regulatory receivership, a term I just made up. But look, Boeing has shown itself to be bankrupt, or nearly so, in many metrics (or qualitative assessments) of quality assurance as well as corporate strategy. Receivership for financial bankruptcy is pretty familiar territory. Isn't part of the legacy of the 737 MAX MCAS disasters the idea that safety in civil aviation design, and honesty and integrity in the certification process, are attributes that don't - or at least should not - have price tags or cost accounting rules?
A criminal matter against Boeing now, even if it could be formally charged and prosecuted, would not be something for the DOJ to brag about, given the rather serious challenges Boeing now confronts. So a respectable best-guess prediction is that DOJ will leverage the threat of such a prosecution in order to force Boeing to agree to another DPA term of, say, three (3) years and some additionally imposing conditions for staying out of legal trouble. . . this time.
The Alaska door plug incident blew the DPA subject matter area wide open again, occurring as it did so close to the end-date of the DPA time period. There were quite pointed objections from some observers about DOJ (FBI) treating the door plug incident as a criminal matter and investigating it as such. It was clear, at that point, that the DOJ's view had become that whether Boeing had fulfilled the DPA's conditions was, at best and giving the Company a substantial benefit of the doubt, an open question.
There also is the complication that the federal appellate court ruled that the two 737 MAX crash victims' families had been incorrectly denied the opportunity, in federal district court in which the DPA had been entered as a matter of record, to exercise their rights under the federal Crime Victim' Rights Act. To venture further case status comments would lead this SLF/attorney into finer points of federal criminal procedure, a terra incognita. But I can say that the fact the crash victims' families will have their literal "day in court" is part of the context for what DOJ will do with the DPA now.
DOJ isn't contemplating "suing" Boeing; this isn't a civil matter. My own view is that, first of all, the DOJ will press Boeing to agree to (for lack of more precise terminology) a DPA-2.0, with another time period dovetailing to where the first DPA ended, and - this would be the more difficult part - a new set of conditions. Some months ago I posted the perhaps scatter-brained idea of putting Boeing into federal regulatory receivership, a term I just made up. But look, Boeing has shown itself to be bankrupt, or nearly so, in many metrics (or qualitative assessments) of quality assurance as well as corporate strategy. Receivership for financial bankruptcy is pretty familiar territory. Isn't part of the legacy of the 737 MAX MCAS disasters the idea that safety in civil aviation design, and honesty and integrity in the certification process, are attributes that don't - or at least should not - have price tags or cost accounting rules?
A criminal matter against Boeing now, even if it could be formally charged and prosecuted, would not be something for the DOJ to brag about, given the rather serious challenges Boeing now confronts. So a respectable best-guess prediction is that DOJ will leverage the threat of such a prosecution in order to force Boeing to agree to another DPA term of, say, three (3) years and some additionally imposing conditions for staying out of legal trouble. . . this time.
There are obvious signs of negligence in the way Boeing has manufactured its aircrafts: bolts that come loose and doors that blow away. If the DOJ proves everyone at the company knew this and management decided to look away instead of fixing it, then there is a good base for prosecuting Boeing executives.
If the DOJ prosecutes Boeing, that would add weight to the civil lawsuits related to the 737 MAX crashes.
Graves-Larsen Joint Statement on FAA Briefing of Boeing Plan [press release] June 04, 2024
Washington, D.C. - Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Sam Graves (R-MO) and Committee Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D-WA) released the following joint statement after today’s briefing for Committee members by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator Michael Whitaker on Boeing’s plan to improve manufacturing processes and aircraft conformity:
“We want to thank Administrator Whitaker for briefing our members and for his assurances that the FAA will hold Boeing accountable for following its proposed safety plan. We believe, and the Administrator agrees, that safety is the highest priority when it comes to America’s gold standard-setting aviation system.
“Both the FAA and the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee will continue to play critical oversight roles as this process moves forward. Our committee’s oversight of the FAA’s efforts and aviation manufacturers, large and small, will continue to be deliberate and fact-based. We will also continue to oversee the implementation of recent laws passed by Congress, including the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 and the Aircraft Certification Reform and Accountability Act, to ensure the FAA has the tools it needs and utilizes them to help keep our system safe.”
Washington, D.C. - Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Sam Graves (R-MO) and Committee Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D-WA) released the following joint statement after today’s briefing for Committee members by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator Michael Whitaker on Boeing’s plan to improve manufacturing processes and aircraft conformity:
“We want to thank Administrator Whitaker for briefing our members and for his assurances that the FAA will hold Boeing accountable for following its proposed safety plan. We believe, and the Administrator agrees, that safety is the highest priority when it comes to America’s gold standard-setting aviation system.
“Both the FAA and the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee will continue to play critical oversight roles as this process moves forward. Our committee’s oversight of the FAA’s efforts and aviation manufacturers, large and small, will continue to be deliberate and fact-based. We will also continue to oversee the implementation of recent laws passed by Congress, including the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 and the Aircraft Certification Reform and Accountability Act, to ensure the FAA has the tools it needs and utilizes them to help keep our system safe.”
No one interested in the case Boeing lost to an electric plane startup that Boeing invested in?
Anyway - who in the FAA needs to be charged for failure to perform due-diligence on the creation and issuance of the Emergency AD? The FAA vouched that the included instructions were suitable for every pilot and that was clearly not the case.
Small wonder the FAA wants to focus away from themselves.
Anyway - who in the FAA needs to be charged for failure to perform due-diligence on the creation and issuance of the Emergency AD? The FAA vouched that the included instructions were suitable for every pilot and that was clearly not the case.
Small wonder the FAA wants to focus away from themselves.
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Something I find astonishing about the FAA in regard to the MAX.
Have they ever explained why they waited so long to ground it after the two fatal crashes, especially when considering 50+ other authorities had already grounded it. Again as a layperson it truly smacked of someone has someone in their back pocket and some palms are being heavily greased. I am unsure if it has ever happened before that the "home" authority had dragged its heels in grounding an aircraft like they did on MAX.
From the outside looking in, it made the FAA look spineless and untrustworthy, and that delay in grounding fed the fear in the flying public against flying in anything with the Boeing name, let alone the MAX.
The media pounced on the ineffectiveness of the FAA in their "ooops everyone else has grounded it, I spose we better ground it too" attitude, that is very simplistic wording, I know, but that was the impression given to many of the public who didn't understand the implications or issues with MAX. The public see bits of aircraft scattered all over the ground and they generally do not have the insight on the why or how, they look to the company who built it and the authority who allowed it to fly to do something, and neither Boeing or the FAA seemed to be doing anything...least not til after the second crash and other authorities and airlines around the world acted and grounded it. It was a very complacent and blase attitude from Boeing and FAA.
Worst of all, there were questions being asked by the public in the context of "had these two planes crashed in the US, would Boeing and the FAA been so slow in acting and so dismissive?"
Have they ever explained why they waited so long to ground it after the two fatal crashes, especially when considering 50+ other authorities had already grounded it. Again as a layperson it truly smacked of someone has someone in their back pocket and some palms are being heavily greased. I am unsure if it has ever happened before that the "home" authority had dragged its heels in grounding an aircraft like they did on MAX.
From the outside looking in, it made the FAA look spineless and untrustworthy, and that delay in grounding fed the fear in the flying public against flying in anything with the Boeing name, let alone the MAX.
The media pounced on the ineffectiveness of the FAA in their "ooops everyone else has grounded it, I spose we better ground it too" attitude, that is very simplistic wording, I know, but that was the impression given to many of the public who didn't understand the implications or issues with MAX. The public see bits of aircraft scattered all over the ground and they generally do not have the insight on the why or how, they look to the company who built it and the authority who allowed it to fly to do something, and neither Boeing or the FAA seemed to be doing anything...least not til after the second crash and other authorities and airlines around the world acted and grounded it. It was a very complacent and blase attitude from Boeing and FAA.
Worst of all, there were questions being asked by the public in the context of "had these two planes crashed in the US, would Boeing and the FAA been so slow in acting and so dismissive?"
Pegase Driver
As far as I remember it was not the FAA that finally grounded the Max on their own initiative, it was the US President that forced it . That part of the story , who pressured who and when would be interesting to read one day.
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Oh to have been a fly on that wall.....
(Just to back it up more than an 'I remember' because it intrigued me)
Having the President force the FAA to ground an aircraft surely diminishes the public trust and confidence in both the FAA and Boeing.
Much gets said about trusting government departments and manufacturers, worldwide. How does a company as large as Boeing and one of the world leaders in aviation matters rebuild their reputations after being essentially shown up by the President and told in no uncertain terms to pull their fingers out and do what should have happened without any prompting?
It makes the rumours and chitchat about "greasing palms" very understandable. The FAA and Boeing were/still are way too close. The FAA should be impartial and unbiased and not show favouritism yet here they were doing exactly that with Boeing and potentially endangering the public and aircrews whilst the rest of the world reacted quickly by grounding the MAX.
Someone has got to have been greasing palms....they had to be cos how else can the FAA have been so blind and so deaf to what Boeing were doing, it beggars belief.
The worst part is that the inaction cost lives and that is completely and utterly unforgiveable. The FAA need prosecuting and suing, let alone Boeing, they were both fully complicit in what happened.
Much gets said about trusting government departments and manufacturers, worldwide. How does a company as large as Boeing and one of the world leaders in aviation matters rebuild their reputations after being essentially shown up by the President and told in no uncertain terms to pull their fingers out and do what should have happened without any prompting?
It makes the rumours and chitchat about "greasing palms" very understandable. The FAA and Boeing were/still are way too close. The FAA should be impartial and unbiased and not show favouritism yet here they were doing exactly that with Boeing and potentially endangering the public and aircrews whilst the rest of the world reacted quickly by grounding the MAX.
Someone has got to have been greasing palms....they had to be cos how else can the FAA have been so blind and so deaf to what Boeing were doing, it beggars belief.
The worst part is that the inaction cost lives and that is completely and utterly unforgiveable. The FAA need prosecuting and suing, let alone Boeing, they were both fully complicit in what happened.
The risk of prosecution and conviction for bribery is a pretty significant risk. Other than "it has to be the case" is there even one piece of evidence showing either a payor, or a recipient, of illegal payments? Compare the simple assertion of greased palms with, for example, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act bribery cases.... there's nothing to be compared.
Of course there is another explanation, stated succinctly in a phrase that has a long history and which has been widely recognized as an occurrence which actually. . . takes place: regulatory capture. It's a kind of careerist mindset, of arrogating a level of ownership of an industry's progress and well-being to one's self. If you want to correlate that well-known tendency by regulators and the regulated with "greased palms", well, it would be odd semantics.
As for the grounding, don't give the then-President so much credit. Despite owning and operating a 757 aircraft, aviation wasn't and isn't among his main interests. Recall that after Amb. Thomas Carter left the ICAO role, the then-President did not nominate a successor Permanent Representative for Senate confirmation and Ambassador rank. Somewhat similarly the current administration has failed to nominate a successor (for Senate confirmation) to Sullenberger, who resigned in July 2022. This is not to defend the FAA's glacial pace in the 737 MAX crisis. But despite large personalities, neither administration was or is reminiscent of LBJ (the notorious arm-twister as Senate Majority Leader, even before the White House).
Of course there is another explanation, stated succinctly in a phrase that has a long history and which has been widely recognized as an occurrence which actually. . . takes place: regulatory capture. It's a kind of careerist mindset, of arrogating a level of ownership of an industry's progress and well-being to one's self. If you want to correlate that well-known tendency by regulators and the regulated with "greased palms", well, it would be odd semantics.
As for the grounding, don't give the then-President so much credit. Despite owning and operating a 757 aircraft, aviation wasn't and isn't among his main interests. Recall that after Amb. Thomas Carter left the ICAO role, the then-President did not nominate a successor Permanent Representative for Senate confirmation and Ambassador rank. Somewhat similarly the current administration has failed to nominate a successor (for Senate confirmation) to Sullenberger, who resigned in July 2022. This is not to defend the FAA's glacial pace in the 737 MAX crisis. But despite large personalities, neither administration was or is reminiscent of LBJ (the notorious arm-twister as Senate Majority Leader, even before the White House).
Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 5th Jun 2024 at 19:12.
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Worst of all, there were questions being asked by the public in the context of "had these two planes crashed in the US, would Boeing and the FAA been so slow in acting and so dismissive?"
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"they (lawyers) wrecked GA, they have experience.."
Not just GA - look at health claims!
Of course it's not JUST the lawyers - it's every individual who decides that "someone must pay" - and that included a lot of people in GA as well as the general public. No win no fee sounds great in theory but it does have consequences
Not just GA - look at health claims!
Of course it's not JUST the lawyers - it's every individual who decides that "someone must pay" - and that included a lot of people in GA as well as the general public. No win no fee sounds great in theory but it does have consequences
The risk of prosecution and conviction for bribery is a pretty significant risk. Other than "it has to be the case" is there even one piece of evidence showing either a payor, or a recipient, of illegal payments? Compare the simple assertion of greased palms with, for example, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act bribery cases.... there's nothing to be compared.
Of course, now in the U.S. we are confronted by the recent development that financial inducements for cooperation on the part of certain characters in the entertainment industry, whose talents may be seen as far closer to the world's oldest profession than to the theater, can be legally categorized as a type of "campaign contribution".
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WR 6-3
I was reading an article that speculated that there may grounds for a shareholder class action suit against Boeing on the grounds that actions taken by management corruptly enriched C suite execs (outsized bonuses ?) which resulted in loss of share holder value. Seems a stretch to me but then I am just a dumb airplane driver, not a lawyer. Since money talks do you see any likely legal moves by major investors aimed at Boeing ?
I was reading an article that speculated that there may grounds for a shareholder class action suit against Boeing on the grounds that actions taken by management corruptly enriched C suite execs (outsized bonuses ?) which resulted in loss of share holder value. Seems a stretch to me but then I am just a dumb airplane driver, not a lawyer. Since money talks do you see any likely legal moves by major investors aimed at Boeing ?
WR 6-3
I was reading an article that speculated that there may grounds for a shareholder class action suit against Boeing on the grounds that actions taken by management corruptly enriched C suite execs (outsized bonuses ?) which resulted in loss of share holder value. Seems a stretch to me but then I am just a dumb airplane driver, not a lawyer. Since money talks do you see any likely legal moves by major investors aimed at Boeing ?
I was reading an article that speculated that there may grounds for a shareholder class action suit against Boeing on the grounds that actions taken by management corruptly enriched C suite execs (outsized bonuses ?) which resulted in loss of share holder value. Seems a stretch to me but then I am just a dumb airplane driver, not a lawyer. Since money talks do you see any likely legal moves by major investors aimed at Boeing ?
Shareholder derivative litigation is not a practice area on my resume, so the above could turn out to be a .... bad day at the office. A quick search-engine-search (I dislike giving any of them product placement) turned up this D&O legal newsletter describing a settlement of a class action shareholder derivative suit based on Boeing's poor decisions especially the MAX accidents. In the article are links to court or court-related documents about the settlement terms. (I haven't run down details to make sure there were no later developments which made material changes in the result, however.) I'm including the link because, as far as this SLF/attorney is concerned, no question by an aviator about a legal matter derived directly from aviation affairs and occurrences is a dumb question.
https://www.dandodiary.com/2021/11/a...237-5-million/
However. .... The crises at Boeing have become profound, or is that an exaggeration? With the caveat about this not being my area of legal practice, I'm inclined to think that the outcome of the pending Department of Justice decision about the Deferred Prosecution Agreement could provoke another round of shareholder litigation. Among other reasons, the ditch along the side of the Engineering Powerhouse Highway into which Boeing has driven - whether one believes it is still in the ditch or has got its wheels mostly back on the road - was not an unavoidable, inevitable result. As more bad news - if there is more, and the pending DPA decision seems to hold no prospect for good news - emerges, institutional shareholders could well see the corporate turnaround taking years if it can be turned around at all. And wanting some recourse more quickly.
Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 8th Jun 2024 at 19:19.
Paxing All Over The World
This was reported in the UK paper The Independent on Thursday 6th June. Reporting from LA.
Latest Boeing whistleblower predicts ‘other things hiding in the bushes’ at beleaguered aircraft manufacturer
Exclusive: The former quality investigator tells The Independent that the company is ‘infested with ‘yes-men and bean-counters’ and should be ‘torn down and rebuilt’ in order for progress to made
Exclusive: The former quality investigator tells The Independent that the company is ‘infested with ‘yes-men and bean-counters’ and should be ‘torn down and rebuilt’ in order for progress to made
Roy Irvin, who worked as a quality investigator for Boeing for six years, said the aircraft manufacturer was “infested with ‘yes men’ and bean-counters”, and that the company would “tear down and rebuild” to make significant progress.
Mr Irvin is one of a handful of employees, both past and present, who have spoken out in recent months about their experiences and concerns of bad workplace practices at Boeing. Two men have died since going public.
The manufacturer has been under fire for months after a series of high-profile safety incidents, including a door plug blowing out of a plane at 16,000 feet in January. The possibility of similar catastrophes occurring in the future should not be ruled out, Mr Irvin said.
“I hope there’s no more but I feel there may be other things hiding in the bushes,” he told The Independent. “The door blowout really hit home for me because I predicted this.”
Mr Irvin is one of a handful of employees, both past and present, who have spoken out in recent months about their experiences and concerns of bad workplace practices at Boeing. Two men have died since going public.
The manufacturer has been under fire for months after a series of high-profile safety incidents, including a door plug blowing out of a plane at 16,000 feet in January. The possibility of similar catastrophes occurring in the future should not be ruled out, Mr Irvin said.
“I hope there’s no more but I feel there may be other things hiding in the bushes,” he told The Independent. “The door blowout really hit home for me because I predicted this.”
Something I find astonishing about the FAA in regard to the MAX.
Have they ever explained why they waited so long to ground it after the two fatal crashes, especially when considering 50+ other authorities had already grounded it. Again as a layperson it truly smacked of someone has someone in their back pocket and some palms are being heavily greased. I am unsure if it has ever happened before that the "home" authority had dragged its heels in grounding an aircraft like they did on MAX.
From the outside looking in, it made the FAA look spineless and untrustworthy, and that delay in grounding fed the fear in the flying public against flying in anything with the Boeing name, let alone the MAX.
The media pounced on the ineffectiveness of the FAA in their "ooops everyone else has grounded it, I spose we better ground it too" attitude, that is very simplistic wording, I know, but that was the impression given to many of the public who didn't understand the implications or issues with MAX. The public see bits of aircraft scattered all over the ground and they generally do not have the insight on the why or how, they look to the company who built it and the authority who allowed it to fly to do something, and neither Boeing or the FAA seemed to be doing anything...least not til after the second crash and other authorities and airlines around the world acted and grounded it. It was a very complacent and blase attitude from Boeing and FAA.
Worst of all, there were questions being asked by the public in the context of "had these two planes crashed in the US, would Boeing and the FAA been so slow in acting and so dismissive?"
Have they ever explained why they waited so long to ground it after the two fatal crashes, especially when considering 50+ other authorities had already grounded it. Again as a layperson it truly smacked of someone has someone in their back pocket and some palms are being heavily greased. I am unsure if it has ever happened before that the "home" authority had dragged its heels in grounding an aircraft like they did on MAX.
From the outside looking in, it made the FAA look spineless and untrustworthy, and that delay in grounding fed the fear in the flying public against flying in anything with the Boeing name, let alone the MAX.
The media pounced on the ineffectiveness of the FAA in their "ooops everyone else has grounded it, I spose we better ground it too" attitude, that is very simplistic wording, I know, but that was the impression given to many of the public who didn't understand the implications or issues with MAX. The public see bits of aircraft scattered all over the ground and they generally do not have the insight on the why or how, they look to the company who built it and the authority who allowed it to fly to do something, and neither Boeing or the FAA seemed to be doing anything...least not til after the second crash and other authorities and airlines around the world acted and grounded it. It was a very complacent and blase attitude from Boeing and FAA.
Worst of all, there were questions being asked by the public in the context of "had these two planes crashed in the US, would Boeing and the FAA been so slow in acting and so dismissive?"
