FAA Grounds 787s
Fwd Bay Ventilation Port
Quotes from Machaca:
(1)"The photo of the forward EE bay venturi vent port taped up with plastic is confusing."
Yes, it was. Thanks for the new pic, which I had searched for in vain! (The "smudge" from the port shows the airflow direction nicely.)
(2) "The battery is not adjacent to the port, and no damage to the hull occurred."
Depends what you mean by "adjacent"? The forward bay seems to be fairly small, judging from this location diagram, and the BAT is at the L/H end, close to the fuselage skin. But the diagram makes it hard to see if the bay is forward or aft of Cabin Door 1L.
The original photo seems to show the plastic-covered port as being just below the first "7" 0f the "787" painted on the L/H side of the fuselage of this particular a/c (ANA seem to have several liveries for their B787s). Here's a link to a photo of an a/c in the same colour scheme. It suggests that the port is therefore just aft of Door 1L (and, of course, well below it). Here's the link to the article with the close-up photo of the port.
So, is the port aft of the bay, or adjacent to it?
(1)"The photo of the forward EE bay venturi vent port taped up with plastic is confusing."
Yes, it was. Thanks for the new pic, which I had searched for in vain! (The "smudge" from the port shows the airflow direction nicely.)
(2) "The battery is not adjacent to the port, and no damage to the hull occurred."
Depends what you mean by "adjacent"? The forward bay seems to be fairly small, judging from this location diagram, and the BAT is at the L/H end, close to the fuselage skin. But the diagram makes it hard to see if the bay is forward or aft of Cabin Door 1L.
The original photo seems to show the plastic-covered port as being just below the first "7" 0f the "787" painted on the L/H side of the fuselage of this particular a/c (ANA seem to have several liveries for their B787s). Here's a link to a photo of an a/c in the same colour scheme. It suggests that the port is therefore just aft of Door 1L (and, of course, well below it). Here's the link to the article with the close-up photo of the port.
So, is the port aft of the bay, or adjacent to it?
Last edited by Chris Scott; 21st Jan 2013 at 18:13. Reason: Link to the photo of port added. Title added.
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Fwd Bay Ventilation Port
Chris Scott,
I think that the port is placed adjacent to the bay - far aft in the bay on the L/H side.
I wonder what function it has - looks just like a hole in the skin? Or is it a venturi?
Vent for the battery?
I think that the port is placed adjacent to the bay - far aft in the bay on the L/H side.
I wonder what function it has - looks just like a hole in the skin? Or is it a venturi?
Vent for the battery?
Last edited by grebllaw123d; 21st Jan 2013 at 19:00.
grebllaw123d,
Not sure yet, but here's a link to a very good photo of the L/H forward fuselage of a/c 811, which has the same colour scheme as the incident a/c 804. (See the second B787 photo on this link.)
The port is just below the first "7" of "787". It doesn't look very venturi-like, so might be a drain hole. (There seems to be a large venturi well below it, almost behind the nose leg.)
Not sure yet, but here's a link to a very good photo of the L/H forward fuselage of a/c 811, which has the same colour scheme as the incident a/c 804. (See the second B787 photo on this link.)
The port is just below the first "7" of "787". It doesn't look very venturi-like, so might be a drain hole. (There seems to be a large venturi well below it, almost behind the nose leg.)
Last edited by Chris Scott; 21st Jan 2013 at 19:14. Reason: 2nd para added.
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Aviation-grade batteries will have to pass far more stringent regulations and certification requirements than their consumer-grade equivalents - it goes with the territory. Obviously, being a relatively new technology as far as aviation use is concerned, some of these requirements will probably need to be tightened as more real-world use cases highlight potential issues.
Talk of lead-acid (and probably even NiMH) technologies ignores the fact that
they cannot supply the required juice for the systems.
@TeachMe : If I recall correctly, the problems with consumer battery fires were traced to a combination of a sub-standard batch of the batteries themselves with poorly-made mains chargers. Are you using the mains charger when flying (I'd be surprised) or another device?
Pedantic comparisons between inexpensive mass produced batteries (over 2 billion mobile devices, laptops and tablets sold in 2012) and the 787 batteries is as foolish as equating the map application on your smartphone to the Honeywell navigation package on the 787.
The 787 battery/electrically system has a statistically proven chance of failure every 25,000 hours. 3 years. That sort of reliability in consumer devices would see multiple daily phone/laptop fires in a office building of a 1000 people.
In the Uk there would be around 30million battery fires per year, every night would be like the Blitz, except with fires all around the country.
The acceptable level of risk is one in a billion flight hours, not one in 25,000
Last edited by peter we; 21st Jan 2013 at 20:47.
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DozyWannabe,
You wrote:
"Obviously, being a relatively new technology as far as aviation use is concerned, some of these requirements will probably need to be tightened as more real-world use cases highlight potential issues."
You are so right - I would even omit "probably"!
You then say that other battery technologies cannot supply enough juice required for the systems.
This is not quite correct.
An example:
On the A340 we had 2 main batteries (NiCd as far as I remember) each with 37 Ah - makes a total of 74 Ah. The Boeing 787 has 1 main battery with 65 Ah.
We had an APU battery with 37 Ah - the BOEING 787 uses the same APU battery as the main battery, i.e. 65 Ah - quite a big battery just for APU starting and a few lights.
So enough power with the "old" battery tecnology, but with penalties in space and weight - double up I guess.
You wrote:
"Obviously, being a relatively new technology as far as aviation use is concerned, some of these requirements will probably need to be tightened as more real-world use cases highlight potential issues."
You are so right - I would even omit "probably"!
You then say that other battery technologies cannot supply enough juice required for the systems.
This is not quite correct.
An example:
On the A340 we had 2 main batteries (NiCd as far as I remember) each with 37 Ah - makes a total of 74 Ah. The Boeing 787 has 1 main battery with 65 Ah.
We had an APU battery with 37 Ah - the BOEING 787 uses the same APU battery as the main battery, i.e. 65 Ah - quite a big battery just for APU starting and a few lights.
So enough power with the "old" battery tecnology, but with penalties in space and weight - double up I guess.
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Peter We, I think you are looking at it from the wrong point of view. Boeing is a marketing company not an engineering company. Saving weight with lithium cobalt dioxide batteries packed cheek by jowl saves space for more marketable and fee generating cargo and slf amenities which contribute to shareholder value. The stock market forgets much more quickly than the families of a few dead passengers.
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http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2007...df/E7-8186.pdf
Read this. After a read, you will grasp the scope and letter of the standards set for Lithium Ion operation aboard the 787.
With a reasonable understanding of the events and the recent commentary, here and elsewhere, it will be impossible to continue to accuse the FAA of jumping the gun, nor will any attempt to defend continued operation without major changes be a reasonable position.
The aircraft failed in most, and (will after further investigation) likely all of the criteria. Withut changing the entire engineering approach to the rules, relative to standby power, the 787, without compliance, effectively has no type certificate.
But that is OK, what is needed now is for Boeing to implement their PLAN B.
There is no chance that, knowing the Lithium chemistry was not a lock, Boeing has nothing ready to refit.
In corporate domain, those who cannot parse the difference between confidence and hubris, fare not well.
short form....
The Proposed Special Conditions
Accordingly, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposes the following special conditions as part of the type certification basis for the Boeing Model 787–8 airplane.
In lieu of the requirements of 14 CFR 25.1353(c)(1) through (c)(4), the following special conditions apply. Lithium ion batteries on the Boeing Model 787–8 airplane must be designed and installed as follows:
(1) Safe cell temperatures and pressures must be maintained during any foreseeable charging or discharging condition and during any failure of the charging or battery monitoring system not shown to be extremely remote. The lithium ion battery installation must preclude explosion in the event of those failures.
(2) Design of the lithium ion batteries must preclude the occurrence of self-sustaining, uncontrolled increases in temperature or pressure.
(3) No explosive or toxic gases emitted by any lithium ion battery in normal operation, or as the result of any failure of the battery charging system, monitoring system, or battery installation not shown to be extremely remote, may accumulate in hazardous quantities within the airplane.
(4) Installations of lithium ion batteries must meet the requirements of 14 CFR 25.863(a) through (d).
(5) No corrosive fluids or gases that may escape from any lithium ion battery may damage surrounding structure or any adjacent systems, equipment, or electrical wiring of the airplane in such a way as to cause a major or more severe failure condition, in accordance with 14 CFR 25.1309(b) and applicable regulatory guidance.
(6) Each lithium ion battery installation must have provisions to prevent any hazardous effect on structure or essential systems caused by the maximum amount of heat the battery can generate during a short circuit of the battery or of its individual cells.
(7) Lithium ion battery installations must have a system to control the charging rate of the battery automatically, so as to prevent battery overheating or overcharging, and,
(i) A battery temperature sensing and over- temperature warning system with a means for automatically disconnecting the battery from its charging source in the event of an over- temperature condition, or,
(ii) A battery failure sensing and warning system with a means for automatically disconnecting the battery from its charging source in the event of battery failure.
(8) Any lithium ion battery installation whose function is required for safe operation of the airplane must incorporate a monitoring and warning feature that will provide an indication to the appropriate flight crewmembers whenever the state-of-charge of the batteries has fallen below levels considered acceptable for dispatch of the airplane.
(9) The Instructions for Continued Airworthiness required by 14 CFR 25.1529 must contain maintenance requirements for measurements of battery capacity at appropriate intervals to ensure that batteries whose function is required for safe operation of the airplane will perform their intended function as long as the battery is installed in the airplane. The Instructions for Continued Airworthiness must also contain procedures for the maintenance of lithium ion batteries in spares storage to prevent the replacement of batteries whose function is required for safe operation of the airplane with batteries that have experienced degraded charge retention ability or other damage due to prolonged storage at a low state of charge.
Note: These special conditions are not intended to replace 14 CFR 25.1353(c) in the certification basis of the Boeing 787–8 airplane. These special conditions apply only to lithium ion batteries and their installations. The requirements of 14 CFR 25.1353(c) remain in effect for batteries and battery installations of the Boeing 787–8 airplane that do not use lithium ion batteries
PLAN B is the last sentence. So it becomes, as an airframer, how does Boeing feel about doing all the legwork to make Lithium Ion batteries acceptable to the regulator, including Airbus, (EASA) versus falling back to the existing rules.....14CFR 25.1353(c).
Read this. After a read, you will grasp the scope and letter of the standards set for Lithium Ion operation aboard the 787.
With a reasonable understanding of the events and the recent commentary, here and elsewhere, it will be impossible to continue to accuse the FAA of jumping the gun, nor will any attempt to defend continued operation without major changes be a reasonable position.
The aircraft failed in most, and (will after further investigation) likely all of the criteria. Withut changing the entire engineering approach to the rules, relative to standby power, the 787, without compliance, effectively has no type certificate.
But that is OK, what is needed now is for Boeing to implement their PLAN B.
There is no chance that, knowing the Lithium chemistry was not a lock, Boeing has nothing ready to refit.
In corporate domain, those who cannot parse the difference between confidence and hubris, fare not well.
short form....
The Proposed Special Conditions
Accordingly, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposes the following special conditions as part of the type certification basis for the Boeing Model 787–8 airplane.
In lieu of the requirements of 14 CFR 25.1353(c)(1) through (c)(4), the following special conditions apply. Lithium ion batteries on the Boeing Model 787–8 airplane must be designed and installed as follows:
(1) Safe cell temperatures and pressures must be maintained during any foreseeable charging or discharging condition and during any failure of the charging or battery monitoring system not shown to be extremely remote. The lithium ion battery installation must preclude explosion in the event of those failures.
(2) Design of the lithium ion batteries must preclude the occurrence of self-sustaining, uncontrolled increases in temperature or pressure.
(3) No explosive or toxic gases emitted by any lithium ion battery in normal operation, or as the result of any failure of the battery charging system, monitoring system, or battery installation not shown to be extremely remote, may accumulate in hazardous quantities within the airplane.
(4) Installations of lithium ion batteries must meet the requirements of 14 CFR 25.863(a) through (d).
(5) No corrosive fluids or gases that may escape from any lithium ion battery may damage surrounding structure or any adjacent systems, equipment, or electrical wiring of the airplane in such a way as to cause a major or more severe failure condition, in accordance with 14 CFR 25.1309(b) and applicable regulatory guidance.
(6) Each lithium ion battery installation must have provisions to prevent any hazardous effect on structure or essential systems caused by the maximum amount of heat the battery can generate during a short circuit of the battery or of its individual cells.
(7) Lithium ion battery installations must have a system to control the charging rate of the battery automatically, so as to prevent battery overheating or overcharging, and,
(i) A battery temperature sensing and over- temperature warning system with a means for automatically disconnecting the battery from its charging source in the event of an over- temperature condition, or,
(ii) A battery failure sensing and warning system with a means for automatically disconnecting the battery from its charging source in the event of battery failure.
(8) Any lithium ion battery installation whose function is required for safe operation of the airplane must incorporate a monitoring and warning feature that will provide an indication to the appropriate flight crewmembers whenever the state-of-charge of the batteries has fallen below levels considered acceptable for dispatch of the airplane.
(9) The Instructions for Continued Airworthiness required by 14 CFR 25.1529 must contain maintenance requirements for measurements of battery capacity at appropriate intervals to ensure that batteries whose function is required for safe operation of the airplane will perform their intended function as long as the battery is installed in the airplane. The Instructions for Continued Airworthiness must also contain procedures for the maintenance of lithium ion batteries in spares storage to prevent the replacement of batteries whose function is required for safe operation of the airplane with batteries that have experienced degraded charge retention ability or other damage due to prolonged storage at a low state of charge.
Note: These special conditions are not intended to replace 14 CFR 25.1353(c) in the certification basis of the Boeing 787–8 airplane. These special conditions apply only to lithium ion batteries and their installations. The requirements of 14 CFR 25.1353(c) remain in effect for batteries and battery installations of the Boeing 787–8 airplane that do not use lithium ion batteries
PLAN B is the last sentence. So it becomes, as an airframer, how does Boeing feel about doing all the legwork to make Lithium Ion batteries acceptable to the regulator, including Airbus, (EASA) versus falling back to the existing rules.....14CFR 25.1353(c).
Last edited by Lyman; 21st Jan 2013 at 21:43.
There was an old adage that the best airliner would be designed by Lockheed, built by Boeing, and with Sales & Marketing by McDonnell Douglas.
Somewhere along the way Lockheed pulled out of commercial aircraft, while McDD pushed the profitability desire too far, didn't come up with much innovative, and priced it too high anyway, so production plummeted and they got absorbed by Boeing. Unfortunately some McDD executive attitudes came with the merger (those in the know may care to insert some individuals here) into the combined organisation, where from about the turn of the century it became the smart thing at the exec level to champion outsourcing everything while downplaying all those experienced in-house engineers who seemed so expensive. And thus they outsourced the future of the company to a whole string of lowest-bidders, with all that entails. Moving the exec offices from the city where they assemble their products to one 1,500 miles away didn't help.
We've already had the major fiasco of the fuselage production issues, which seriously delayed the production, and now the battery system which appears, somewhere along its own chain, unfit for purpose. Of course, if all that Boeing engineers' experience had not been got rid of, things might be a little different.
All this public talk of the battery manufacturer, the circuit manufacturer, and so on is not actually relevant to the purchasers of the aircraft, or indeed to others. This aircraft was built and sold by Boeing, they are the company that the airlines have the contractural arrangement with, they are responsible for integrating all their outsourcers, they are the ones responsible for the certification with the authorities, and they are the ones who receive the cash from their customers - or not, at the moment. One day I trust that Boeing will fully wake up to this.
Somewhere along the way Lockheed pulled out of commercial aircraft, while McDD pushed the profitability desire too far, didn't come up with much innovative, and priced it too high anyway, so production plummeted and they got absorbed by Boeing. Unfortunately some McDD executive attitudes came with the merger (those in the know may care to insert some individuals here) into the combined organisation, where from about the turn of the century it became the smart thing at the exec level to champion outsourcing everything while downplaying all those experienced in-house engineers who seemed so expensive. And thus they outsourced the future of the company to a whole string of lowest-bidders, with all that entails. Moving the exec offices from the city where they assemble their products to one 1,500 miles away didn't help.
We've already had the major fiasco of the fuselage production issues, which seriously delayed the production, and now the battery system which appears, somewhere along its own chain, unfit for purpose. Of course, if all that Boeing engineers' experience had not been got rid of, things might be a little different.
All this public talk of the battery manufacturer, the circuit manufacturer, and so on is not actually relevant to the purchasers of the aircraft, or indeed to others. This aircraft was built and sold by Boeing, they are the company that the airlines have the contractural arrangement with, they are responsible for integrating all their outsourcers, they are the ones responsible for the certification with the authorities, and they are the ones who receive the cash from their customers - or not, at the moment. One day I trust that Boeing will fully wake up to this.
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Hi Lyman,
I would like to believe that, but I am not sure that plan B is all that simple.
Maybe you are right, perhaps they have a non-Lithium-ion replacement that will fit the slot. But if they do, it is going to be 4 times heavier and twice the volume. Even if they have another Lithium-ion battery on the drawing board, it is going to take some time before it is ready to go. I could be wrong, engineers are at their most creative under pressure.
But perhaps there is a way out for Boeing. I am sure the engineers will find some issue responsible for starting these fires. This will be fixed across the fleet, but it still leaves Boeing with a battery which is flammable. Even if it is much less likely to catch fire, it still can't be certified. After fixing the initial flaw perhaps a compromise can be arranged with the FAA. Boeing would propose a battery redesign and promise to fit the new units within a limited time period, say 6 months. The 787 would be allowed fly again during this period which would give Boeing enough time to build, test and certify the new battery.
But that is OK, what is needed now is for Boeing to implement their PLAN B.
There is no chance that, knowing the Lithium chemistry was not a lock, Boeing has nothing ready to refit.
There is no chance that, knowing the Lithium chemistry was not a lock, Boeing has nothing ready to refit.
Maybe you are right, perhaps they have a non-Lithium-ion replacement that will fit the slot. But if they do, it is going to be 4 times heavier and twice the volume. Even if they have another Lithium-ion battery on the drawing board, it is going to take some time before it is ready to go. I could be wrong, engineers are at their most creative under pressure.
But perhaps there is a way out for Boeing. I am sure the engineers will find some issue responsible for starting these fires. This will be fixed across the fleet, but it still leaves Boeing with a battery which is flammable. Even if it is much less likely to catch fire, it still can't be certified. After fixing the initial flaw perhaps a compromise can be arranged with the FAA. Boeing would propose a battery redesign and promise to fit the new units within a limited time period, say 6 months. The 787 would be allowed fly again during this period which would give Boeing enough time to build, test and certify the new battery.
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@Lyman
are you saying that the FAA , by following its own rules MUST withdraw type certification for the 787 , thus rendering it `unairworthy` until either the Li-Ion batteries are replaced , or an acceptable engineering *within the rules* solution is found?
will they genuinely ground the type for that potential length of time?
are you saying that the FAA , by following its own rules MUST withdraw type certification for the 787 , thus rendering it `unairworthy` until either the Li-Ion batteries are replaced , or an acceptable engineering *within the rules* solution is found?
will they genuinely ground the type for that potential length of time?
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Glenbrook,
I hope you're right, but can you imagine which bureaucrat at the FAA, having been "burned" twice now, is going to sign off on what you propose?
That would take giant brass ones, even if they believed the Boeing spin.
I hope you're right, but can you imagine which bureaucrat at the FAA, having been "burned" twice now, is going to sign off on what you propose?
That would take giant brass ones, even if they believed the Boeing spin.
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glenbrook
It is a frame, within which there is regulatory, economic, and engineering wiggle room.
The hope is that the current problem is related to the Manganese, the addition of which, though approved, may be the weak link, and Cobalt Oxide may be the default solution. The rules were published in April 2007, almost six years ago, so Boeing have some, [I]some[I] latitude. Abandoning LithIon would be a complete nightmare, but at this point, FAA has no room to be flexible, there is not a soul in the biz who wouldn't be ready to accuse the administration of special treatment. With such an open ended and potentially catastrophic issue of safety, Boeing has to decide how much to invest in the "new standard" (LithIon) for the industry. It would be off ledger, since it doesn't correlate to the original certificate.
HalloweenJack....
Yep, if FAA gets dug in, the certificate can be continued only with Ni batteries, or a bulletproof presentation of LithIon as the standard of safety. All "leniency" is over, done...If FAA get soft, and there is a problem, an accident, woe be tide....
It is a frame, within which there is regulatory, economic, and engineering wiggle room.
The hope is that the current problem is related to the Manganese, the addition of which, though approved, may be the weak link, and Cobalt Oxide may be the default solution. The rules were published in April 2007, almost six years ago, so Boeing have some, [I]some[I] latitude. Abandoning LithIon would be a complete nightmare, but at this point, FAA has no room to be flexible, there is not a soul in the biz who wouldn't be ready to accuse the administration of special treatment. With such an open ended and potentially catastrophic issue of safety, Boeing has to decide how much to invest in the "new standard" (LithIon) for the industry. It would be off ledger, since it doesn't correlate to the original certificate.
HalloweenJack....
Yep, if FAA gets dug in, the certificate can be continued only with Ni batteries, or a bulletproof presentation of LithIon as the standard of safety. All "leniency" is over, done...If FAA get soft, and there is a problem, an accident, woe be tide....
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Any "spin" - as you put it - will be directed at investors and customers, not the regulators.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 21st Jan 2013 at 22:38.
The APU is required for the ETOPS certification, which by definition has to be very reliable and therefore needs a very reliable battery.
I can see that this is going to be a long process.
I can see that this is going to be a long process.
Please mods stop reposting of the li-ion special conditions. I listed them days ago back at #111. And no, 787 does not comply with it's special certification conditions so it must not fly
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H.O.P.E.
787 Battery
Include what you BELIEVE really caused the problem:
During battery operation, lithium at the negative electrode gives up electrons to become Li+, which dissolves into the electrolyte. This process is reversed during the recharge cycle, but the replated lithium adds unevenly to the electrode surface, and as the battery is charged and discharged, dendrites grow from the surface, which can cause short-circuiting in the battery and lead to explosions.
REALLY caused the problem:
Most of the batteries will pass all tests. During the manufacturing of the cells the annealing process has to be monitored Microscopically. Contamination or lack of proper cooling creates a Dendritic Structure.
And what can be done to prevent a recurrence:
Quality Control. Environment in manufacturing process.
OR correct the situation:
Work together!
Include what you BELIEVE really caused the problem:
During battery operation, lithium at the negative electrode gives up electrons to become Li+, which dissolves into the electrolyte. This process is reversed during the recharge cycle, but the replated lithium adds unevenly to the electrode surface, and as the battery is charged and discharged, dendrites grow from the surface, which can cause short-circuiting in the battery and lead to explosions.
REALLY caused the problem:
Most of the batteries will pass all tests. During the manufacturing of the cells the annealing process has to be monitored Microscopically. Contamination or lack of proper cooling creates a Dendritic Structure.
And what can be done to prevent a recurrence:
Quality Control. Environment in manufacturing process.
OR correct the situation:
Work together!
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Remember that the business case for the B787 was predicated on an increase in "point-to-point" journeys as compared to the traditional "hub-and-spoke" system. As such, it does not - at least initially - require ETOPS certification as it can fulfil that business case via intra-continental routes.