What's the latest news of the V22 Osprey?
http://www.marines.mil/unit/mcascher...x#.T06vW8U7U1I
Bold Alligator 2012 confirms capabilities of 2nd MAW aviation
2/15/2012 By Lance Cpl. Scott L. Tomaszycki , Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point
MARINE CORPS AIR STATION CHERRY POINT, N.C. (Feb. 15, 2012) — U.S. Navy amphibious ships can carry the personnel and air power needed to conduct military operations in a myriad of locations throughout the world. During Exercise Bold Alligator 2012, every aspect of Marine aviation was used in the full range of air operations to showcase the advantages of seabasing.
Bold Alligator, which took place Jan. 30 through Feb. 12 afloat and ashore in and around Virginia and North Carolina, was the first Marine Expeditionary Brigade level amphibious exercise of its size in the past ten years. It granted valuable experience to pilots and aircrews as they reacquainted themselves with the shipboard working environment.
Col. Scott S. Jensen, commanding officer of the aviation combat element for the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade during the exercise, likened the exercise to softball practice. The members of a good softball team already know the mechanics of a double-play whether they practice or not. When the team is getting ready for a tournament, however, they perfect their techniques. Marine aviators know the mechanics of working on a ship but need things like Bold Alligator to get ready for the big tournament.
The ‘tournament’ of Bold Alligator was Feb. 6, when Marines of Regimental Landing Team 2 stormed Onslow Beach, N.C. While RLT-2 Marines secured their frontline positions, and the aviation arm consisting of an array of aviation assets practiced operations supporting the landing.
“Prior to the Marines landing on shore, we’ll spend time clearing the airspace in order to get air superiority,” said Capt. Johnathan P. Stouffer, an AV-8B Harrier pilot with Marine Attack Squadron 231. “Once we have that, we’ll conduct shaping operations to prepare the battlefield for the Marines. Based on intelligence we’ll strike where all the enemy positions are so they can’t harm our Marines while they’re landing on the beach. Once they get on the beach, we’ll transition to close air support and strike where they see the enemy.”
AH-1W Cobras also provided air support during the operation, conducting all air strikes inside authorized bombing ranges at Camp Lejeune. Marine F/A-18 Hornets supported the operation from Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, which role-played as an expeditionary airfield. More Hornets operated from the USS Enterprise. MV-22 Ospreys inserted Marines and coalition troops to take critical objectives. Jensen said inserting troops by Osprey and helicopters provide important advantages in maneuver warfare.
“It’s all about mobility. Our assault helicopters, our MV-22’s and our CH-53’s are just as necessary to move our landing force ashore, to evacuate casualties and be able to connect the ships to the shore in conjunction with the landing craft,” Jensen explained. “The helicopters present rapid mobility; you don’t have to stay on roads. You can get there quick and take care of things that might need to be taken care of.”
This rapid warfighting strategy was represented by a Marine reconnaissance raid into Fort Pickett, Va., to strike against a high value target behind enemy lines. The mission was made possible by the Osprey, because it has greater speed and range than conventional helicopters.
Aviation also practiced long range strikes against strategic targets away from the main battlefield. On two occasions, Marine aviation struck notional missile launch sites, using a package of EA-6B Prowlers for protection against anti-aircraft defenses, AV-8B Harriers and Hornets to engage enemy aircraft and strike the target, and KC-130Js to refuel the aircraft.
Amphibious aviation assets are for more than dropping bombs. According to Jensen, the squadrons have to be ready for any kind of aviation mission. Marine expeditionary units are a 911 force capable of anything, from helping refugees and casualty evacuations to dropping bombs on the enemy. A Marine Expeditionary Brigade, the size of the force used during Bold Alligator, has a more defined purpose when assembled but still maintains a wide range of capabilities.
“If you look back on the island hopping campaigns back in World War II, any time they cut short the artillery preparation of the battlefield casualties were always a lot higher,” said Stouffer. “If we skip out on Marine aviation, it’s going to take a lot more lives to accomplish the goal. Having us there is saving lives.”
2/15/2012 By Lance Cpl. Scott L. Tomaszycki , Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point
MARINE CORPS AIR STATION CHERRY POINT, N.C. (Feb. 15, 2012) — U.S. Navy amphibious ships can carry the personnel and air power needed to conduct military operations in a myriad of locations throughout the world. During Exercise Bold Alligator 2012, every aspect of Marine aviation was used in the full range of air operations to showcase the advantages of seabasing.
Bold Alligator, which took place Jan. 30 through Feb. 12 afloat and ashore in and around Virginia and North Carolina, was the first Marine Expeditionary Brigade level amphibious exercise of its size in the past ten years. It granted valuable experience to pilots and aircrews as they reacquainted themselves with the shipboard working environment.
Col. Scott S. Jensen, commanding officer of the aviation combat element for the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade during the exercise, likened the exercise to softball practice. The members of a good softball team already know the mechanics of a double-play whether they practice or not. When the team is getting ready for a tournament, however, they perfect their techniques. Marine aviators know the mechanics of working on a ship but need things like Bold Alligator to get ready for the big tournament.
The ‘tournament’ of Bold Alligator was Feb. 6, when Marines of Regimental Landing Team 2 stormed Onslow Beach, N.C. While RLT-2 Marines secured their frontline positions, and the aviation arm consisting of an array of aviation assets practiced operations supporting the landing.
“Prior to the Marines landing on shore, we’ll spend time clearing the airspace in order to get air superiority,” said Capt. Johnathan P. Stouffer, an AV-8B Harrier pilot with Marine Attack Squadron 231. “Once we have that, we’ll conduct shaping operations to prepare the battlefield for the Marines. Based on intelligence we’ll strike where all the enemy positions are so they can’t harm our Marines while they’re landing on the beach. Once they get on the beach, we’ll transition to close air support and strike where they see the enemy.”
AH-1W Cobras also provided air support during the operation, conducting all air strikes inside authorized bombing ranges at Camp Lejeune. Marine F/A-18 Hornets supported the operation from Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, which role-played as an expeditionary airfield. More Hornets operated from the USS Enterprise. MV-22 Ospreys inserted Marines and coalition troops to take critical objectives. Jensen said inserting troops by Osprey and helicopters provide important advantages in maneuver warfare.
“It’s all about mobility. Our assault helicopters, our MV-22’s and our CH-53’s are just as necessary to move our landing force ashore, to evacuate casualties and be able to connect the ships to the shore in conjunction with the landing craft,” Jensen explained. “The helicopters present rapid mobility; you don’t have to stay on roads. You can get there quick and take care of things that might need to be taken care of.”
This rapid warfighting strategy was represented by a Marine reconnaissance raid into Fort Pickett, Va., to strike against a high value target behind enemy lines. The mission was made possible by the Osprey, because it has greater speed and range than conventional helicopters.
Aviation also practiced long range strikes against strategic targets away from the main battlefield. On two occasions, Marine aviation struck notional missile launch sites, using a package of EA-6B Prowlers for protection against anti-aircraft defenses, AV-8B Harriers and Hornets to engage enemy aircraft and strike the target, and KC-130Js to refuel the aircraft.
Amphibious aviation assets are for more than dropping bombs. According to Jensen, the squadrons have to be ready for any kind of aviation mission. Marine expeditionary units are a 911 force capable of anything, from helping refugees and casualty evacuations to dropping bombs on the enemy. A Marine Expeditionary Brigade, the size of the force used during Bold Alligator, has a more defined purpose when assembled but still maintains a wide range of capabilities.
“If you look back on the island hopping campaigns back in World War II, any time they cut short the artillery preparation of the battlefield casualties were always a lot higher,” said Stouffer. “If we skip out on Marine aviation, it’s going to take a lot more lives to accomplish the goal. Having us there is saving lives.”
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Taliban IED hide-out found near Bastion
6 March 2012 | Afghanistan
Details have just emerged of a joint UK/US/Afghan operation that's seized and destroyed a large cache of Taliban IED-making equipment south of Bastion Airfield.
Operation Backfoot involved 2 Squadron, RAF Regiment, warriors from Afghan Army’s 3rd Brigade and US Marines from 2 Marine Expeditionary Force.
The force deployed by US Osprey aircraft, with its unique tilt-rotor capability, and as well as seizing the bomb making materials also gathered a wealth of intelligence despite coming under fire several times.
The operation took place in the Dasht (or desert) south of Bastion Airfield - a sparse landscape of rolling fields and scrub dotted with compounds and is increasingly being used as a harbour area by Taliban forces who have come under pressure elsewhere by successful coalition operations. Its protection is the task of 2 Squadron, operating as part of 3 RAF Force Protection Wing.
It is an area where insurgents have mingled with the local population - some of them Taliban sympathizers - and their presence has seen attempts to increase poppy production in the area to fund their summer campaign.
Because of the sparse agricultural cover in the area during the winter, the insurgents have based themselves in compounds to fire on ISAF foot patrols from cover.
The string of IEDs that has been sown across approaches to the area, together with their ‘stand-off and shoot’ tactics, was meant to block ISAF forces from approaching.
Sqn Ldr Jules Weekes, who commanded the RAF troops, said: “There is a certain dynamic to Taliban activities in this area. They operate in small teams of five or six, travelling by motorbike as their preferred guerrilla tactic. Part of this operation is to find out how ‘he’ does business.”
Several suspect compounds were targeted which saw the Ospreys land troops at two separate landing zones, either side of the wide Chah-e Anjir wadi.
The dismounted troops - supported by a number of 2 Squadron Ridgeback and Jackal patrol vehicles and a specialist US Marine IED clearance team – did not go unchallenged. A number of small arms attacks were beaten off by the ground troops and heavier attacks were dealt with by Apache and Cobra gunships. One US Marine patrol, temporarily pinned down by heavy small-arms fire, was supported by a show of force from an F18 which was sufficient to deter the insurgents.
As well as gaining vital intelligence the operation found a substantial IED cache in a compound, which contained a variety of bomb-making equipment, mines and several complete IEDs which were ready to be used against ISAF forces.
Wing Commander Jason Sutton, the commander of 3 RAF Force Protection Wing, said: “The open approaches to this area mean that it is hard to gain the element of surprise. However, by using the Ospreys to approach rapidly from an unexpected direction, the operation managed to achieve it.
“The RAF Regiment’s role is to defend airbases and those who operate from them, but the old adage of attack being the best form of defence remains as true today as ever. Targeting the insurgents and their supply networks takes the initiative away from them so that we can dictate the terms of the fight. It disrupts the insurgents’ attempts to attack Bastion and its vital air operations, denies them freedom of movement and supports the Afghan National Security Forces as together we work to protect the population who live around the base.”
PICTURE: Ministry of Defence - Dawn breaks as Operation Backfoot gets underway
6 March 2012 | Afghanistan
Details have just emerged of a joint UK/US/Afghan operation that's seized and destroyed a large cache of Taliban IED-making equipment south of Bastion Airfield.
Operation Backfoot involved 2 Squadron, RAF Regiment, warriors from Afghan Army’s 3rd Brigade and US Marines from 2 Marine Expeditionary Force.
The force deployed by US Osprey aircraft, with its unique tilt-rotor capability, and as well as seizing the bomb making materials also gathered a wealth of intelligence despite coming under fire several times.
The operation took place in the Dasht (or desert) south of Bastion Airfield - a sparse landscape of rolling fields and scrub dotted with compounds and is increasingly being used as a harbour area by Taliban forces who have come under pressure elsewhere by successful coalition operations. Its protection is the task of 2 Squadron, operating as part of 3 RAF Force Protection Wing.
It is an area where insurgents have mingled with the local population - some of them Taliban sympathizers - and their presence has seen attempts to increase poppy production in the area to fund their summer campaign.
Because of the sparse agricultural cover in the area during the winter, the insurgents have based themselves in compounds to fire on ISAF foot patrols from cover.
The string of IEDs that has been sown across approaches to the area, together with their ‘stand-off and shoot’ tactics, was meant to block ISAF forces from approaching.
Sqn Ldr Jules Weekes, who commanded the RAF troops, said: “There is a certain dynamic to Taliban activities in this area. They operate in small teams of five or six, travelling by motorbike as their preferred guerrilla tactic. Part of this operation is to find out how ‘he’ does business.”
Several suspect compounds were targeted which saw the Ospreys land troops at two separate landing zones, either side of the wide Chah-e Anjir wadi.
The dismounted troops - supported by a number of 2 Squadron Ridgeback and Jackal patrol vehicles and a specialist US Marine IED clearance team – did not go unchallenged. A number of small arms attacks were beaten off by the ground troops and heavier attacks were dealt with by Apache and Cobra gunships. One US Marine patrol, temporarily pinned down by heavy small-arms fire, was supported by a show of force from an F18 which was sufficient to deter the insurgents.
As well as gaining vital intelligence the operation found a substantial IED cache in a compound, which contained a variety of bomb-making equipment, mines and several complete IEDs which were ready to be used against ISAF forces.
Wing Commander Jason Sutton, the commander of 3 RAF Force Protection Wing, said: “The open approaches to this area mean that it is hard to gain the element of surprise. However, by using the Ospreys to approach rapidly from an unexpected direction, the operation managed to achieve it.
“The RAF Regiment’s role is to defend airbases and those who operate from them, but the old adage of attack being the best form of defence remains as true today as ever. Targeting the insurgents and their supply networks takes the initiative away from them so that we can dictate the terms of the fight. It disrupts the insurgents’ attempts to attack Bastion and its vital air operations, denies them freedom of movement and supports the Afghan National Security Forces as together we work to protect the population who live around the base.”
PICTURE: Ministry of Defence - Dawn breaks as Operation Backfoot gets underway
One US Marine patrol, temporarily pinned down by heavy small-arms fire, was supported by a show of force from an F18 which was sufficient to deter the insurgents.
No need to bomb or strafe it seems....just wave your Supersonic Willy!
Who writes this crap?
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Top Stories | British Forces News
Well hellfire....let's just fly the F-18's up and down the Wadi then.... No need to bomb or strafe it seems....
Show of Force?
Hopefully that "show" was dropping a pair of 1,000 pound bombs....or a CBU drop! Then I am all into such "shows".
Hopefully that "show" was dropping a pair of 1,000 pound bombs....or a CBU drop! Then I am all into such "shows".
Pretty sure "show of force" can refer to a strafing run in the vicinity, or even a line up without actually firing. Both of which would be successful in scaring the pants off of the guy holding the duct-taped AK-47.
C'mon SAS, youre all about saving the taxpayer money! This should make you happy they aren't spending $40,000 a pop to drop JDAMs right?
C'mon SAS, youre all about saving the taxpayer money! This should make you happy they aren't spending $40,000 a pop to drop JDAMs right?
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Show of Force?
Remember from your Bristow's days SAS that this is "British English," not "American English"! They tend to be a bit more reserved in their commentary.
Lexington Institute
Misleading Metrics Understate Readiness And Versatility Of MV-22 Tilt-Rotor
Author: Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D.
Date: Tuesday, March 06, 2012
Over the last five years, the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft has demonstrated its operational value in 17 foreign deployments while becoming the safest rotorcraft in the Marine Corps fleet. The aircraft has performed raids in Iraq, disaster relief in Haiti, casualty evacuation in Jordan, counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan and combat rescue in Libya. Operational commanders are clamoring for more of the unique airframes because, in the words of one Marine briefing, it flies "twice as fast, carrying three times the payload, at four times the range of the legacy helicopter it replaces."
You'd think that after 140,000 safe flight hours, often in harrowing circumstances, critics would begin recognizing that the MV-22 is everything the Marines promised it would be -- agile, versatile, reliable and affordable. Well, no such luck. Even though transition from the ancient CH-46 helicopter to the MV-22 is now more than 50 percent complete, some so-called experts continue to spout misleading information about the aircraft's price and performance. They say the Osprey costs too much to build and operate, and has not demonstrated adequate levels of readiness in combat operations.
No doubt about it, $68 million is a lot of money to pay for the production version of a rotorcraft. However, the performance characteristics of the Osprey make it the operational equivalent of two or three conventional helicopters. The CH-46 that the MV-22 is replacing can carry 12 troops to a combat radius of 75 nautical miles (nm.) at a top speed of 145 nm. per hour. The MV-22, in contrast, can carry 24 troops to a combat radius of 325 nautical miles at a top speed of 260 nm. per hour. The range differential alone is a huge force multiplier. For instance, a CH-46 stationed in Baghdad can't even make it to the Iraqi border and back without refueling, whereas an MV-22 stationed at the same base can reach the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean Sea or the Caspian Sea -- and then turn around and fly back without refueling.
The contrast in performance underscores why picking any airframe other than Osprey for combat search-and-rescue is irresponsible (as the Air Force should have learned when MV-22s rescued a stranded U.S. fighter crew in Libya during the recent conflict there). But it takes time for people to appreciate the full potential of a revolutionary airframe, so it is no surprise that as Canada puts together its own solicitation for a new combat search-and-rescue helicopter, it is making the same mistakes the U.S. Air Force did -- applying dated metrics and assumptions that favor a solution sure to leave some personnel stranded forever in hostile territory. The simple fact is that any solution other than a tilt-rotor can't fly far enough or fast enough to save some endangered warfighters.
In that regard, the critics are doing warfighters a real disservice by citing misleading comparisons between Osprey and various conventional helicopters. For instance, they complain it costs about $10,000 per flight hour to operate the MV-22 compared with about $3,000 per flight hour for the MH-60, the Marine helicopter most closely resembling what the Air Force uses for combat search-and-rescue. However, this ignores the superior speed, range and carrying capacity of the MV-22. When the metric is changed to cost per mile flown, the MV-22 only looks about 60 percent more expensive, and when the metric is passenger seat miles, the MV-22 looks twice as efficient ($1.53 versus $3.21). After all, it can carry three times more people than an MH-60, which like its greater speed and range might come in handy in some rescue operations.
It is also worth noting that the MV-22's computerized reporting system depresses apparent readiness rates compared with the older, manual system used for the legacy CH-46s it will replace. The Osprey actually has high mission-capable rates, but the way the new system measures availability makes it look less ready than it really is. Eventually these matters will all be sorted out, and it will be obvious the MV-22 is far, far superior to a conventional rotorcraft in just about any imaginable scenario. That's why even the Army, which has no formal plans to buy tilt-rotors, is taking a close look at its medical-evacuation potential. Let's just hope the rest of the world wakes up to the revolutionary potential of tilt-rotor technology while there is still time to leverage economies of scale off of a warm production line.
Author: Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D.
Date: Tuesday, March 06, 2012
Over the last five years, the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft has demonstrated its operational value in 17 foreign deployments while becoming the safest rotorcraft in the Marine Corps fleet. The aircraft has performed raids in Iraq, disaster relief in Haiti, casualty evacuation in Jordan, counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan and combat rescue in Libya. Operational commanders are clamoring for more of the unique airframes because, in the words of one Marine briefing, it flies "twice as fast, carrying three times the payload, at four times the range of the legacy helicopter it replaces."
You'd think that after 140,000 safe flight hours, often in harrowing circumstances, critics would begin recognizing that the MV-22 is everything the Marines promised it would be -- agile, versatile, reliable and affordable. Well, no such luck. Even though transition from the ancient CH-46 helicopter to the MV-22 is now more than 50 percent complete, some so-called experts continue to spout misleading information about the aircraft's price and performance. They say the Osprey costs too much to build and operate, and has not demonstrated adequate levels of readiness in combat operations.
No doubt about it, $68 million is a lot of money to pay for the production version of a rotorcraft. However, the performance characteristics of the Osprey make it the operational equivalent of two or three conventional helicopters. The CH-46 that the MV-22 is replacing can carry 12 troops to a combat radius of 75 nautical miles (nm.) at a top speed of 145 nm. per hour. The MV-22, in contrast, can carry 24 troops to a combat radius of 325 nautical miles at a top speed of 260 nm. per hour. The range differential alone is a huge force multiplier. For instance, a CH-46 stationed in Baghdad can't even make it to the Iraqi border and back without refueling, whereas an MV-22 stationed at the same base can reach the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean Sea or the Caspian Sea -- and then turn around and fly back without refueling.
The contrast in performance underscores why picking any airframe other than Osprey for combat search-and-rescue is irresponsible (as the Air Force should have learned when MV-22s rescued a stranded U.S. fighter crew in Libya during the recent conflict there). But it takes time for people to appreciate the full potential of a revolutionary airframe, so it is no surprise that as Canada puts together its own solicitation for a new combat search-and-rescue helicopter, it is making the same mistakes the U.S. Air Force did -- applying dated metrics and assumptions that favor a solution sure to leave some personnel stranded forever in hostile territory. The simple fact is that any solution other than a tilt-rotor can't fly far enough or fast enough to save some endangered warfighters.
In that regard, the critics are doing warfighters a real disservice by citing misleading comparisons between Osprey and various conventional helicopters. For instance, they complain it costs about $10,000 per flight hour to operate the MV-22 compared with about $3,000 per flight hour for the MH-60, the Marine helicopter most closely resembling what the Air Force uses for combat search-and-rescue. However, this ignores the superior speed, range and carrying capacity of the MV-22. When the metric is changed to cost per mile flown, the MV-22 only looks about 60 percent more expensive, and when the metric is passenger seat miles, the MV-22 looks twice as efficient ($1.53 versus $3.21). After all, it can carry three times more people than an MH-60, which like its greater speed and range might come in handy in some rescue operations.
It is also worth noting that the MV-22's computerized reporting system depresses apparent readiness rates compared with the older, manual system used for the legacy CH-46s it will replace. The Osprey actually has high mission-capable rates, but the way the new system measures availability makes it look less ready than it really is. Eventually these matters will all be sorted out, and it will be obvious the MV-22 is far, far superior to a conventional rotorcraft in just about any imaginable scenario. That's why even the Army, which has no formal plans to buy tilt-rotors, is taking a close look at its medical-evacuation potential. Let's just hope the rest of the world wakes up to the revolutionary potential of tilt-rotor technology while there is still time to leverage economies of scale off of a warm production line.
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Osprey to star at RIAT
9 March 2012 | UK
A unique aircraft that is both a helicopter and an aeroplane will make a rare appearance in the UK when it takes part in the Royal International Air Tattoo at RAF Fairford this summer.
The US Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey stole the show at the Air Tattoo 2006 where it marked its UK flying display debut. It is the world’s first tilt-rotor aircraft and makes a welcome return to Fairford on July 7-8 2012.
A cross between a helicopter and a fixed-wing aeroplane, the Osprey’s rotor blades can tilt mid-air enabling it to take off vertically and then reconfigure to fly like an aeroplane. This allows it to reach speeds twice as fast as a helicopter and carry heavier payloads at higher altitudes.
In 2007, the aircraft was deployed operationally for the first time, supporting routine cargo and troop movements in Iraq. Two years later, the aircraft performed its first offensive combat mission, Operation Cobra’s Anger, transporting US Marines and Afghan troops into Helmand Province to disrupt the Taliban’s communications and supply lines.
In 2010, Ospreys performed their first humanitarian mission, operating in Haiti as part of Operation Unified Response following an earthquake in the country.
The US Marine Corps plans to send two MV-22Bs, one for the flying display and the other for the static park.
An Air Tattoo spokesman said few other modern aircraft have been so revolutionary in terms of their design and operational capability. He added: “In musical terms, adding the Osprey to the flying display is a bit like Glastonbury adding Jay-Z to the bill – it’s sassy, has lots of good moves and looks downright cool.”
9 March 2012 | UK
A unique aircraft that is both a helicopter and an aeroplane will make a rare appearance in the UK when it takes part in the Royal International Air Tattoo at RAF Fairford this summer.
The US Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey stole the show at the Air Tattoo 2006 where it marked its UK flying display debut. It is the world’s first tilt-rotor aircraft and makes a welcome return to Fairford on July 7-8 2012.
A cross between a helicopter and a fixed-wing aeroplane, the Osprey’s rotor blades can tilt mid-air enabling it to take off vertically and then reconfigure to fly like an aeroplane. This allows it to reach speeds twice as fast as a helicopter and carry heavier payloads at higher altitudes.
In 2007, the aircraft was deployed operationally for the first time, supporting routine cargo and troop movements in Iraq. Two years later, the aircraft performed its first offensive combat mission, Operation Cobra’s Anger, transporting US Marines and Afghan troops into Helmand Province to disrupt the Taliban’s communications and supply lines.
In 2010, Ospreys performed their first humanitarian mission, operating in Haiti as part of Operation Unified Response following an earthquake in the country.
The US Marine Corps plans to send two MV-22Bs, one for the flying display and the other for the static park.
An Air Tattoo spokesman said few other modern aircraft have been so revolutionary in terms of their design and operational capability. He added: “In musical terms, adding the Osprey to the flying display is a bit like Glastonbury adding Jay-Z to the bill – it’s sassy, has lots of good moves and looks downright cool.”
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"Shows of force" are a pretty common thing. Not as effective as actually engaging, but it's enough to make them put their heads down for a bit.
Dropping bombs over there is taken as something of a last resort under current ROE, for better or worse.
Dropping bombs over there is taken as something of a last resort under current ROE, for better or worse.
After this last bit of force showing.....we might really really think about bringing all our Lads and Lasses home!
The 64 Dollar question....Will there be as much rioting, mayhem, and noise over the murder of 16 Civilians as there was over the accidental burning of a hand full of Qurans?
I bet not! Which to a reasonable person does really make one wonder how in the hell we can ever relate to such folks!
The 64 Dollar question....Will there be as much rioting, mayhem, and noise over the murder of 16 Civilians as there was over the accidental burning of a hand full of Qurans?
I bet not! Which to a reasonable person does really make one wonder how in the hell we can ever relate to such folks!
How it flies
For those interested
Flying the V-22 | Vertical - Helicopter News
An Air Force major describes some of the handling characteristics of CV-22.
Osprey Driver may or may not wish to comment.
Flying the V-22 | Vertical - Helicopter News
An Air Force major describes some of the handling characteristics of CV-22.
Osprey Driver may or may not wish to comment.
The Marines are still acting like Cats covering up poop......and defaming two Good Marines in the process....all to hide malfeasance at senior levels of command.
http://http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/marine-corps/218913-jones-widows-seek-exoneration-for-marine-pilots-in-2000-osprey-crash]Rep. Jones, widows seek exoneration for Marine pilots in 2000 Osprey crash - The Hill's DEFCON Hill
Talk about looking out for the Troops.......yeah right!
Just as a side note.....this McCorkle fella.....well at least he knows who butters his bread....and would upon his retirement!
http://http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/marine-corps/218913-jones-widows-seek-exoneration-for-marine-pilots-in-2000-osprey-crash]Rep. Jones, widows seek exoneration for Marine pilots in 2000 Osprey crash - The Hill's DEFCON Hill
Jones said the Marines’ investigation report actually exonerates the pilots — it was the Marines’ statement about the investigation that sparked the “pilot error” blame.
“Unfortunately, the pilots’ drive to accomplish that mission appears to have been the fatal factor,” the release said.
That statement led to years of press accounts that said pilot error was the cause of the crash, Gruber and Brow say. They are asking the Marines to issue a statement that says the two pilots “were not at fault” and include it in the accident report.
As Jones stepped up efforts to clear the pilots’ names last year, he solicited letters from the three crash investigators, all of whom wrote that the pilots should not be blamed for the crash.
Documents reviewed by The Hill and interviews with those involved show the circumstances surrounding the accident do not lead to simple conclusions. While the pilots took actions that contributed to the crash, they and their superiors did not yet understand the flight condition called “vortex-ring state” (VRS) that caused the Osprey to roll over and crash.
“Unfortunately, the pilots’ drive to accomplish that mission appears to have been the fatal factor,” the release said.
That statement led to years of press accounts that said pilot error was the cause of the crash, Gruber and Brow say. They are asking the Marines to issue a statement that says the two pilots “were not at fault” and include it in the accident report.
As Jones stepped up efforts to clear the pilots’ names last year, he solicited letters from the three crash investigators, all of whom wrote that the pilots should not be blamed for the crash.
Documents reviewed by The Hill and interviews with those involved show the circumstances surrounding the accident do not lead to simple conclusions. While the pilots took actions that contributed to the crash, they and their superiors did not yet understand the flight condition called “vortex-ring state” (VRS) that caused the Osprey to roll over and crash.
The Marines remain unconvinced. In his last letter to Jones in 2011, Amos wrote: “I cannot prevent outside observers from using unflattering characterizations about these pilots.”
But some who were involved don’t think the Marines should change their report. Retired Lt. Gen. Fred McCorkle, former Marine aviation chief, said while the crash was heartbreaking, the pilots’ actions still led to the tragedy.
“To me, it was human factors,” McCorkle said in an interview. “That’s what I’ve told the family, and that’s the way it’s going to stay.”
“To me, it was human factors,” McCorkle said in an interview. “That’s what I’ve told the family, and that’s the way it’s going to stay.”
While the V-22 was considered for cancellation in 2001, there was heavy political lobbying to save it. The Boeing effort was led by General Richard Hearny, the former head of Marine Aviation, who retired in 1996 and is Vice President for business development at Boeing. The lobby effort for Boeing's partner, Bell Helicopter, was led by its Vice President for government relations, General Terrence R. Dake, who retired from the Marines in 2000 after heading Marine Aviation. The effort at Headquarters Marine Corps was led by the head of Marine Aviation, General Fred McCorkle (left). Soon after retiring from the Marines in October 2001, McCorkle joined the board of directors and as a senior advisor for GKN Aerospace Services (V-22 fuel tanks). He also serves on the Rolls-Royce North America board of directors (V-22 engines), and is a member of the board of directors of Lord Corporation (V-22 components). In addition, he has served as a consultant for Boeing Aerospace (V-22 maker) and Optical Air Data Systems (V-22 low airspeed indicator).
While these Generals receive an $8000 a month retirement check from the Marines, a tradition has emerged in which the head of Marine Aviation is financially rewarded after retirement for not rocking the boat. Questioning the progress of the V-22 is difficult since the current head of Marine Aviation must challenge his former bosses working for defense contractors. This was revealed during a December 2000 news conference when a reporter asked General McCorkle if the Corps might abandon the V-22. McCorkle replied: "that would be something above my pay grade, quite frankly." At that time, McCorkle was a three-star General and head of Marine Aviation, yet he considered the future of Marine Aviation to be in the hands of others. McCorkle saw himself as a just a salesman whose loyalty to the V-22 program would make him a wealthy executive.
While these Generals receive an $8000 a month retirement check from the Marines, a tradition has emerged in which the head of Marine Aviation is financially rewarded after retirement for not rocking the boat. Questioning the progress of the V-22 is difficult since the current head of Marine Aviation must challenge his former bosses working for defense contractors. This was revealed during a December 2000 news conference when a reporter asked General McCorkle if the Corps might abandon the V-22. McCorkle replied: "that would be something above my pay grade, quite frankly." At that time, McCorkle was a three-star General and head of Marine Aviation, yet he considered the future of Marine Aviation to be in the hands of others. McCorkle saw himself as a just a salesman whose loyalty to the V-22 program would make him a wealthy executive.
Last edited by SASless; 29th Mar 2012 at 15:42.
Operating a vehicle outside the defined NATOPS would be grounds for a determination of "pilot error" would it not?
A great comment posted on the article itself:
A great comment posted on the article itself:
Descent limits were in place. All rotary winged pilots are trained to observe the 800/40 rule. When ground speed is 40 knots or less rate of descent is not to exceed 800 feet per minute. The NATOPS manual that existed for the Osprey at the time included the 800/40 rule. Brow and Gruber were both trained to observe the 800/40 rule. Gruber himself was an experienced CH-53E pilot. The fact is that if Brow and Gruber had flown any rotary winged platform in the same manner that they flew the Osprey that night, the results would have been the same.
HROD testing of the V-22 showed that the Osprey is less susceptible to entering VRS than any rotary winged platform and when encountered, recovery is achieved much quicker in the Osprey.
http://legacy.vtol.org/pdf/test-60.pdf
"causing one of the rotors to enter VRS and stop rotating,"
Jeremy Herb doesn't know what he's talking about. Due to the high rate of descent one of the proprotors lost lift due to the "dirty air" beneath it; it did not stop rotating, causing the aircraft to roll due to the asymmetric lift.
Walter Jones has been repeatedly rebuked by the Department of the Navy for this crusade of his. He needs to accept that this accident was indeed caused by pilot error and move on. His constituents deserve a Congressman who doesn't spend his career beating a dead horse.
Were John Brow and Brooks Gruber here today they'd admit that they made a number of errors that night in deviating from NATOPS: descending at nearly 3500 feet per minute at ~100 knots, losing situational awareness and violating basic airmanship guidelines. They screwed the pooch and ended up killing 19 Marines in the process. Any other explanation is simply revisionist history.
HROD testing of the V-22 showed that the Osprey is less susceptible to entering VRS than any rotary winged platform and when encountered, recovery is achieved much quicker in the Osprey.
http://legacy.vtol.org/pdf/test-60.pdf
"causing one of the rotors to enter VRS and stop rotating,"
Jeremy Herb doesn't know what he's talking about. Due to the high rate of descent one of the proprotors lost lift due to the "dirty air" beneath it; it did not stop rotating, causing the aircraft to roll due to the asymmetric lift.
Walter Jones has been repeatedly rebuked by the Department of the Navy for this crusade of his. He needs to accept that this accident was indeed caused by pilot error and move on. His constituents deserve a Congressman who doesn't spend his career beating a dead horse.
Were John Brow and Brooks Gruber here today they'd admit that they made a number of errors that night in deviating from NATOPS: descending at nearly 3500 feet per minute at ~100 knots, losing situational awareness and violating basic airmanship guidelines. They screwed the pooch and ended up killing 19 Marines in the process. Any other explanation is simply revisionist history.
Last edited by SansAnhedral; 29th Mar 2012 at 20:05.
40/800 rule and 53E's
Sans,
Don't know the source of the article, but the section professing that the 40/800 VRS boundary applies to 53E's ( implying all helicopters ) and that a 53E, if flying the same profile, would have encountered the same result, is simply incorrect. Reminiscent of the old saw about the " Big Lie ".
Thanks,
John Dixson
Don't know the source of the article, but the section professing that the 40/800 VRS boundary applies to 53E's ( implying all helicopters ) and that a 53E, if flying the same profile, would have encountered the same result, is simply incorrect. Reminiscent of the old saw about the " Big Lie ".
Thanks,
John Dixson
John is exactly right.....especially when one considers the 53 is single rotored...and thus not possibly susceptible to differential Vortex Ring State.
Despite the three Accident Investigators clearly stating it is their separate and jointly held opinion the two pilots were not responsible for the accident....I would suggest they are much closer to the issue and thus have a basis upon which to make that statement.
Sans....I really do object to you saying what you just did about the Pilots....both in tone....and more specifically as it is directly opposed to what the Accident Report and the three Accident Investigators had to say.
It is a USMC Press Statement that laid the blame on the pilots.....not the Accident Inquiry.
I submit both you and the USMC are wrong in what you are saying.
It is because of that fatal crash that more testing had to be done and the true dangers of VRS in the Osprey became known.
The two dead men did not have benefit of all that later data.....did they?
Despite the three Accident Investigators clearly stating it is their separate and jointly held opinion the two pilots were not responsible for the accident....I would suggest they are much closer to the issue and thus have a basis upon which to make that statement.
Sans....I really do object to you saying what you just did about the Pilots....both in tone....and more specifically as it is directly opposed to what the Accident Report and the three Accident Investigators had to say.
It is a USMC Press Statement that laid the blame on the pilots.....not the Accident Inquiry.
I submit both you and the USMC are wrong in what you are saying.
It is because of that fatal crash that more testing had to be done and the true dangers of VRS in the Osprey became known.
The two dead men did not have benefit of all that later data.....did they?
V-22 ≠ H-53E
John Dixson is absolutely correct. One cannot compare the V-22 to the H-53E. One of my first test flights in the H-53E was a pitot system calibration flight. There were two end points to the test, a 40 KIAS autorotation and a Vne (170KIAS) autorotation. At 40 KIAS and the VSI pegged at 6000 FPM rate of descent our recovery was accomplished with collect alone. To quote the Chief Program Pilot (Frank Tefft) when he instructed me to just increase the collective, he said “that the machine wouldn’t like it but it could take it.” Sure enough, 13,000m ESHP dug us out of the descent with no signs of VRS. Later in my career I was provided with an opportunity to fly in an H-53E with Brooks Gruber. He was a consuement professional and a Great pilot. If there were any mistakes made by the flight crew, it was assuming that the V-22 would perform similarly to the H-53E.
Sans....I really do object to you saying what you just did about the Pilots....both in tone....and more specifically as it is directly opposed to what the Accident Report and the three Accident Investigators had to say.
And, as nobody has deemed it necessary to respond, Ill repeat my question from the previous post.
Does or doesn't operating an aircraft outside NATOPS warrant a "pilot error" determination? Simple question.
http://legacy.vtol.org/pdf/test-60.pdf
7. In comparison to the published NATOPS descent rate limitation, it is shown that the V–22 has significant margin for avoiding VRS.
Last edited by SansAnhedral; 30th Mar 2012 at 21:02.