AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
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HC
One has to wonder why the CAA said what they said rather than:
'It is not normal to ground a fleet after an accident and we have had no indication from the AAIB that this situation should be any different.'
They certainly haven't improved matters.
'It is not normal to ground a fleet after an accident and we have had no indication from the AAIB that this situation should be any different.'
They certainly haven't improved matters.
Last edited by Ray Joe Czech; 2nd Sep 2013 at 10:21. Reason: Speling :)
Hi – Yes it does seem that there is discord amongst the various parties and you are right I don’t understand the history or rational behind.
I’m not sure I follow your position re: your 2nd / 3rd paragraphs. The AAIB interim report after REDW shows that even their reports are best efforts – I’d absolutely suggest that they failed because of commercial pressure, in so far as they have limited resource and were led to a conclusion in that case by the manufacturer. Yet whilst one believes that everyone in the chain is acting with the very best of intentions there is surely nothing wrong with the implementation of a clear, consistent and timely reporting process?
You don’t need to take a default grounding position if all the parties are happy with their risk, including those on the ground, but I guess the driver for that is if you see aircraft accidents primarily being technical failures over piloting errors or vice versa.
CAA/AAIB in cahoots? I’m not sure I’d choose that word but I don’t see closer working as a bad thing. When you ask who should do this communicating I don’t see what would be at all wrong with a process that saw an initial AAIB/CAA/operator statement that explained the facts as they were known within 24hours and then a clear set of statements from a nominated PR office subsequently. Otherwise you get an un-coordinated mess as each news agency calls each party at different times, with a fresh story.
There is nothing wrong with good, clear communication and in fact you can see from the EC225 situation that it doesn’t need an AAIB report before you see constructive action.
The last we heard from the AAIB on the 225 was when? March 2013? Seems odd that on one day we all throw our hands up over the need to wait for the AAIB to report (which can take years) and then on another day we are more than happy to run with the read between the lines and rumour.. That doesn't seem the most professional way to work.
In fact its beyond that when there are people who have lost their lives and someone suggests its piloting error, not a technical matter and then refuses to clarify that statement. That's just playing stupid games isn't it?
I’m not sure I follow your position re: your 2nd / 3rd paragraphs. The AAIB interim report after REDW shows that even their reports are best efforts – I’d absolutely suggest that they failed because of commercial pressure, in so far as they have limited resource and were led to a conclusion in that case by the manufacturer. Yet whilst one believes that everyone in the chain is acting with the very best of intentions there is surely nothing wrong with the implementation of a clear, consistent and timely reporting process?
You don’t need to take a default grounding position if all the parties are happy with their risk, including those on the ground, but I guess the driver for that is if you see aircraft accidents primarily being technical failures over piloting errors or vice versa.
CAA/AAIB in cahoots? I’m not sure I’d choose that word but I don’t see closer working as a bad thing. When you ask who should do this communicating I don’t see what would be at all wrong with a process that saw an initial AAIB/CAA/operator statement that explained the facts as they were known within 24hours and then a clear set of statements from a nominated PR office subsequently. Otherwise you get an un-coordinated mess as each news agency calls each party at different times, with a fresh story.
There is nothing wrong with good, clear communication and in fact you can see from the EC225 situation that it doesn’t need an AAIB report before you see constructive action.
The last we heard from the AAIB on the 225 was when? March 2013? Seems odd that on one day we all throw our hands up over the need to wait for the AAIB to report (which can take years) and then on another day we are more than happy to run with the read between the lines and rumour.. That doesn't seem the most professional way to work.
In fact its beyond that when there are people who have lost their lives and someone suggests its piloting error, not a technical matter and then refuses to clarify that statement. That's just playing stupid games isn't it?
Last edited by Pittsextra; 2nd Sep 2013 at 11:34. Reason: formatting and added last paragraph
The problems between the AAIB and the CAA has many facets.
The CAA Neddies damn sure don't like being told....they are in the business of "Telling" others what to do.
The AAIB oft times are dealing with the results of CAA decisions or lack of decision.
Exactly the same situation exists between the NTSB and the FAA in the United States.
So nothing new in all this.
We all have our favorite examples of the disconnect the CAA/FAA have from reality at times....but mine is the following.
The Airlines wanted to add passengers on B-727 airliners on flights from NYC to San Juan, Puerto Rico. Portions of those flights qualified as "Over Water" but actually paralleled the coastline rather than flying away from it as is normal. The Airlines made their case, the FAA accepted that statistically double or triple engine failures in the 727 would never happen and approved the removal of all the overwater flight required safety equipment....rafts, jackets, etc.
Three weeks later....at the exact furtherest point offshore and well out to Sea....a bumbling Flight Engineer managed to shut down all three engines while mishandling the fuel system. The Crew did manage to get the engines back on line after doing Re-Starts.
The FAA in a rare fit of wisdom reversed itself and back in went the rafts and jackets.
If the aircraft had crashed....and all were lost as a result.....how would/should the NTSB have described the FAA Decision?
The AAIB and CAA, just as the NTSB and FAA, can have reasons for a somewhat adversarial relationship....and should in some cases.
As to the CAA decision.....exactly what data were they basing that decision upon? Just what was the "Evidence" from the AAIB and what were the sources of the other "Evidence"....and what was it?
The CAA Neddies damn sure don't like being told....they are in the business of "Telling" others what to do.
The AAIB oft times are dealing with the results of CAA decisions or lack of decision.
Exactly the same situation exists between the NTSB and the FAA in the United States.
So nothing new in all this.
We all have our favorite examples of the disconnect the CAA/FAA have from reality at times....but mine is the following.
The Airlines wanted to add passengers on B-727 airliners on flights from NYC to San Juan, Puerto Rico. Portions of those flights qualified as "Over Water" but actually paralleled the coastline rather than flying away from it as is normal. The Airlines made their case, the FAA accepted that statistically double or triple engine failures in the 727 would never happen and approved the removal of all the overwater flight required safety equipment....rafts, jackets, etc.
Three weeks later....at the exact furtherest point offshore and well out to Sea....a bumbling Flight Engineer managed to shut down all three engines while mishandling the fuel system. The Crew did manage to get the engines back on line after doing Re-Starts.
The FAA in a rare fit of wisdom reversed itself and back in went the rafts and jackets.
If the aircraft had crashed....and all were lost as a result.....how would/should the NTSB have described the FAA Decision?
The AAIB and CAA, just as the NTSB and FAA, can have reasons for a somewhat adversarial relationship....and should in some cases.
But next day the CAA backed the lifting of the ban, saying it drew its conclusions after reviewing the evidence available including that "already published by the Air Accidents Investigation Branch".
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AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
It will all be down to politics and not to any technical reasoning. The problem will be that as soon as one of the pilot's farts, it will make front page headlines. As we know, cockpit warning lights come on fairly often, typically either a false alarm or showing a reduction in redundancy.
Damn, a Fart Warninglight, did not see that one coming. Guess they will get me now.
Damn, a Fart Warninglight, did not see that one coming. Guess they will get me now.
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Damn, a Fart Warninglight, did not see that one coming. Guess they will get me now.
Never mind, I'll get back under my stone.
AAIB/NTSB
SAS,
From the NTSB website, a short CV of the Chairperson:
Hersman received B.A. degrees in Political Science and International Studies from Virginia Tech, and an M.S. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from George Mason University. She holds a commercial driver's license (with passenger, school bus, and air brake endorsements) as well as a motorcycle endorsement.
Hopefully, the Chair of the AAIB has some background that will assist in this increasingly technology dependent business of aircraft accident investigation.
From the NTSB website, a short CV of the Chairperson:
Hersman received B.A. degrees in Political Science and International Studies from Virginia Tech, and an M.S. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from George Mason University. She holds a commercial driver's license (with passenger, school bus, and air brake endorsements) as well as a motorcycle endorsement.
Hopefully, the Chair of the AAIB has some background that will assist in this increasingly technology dependent business of aircraft accident investigation.
Last edited by JohnDixson; 2nd Sep 2013 at 13:52. Reason: Added comment.
Pitts, you can wish for whatever relationship you like between AAIB and CAA, but it ain't going to happen!
They have completely different roles, agendas and areas of skill and knowledge, so why should they agree about anything, any more than the pilots and the SLF do?
Well to be fair, the pilots and the SLF, as well as the AAIB and CAA, all want there to be no more accidents. But how one arrives at that nirvana is a bun fight.
The AAIB have no remit to ground aircraft. Their sole remit is to investigate accidents and discover what happened and why, and suggest ways to prevent a recurrence.
The CAA have no remit to investigate crashery, only to act as they see fit after the facts are revealed by the AAIB. But inevitably there is a grey area whilst a high profile investigation is in progress. You might not like it, but that's tough as (as I said in my first para) it ain't going to change!
I also think you are trying to tailor your ideas of how things should work, to this particular set of circumstances. There is no way that any AAIB statement should be linked or made jointly with anyone else, not even the CAA and most certainly not any operator. Each has their own agenda and any mixing of messages would be horrendous.
No-one has said it is "pilot error" yet, all they have said is that so far there seem to be no airworthiness issues. Not the same thing, since there are plenty of other things, either in isolation or in combination, that can cause an accident.
They have completely different roles, agendas and areas of skill and knowledge, so why should they agree about anything, any more than the pilots and the SLF do?
Well to be fair, the pilots and the SLF, as well as the AAIB and CAA, all want there to be no more accidents. But how one arrives at that nirvana is a bun fight.
The AAIB have no remit to ground aircraft. Their sole remit is to investigate accidents and discover what happened and why, and suggest ways to prevent a recurrence.
The CAA have no remit to investigate crashery, only to act as they see fit after the facts are revealed by the AAIB. But inevitably there is a grey area whilst a high profile investigation is in progress. You might not like it, but that's tough as (as I said in my first para) it ain't going to change!
I also think you are trying to tailor your ideas of how things should work, to this particular set of circumstances. There is no way that any AAIB statement should be linked or made jointly with anyone else, not even the CAA and most certainly not any operator. Each has their own agenda and any mixing of messages would be horrendous.
No-one has said it is "pilot error" yet, all they have said is that so far there seem to be no airworthiness issues. Not the same thing, since there are plenty of other things, either in isolation or in combination, that can cause an accident.
Last edited by HeliComparator; 2nd Sep 2013 at 14:28.
HC I hear you and its a view. Personally I think its a shame and they are perhaps less effective for the self inflicted issues you express. I don't really see a downside to more co-ordination of their communications - for instance the Eurocopter 225 dedicated site is actually a nice piece of work that could quite easily be referenced by the AAIB - at least that then makes the statement that they endorse this work.
Well lets be honest "airworthiness" has a fairly big delta. After all there have been some pretty big failures where the absolute cause and the contributory causes have been such that business continues as normal. Like you say even the AAIB recommendations get rejected by aviation authorities.
Regardless I'm not sure whose purpose it serves to maintain vagueness around the kind of statements we have seen.
No-one has said it is "pilot error" yet, all they have said is that so far there seem to be no airworthiness issues. Not the same thing, since there are plenty of other things, either in isolation or in combination, that can cause an accident.
Regardless I'm not sure whose purpose it serves to maintain vagueness around the kind of statements we have seen.
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Emergency escape
Below is a Pprune excerpt from as number of years ago in Malaysia.
Chopper Crashes Near Oil Rig Off Bintulu, All 13 On Board Safe
KUCHING, June 18 (Bernama) -- A Malaysia Helicopter Services (MHS) chopper crashed at sea near the oil operators Malaysia B11 oil rig, some 170km off Bintulu in Sarawak, at about noon Saturday but all 13 people on board, including the two pilots, are safe.
Malaysia said all the 11 passengers -- eight Malaysians, two New Zealanders and a Briton -- and the Malaysian pilots were evacuated by another helicopter to Miri for observation and medical treatment.
One of the passengers is reported to have sustained bruises, according to oil operator's Malaysia officials who were contacted.
The oil company said all family members of the passengers and pilots had been notified.
"The company's emergency response team continues to monitor the situation and will lend full assistance to later investigations into the incident," it said.
The oil company said the mishap happened at about 12.05 pm when the helicopter, on a routine flight, encountered difficulties near the B11 platform and crashed into the water.
The chopper, one of three contracted from MHS for the oil companies Malaysia's upstream activities, was enroute to B11 from the Miri helibase.
The identities of the passengers and pilots have yet to be released.
In Miri, next-of-kin gathered at the Columbia Medical Centre where those on board had been brought for observation and medical treatment.
Reporters were also there to attempt to get eye-witness accounts of the incident, but they were prevented from talking to anyone.
Nevertheless, according to one of the passengers, the mishap happened about 11km from the B-11 platform, and the incident was seen by personnel at the platform.
He said the helicopter was at a height of about 4,000 feet when those on board realised that something was wrong. Then, at about 1,000 feet, the chopper spun and crashed into the water.
He said all the passengers and the pilots managed to emerge from the sinking helicopter and were rescued by the oil company's emergency response team.
He said that thanks to the experienced pilots and the high level of safety standards practised by the oil company, they managed to evade a worst situation had they landed on the platform.
My words
One came up to the surface facing the wrong way and was revived in the liferaft due to having difficulty in pushing out the windows from the middle and two others in the rear of the inverted nose down helicopter had similar difficulties but managed to find an air gap up high and got a second chance.
At that time rebreathers were only used in cold water environments due to cold water gasp reflex. Subsequently within that oil company, rebreathers were introduced for temperate environments and proved a major success for the many thousands in that region.
However this was not limited to those in the back and HEED was introduced for those at the front to great effect.
From earlier posts this does not seem to have been implemented in other environs.
212man, hopefully with your new location you can back me up on this and drive it forward.
Maybe HEEDS is the way to go for all on an offshore helicopter with the appropriate training if rebreathers are seen as too cumbersome.
HEEDS may have been a greater bonus in this very short notice Shetland incident than the rebreather
My ten cents worth.
Chopper Crashes Near Oil Rig Off Bintulu, All 13 On Board Safe
KUCHING, June 18 (Bernama) -- A Malaysia Helicopter Services (MHS) chopper crashed at sea near the oil operators Malaysia B11 oil rig, some 170km off Bintulu in Sarawak, at about noon Saturday but all 13 people on board, including the two pilots, are safe.
Malaysia said all the 11 passengers -- eight Malaysians, two New Zealanders and a Briton -- and the Malaysian pilots were evacuated by another helicopter to Miri for observation and medical treatment.
One of the passengers is reported to have sustained bruises, according to oil operator's Malaysia officials who were contacted.
The oil company said all family members of the passengers and pilots had been notified.
"The company's emergency response team continues to monitor the situation and will lend full assistance to later investigations into the incident," it said.
The oil company said the mishap happened at about 12.05 pm when the helicopter, on a routine flight, encountered difficulties near the B11 platform and crashed into the water.
The chopper, one of three contracted from MHS for the oil companies Malaysia's upstream activities, was enroute to B11 from the Miri helibase.
The identities of the passengers and pilots have yet to be released.
In Miri, next-of-kin gathered at the Columbia Medical Centre where those on board had been brought for observation and medical treatment.
Reporters were also there to attempt to get eye-witness accounts of the incident, but they were prevented from talking to anyone.
Nevertheless, according to one of the passengers, the mishap happened about 11km from the B-11 platform, and the incident was seen by personnel at the platform.
He said the helicopter was at a height of about 4,000 feet when those on board realised that something was wrong. Then, at about 1,000 feet, the chopper spun and crashed into the water.
He said all the passengers and the pilots managed to emerge from the sinking helicopter and were rescued by the oil company's emergency response team.
He said that thanks to the experienced pilots and the high level of safety standards practised by the oil company, they managed to evade a worst situation had they landed on the platform.
My words
One came up to the surface facing the wrong way and was revived in the liferaft due to having difficulty in pushing out the windows from the middle and two others in the rear of the inverted nose down helicopter had similar difficulties but managed to find an air gap up high and got a second chance.
At that time rebreathers were only used in cold water environments due to cold water gasp reflex. Subsequently within that oil company, rebreathers were introduced for temperate environments and proved a major success for the many thousands in that region.
However this was not limited to those in the back and HEED was introduced for those at the front to great effect.
From earlier posts this does not seem to have been implemented in other environs.
212man, hopefully with your new location you can back me up on this and drive it forward.
Maybe HEEDS is the way to go for all on an offshore helicopter with the appropriate training if rebreathers are seen as too cumbersome.
HEEDS may have been a greater bonus in this very short notice Shetland incident than the rebreather
My ten cents worth.
Last edited by pmmcdm; 2nd Sep 2013 at 15:24.
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I was thinking about the various points being discussed on this thread whilst returning from offshore Canada today in a S92 where we had a missed approach (fog) to another FPSO to drop off/pick up some more PAX, then cooked in the suits for a few hours back to the beach.
I have been "trained" in both the air pocket plus (Malaysia) and the HUEBA (Canada), so I have the benefit of being able to directly compare the two systems from a PAX perspective. The talk offshore over this side of the pond since Friday has been quite muted on the Shetland ditching, mainly because there hasn't been any real media coverage in Canada, but one thing that we all agreed on was we're glad to not be using the SP over here. There are several reasons for this...but in summary it is down to the bulkiness of our current flight suits, the cramped cabin and the limited range for our offshore destinations over here with very few alternates.
Despite the larger room in the S92 cabin, the combination of our suits, HUEBAs and S92 window sizes make it a tight squeeze, especially as we are not getting any smaller in the back over the years
Since Cougar 491 on March 12th, 2009, HUEBAs were quickly introduced. We also got a revised version of the Helly Hansen HTS-1 (previously known as the E452 "boil-in-the-bag") to improve the fit of the face seal (still IMO a step back, the Shark suits used in North Sea waters with a full neck seal are far better). These Transport Canada certified flight suits are used as they are also certified for marine use, and with our variable weather we tend to use vessel transfer quite a bit with the Frog system, which for those not using it is actually really safe as you have very tight sea state and visibility limits before it is sanctioned for use, and only cranes with certified e-brakes are allowed to be used for personnel transfer.
The HUEBA IMO is a great piece of equipment, but the S92 windows are quite narrow, especially the 10 knock-out ones over our aux fuel tank and mid-row seats. We have 13 exits in total on the S92 including the 3 larger "pull the handle and hit the bottom of the unit" type, plus the main door in the event of a non-capsize situation. We are not allowed to deploy the HUEBA in our HUET over here in case we get it wrong. I disagree with this as I would like to find out if I can squeeze through the window with the HUEBA mouthpiece in my mouth, goggles on to stop me breathing through my nose, and how long I could really get out of the HUEBA when under stress/exertion. I have no issues with signing a waiver, but sadly the oil companies and the safety regulator will not let us take "undue risk". So much for safety improvements, there will always be risk, by opting to work in the offshore industry for the past 22 years I think I've earned the right to be my own risk level decision maker. The fact that we do the airpocket plus pool training and also use it in the HUET in the MIS-BOISET in Malaysia is much more beneficial. I wonder how many PAX in the Shetland ditching actually used their rebreathers, hopefully we will find out from the AAIB report when published.
What we need IMO is a complete review of helo transport as mentioned by previous posters, e.g. opt for a TEMPS style "escape pod" design that will self-right and be water-tight. If we wished to go with a freefall option there would be very few PAX on a flight as you would most likely have to be held in an inclined position to minimize the g-forces on impact. We can never remove all elements of risk, but we can improve the safety rating and survivability of our transport.
I am surprised that the bus drivers over here in Canada don't ask for more safety features for themselves, such as HEED/HUEBA, immersion suits, I assume that they accept the risk more readily whether via their trust in their equipment and training, both military and civil, and just get on with it. For us passengers in the back we tend to expect the same safety standard levels and survivability that we have become accustomed to at our offshore installations. I can remember back to how different the safety culture offshore was back in 1991 in comparison to now, perhaps we need the same step change in culture for our offshore transportation systems. After all, there is a relatively long life left in this industry, so why not have the oil companies invest in it more by working with the equipment manufacturers to come up with a safer survival system design in the helos.
We only move forward by learning from our mistakes and revising our engineering practices, that is the true nature of progress. I just hope we can apply some of that logic to the outcome of this most recent loss of life.
Safe flying
Max
I have been "trained" in both the air pocket plus (Malaysia) and the HUEBA (Canada), so I have the benefit of being able to directly compare the two systems from a PAX perspective. The talk offshore over this side of the pond since Friday has been quite muted on the Shetland ditching, mainly because there hasn't been any real media coverage in Canada, but one thing that we all agreed on was we're glad to not be using the SP over here. There are several reasons for this...but in summary it is down to the bulkiness of our current flight suits, the cramped cabin and the limited range for our offshore destinations over here with very few alternates.
Despite the larger room in the S92 cabin, the combination of our suits, HUEBAs and S92 window sizes make it a tight squeeze, especially as we are not getting any smaller in the back over the years
Since Cougar 491 on March 12th, 2009, HUEBAs were quickly introduced. We also got a revised version of the Helly Hansen HTS-1 (previously known as the E452 "boil-in-the-bag") to improve the fit of the face seal (still IMO a step back, the Shark suits used in North Sea waters with a full neck seal are far better). These Transport Canada certified flight suits are used as they are also certified for marine use, and with our variable weather we tend to use vessel transfer quite a bit with the Frog system, which for those not using it is actually really safe as you have very tight sea state and visibility limits before it is sanctioned for use, and only cranes with certified e-brakes are allowed to be used for personnel transfer.
The HUEBA IMO is a great piece of equipment, but the S92 windows are quite narrow, especially the 10 knock-out ones over our aux fuel tank and mid-row seats. We have 13 exits in total on the S92 including the 3 larger "pull the handle and hit the bottom of the unit" type, plus the main door in the event of a non-capsize situation. We are not allowed to deploy the HUEBA in our HUET over here in case we get it wrong. I disagree with this as I would like to find out if I can squeeze through the window with the HUEBA mouthpiece in my mouth, goggles on to stop me breathing through my nose, and how long I could really get out of the HUEBA when under stress/exertion. I have no issues with signing a waiver, but sadly the oil companies and the safety regulator will not let us take "undue risk". So much for safety improvements, there will always be risk, by opting to work in the offshore industry for the past 22 years I think I've earned the right to be my own risk level decision maker. The fact that we do the airpocket plus pool training and also use it in the HUET in the MIS-BOISET in Malaysia is much more beneficial. I wonder how many PAX in the Shetland ditching actually used their rebreathers, hopefully we will find out from the AAIB report when published.
What we need IMO is a complete review of helo transport as mentioned by previous posters, e.g. opt for a TEMPS style "escape pod" design that will self-right and be water-tight. If we wished to go with a freefall option there would be very few PAX on a flight as you would most likely have to be held in an inclined position to minimize the g-forces on impact. We can never remove all elements of risk, but we can improve the safety rating and survivability of our transport.
I am surprised that the bus drivers over here in Canada don't ask for more safety features for themselves, such as HEED/HUEBA, immersion suits, I assume that they accept the risk more readily whether via their trust in their equipment and training, both military and civil, and just get on with it. For us passengers in the back we tend to expect the same safety standard levels and survivability that we have become accustomed to at our offshore installations. I can remember back to how different the safety culture offshore was back in 1991 in comparison to now, perhaps we need the same step change in culture for our offshore transportation systems. After all, there is a relatively long life left in this industry, so why not have the oil companies invest in it more by working with the equipment manufacturers to come up with a safer survival system design in the helos.
We only move forward by learning from our mistakes and revising our engineering practices, that is the true nature of progress. I just hope we can apply some of that logic to the outcome of this most recent loss of life.
Safe flying
Max
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I am surprised that the bus drivers over here in Canada don't ask for more safety features for themselves, such as HEED/HUEBA, immersion suits, I assume that they accept the risk more readily whether via their trust in their equipment and training
Clarify please.... are you stating that the pilots (bus drivers, as you call them)who transport you to/from your installations do not wear HEEDS or immersion suits? I find this hard to understand.
ILS
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ILS, different operators have different specs for PPE, the Cougar pilots over here flying the S92s wear a navy blue flight suit, not anywhere near as bulky (for obvious reasons) as the PAX suits. They may have HEEDs in the cockpits but from the pilots I've seen doing their visual check on the helidecks there does not appear to be any built-in/attached rebreather on their flight suits.
My point if clarification is so needed is the inherent difference in the PPE used by the PAX in the back and the drivers in the front. Perhaps we need to have the same level of protection, after all we are exposed to the same risks and hazards albeit the drivers have a lot more of exposure to the inherent risks.
Max
My point if clarification is so needed is the inherent difference in the PPE used by the PAX in the back and the drivers in the front. Perhaps we need to have the same level of protection, after all we are exposed to the same risks and hazards albeit the drivers have a lot more of exposure to the inherent risks.
Max
Last week I posted that in China the aircraft had a facility to jettison the main door from the cockpit. When I flew the 332 in Aberdeen I do not remember a cabin door jettison being in the pre-start checks so I am sure that they were not fitted----but I may be wrong.
I have no idea whether the 225 is fitted with these, the Chinese ones would have been; but if they aren't they should be.
I have no idea whether the 225 is fitted with these, the Chinese ones would have been; but if they aren't they should be.
Last edited by Fareastdriver; 2nd Sep 2013 at 20:22.
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There are plenty of drivers in the North Sea not wearing survival suits today as well. Summer water temperatures of more than a “sultry" +10 in many areas means summer suits on. Not so smart from a survival point of view, as your survival time in water less than +15 is pretty short, but up to 8 hours in the cockpit often without aircon in a survival suit also has its downsides on safety for the pax, as many feel the fatigue caused by wearing the survival suits is a greater hazard.
Pilots do not have any rebreather or STASS either. The main reason for this - there is only one - money. The pilots unions have not been as effective as the offshore unions in pushing safety and HSE at work.
Pilots do not have any rebreather or STASS either. The main reason for this - there is only one - money. The pilots unions have not been as effective as the offshore unions in pushing safety and HSE at work.
it was 3 in a timespan of 5 years prior to 1991 when no cardiac screening was executed prior to the Training.
Since 1991 when medical Screening upfront became the norm the paper mentions two fatalities also due to cardiac problems which are at least partly attributed to the HUET.
Fareastdriver, the remote cabin door jettisons are fitted to all our AS332Ls. As far as I know it was standard. However, in the L2 and 225 the same handles remotely deploy the life rafts instead. This is because (amongst other things) remotely deployable life rafts are a JAR-OPS 3 requirement, remotely jettisonable doors are not.
Last edited by HeliComparator; 2nd Sep 2013 at 19:56.
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!Didnt EC experiment with a bigger frame for the 225 before she was introduced? Do some digging. Who decided the current frame was sufficient? What was the reasons?
Spend a lot of time today in a 737-800, then 340-600 and thought of the demands written here for pax. Leg room such that my knees where stuck behind the seat infront and trying to lift them was a camasutra possibility till the person infront decided to lay his seat bck. Trying to lie down low to stretch my legs, the knees got stuck. The person next to me and I had to share a armrest which resulted in me sitting with my arm tucked up in my ribs as I lost. This was a window seat on both flights costing more than my monthly salary
Spend a lot of time today in a 737-800, then 340-600 and thought of the demands written here for pax. Leg room such that my knees where stuck behind the seat infront and trying to lift them was a camasutra possibility till the person infront decided to lay his seat bck. Trying to lie down low to stretch my legs, the knees got stuck. The person next to me and I had to share a armrest which resulted in me sitting with my arm tucked up in my ribs as I lost. This was a window seat on both flights costing more than my monthly salary
Join Date: Mar 2009
Location: St. John's, Newfoundland
Age: 55
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Pilots do not have any rebreather or STASS either. The main reason for this - there is only one - money. The pilots unions have not been as effective as the offshore unions in pushing safety and HSE at work
To me this is totally wrong, if anyone needs the best available safety equipment it's the pilots. I remember the S61 pilots back in the 90s who took us from Unst to the Ninian field had a blue dry suits with the back of the shoulders zipper, very similar to a divers suit with a full neck seal. Even the stewardess who sat in the back with us wore an identical style flight suit. We wore those old Multifab orange ones back then with the front zipper, before moving on to the Shark suits developed for Shell (and IMO still the best suit I've ever used).
Time for the oil companies to pony up the cash and ensure that the complete service line that brings them huge profits is made as safe as reasonably practicable. When workers start to refuse to go offshore and there are no replacements due to skilled workforce attrition then perhaps the oil companies will think again. After all, it all comes down to economics, the cost to improve helicopter operations will just be transferred to the end user of the industry's end products.
What we need are technical steering groups to be formed by the operators, similar to what was done with JIGSAW, to move this forward. Just look at what the Norwegians went through to get a better flight suit, which I believe is a Helly Hansen product which uses a material designed to provide better thermal control for the user. Here's a link, looks pretty good to me. If they're good enough for Norwegian North Sea I reckon they'll be good enough for the Grand banks offshore Newfoundland.
Sea Air survival suit by Hansen Protection
Anybody on this thread used this specific type of suit, and if so is there a variant for the pilot?
"I am surprised that the bus drivers over here in Canada don't ask for more safety features for themselves, such as HEED/HUEBA, immersion suits, I assume that they accept the risk more readily whether via their trust in their equipment and training "
No need to be surprised. I always wore a survival suit (much lighter weight than the pax suits, you couldn't operate the controls in those) and a HUEBA for over a decade of flying offshore off Canada's East Coast....
No need to be surprised. I always wore a survival suit (much lighter weight than the pax suits, you couldn't operate the controls in those) and a HUEBA for over a decade of flying offshore off Canada's East Coast....
Last edited by Bladestrike; 2nd Sep 2013 at 23:01.