tail rotor failure at hover
Delaying landing the aircraft without removing engine power during a tail rotor failure at a hover is exactly the wrong thing to do....in my sometimes less than humble opinion.
I fall back on adage of "Ass, Tin, Ticket!".
The helicopter is a reusable shipping container designed to protect its contents....and can be used for that purpose when needed.
The Boss Fellah can buy another Helicopter.
The Authority can only take your License.
Do what serves your best interest in minimizing injury or death for you, your crew, and your passengers and don't worry about the rest.
An example....had the crew landed immediately upon realizing they had lost tail rotor control and got the Throttles moved back to ground idle or shutoff....they might have avoided going swimming.
If you get hit with a commercial....my apologies but this is the run-up to our Midterm Elections!
I fall back on adage of "Ass, Tin, Ticket!".
The helicopter is a reusable shipping container designed to protect its contents....and can be used for that purpose when needed.
The Boss Fellah can buy another Helicopter.
The Authority can only take your License.
Do what serves your best interest in minimizing injury or death for you, your crew, and your passengers and don't worry about the rest.
An example....had the crew landed immediately upon realizing they had lost tail rotor control and got the Throttles moved back to ground idle or shutoff....they might have avoided going swimming.
If you get hit with a commercial....my apologies but this is the run-up to our Midterm Elections!
Care to tell us where you were taught that?
Megan, really? pulling straight up with no anti TQ control? Have you ever stopped to think about that?
I taught at that location very early in the Program.....I do not recall that being part of the approved curriculum.
As I said SAS, "Can only assume it was something dreamt up by the instructor involved". Instructor was not you BTW, though can't recall who it was, had a number over the years. 
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: Do I come here often?
Posts: 898
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
you weren’t the only person shown that. I was on D transition 5 years ago. I never believed in it especially as the RFM said “at 10 feet retard both FCL’s” or very similar words.
Certainly the hover failure, if you pulled both FCL’s single pilot stopped the spin and the aircraft sank to the deck.
SND
Another thing to consider is your subsequent NR relative to the cab versus terra firma.
Having a TR lets you "wind your way into the sky" - lack of a TR unwinds it relative to terra firma but not the cab.
A rotation of 1.5 turns per second = 90 RPM which in the recent AW169 incident would equal 26-27% of your NR!
Your face mashed into the panel or the windscreen may be the least of your problems by then!
It is most important to not let the rotation develop. This enhances self-preservation!
I have experienced TR drive failure simulation (level D manufacturer owned with manufacturers data but appreciating the caveats.)
OGE Hover 2000'.
Aircraft with collective mounted throttles and a very large fin (EC135) - no briefing or forewarning and average ability on my part - recovered it but saw ~ 200' on the RAD ALT.
Most of todays machinery with skinny little pylons to enhance TR performance - good luck getting it straightened out with forward speed. You will need a lot of room on your side.
IGE - chop the throttles (if you can) and hold it off as long as possible. If you cant chop the throttles just plant it. To quote Sasless - ATT!
Having a TR lets you "wind your way into the sky" - lack of a TR unwinds it relative to terra firma but not the cab.
A rotation of 1.5 turns per second = 90 RPM which in the recent AW169 incident would equal 26-27% of your NR!
Your face mashed into the panel or the windscreen may be the least of your problems by then!
It is most important to not let the rotation develop. This enhances self-preservation!
I have experienced TR drive failure simulation (level D manufacturer owned with manufacturers data but appreciating the caveats.)
OGE Hover 2000'.
Aircraft with collective mounted throttles and a very large fin (EC135) - no briefing or forewarning and average ability on my part - recovered it but saw ~ 200' on the RAD ALT.
Most of todays machinery with skinny little pylons to enhance TR performance - good luck getting it straightened out with forward speed. You will need a lot of room on your side.
IGE - chop the throttles (if you can) and hold it off as long as possible. If you cant chop the throttles just plant it. To quote Sasless - ATT!
SASless - I take issue with your comments associated with the Canadian frigate crash.
Taking into account the "WTF" factor for pilots, this could add up to 3 seconds ish of delay. For a TR failure this could equate to 2 x complete revolutions of the aiframe before the crew accepted the cause.
1. The G forces are enormous - the NH pilot may not be able to get to the throttles.
2. Taking this particular incident into account. Even assuming the the throttles were chopped almost immediately - this would result in the CH124 sinking and colliding head first with the back of the ships superstructure, probably causing even more of a mess and definitely missing the deck!
Sometimes (naturally or otherwise) it works out best if the pilot(s) don't have time to react properly....
Taking into account the "WTF" factor for pilots, this could add up to 3 seconds ish of delay. For a TR failure this could equate to 2 x complete revolutions of the aiframe before the crew accepted the cause.
1. The G forces are enormous - the NH pilot may not be able to get to the throttles.
2. Taking this particular incident into account. Even assuming the the throttles were chopped almost immediately - this would result in the CH124 sinking and colliding head first with the back of the ships superstructure, probably causing even more of a mess and definitely missing the deck!
Sometimes (naturally or otherwise) it works out best if the pilot(s) don't have time to react properly....
TC,
This is what I posted:
When you are that close to landing on a Deck (elevated helipad, roof top helipad....or anywhere for that matter) and you are unable to stop a yaw to the right (American design)....how long does it take to know you have a problem....45 degrees of yaw....90 degrees....180 degrees....360 degrees 720 degrees?
Yes there is a delay before you realize you have a problem.....yes....there is a delay while you process that recently learned knowledge.....then you have to formulate your plan....execute your plan....and then see if your plan is working.
My point in presenting the video was to demonstrate how quickly the situation gets out of hand.....if retarding the Engine Levers is delayed.....FOR WHATEVER REASON!
Boy Scout Motto is "Always Prepared!".....that works for Helicopter flying too.
From personal experience....when my left foot touched the chin bubble and the aircraft was still turning right.....even my slow thinking Red Neck Brain grasped there was a problem....instantly!
That same slow thinking brain worked better if it was like the old fashioned water well pump....the kind that had to be "primed".
That is where training and SOP's (Cockpit Procedures) come into play.
I do firmly believe....had the Handling Pilot firmly bottomed the Collective before the aircraft or as the aircraft rotated past the starboard side of the ship....they might possibly have stayed on the deck and had a better outcome.
(As we do not know for real at what point the ECL's were retarded....we can only guess they were still powered when the aircraft rolled over onto its side and spinning like a Top.)
As it was....they had one heck of story to tell in the Bar later....all survived and only one crew member was injured with a broken arm.
The teaching point is simple....at or near a hover and you lose Tail Rotor Drive/Thrust....holdiing the Collective up is not going to end well.....but landing the helicopter and getting the power off as quickly as possible is the far better course of action.
In the specific case of Helicopters with Collective mounted throttles....I would reverse that order.....meaning roll off the Throttle(s) then carry out an EOL.
This is what I posted:
An example....had the crew landed immediately upon realizing they had lost tail rotor control and got the Throttles moved back to ground idle or shutoff....they might have avoided going swimming.
Yes there is a delay before you realize you have a problem.....yes....there is a delay while you process that recently learned knowledge.....then you have to formulate your plan....execute your plan....and then see if your plan is working.
My point in presenting the video was to demonstrate how quickly the situation gets out of hand.....if retarding the Engine Levers is delayed.....FOR WHATEVER REASON!
Boy Scout Motto is "Always Prepared!".....that works for Helicopter flying too.
From personal experience....when my left foot touched the chin bubble and the aircraft was still turning right.....even my slow thinking Red Neck Brain grasped there was a problem....instantly!
That same slow thinking brain worked better if it was like the old fashioned water well pump....the kind that had to be "primed".
That is where training and SOP's (Cockpit Procedures) come into play.
I do firmly believe....had the Handling Pilot firmly bottomed the Collective before the aircraft or as the aircraft rotated past the starboard side of the ship....they might possibly have stayed on the deck and had a better outcome.
(As we do not know for real at what point the ECL's were retarded....we can only guess they were still powered when the aircraft rolled over onto its side and spinning like a Top.)
As it was....they had one heck of story to tell in the Bar later....all survived and only one crew member was injured with a broken arm.
The teaching point is simple....at or near a hover and you lose Tail Rotor Drive/Thrust....holdiing the Collective up is not going to end well.....but landing the helicopter and getting the power off as quickly as possible is the far better course of action.
In the specific case of Helicopters with Collective mounted throttles....I would reverse that order.....meaning roll off the Throttle(s) then carry out an EOL.
Better still - if this "north American" approach had been replaced by the european one (where we bring the cab to the hover alongside the ship FIRST and then transition sideways, the whole episode would have been better resolved for all concerned, as the TR failure in the approach or hover would have resulted in contact with the ocean - relatively safely and as importantly, the subsequent crash would NOT have impacted the damn ship causing untold damage to its superstructure.
What "eejit" designed an approach to land on a ship - directly from behind, with thousands of tonnes of steel blocking any possible escape route?????
IF someone had died either from the impact with the deck or falling off it, the chances of this being avoided would have been greatly enhanced by hovering alongside first before deciding all was well and then transitioning sideways.
Concur with teaching point - a TR failure in the hover is best dealt with by selecting down motion on the collective, taking power off and forcing a positive landing.
What "eejit" designed an approach to land on a ship - directly from behind, with thousands of tonnes of steel blocking any possible escape route?????
IF someone had died either from the impact with the deck or falling off it, the chances of this being avoided would have been greatly enhanced by hovering alongside first before deciding all was well and then transitioning sideways.
Concur with teaching point - a TR failure in the hover is best dealt with by selecting down motion on the collective, taking power off and forcing a positive landing.
TC,
Perhaps your allergy to Spam is causing you some indigestion.
Even using your method....the aircraft has to approach the ship in order to land aboard.
When the Tail Rotor decides to go is not up to any procedure used and if it goes as you are crossing onto the deck or over the deck....as small as most Frigate Decks are....you are in a very bad position to land aboard or not roll off the deck into the Sea.
Ship Decks are just unstable pinnacles in reality....aren't they?
Do your Navy Pilots hover alongside the mountain top then transition sideways to land?
Perhaps your allergy to Spam is causing you some indigestion.
Even using your method....the aircraft has to approach the ship in order to land aboard.
When the Tail Rotor decides to go is not up to any procedure used and if it goes as you are crossing onto the deck or over the deck....as small as most Frigate Decks are....you are in a very bad position to land aboard or not roll off the deck into the Sea.
Ship Decks are just unstable pinnacles in reality....aren't they?
Do your Navy Pilots hover alongside the mountain top then transition sideways to land?
TC, the audio in that film clip indicates USS Cushing, which was a LAMPS MK III capable ship in 2002 when that accident happened.
(I am pretty sure my log book indicates a few landings on that ship when it was in the PAC fleet ... but it's been a while).
The up the backside approach was designed in the early 1980's for the RAST/BEARTRAP crapola that the USN decided was needed for recovery on rough seas.
I preferred the 30 degree offset approach from LAMPS MK I, but that's no matter.
Good friend of mine was in a hover, about to put a LAMPS MK III (SH-60B) onto a ship via that silly RAST thing when his TR let go. At night.
He just got away from the ship, then chopped throttles (CP did that) and spalshed it in wet. All over very quickly. All swam out. HEEDS was helpful to all.
The approach wasn't the problem in this case. it appears to me that the approach had stopped/paused over the NATO SeaSparrow/SeaChicken launcher aft of the flight deck. The usual method was to keep the relative motion > 0 until over the spot, however, carrier folks weren't as used to those approaches as LAMPS folks.
The H-3 in that video is in dirty air coming into the spot, and IMO not being a LAMPS guy was coming in at too low of an angle, technique wise, in terms of angle measured from the vertical. (My perception of that might be due to the video angle of the camera, so I may not be right about that).
Typical Carrier based habit for an on board ship landing.
Beyond that, SASless is right, even if he is an Army guy.
If the tail lets go there, it's a worst case scenario; you ain't flying that one away, dump the collective and stay dry.
Uncle will get a new bird.
Back in the day, our 30 degree offset kept you clear of the ship until over the deck, but that's an ax to grind that does nobody any good, since RAST was this magical fkucing thing ... never mind me, just a curmudgeon here, grumbling into his beer.
As to your "European Approach" crap, bollocks to it being "better." Did it a few times in a NATO ex due to STANAGS and HOSTAC rules.
Going into a HOGE hover next to the ship and sliding actually increases some risks, although if the tail lets go before the slide, cut gun into the water and Robert's your mother's brother. Yeah.
If it lets go as you slide over the deck you get into the same pickle that Sea King guy did. Momentum is a thing.
(I am pretty sure my log book indicates a few landings on that ship when it was in the PAC fleet ... but it's been a while).
The up the backside approach was designed in the early 1980's for the RAST/BEARTRAP crapola that the USN decided was needed for recovery on rough seas.
I preferred the 30 degree offset approach from LAMPS MK I, but that's no matter.
Good friend of mine was in a hover, about to put a LAMPS MK III (SH-60B) onto a ship via that silly RAST thing when his TR let go. At night.
He just got away from the ship, then chopped throttles (CP did that) and spalshed it in wet. All over very quickly. All swam out. HEEDS was helpful to all.
The approach wasn't the problem in this case. it appears to me that the approach had stopped/paused over the NATO SeaSparrow/SeaChicken launcher aft of the flight deck. The usual method was to keep the relative motion > 0 until over the spot, however, carrier folks weren't as used to those approaches as LAMPS folks.
The H-3 in that video is in dirty air coming into the spot, and IMO not being a LAMPS guy was coming in at too low of an angle, technique wise, in terms of angle measured from the vertical. (My perception of that might be due to the video angle of the camera, so I may not be right about that).
Typical Carrier based habit for an on board ship landing.
Beyond that, SASless is right, even if he is an Army guy.
If the tail lets go there, it's a worst case scenario; you ain't flying that one away, dump the collective and stay dry.
Uncle will get a new bird.
Back in the day, our 30 degree offset kept you clear of the ship until over the deck, but that's an ax to grind that does nobody any good, since RAST was this magical fkucing thing ... never mind me, just a curmudgeon here, grumbling into his beer.
As to your "European Approach" crap, bollocks to it being "better." Did it a few times in a NATO ex due to STANAGS and HOSTAC rules.
Going into a HOGE hover next to the ship and sliding actually increases some risks, although if the tail lets go before the slide, cut gun into the water and Robert's your mother's brother. Yeah.
If it lets go as you slide over the deck you get into the same pickle that Sea King guy did. Momentum is a thing.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 3rd Nov 2018 at 19:04.
SAS - I am/was a navy pilot for decades. Lonewolf I operated off Canadian frigates for 3 years during my exchange tour and used the beartrap hundreds of timesd. What a fantastic piece of kit (by the way the Brits invented it but never used it).
Bringing a cab alongside first kills several birds with one stone:
1. NO dirty air to worry about.
2. A permanent escape route dead ahead and to the offside.
3. At night, the PH has continuous visiuals with deck lighting throughout the landing procedure. Approaching from over the stern can and does (because I did many cross deck ops with the yanks) cause visuals to "disappear" as the ship pitches out of limits.
For example: Pitch limits for a frigate at night, for a FREE landing: +/- 1-3 degrees. Roll limits: 5-10 degrees. Haul down: Pitch: up to 10 degrees. Roll: 25 degrees. These limits are impossible to sustain if one approaches over the stern. Alongside - you can simply wait forever until the ship enters 'quiessence' and then you can land. This is impossible coming in over the back.
4.. Pilot can trim, relax and get ready for the final landing assessing everything in relative calm before relying on 100% looking out.
5.. Any T's and P's issues can be identified and resolved before "committing".
In this particular incident described here - the TR let loose just as he cleared the edge of the aft portion of the deck. Failure occuring 1 second earlier would have driven the cab right into the back of the frigate making matters MUCH worse for all concerned including the ship. Hovering alongside at a high power setting might actually trigger the TR failure resulting in a downward trajectory into the ogging WITHOUT hitting the ship. Once committed to moving sideways over the deck however - of course the scenario would be the same as the one described here but the amount of time spent over the ship during this manouevre would have been reduced to a minimum, so too - harm to the crew.
It's a no brainer - hovering alongside is by a long chalk the safest option. [Which is why the vast majority of other country's naval ops deploy it.]
Another reason why an approach from the astern or "30 degrees" is ridiculous:
This would never have happened if one approached to the hover alongside |FIRST!
Bringing a cab alongside first kills several birds with one stone:
1. NO dirty air to worry about.
2. A permanent escape route dead ahead and to the offside.
3. At night, the PH has continuous visiuals with deck lighting throughout the landing procedure. Approaching from over the stern can and does (because I did many cross deck ops with the yanks) cause visuals to "disappear" as the ship pitches out of limits.
For example: Pitch limits for a frigate at night, for a FREE landing: +/- 1-3 degrees. Roll limits: 5-10 degrees. Haul down: Pitch: up to 10 degrees. Roll: 25 degrees. These limits are impossible to sustain if one approaches over the stern. Alongside - you can simply wait forever until the ship enters 'quiessence' and then you can land. This is impossible coming in over the back.
4.. Pilot can trim, relax and get ready for the final landing assessing everything in relative calm before relying on 100% looking out.
5.. Any T's and P's issues can be identified and resolved before "committing".
In this particular incident described here - the TR let loose just as he cleared the edge of the aft portion of the deck. Failure occuring 1 second earlier would have driven the cab right into the back of the frigate making matters MUCH worse for all concerned including the ship. Hovering alongside at a high power setting might actually trigger the TR failure resulting in a downward trajectory into the ogging WITHOUT hitting the ship. Once committed to moving sideways over the deck however - of course the scenario would be the same as the one described here but the amount of time spent over the ship during this manouevre would have been reduced to a minimum, so too - harm to the crew.
It's a no brainer - hovering alongside is by a long chalk the safest option. [Which is why the vast majority of other country's naval ops deploy it.]
Another reason why an approach from the astern or "30 degrees" is ridiculous:
This would never have happened if one approached to the hover alongside |FIRST!
TC,
The 46 crash was not a standard ship landing.....it was a Counter Terrorist Assault Landing gone awfully wrong.
Seven people died in the crash.
It was clearly a pilot error accident.
The Pilot under shot the deck, stuck one rear landing gear through the wire netting and experienced dynamic roll over.
The 46 crash was not a standard ship landing.....it was a Counter Terrorist Assault Landing gone awfully wrong.
Seven people died in the crash.
It was clearly a pilot error accident.
The Pilot under shot the deck, stuck one rear landing gear through the wire netting and experienced dynamic roll over.
We all know the story behind this vintage piece SAS. The cause of the crash was power settling by the way.
Dynamic rollover eh? WTF will you think of next?
The rigging and wheel tangling was a by product.
i say again: This could NOT have happened if he'd shot an approach to the hover alongside.
7 people would be alive today if this jerk hadnt shot a zero/zero.
Dynamic rollover eh? WTF will you think of next?
The rigging and wheel tangling was a by product.
i say again: This could NOT have happened if he'd shot an approach to the hover alongside.
7 people would be alive today if this jerk hadnt shot a zero/zero.
TC.....let's take it very slowly so you might grasp what is being said.
It was not a standard deck landing.
The aircraft landed short of the deck.
The landing gear got hung up in the deck edge skirting preventing the aircraft from maintaining controlled flight.
With the landing gear tangled as it was.....the aircraft rolled over on its side as it departed the deck.
Alongside per UK method or a Standard USN approach would not have allowed this to happen.
Crapsakes....you have a video to watch to see what happened AND you are the one that posted it.
Watch it again......carefully......perhaps you can accept that it was not a standard approach in any regard.
You do see the two SEAL Assault Craft following the Helicopter to the Ship...right?
That give you a clue as to what was going on in that evolution?
It was a fast aggressive approach and attempted landing that went all wrong.
It has nothing to do with "Standard" in the manner you wish to apply that concept.
When you do a Direct Action Assault....pull up alongside the Target and wait for the ship to enter whatever the hell you called it.....when assaulting a vessel with armed terrorists aboard and see how long you last.
Why can you not just accept the RN does it one way and the USN. uses a different method.
I submit they each have reasons for doing what they do that are valid to each.
Of course you will not want to argue who does more of these things.....considering the size of the two fleets and its associated helicopter force.
It was not a standard deck landing.
The aircraft landed short of the deck.
The landing gear got hung up in the deck edge skirting preventing the aircraft from maintaining controlled flight.
With the landing gear tangled as it was.....the aircraft rolled over on its side as it departed the deck.
Alongside per UK method or a Standard USN approach would not have allowed this to happen.
Crapsakes....you have a video to watch to see what happened AND you are the one that posted it.
Watch it again......carefully......perhaps you can accept that it was not a standard approach in any regard.
You do see the two SEAL Assault Craft following the Helicopter to the Ship...right?
That give you a clue as to what was going on in that evolution?
It was a fast aggressive approach and attempted landing that went all wrong.
It has nothing to do with "Standard" in the manner you wish to apply that concept.
When you do a Direct Action Assault....pull up alongside the Target and wait for the ship to enter whatever the hell you called it.....when assaulting a vessel with armed terrorists aboard and see how long you last.
Why can you not just accept the RN does it one way and the USN. uses a different method.
I submit they each have reasons for doing what they do that are valid to each.
Of course you will not want to argue who does more of these things.....considering the size of the two fleets and its associated helicopter force.
SAS the pilot was a grunt, probably never seen a ship before.
His "brain" thought: I'll do a zero/zero approach offering minimum exposure time on finals, except, ships MOVE and they move when least expected, so an attempt to land on a hard surface, when that hard surface has just moved down or up 6 feet in a matter of seconds before landing, suggests this is NOT, repeat NOT the way to land on a ship. But when grunts drive, others dive.
Secondly: AFTER, repeat AFTER the helo hit the deck (not before) having made a (shall we say) positive landing, only then did the helo find itself short and the rear gear tangled in the rigging. The pilots then action was to lift away from the short landing by applying collective and voila - the helo pivoted about the gear tipping the cab over.
Make no mistake SAS, this was an approach which led to him approaching too qiuckly for the circumstances and finding at the end of the approach that he didn't have the power to cancel the fwd momentum of the helo (Ergo: Power settling). This is the ONLY reason he collided with the superstructure. Post collision - he tried to reverse away and got snared up.
PS: i love the dynamic rollover idea though - that's a cracker! Were you a grunt too, I guess?
His "brain" thought: I'll do a zero/zero approach offering minimum exposure time on finals, except, ships MOVE and they move when least expected, so an attempt to land on a hard surface, when that hard surface has just moved down or up 6 feet in a matter of seconds before landing, suggests this is NOT, repeat NOT the way to land on a ship. But when grunts drive, others dive.
Secondly: AFTER, repeat AFTER the helo hit the deck (not before) having made a (shall we say) positive landing, only then did the helo find itself short and the rear gear tangled in the rigging. The pilots then action was to lift away from the short landing by applying collective and voila - the helo pivoted about the gear tipping the cab over.
Make no mistake SAS, this was an approach which led to him approaching too qiuckly for the circumstances and finding at the end of the approach that he didn't have the power to cancel the fwd momentum of the helo (Ergo: Power settling). This is the ONLY reason he collided with the superstructure. Post collision - he tried to reverse away and got snared up.
PS: i love the dynamic rollover idea though - that's a cracker! Were you a grunt too, I guess?
TC ...I think you will find that if a wheel hooks up , just the same as a skid catching something ....you will revolve over that point and that is called dynamic roll over .
Ps . So based on that video he was a grunt . ..... I would love to see what a **** you will look when we discover the pilot had 10x the number of deck landings than you have !!!!!!!!!
Ps . So based on that video he was a grunt . ..... I would love to see what a **** you will look when we discover the pilot had 10x the number of deck landings than you have !!!!!!!!!
TC.....time for you to quit digging that foxhole you are in!
Please do explain how you reckon the Pilot was a “Grunt”.
I’m beginning to think you need a guide book to tell the difference between that thing you have hidden your head in.....and a foxhole!
You do understand the Navy AND the Marines operate helicopters from ships routinely with Marine Aviators in the Cockpits and have done so from the late 1940’s?
Or is this news to you?
Also...it was a USMC 46...the sea was calm....and the wind was light..
Now as to the “Grunt”. .....run that by us again please.
http://www.check-six.com/Crash_Sites...-USMC-1999.htm
Please do explain how you reckon the Pilot was a “Grunt”.
I’m beginning to think you need a guide book to tell the difference between that thing you have hidden your head in.....and a foxhole!
You do understand the Navy AND the Marines operate helicopters from ships routinely with Marine Aviators in the Cockpits and have done so from the late 1940’s?
Or is this news to you?
Also...it was a USMC 46...the sea was calm....and the wind was light..
Now as to the “Grunt”. .....run that by us again please.
http://www.check-six.com/Crash_Sites...-USMC-1999.htm
Last edited by SASless; 5th Nov 2018 at 10:26. Reason: Add Link, amend "Navy" to "USMC"