Baton Rouge PD R-44 fatal 26th March 2023
The USHST seem to be the people doing most to reduce helicopter accidents in the US - their website is good https://ushst.org/ But they are a voluntary organisation albeit one with a great vision.
PAO clearly has different roles to normal GA yet is regulated (very lightly) in much the same way which, given the type of flying (as in this case) that can be conducted by PAO (night high speed car pursuits) seems surprising.
Not sure about glass panel and extras fixing the basic problem tho. Unless Robinson have put a stick trim into later Ravens, it just doesn‘t seem a safe choice for night operations.
Last edited by Chock Puller; 31st Mar 2023 at 13:37. Reason: profanity
Going from a sectional to a terminal is gag: Maybe I can make out more with this smaller scale chart. Nope. It just covers a smaller area
Last edited by Torquetalk; 31st Mar 2023 at 10:50.
Originally Posted by [email protected]
Yes as you say, very limited oversight from the FAA with only Advisory Circulars (not mandatory or regulatory) to determine if the operation is PAO (Public Aircraft Ops) or not. https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/fi...ac_00.1-1b.pdf
Last edited by wrench1; 31st Mar 2023 at 13:21. Reason: context
Thanks wrench 1, it doesn't seem quite the level of oversight, regulation and monitoring that we might expect of a Govt service in this country but, horses for courses and all that.
Prelim report out. Interesting failure sequence.
BTR PD Preliminary Report
The main rotor transmission, mast, and main rotor blades came to rest in a wooded area about 250 feet east of the main wreckage.
My money is on IIMC followed by uncontrolled attitude leading to rotor strike on the cockpit and subsequent in-flight departure of the transmission. Horrendous.
Yes, the lack of reporting and flight following is shameful.
Yes, the lack of reporting and flight following is shameful.
Flight following should have been a function of the Police Dispatch system just as it tracks the location and activities of ground units.
My experience was we called lifting...announced our routing...coordinated with both Dispatch and the Ground Units we were supporting....and called landing and next available callout time post refueling, etc. Each flight following call was confirmed received by Dispatch.
Face it....it was a dark night, temp and dew point were close with a light wind, the flight was on the edge of small lighted areas surrounded by dark areas of forest, the Robbie was not equipped for IMC flight, and in all likelihood the Pilots were not current or proficient in IMC/IFR flight. The flight path trace shows the aircraft passing adjacent to a lit area but heading into the darkness. The overcast was probably not even and no doubt varied locally.
If the Aircraft had a functioning AI and a turn coordinator/turn and slip indicator,Altimeter/VSI and even a Rad Alt....lacking Stick Trim, an Autopilot of some sort, moving map display....IIMC at a low level in such weather conditions was not going to turn out well.
If there were no such aids or only an AI and basic flight instruments....the outcome was far more likely to be catastrophic.
Circumstantial evidence provided by the Tracking Data....seems consistent with a loss of control by the Pilot(s) due to IIMC.
Lots of lessons to be relearned from this tragedy.
Police Units doing it on the cheap and not utilizing trained, experienced Helicopter Pilots to fly their aircraft and instead using minimum trained Police Officers as Pilots is not a recipe for success.
Over large well lit urban areas....there is some leeway for using VFR/VMC only machines and pilots....but where there is much darkness and scant surface lighting....it proves to be a very dangerous situation.
EMS Operations in the United States learned that lesson and have embraced the use of NVG's, FLIR, and sophisticated twin engined helicopters with success when combined with a proper safety culture.
The Maryland State Police learned these lessons a very long time ago due to very similar circumstances.....and shifted from Jet Rangers to Dauphins and a much revamped safety culture.
Good intentions does not always lead to good outcomes.
My experience was we called lifting...announced our routing...coordinated with both Dispatch and the Ground Units we were supporting....and called landing and next available callout time post refueling, etc. Each flight following call was confirmed received by Dispatch.
Face it....it was a dark night, temp and dew point were close with a light wind, the flight was on the edge of small lighted areas surrounded by dark areas of forest, the Robbie was not equipped for IMC flight, and in all likelihood the Pilots were not current or proficient in IMC/IFR flight. The flight path trace shows the aircraft passing adjacent to a lit area but heading into the darkness. The overcast was probably not even and no doubt varied locally.
If the Aircraft had a functioning AI and a turn coordinator/turn and slip indicator,Altimeter/VSI and even a Rad Alt....lacking Stick Trim, an Autopilot of some sort, moving map display....IIMC at a low level in such weather conditions was not going to turn out well.
If there were no such aids or only an AI and basic flight instruments....the outcome was far more likely to be catastrophic.
Circumstantial evidence provided by the Tracking Data....seems consistent with a loss of control by the Pilot(s) due to IIMC.
Lots of lessons to be relearned from this tragedy.
Police Units doing it on the cheap and not utilizing trained, experienced Helicopter Pilots to fly their aircraft and instead using minimum trained Police Officers as Pilots is not a recipe for success.
Over large well lit urban areas....there is some leeway for using VFR/VMC only machines and pilots....but where there is much darkness and scant surface lighting....it proves to be a very dangerous situation.
EMS Operations in the United States learned that lesson and have embraced the use of NVG's, FLIR, and sophisticated twin engined helicopters with success when combined with a proper safety culture.
The Maryland State Police learned these lessons a very long time ago due to very similar circumstances.....and shifted from Jet Rangers to Dauphins and a much revamped safety culture.
Good intentions does not always lead to good outcomes.
Last edited by SASless; 10th Jun 2024 at 15:05.
The following 2 users liked this post by SASless:
Flight following should have been a function of the Police Dispatch system just as it tracks the location and activities of ground units.
My experience was we called lifting...announced our routing...coordinated with both Dispatch and the Ground Units we were supporting....and called landing and next available callout time post refueling, etc. Each flight following call was confirmed received by Dispatch.
Face it....it was a dark night, temp and dew point were close with a light wind, the flight was on the edge of small lighted areas surrounded by dark areas of forest, the Robbie was not equipped for IMC flight, and in all likelihood the Pilots were not current or proficient in IMC/IFR flight. The flight path trace shows the aircraft passing adjacent to a lit area but heading into the darkness. The overcast was probably not even and no doubt varied locally.
If the Aircraft had a functioning AI and a turn coordinator/turn and slip indicator,Altimeter/VSI and even a Rad Alt....lacking Stick Trim, an Autopilot of some sort, moving map display....IIMC at a low level in such weather conditions was not going to turn out well.
If there were no such aids or only an AI and basic flight instruments....the outcome was far more likely to be catastrophic.
Circumstantial evidence provided by the Tracking Data....seems consistent with a loss of control by the Pilot(s) due to IIMC.
Lots of lessons to be relearned from this tragedy.
Police Units doing it on the cheap and not utilizing trained, experienced Helicopter Pilots to fly their aircraft and instead using minimum trained Police Officers as Pilots is not a recipe for success.
Over large well lit urban areas....there is some leeway for using VFR/VMC only machines and pilots....but where there is much darkness and scant surface lighting....it proves to be a very dangerous situation.
EMS Operations in the United States learned that lesson and have embraced the use of NVG's, FLIR, and sophisticated twin engined helicopters with success when combined with a proper safety culture.
The Maryland State Police learned these lessons a very long time ago due to very similar circumstances.....and shifted from Jet Rangers to Dauphins and a much revamped safety culture.
Good intentions does not always lead to good outcomes.
My experience was we called lifting...announced our routing...coordinated with both Dispatch and the Ground Units we were supporting....and called landing and next available callout time post refueling, etc. Each flight following call was confirmed received by Dispatch.
Face it....it was a dark night, temp and dew point were close with a light wind, the flight was on the edge of small lighted areas surrounded by dark areas of forest, the Robbie was not equipped for IMC flight, and in all likelihood the Pilots were not current or proficient in IMC/IFR flight. The flight path trace shows the aircraft passing adjacent to a lit area but heading into the darkness. The overcast was probably not even and no doubt varied locally.
If the Aircraft had a functioning AI and a turn coordinator/turn and slip indicator,Altimeter/VSI and even a Rad Alt....lacking Stick Trim, an Autopilot of some sort, moving map display....IIMC at a low level in such weather conditions was not going to turn out well.
If there were no such aids or only an AI and basic flight instruments....the outcome was far more likely to be catastrophic.
Circumstantial evidence provided by the Tracking Data....seems consistent with a loss of control by the Pilot(s) due to IIMC.
Lots of lessons to be relearned from this tragedy.
Police Units doing it on the cheap and not utilizing trained, experienced Helicopter Pilots to fly their aircraft and instead using minimum trained Police Officers as Pilots is not a recipe for success.
Over large well lit urban areas....there is some leeway for using VFR/VMC only machines and pilots....but where there is much darkness and scant surface lighting....it proves to be a very dangerous situation.
EMS Operations in the United States learned that lesson and have embraced the use of NVG's, FLIR, and sophisticated twin engined helicopters with success when combined with a proper safety culture.
The Maryland State Police learned these lessons a very long time ago due to very similar circumstances.....and shifted from Jet Rangers to Dauphins and a much revamped safety culture.
Good intentions does not always lead to good outcomes.
The following users liked this post:
Fancy all bells and whistles twin with the modes to help you out of a hole you dug isn’t much good if you decide to fly it by hand into the ground.
My experience was we called lifting...announced our routing...coordinated with both Dispatch and the Ground Units we were supporting....and called landing and next available callout time post refueling, etc. Each flight following call was confirmed received by Dispatch.
One night we called we were coming into land at our base, but didn't give the usual on the ground call. Instead we landed and shut down in the middle of the airfield and waited for our Control Room to call to see if we were ok. After ten minutes of silence we pressed the emergency button on the Police radio. Our Control Room didn't respond, but a neighbouring one did. We kept quiet. Eventually we could see a patrol arrive at the base. They just remained next to the hangar.
We eventually started up and returned to the hangar. When we asked why they didn't search the airfield, they said incase of landing aircraft, despite the airfield being in darkness.
A rather detailed report of the exercise was subsequently circulated.
The following 2 users liked this post by MightyGem:
Flying a night pursuit with a reported overcast cloudbase of 900ft and numerous obstructions in the immediate area up to 370'agl seems unnecessarily punchy to me to say the least.
How many times have we been told cloudbase x00ft and discovered in reality, and maybe sometimes just locally it's half that or less?
I won't comment on the cultural/Professional differences between European police ops and this sort of shonky setup but I'm afraid my only thought is I wonder why it doesn't happen more often.
How many times have we been told cloudbase x00ft and discovered in reality, and maybe sometimes just locally it's half that or less?
I won't comment on the cultural/Professional differences between European police ops and this sort of shonky setup but I'm afraid my only thought is I wonder why it doesn't happen more often.