Mid-Air Collision over Southern Germany (merged)
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Been reading about this terrible incident...I am wondering why RVSM has anything to do with this - we should be questioning why the aircraft ended up on the collision course in the first place - RVSM or normal airspace raises the same concerns - surely if under radar control you should not have this problem. Why was the DHL aircrfat not warned of the situation?
on your FM dial
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Ausatco and Fox3snapshot, nothing at this stage is definitive. That much is obvious.
But there are questions that need asking. Perhaps one of you might enlighten us.
Would you consider that it is reasonable for a controller to first issue instructions to separate two aircraft which are on a collision course 50 seconds (or even 90 seconds) prior to impact?
If the initial instruction was issued that late, then why was it issued that late?
Is it reasonable to expect that an enroute controller should be able to identify traffic conflicts without the benefit of the automatic conflict alerting devices which were apparently offline for maintenance?
After the traffic is handed over, how much time should it take for a controller to identify that a conflict exists?
Skyguide were very quick to start throwing mud, blaming the crew of the TU154 and blaming TCAS. They seem to have been back-pedalling ever since their initial press statement.
Shakespeare, said : “… this possibly would not have happened had BOTH a/c been cruising at STANDARD cruising levels”
If the B757 was on a north-westerly track, and the TU154 was on a south-westerly track, wouldn’t “evens” be standard in RVSM airspace?
Fox3snapshot, are you, in your 3rd July 2002 03:38 post, suggesting that the altimeter setting knob is in some way connected to the transponder’s mode C altitude output and TCAS when below the transition level?
It doesn’t work that way in any aircraft I’ve flown. They all output raw pressure altitude based on 1013/29.92. I have not flown a TU154.
Captchunder, I could not agree more. And bring on one single sky for Europe as well. Refer Flight International editorial on page 3, 11-17 June 2002.
But there are questions that need asking. Perhaps one of you might enlighten us.
Would you consider that it is reasonable for a controller to first issue instructions to separate two aircraft which are on a collision course 50 seconds (or even 90 seconds) prior to impact?
If the initial instruction was issued that late, then why was it issued that late?
Is it reasonable to expect that an enroute controller should be able to identify traffic conflicts without the benefit of the automatic conflict alerting devices which were apparently offline for maintenance?
After the traffic is handed over, how much time should it take for a controller to identify that a conflict exists?
Skyguide were very quick to start throwing mud, blaming the crew of the TU154 and blaming TCAS. They seem to have been back-pedalling ever since their initial press statement.
Shakespeare, said : “… this possibly would not have happened had BOTH a/c been cruising at STANDARD cruising levels”
If the B757 was on a north-westerly track, and the TU154 was on a south-westerly track, wouldn’t “evens” be standard in RVSM airspace?
Fox3snapshot, are you, in your 3rd July 2002 03:38 post, suggesting that the altimeter setting knob is in some way connected to the transponder’s mode C altitude output and TCAS when below the transition level?
It doesn’t work that way in any aircraft I’ve flown. They all output raw pressure altitude based on 1013/29.92. I have not flown a TU154.
Captchunder, I could not agree more. And bring on one single sky for Europe as well. Refer Flight International editorial on page 3, 11-17 June 2002.
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Whatever the lapses in Swiss ATC here, we must admire their news management skills. Anyone reading the newspapers in the UK would be given the impression that blame rested squarely with the Russian pilots.
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Aircraft Tracks
Actual aircraft tracks as illustrated on SkyGuide's WWW:-
www.skyguide.ch/img/photos_presse/skyguide-map-detail.jpg
www.skyguide.ch/img/photos_presse/skyguide-map-detail.jpg
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Whilst I can see the benefits of single Euro ATC, I can't see how it would have avoided this conflict. A Euro ATC structure would still employ nationals from all EU countries so the language issues would still exist. (Even if only English controllers were employed, the pilots flying the aircraft would still be non-native English speakers). Secondly, the crash apparently occurred shortly after handover. Any EU wide ATC system would have to be split into regional sectors and handovers would still need to occur between controllers. There is no way one controller could be expected to control airspace from the Arctic Circle to the north coast of Africa! 
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Alpha Leader
Yes prhaps I have opened a can of worms and if this leads to improved co-ordination in the future it may help to save innocent lives.
Your point about the level after trasadingen raises another question that needs to be asked. Is it possible that in the co-ordination/handover the conflict was not spotted and the descent instruction was merely to achieve the standard level after trasadingen and not as a conflict resolution? This could account for an apparent lack of urgency in the descent instruction to the TU. I do not intend this as speculation but rather as a question to be asked during investigation.
What is quite sure is that if the two a/c had been flying at different levels there would not have been a TA or RA, and TCAS would not have become involved. However the tragic incident has drawn out a number of pertinent comments on the use of TCAS that hopefully will be discussed in detail and lead to a better and safer understanding of this potentially useful facility
Yes prhaps I have opened a can of worms and if this leads to improved co-ordination in the future it may help to save innocent lives.
Your point about the level after trasadingen raises another question that needs to be asked. Is it possible that in the co-ordination/handover the conflict was not spotted and the descent instruction was merely to achieve the standard level after trasadingen and not as a conflict resolution? This could account for an apparent lack of urgency in the descent instruction to the TU. I do not intend this as speculation but rather as a question to be asked during investigation.
What is quite sure is that if the two a/c had been flying at different levels there would not have been a TA or RA, and TCAS would not have become involved. However the tragic incident has drawn out a number of pertinent comments on the use of TCAS that hopefully will be discussed in detail and lead to a better and safer understanding of this potentially useful facility
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Oldjet Jockey:
Your point re Trasadingen is very valid, although - with only five a/c on his hands at the time - it is hard to imagine that an alert controller would have overlooked the fact that another a/c was at the same FL of 360.
Your point re Trasadingen is very valid, although - with only five a/c on his hands at the time - it is hard to imagine that an alert controller would have overlooked the fact that another a/c was at the same FL of 360.
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BBC news are now reporting that due to the 'conflict alert' system (STCA?) being off-line for maintenance, the procedures are for 2 controllers to man the sector (presumably as T & P). An extra set of eyes and ears to make up for the absence of the automated conflict alert, whether that be STCA or Medium Term Conflict Detection.
One of these controllers was reportedly on an "unauthorised break" when the accident happened.
The finger seems to be being pointed at the Russian crew. However, if, and it is only an 'if', both the aircraft were co-ordinated in at FL360, the controller has accepted a planning conflict that should be resolved by tactical means, i.e. vectoring or climb/descent, when on frequency. The fact that reports indicate instructions to change level were only given a minute prior to the accident occurring would suggest that 'avoiding action' was being instigated rather than a routine deconfliction of traffic. Vertical separation should of course be provided before the loss of lateral separation (presumably 5nm in the airspace concerned). Unfortunately, initial indications suggest that ATC error may be the root cause of the accident.
One of these controllers was reportedly on an "unauthorised break" when the accident happened.
The finger seems to be being pointed at the Russian crew. However, if, and it is only an 'if', both the aircraft were co-ordinated in at FL360, the controller has accepted a planning conflict that should be resolved by tactical means, i.e. vectoring or climb/descent, when on frequency. The fact that reports indicate instructions to change level were only given a minute prior to the accident occurring would suggest that 'avoiding action' was being instigated rather than a routine deconfliction of traffic. Vertical separation should of course be provided before the loss of lateral separation (presumably 5nm in the airspace concerned). Unfortunately, initial indications suggest that ATC error may be the root cause of the accident.
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VDL Mode 4
Maybe it´s time to realise that the old radarbased atc systems needs to be replaced. Ive tried to find a site that explains the new world standard system invented by the swede Håkan Lanz. I think it´s called VDL mode 4. I cant say that this system would have prevented this accident but it sure would have given the pilots a better picture of the situation.
From what I´ve heard this system is up for large scale testing in Spain and Portugal...
Regards// Preflight
From what I´ve heard this system is up for large scale testing in Spain and Portugal...
Regards// Preflight
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BIK_116.80
I will try to answer some of your questions as an ex enroute controller
Is it reasonable for a controller to first issue instructions.........50 seconds prior to .......?
No if he is doing his job properly and has all the normal flight data available to him.
If the initial instruction was issued that late then why was it issued that late?
Only speculation at this time, the investigation should reveal the answer
Is it reasonable to expect.........without the benefit of the automatic conflict alert.........
I would say yes with the rider that perhaps controllers have been lulled into a false sense of security since its introduction. I certainly never had such a facility and would have been very ashamed to have missed a potential conflict in such light traffic.
After traffic is handed over how much time should it take for a controller to identify a conflict....?
If the system is working as designed the controller should not be faced with a traffic confliction. This should have been resolved during co-ordination prior to handover so no time should be needed. If however the co-ordination was faulty one might expect a wide awake controller to identify the conflict on initial contact.
I will try to answer some of your questions as an ex enroute controller
Is it reasonable for a controller to first issue instructions.........50 seconds prior to .......?
No if he is doing his job properly and has all the normal flight data available to him.
If the initial instruction was issued that late then why was it issued that late?
Only speculation at this time, the investigation should reveal the answer
Is it reasonable to expect.........without the benefit of the automatic conflict alert.........
I would say yes with the rider that perhaps controllers have been lulled into a false sense of security since its introduction. I certainly never had such a facility and would have been very ashamed to have missed a potential conflict in such light traffic.
After traffic is handed over how much time should it take for a controller to identify a conflict....?
If the system is working as designed the controller should not be faced with a traffic confliction. This should have been resolved during co-ordination prior to handover so no time should be needed. If however the co-ordination was faulty one might expect a wide awake controller to identify the conflict on initial contact.
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What of the "single sky" proposal?
This extract from The Guardian's coverage this morning.
I'm an outside observer, and would be interested to hear what those in the industry have to say on privatisation issues and the single sky proposal:
"Would an integrated European air traffic control have prevented the crash?
Air traffic controllers across Europe recently went on strike over the EU "single sky" proposal, under which planes cruising above 28,000ft would be guided and controlled by a unified organisation, avoiding disruptive handovers. The unions claimed it would lead to job losses.
Surprise was expressed yesterday at how little time the Swiss controller had to assess the situation. The Tu-154 arrived in Swiss airspace at 11.30pm, just five minutes before the collision. The fact that both planes were allowed to converge rapidly on one another, both at 36,000ft, was also questioned.
Russian aviation officials said the Swiss controller should have ordered the Boeing to climb away at the same time that the passenger jet was instructed to dive. And why, they wanted to know, was the first warning only given 50 seconds before the point of collision.
Gilles Gantelet, a spokes- man for the European commission, said it was too early to determine whether the "single sky" plan would have prevented the crash.
The accident happened in an area where zones controlled by Vienna, Munich and Zurich converge. One airline pilot said: "It's a busy area but it's well organised. You have confidence in them despite the national split."
Erwin Teufel, the minister president of the German state of Baden-Württemberg, said: "We're looking forward for discussions between Germany and Switzerland to find a way of reducing the overburdened air corridor over Lake Constance."
South-west German airspace has been controlled by Skyguide for more than 30 years.
Skyguide, which was recently privatised, looks after traffic flying over the region and landings and takeoffs at the large regional airports.The agreement is a part of a bilateral contract between the two neighbours which was hammered out two years ago, but has yet to be ratified by either country.
It has come under strain after accusations by Switzerland that Germany has been heavy handed and tried to renege on the agreement in an effort to take over control of large areas of air space and dictate common practices.
There have been several near air traffic accidents in the region, leading critics to say that a crash was inevitable. "
(p.4 The Guardian 3/7/2002)
I'm an outside observer, and would be interested to hear what those in the industry have to say on privatisation issues and the single sky proposal:
"Would an integrated European air traffic control have prevented the crash?
Air traffic controllers across Europe recently went on strike over the EU "single sky" proposal, under which planes cruising above 28,000ft would be guided and controlled by a unified organisation, avoiding disruptive handovers. The unions claimed it would lead to job losses.
Surprise was expressed yesterday at how little time the Swiss controller had to assess the situation. The Tu-154 arrived in Swiss airspace at 11.30pm, just five minutes before the collision. The fact that both planes were allowed to converge rapidly on one another, both at 36,000ft, was also questioned.
Russian aviation officials said the Swiss controller should have ordered the Boeing to climb away at the same time that the passenger jet was instructed to dive. And why, they wanted to know, was the first warning only given 50 seconds before the point of collision.
Gilles Gantelet, a spokes- man for the European commission, said it was too early to determine whether the "single sky" plan would have prevented the crash.
The accident happened in an area where zones controlled by Vienna, Munich and Zurich converge. One airline pilot said: "It's a busy area but it's well organised. You have confidence in them despite the national split."
Erwin Teufel, the minister president of the German state of Baden-Württemberg, said: "We're looking forward for discussions between Germany and Switzerland to find a way of reducing the overburdened air corridor over Lake Constance."
South-west German airspace has been controlled by Skyguide for more than 30 years.
Skyguide, which was recently privatised, looks after traffic flying over the region and landings and takeoffs at the large regional airports.The agreement is a part of a bilateral contract between the two neighbours which was hammered out two years ago, but has yet to be ratified by either country.
It has come under strain after accusations by Switzerland that Germany has been heavy handed and tried to renege on the agreement in an effort to take over control of large areas of air space and dictate common practices.
There have been several near air traffic accidents in the region, leading critics to say that a crash was inevitable. "
(p.4 The Guardian 3/7/2002)
Gentleman Aviator
Some thoughts/questions which don't seem to have had much exposure on this thread - and I speak as a military aviator with perhaps different frames of reference - but which seem to me to flow from basic aviation commonsense/airmanship.
1. It was a "quiet sector", only 4 or 5 ac to be controlled; so why were 2 planned routes in confliction anyway?
2. Both crews were reportedly working the same frequency, so should not whoever was first on freq have heard the other "arrive" in the sector, and used their SA (situational awareness) to note a possible confliction?
3. We all (pilots and controllers) work less well when underaroused, particularly on a "quiet night". Is there an argument for saying "never mind noise-abatement, let's spread the traffic more evenly through the 24 hrs!"
4. I note the arguments about TAS/IAS relationships and sluggish response in roll (and I know we ain't talking fighters), but we all operate in a 3 dimensional environment; why does the maintenance of separation (by TCAS or ATC) seem to concentrate on vertical OR lateral separation, but not both? Put simply: climb or descend, but turn too!
5. Final point: some talk of the Mk I Eyeball as the final safety net. I was told in training the Mk II was better: it's trained, experienced and regularly checked! Should we lookout more than we do on "quiet nights"?
Before I'm rubbished - please read my caveats again. Like most accidents, there are many links in the chain that caused it (and we don't know yet what those links were, or how many there were). But like all chains, break one link and the chain is gone ..........
1. It was a "quiet sector", only 4 or 5 ac to be controlled; so why were 2 planned routes in confliction anyway?
2. Both crews were reportedly working the same frequency, so should not whoever was first on freq have heard the other "arrive" in the sector, and used their SA (situational awareness) to note a possible confliction?
3. We all (pilots and controllers) work less well when underaroused, particularly on a "quiet night". Is there an argument for saying "never mind noise-abatement, let's spread the traffic more evenly through the 24 hrs!"
4. I note the arguments about TAS/IAS relationships and sluggish response in roll (and I know we ain't talking fighters), but we all operate in a 3 dimensional environment; why does the maintenance of separation (by TCAS or ATC) seem to concentrate on vertical OR lateral separation, but not both? Put simply: climb or descend, but turn too!
5. Final point: some talk of the Mk I Eyeball as the final safety net. I was told in training the Mk II was better: it's trained, experienced and regularly checked! Should we lookout more than we do on "quiet nights"?
Before I'm rubbished - please read my caveats again. Like most accidents, there are many links in the chain that caused it (and we don't know yet what those links were, or how many there were). But like all chains, break one link and the chain is gone ..........
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RVSM?!??!?!?!
I understood from some of the initial reports that they where at FL260 at the time of the disaster?!?!?
IF I'm correct then the russians might have been completely without RVSM?!?!?
My condelences....may we learn what we need to avoid such disasters in the future.
IF I'm correct then the russians might have been completely without RVSM?!?!?
My condelences....may we learn what we need to avoid such disasters in the future.
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It seems obvious that the controller was aware of the conflict, hence the order to change altitude to the Russian jet. In that case, if the controller saw that the conflict could result in violating protected airspace, he/she should have issued "immediate" vectors or climb/dive to the pilots.
Let's wait for the investigation, however, in politics we know how these things go especially when you have four different nations involved.
Let's wait for the investigation, however, in politics we know how these things go especially when you have four different nations involved.
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Some dispute as to "Unauthorised break": When STCA offline at night, it is NOT a requirement to operate a two ATCO per sector system. This requirement only applies during daytime (busier) hours.
(Reported on BBC TV 'Ceefax' as having originated from Skyguide)
(Reported on BBC TV 'Ceefax' as having originated from Skyguide)
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If it transpires that the Russian pilot only had 50 seconds notice before the collision it might be wise to stop pointing fingers in this direction.
So let's the see what would have happened if the Tu154 pilot responded normally. Obviously the times I am using are hypotethical but based on my background.
I am also assuming (possibly wrongly) that the controller told the Tu154 to the descend in a normal voice tone.
Action 1. Listen, acknowledge, and process ATC request i.e. about 1 second.
Action 2. Set 35000 in the FCU or whatever they have in the Tu, and then set the v/s to -1000 fpm (normal for a 1000 ft level change) , i.e. another 2 seconds.
Action 3. The Autopilot starts figuring what the pilot wants to do and starts descending, i.e. about 2 seconds.
So that 's 5 seconds gone, leaving 45 seconds to descend at 1000 fpm. i.e. at the intersection point, the aircraft would have missed each other by about 750 feet, still less than the required 1000 ft vertical separation.
So let's the see what would have happened if the Tu154 pilot responded normally. Obviously the times I am using are hypotethical but based on my background.
I am also assuming (possibly wrongly) that the controller told the Tu154 to the descend in a normal voice tone.
Action 1. Listen, acknowledge, and process ATC request i.e. about 1 second.
Action 2. Set 35000 in the FCU or whatever they have in the Tu, and then set the v/s to -1000 fpm (normal for a 1000 ft level change) , i.e. another 2 seconds.
Action 3. The Autopilot starts figuring what the pilot wants to do and starts descending, i.e. about 2 seconds.
So that 's 5 seconds gone, leaving 45 seconds to descend at 1000 fpm. i.e. at the intersection point, the aircraft would have missed each other by about 750 feet, still less than the required 1000 ft vertical separation.
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Is this not the most significant bit of info , assuming factual
from alphleader post
QUOTE:
Skyguide were also in contact with the crew of the B-757, and had been so since that aircraft had entered Skyguide’s air space over the Swiss-Italian border. The pilot of the B-757 also informed ATC that he was following instructions of his TCAS to descend. This report from the Boeing crew was received immediately prior to the last set of instructions radioed to the TU-154 to descend, after which the collision happened.
The words " RECIEVED IMMEDIATELY PRIOR " jump out at you .
Why if the boeing stated he was decending in line with TCAS instruction , was the TU 154 further instructed to decend after the Boeing message was recieved .
Could the controller in any way have been incappacitated in the time prior to the 50 sec warning and then panick / confusion set in ?
from alphleader post
QUOTE:
Skyguide were also in contact with the crew of the B-757, and had been so since that aircraft had entered Skyguide’s air space over the Swiss-Italian border. The pilot of the B-757 also informed ATC that he was following instructions of his TCAS to descend. This report from the Boeing crew was received immediately prior to the last set of instructions radioed to the TU-154 to descend, after which the collision happened.
The words " RECIEVED IMMEDIATELY PRIOR " jump out at you .
Why if the boeing stated he was decending in line with TCAS instruction , was the TU 154 further instructed to decend after the Boeing message was recieved .
Could the controller in any way have been incappacitated in the time prior to the 50 sec warning and then panick / confusion set in ?
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And what will CPDLC provide you except another avenue for data to be hosed off at the crew and the aircrafts' avionics? Until there is a real vital use for it it is a waste of money and bandwidth.
Lets wait for the investigation. If it is like many others there will be enough blame to go around.
Lets wait for the investigation. If it is like many others there will be enough blame to go around.
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In reponse to Pengjian:
The notion that European controllers went on strike to protest against the Single Sky proposals is a standard case of media soundbites missing the point.
I understand from the more militant members of our union, and from other ATCO contacts, that the action was actually taken because ATCEUC, the umbrella union representing (I think) 5000 controllers throughout Europe was not directly involved in the negotiation.
Some time ago they 'delegated' (or it was delegated for them) their rights to seats at the table to the ETF (European Transport Federation). Subsequently, the ETF went off on some kind of wrong direction (to ATCEUC 's perspective), and the views of controllers and the ATM professionals were not heard, never mind listened to.
I'm trying to relate this in the most objective, honest way, but now perhaps I should say that my opinion as one of 'Thatcher's children' (apparently) takes over. It seems that the ATCEUC simply threw all of its toys out of the pram, and tried to wail to anyone listening. Of course, in France and other still very much civil-service outfits this is easier to do than at multinational or semi-privatised units.
At Maastricht we made a token gesture of work-to-rule for four hours, and despite much acclaim for the support offered, in real terms it was a pointless and fruitless exercise.
Maastricht in particular (as part of Eurocontrol, at least for the moment) has long supported a single sky. It is infact the organisation's slogan, and its culture. Maastricht UAC has very successfully provided cross-national ATC for 30 years.
The practicalities of a pan-European system are really only in the realms of the technical, not principle.
Would a pan-European system have prevented this accident?
It would appear not. Aircraft often come closer than we would like in an ideal world. We would all need to start talking in soundbites ourselves to avoid the sense of inevitability and tragedy that this real world provokes.
eg. 'acceptable risk' . Is a single midair acceptable amongst five million movements? As risk managers we may have to concede yes.
As human beings and professionals within the aviation industry, we all scream an adamant NO!
For aircraft to collide, serious human errors occurred somewhere.
There is no blueprint for Europe that will exclude human error.
The notion that European controllers went on strike to protest against the Single Sky proposals is a standard case of media soundbites missing the point.
I understand from the more militant members of our union, and from other ATCO contacts, that the action was actually taken because ATCEUC, the umbrella union representing (I think) 5000 controllers throughout Europe was not directly involved in the negotiation.
Some time ago they 'delegated' (or it was delegated for them) their rights to seats at the table to the ETF (European Transport Federation). Subsequently, the ETF went off on some kind of wrong direction (to ATCEUC 's perspective), and the views of controllers and the ATM professionals were not heard, never mind listened to.
I'm trying to relate this in the most objective, honest way, but now perhaps I should say that my opinion as one of 'Thatcher's children' (apparently) takes over. It seems that the ATCEUC simply threw all of its toys out of the pram, and tried to wail to anyone listening. Of course, in France and other still very much civil-service outfits this is easier to do than at multinational or semi-privatised units.
At Maastricht we made a token gesture of work-to-rule for four hours, and despite much acclaim for the support offered, in real terms it was a pointless and fruitless exercise.
Maastricht in particular (as part of Eurocontrol, at least for the moment) has long supported a single sky. It is infact the organisation's slogan, and its culture. Maastricht UAC has very successfully provided cross-national ATC for 30 years.
The practicalities of a pan-European system are really only in the realms of the technical, not principle.
Would a pan-European system have prevented this accident?
It would appear not. Aircraft often come closer than we would like in an ideal world. We would all need to start talking in soundbites ourselves to avoid the sense of inevitability and tragedy that this real world provokes.
eg. 'acceptable risk' . Is a single midair acceptable amongst five million movements? As risk managers we may have to concede yes.
As human beings and professionals within the aviation industry, we all scream an adamant NO!
For aircraft to collide, serious human errors occurred somewhere.
There is no blueprint for Europe that will exclude human error.