What's the latest on tilt rotors?

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: HeliFlight and Flight Safety

It is true that the UH-60 and the AH-64 were designed to be ballistic tolerant to being hit by a single 23mm High explosive round. The operative word is single.

The Army also lied to the pilots of the Apache relative to its’ invulnerability to the ZSU 23-4 weapons system. This was the primary weapon that would be used against the Apache if it were to attack a group of Warsaw Pact tanks.

This weapon was also being supplied to all of the governments that were in league with the Warsaw Pact. The U S Army commissioned a study by a so-called ”Think Tank” to study the effectiveness of the ZSU 23-4 against the Apache. It was their considered opinion that the ZSU 23-4 was inaccurate, It had a low degree of reliability and that if the ZSU 23-4 did hit the Apache with one round, the pilot would have sufficient time to evade any further hits by dropping below the tree line. Then again, there are not very many trees in the Middle Eastern wastelands.

The uninitiated reader should understand that the ZSU 23-4 has a rate of fire of 1200 rounds per minute and that if one round hit its’ mark, there would be forty or fifty rounds right behind the first round. When I was on contract with Agusta helicopters I took a two-week holiday in Yugoslavia.

While there, I watched a T V program, which was describing the weaponry of the Warsaw Pact. One of the weapons demonstrated was the ZSU 23-4. In the demonstration the weapon was pointed on a line parallel to a stand of trees. A helicopter popped up from behind the trees and in an instant the weapon acquired the helicopter and was pointed directly at it. The helicopter then dropped below the treetops and at that time the gun was turned off. The helicopter was allowed to fly away and the gun was turned on. It immediately started to fire and it swept an arc approximately 30 to 45 degrees on either side of center. The trees started to explode. It looked like there were hundreds of chain saw wielding loggers in the tree stand felling trees as fast as they could. It appeared to the writer that if a hail of 23mm bullets didn’t hit the helicopter, a falling tree would destroy it.

Regarding the V-22, it is not as much a case of invulnerability to taking a round it is more a case of reparability and availability after taking a round or suffering other major battle damage. The methodology of repair has to be the same as the procedure for construction. If the structure was cured in an autoclave the repair must be cured in an autoclave. The entire back section of the V-22 fuselage is made of one piece of continuous composite lay-up. If it suffers major damage it must be removed and sent back to the factory or depot for repair. In smaller damage areas the Navy specified the use of a common repair procedure for composite material. However, on the V-22 they specified that the repair had to be X-rayed to determine that there were no voids in the repair that would compromise the integrity of the repair. It turned out that the repair material was opaque to X rays and voids, if present, could not be detected. That was six years ago. Hopefully by now they have developed new repair procedures. However, based on what is going on now, I would not think that they have made any changes.

It is also my personal opinion that the Comanche has the same problem due to its' method of construction.


------------------
The Cat

[This message has been edited by Lu Zuckerman (edited 24 February 2001).]

[This message has been edited by Lu Zuckerman (edited 24 February 2001).]

[This message has been edited by Lu Zuckerman (edited 24 February 2001).]

[HeliFlight]

Thanks LU:
Good stuff on the UH-60 and AH-64. I'd hate to be on the HOT END of a ZSU 23-4 no matter what I was flying!!!

Some of your stuff on the V-22 may be outdated, but at least it comes from a basis in fact. You don't make up "theories" that have no basis in reality that wind up being disproven a post or two later (like someone we know).

[This message has been edited by HeliFlight (edited 24 February 2001).]

[muhdzailan]

The V-22 Osprey is a multifunction aircraft that is useful for search and rescue operations and transport flight.Sadly,due to two crashes involving the aircraft,it should be examined and checked toroughly before it is certified "Fit to Fly".

[UNCTUOUS]

US GAO savages V-22 test programme

21 February 2001The US Government Audit Office (GAO) has issued a report on the state of the V-22 test programme that may well be the final nail in the coffin of an ill-fated tilt-rotor aircraft procurement for the US Marine Corps.
In a letter to the US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, the GAO says, "Our review of the V-22 program, which is already in low-rate initial production, revealed that the Department planned to proceed with a full-rate production decision without knowing whether new technology could meet Marine Corps requirements; whether the design would work as required; or whether the design could be produced within cost, schedule, and quality targets."

In particular the GAO was scathing about the manner in which the initial test programme had been constantly reduced. "Specifically, developmental testing was deleted, deferred, or simulated in order to meet cost and schedule goals. ...To meet cost and schedule targets, the actual testing conducted was less than a third of that originally planned," the letter continued.

Notably the report pointed out that the 113 planned test conditions to investigate Vortex Ring State, a condition where the tilt-rotor settles into its own downwash and loses lift, which may have contributed to the crash in April last year in Arizona, which killed 19 Marines, were reduced to 49. Of these only 33 were actually flown.

The report, Readiness of the Marine Corps' V-22 Aircraft for Full-Rate Production (pdf 270kb download of full GAO Report) concluded that there was significant risk with proceeding with full-rate production because:

**Knowledge of V-22 design and performance parameters fell short of what should have been known before beginning production
**Developmental flight testing was deleted, deferred, or simulated
**Operational test waivers and limitations reduced testing for operational realism
**Assessment was based on reduced system requirements
**Major concerns were raised in OPEVAL, JAG report, OPEVAL database, DOT& E, and other reports
**Risks of moving forward without additional knowledge
**Value of system for Marine Corps operations was not yet established
**Connection between demonstrated problems not known; unknown problems not discovered
**The contract exposed government to responsibility to fund any design modifications -some, perhaps significant, changes were likely
**Longer term risk to modernisation account, as cost increases beyond already budgeted funds were likely
**Marine Corps budget impacted by maintainability shortfalls

The V-22 is the US Marine Corps priority equipment procurement programme, intended to replace the ageing helicopter troop lift capability. The Marine Corps wants the aircraft for its high speed (300Kts) in level flight and for its increased capacity (up to 24 combat equipped troops). However, the GAO even calls the latter into doubt suggesting that approximately 15 combat equipped troops is the real figure.

The V-22 programme has always been controversial. Vice president Dick Cheney tried to kill it in its initial stages when he was Defense Secretary to Ex-President George Bush. Since then the budget has been constantly exceeded, and now runs at some $40 billion for 458 tilt-rotors for the Marines (350), Navy (48) and AirForce (50).

In addition to the accident in Arizona, the V-22 had two crashes (one fatal, 3 USMC and 4 civilians died) during its early developmental stages, and finally a fatal crash in December 2000 when 4 Marines died. The USMC also suspended the commander of the V-22 test squadron in January this year after receiving an anonymous letter alleging falsification of maintenance records. The USMC has denied that poor maintenance was the cause of either of the last two fatal crashes.

The US Department of Defense has halted any decisions on the future of the V-22 programme until a 'Blue Riband' panel of experts, set up in December last year by previous Secretary of Defense William Cohen, and tasked with an " independent, high level review of the programme", has issued its report, expected in the next two months.
Link to Article

[muhdzailan]

The V-22 Osprey is a multifunction aircraft that is useful for search and rescue operations and transport flight.Sadly,due to two crashes involving the aircraft,it should be examined and checked toroughly before it is certified "Fit to Fly".

[HeliFlight]

Pinnochy-Unc:
Gee…what a surprise… the same GAO report being written about by a different reporter (different person saying exactly the same thing). You have been posting it all over the other threads- why not here!

Looks like you are Pulling an Unctuous in more ways than one… the only parts of the report being talked about in the General Press is the negative side (which you love)- the rest is never seen. The General Press does this to sell newspapers (you do it for your ego boost- nobody will listen to you anywhere else but here, and even the General Press won’t print your babblings when you try to sell it to them). By the way, I suppose you have been holding back on your most treasured publications (the Tattler and Enquirer) to really prove you are right a little later (your version of a knock out punch).

The Industry Press tries to look at the reality of the situation (if it is dangerous- throw it out, if it is safe- make it safer) So now that you have shown us ad nauseum how the people trying to sell papers report the story… let’s see how people who understand what they are talking about say (we already know how you like to ignore the EXPERTS so for sure you won’t like this) But for the rest of us interested in the truth let’s see…

[HeliFlight]

Black Hawk Crash Provides Context for Osprey Woes
Helicopter News, February 22, 2001


The Marine Corps V-22 Osprey continues to suffer from allegations of program mismanagement and the assumption of undue risk. However, other recent events in the rotorcraft world have served to provide some much-needed context for the difficulties that now confront the Osprey.

The most tragic of these events was the crash, earlier this month, of two U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawks in Honolulu, Hawaii, during a night training exercise involving Night Vision Goggles (NVGs). Six soldiers were killed and 11 personnel were injured when the two Black Hawks “came in contact”

The Army has not yet officially determined what caused the accident, but one of the survivors, Sgt. Leslie Frye Told ABC’s Good Morning America that he saw what appeared to be hanging cargo from one Black Hawk hit the rotor of the second helicopter in which he himself was riding .

“Something did come up on the right-hand side and hit the rotor blades of the helicopter,” he said. “I do not believe it was another helicopter, and the only other thing flying in the air at the time was a Humvee slung under the trail helicopter.”

The tragic incident underscores the fact that rotary flight is inherently dangerous, and that even mature helicopters like the Black Hawk suffer from a disconcerting number of accidents and mishaps. In 1999, for instance, three Black Hawk crashes killed 10 U.S. servicemen. In 1998, five Black Hawk crashes killed three soldiers. And eight Army personnel died I n1997 when two UH-60s crashed.

Significantly, though, this latest Black Hawk incident, like the four V-22 crashes, does not appear to involve any fundamental technological flaw inherent to the aircraft itself. Indeed, all four Osprey accidents are unrelated to tiltrotor technology; none share a common thread; and all have separate causes.

Relative Safety
Thus, when examining the safety and airworthiness of the V-22, the appropriate comparison is not to some utopian standard that does not exist in the real world. Rather, what must be assessed is Osprey’s relative safety vis-à-vis other available rotorcraft.

This point, too, came into stark relief earlier this month when the Navy found cracks in an H-46 Forward Longitudinal Differential Bellcrank, which aids in changing the pitch of the forward rotor head. Failure of the bellcrank results in loss of control of the aircraft.

It was the third time such a crack had been discovered. Consequently, Navy officials have decided to increase the frequency of aircraft inspections from every 25 hours of flight to every 10 hours of flight. The new rule affects all 308 Navy H-46 helicopters, including 229 Marine Corps CH-46Es. A CH-46 crash in December 1998 killed six Marines and one sailor.

“Despite programs to extend the service life of the Sea Knight, maintenance personnel are finding that components that have never before failed are beginning to break due to increased age and fatigue,” said the Marine Corps in a statement. The Marines also note that CH-46 maintenance costs per flight hour rose by 75% between 1993 and 1998 without inflation. Flight hours, meanwhile, declined by 23% during that same period.

GAO Criticism
This is important because the Osprey is earmarked to replace the Corps’s antiquated fleet of CH-46 helicopters. Yet, a number of critics at the General Accounting Office (GAO) most recently argue that, at least for now, the V-22 is an unworthy replacement aircraft. “

Our review of the program… revealed that the [Defense] Department planned to proceed with a full-rate production decision without knowing whether [the] new technology could meet Marine Corps requirements; whether the design would work as required; or whether the design could be produced within cost, schedule, and quality targets. Specifically, developmental testing was deleted, deferred, or simulated in order to meet cost and schedule goals,” the GAO said in a February 20 letter to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.

This may be true, but the GAO’s analysis concerns only the V-22. It does not address the cost involved in the only available immediate alternative, which is to continue to keep the CH-46 airborne. Again, the appropriate comparison is not with an idealized “best practice” procurement envisioned by the GAO. The appropriate comparison lies instead with what alternative options exist in the real world.

The GAO, as befits its watchdog function, has identified a number of areas¾including rapid descent flight envelope testing and air combat maneuvering¾where it believes insufficient testing was done on the V-22. The Marine Corps disagrees, arguing that no aircraft is every perfectly understood and employed when it enters full-rate production.

Indeed, additional testing and refinement, they say, is the norm for all military helicopters and airplanes. In fact, the Osprey has been under development far longer than is warranted; and there is a serious need for this aircraft out in the fleet, where, slowly but surely, it can be mastered and deployed to maximum effect, Corps officials say.

Conclusion
The GAO and the Marines both make strong and convincing cases. Such disagreement is healthy. For its part, the GAO helps to guard against dangerous and rash decision-making by warriors who may be too eager for new aircraft and new technology. Marine Corps zeal and determination, by contrast, helps to guard against a paralyzing obsession with unachievable perfection, which can hinder military and technological progress. The ultimate decision, though, lies with Congress, which will have to make a carefully weighed and deliberate decision.

[HeliFlight]

See Pinnochy-Unc...
this is called being O-B-J-E-C-T-I-V-E
It means to look at BOTH sides without personal prejudice.
By using this you can come up with an accurate conclusion in the end. It is much better then inventing a false theory then changing the facts whenever you can to make them fit the theory. This means you could avoid all the embarrassment and humiliation you have been through as each one of your fabricated "theories" has come unravelled one by one when they were disproven by ACTUAL facts.

Take a look at the definition of "unctuous" in the dictionary and you will be able to better understand why you have such a difficult time with this objectivity stuff that is so alien to you. You have definitely chosen the best name for yourself because it describes your lack of interest in the facts perfectly!!!
(I especially like the excessively smug, greasy, and oily parts )

[This message has been edited by HeliFlight (edited 26 February 2001).]

[UNCTUOUS]

JAG Report - Opinion Section Quotes
•“After reviewing the evidence collected, it was concerning to see how ‘easy’
it was for the recipe of uncontrolled flight to be concocted.”
•“Aircraft performance envelopes are developed, and procedures and
guidance published (NATOPS) to prevent pilots from putting an aircraft in a
situation that would exceed safe parameters. The MV-22 performance
envelope may be one that fleet pilots can operate within, but given the rigors
of combat, real world operations, and realistic training for both, the
consequences of exceeding this particular envelope appears to be
excessively grave (departure from controlled flight with no warning).”
•“In traditional rotorcraft, Power Settling would cause uncommanded rates of
descent and, depending on altitude, may result in a hard landing or quite
possibly a controlled crash. In all likelihood, however, such an event would
result in the aircraft at least hitting the ground in an upright attitude. In this
respect, with regard to Vortex Ring State and/or Blade Stall, the MV-22
appears to be less forgiving than conventional helicopters. A V-22, because
of the approximately 8’ 8” distance because of its prop-rotors, as evidenced
by this mishap, is capable of having one rotor impacted by the effects of
Vortex Ring State and/or Blade Stall and the other not, resulting in an
asymmetrical condition. We believe that this was the case of the mishap.
The end result was a departure from controlled flight instead of a hard
landing or controlled crash .…”
•“There were, however, two other incidents that occurred during OPEVAL
where pilots reported experiencing an uncommanded roll during section
operations...The fact that the causes of these two incidents are not yet
known, coupled with limited developmental formation testing (4 flights for
11.7 hours), make it difficult to completely exclude wake turbulence or
downwash as potential contributors to the mishap.”

JAG Report - Recommendation Section Quotes
•“All V-22 operators should become acutely familiar with the potential consequences
of high rates-of-descent combined with slow airspeeds that are present with tilt-rotor
design. Though all rotorcraft have the potential to enter into a Vortex Ring
condition, recorded occurrences to date have been rare. The fact that this aircraft
not only found itself in a Vortex Ring State condition with no apparent warning to the
aircrew, but also departed controlled flight is particularly concerning. Until further
testing is conducted on the Vortex Ring State phenomenon, safe flight will require
strict adherence to procedures and limitations.”
•“PMA-275, PMA-205, and the Contractor expedite incorporation of Vortex Ring
State and blade stall warnings and procedures into the MV-22 NATOPS...The
preliminary NATOPS manual and V-22 ground school syllabus provides insufficient
guidance/warning as to high rate of descent/slow airspeed conditions and the
potential consequences.”
•“That NAVAIR continue to explore the aerodynamic effects of formation flight with
the MV-22. The MV-22 will be operationally employed in a similar fashion to
existing fleet aircraft. Multi-ship formations will be the norm as the aircraft executes
its various missions. Questions still remain concerning potential aerodynamic
influences, such as wake turbulence on wingmen during formation flight. Two
‘anomalies in addition to the mishap occurred during OPEVAL where this issue was
at least a concern.”

OPTEVFOR V-22 OPEVAL Report Quotes
• Summary - “The Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization
(NATOPS) manual lacked adequate applicable content, accuracy, and clarity. Additionally,
because of incomplete developmental testing in the high rate of descent (HROD)
regime, there was insufficient explanatory or emphatic text to warn pilots of the
hazards of operating in this area. The flight simulator did not replicate this loss of
controlled flight regime.”
•“The V-22 has the potential to enter high rates of descent at high nacelle angles
with low airspeed. This condition occurs very rapidly with little to no warning to the
pilots. In simulation at 95 degrees nacelle, 39 KCAS, and 0 feet per minute rate of
descent (ROD), pulling the thrust control lever (TCL) full aft caused an immediate
descent exceeding the 800 feet per minute NATOPS WARNING. If forward TCL is
applied at this point, an uncontrolled flight condition is possible. Within 3 seconds,
the simulator exhibited in excess of 3,000 fpm ROD.”
• Additional Recommendation - “Continue developmental testing to investigate
HROD/loss of controlled flight phenomena and determine safe flight envelope for
these conditions. Consider providing cockpit warning of this condition to the pilots
to preclude entry into unsafe flight regimes.”
• Section 4 Test and Results -”The V-22 technical documentation did not support
the operation and maintenance of the V-22. The NATOPS was plagued with
inaccuracies that degraded flight operations and still contained FSD and EMD
aircraft data not pertinent to production aircraft. Performance charts furnished by
the developer to support OPEVAL were also inaccurate when compared to actual
flight conditions and the CMS. Additionally, because of incomplete developmental
testing in the HROD regime, there was insufficient explanatory or emphatic text to
warn pilots of the hazard of operating in this condition.”

DOT&E Operational Test and Evaluation Report Quotes
• Executive Summary - “Vortex Ring State can occur in all rotary-wing aircraft under
similar conditions of low airspeed and high sink rate. No mechanical or electrical
failures in the aircraft were found to contribute to the mishap…. In the tiltrotor V-22,
the onset of VRS can occur in the proprotor on one side without the other side
losing lift. In such a case, the aircraft tends to roll sharply into the side that first
loses lift, resulting in large, unexpected bank angles, followed immediately by rapid
dropping of the nose of the aircraft and a steep dive. At low altitudes, there may be
no opportunity for recovery.”
•“While the possible existence of VRS in the V-22 was known when flight limits for
OPEVAL were established, the unusual attitude following entry into VRS was not
expected.”
•“In addition, testing to date suggests that should a pilot inadvertently exceed
published limitations, there may be no easily recognizable warning that the aircraft
is nearing the danger zone - and some flight control inputs; e.g., a roll or yaw
command, may trigger an asymmetric thrust condition. Such a situation can easily
be envisioned in flight conditions that place a high workload demand on the pilots;
e.g., night or low visibility, system malfunctions, hostile fire, etc., should a
breakdown of crew coordination or loss of situational awareness occur. Thus, the
first indication the pilot may receive that he has encountered this difficulty is when
the aircraft initiates an uncommanded, uncontrollable roll. High rate-of-descent
(HROD) testing continues to define the VRS phenomenon.”

DOT&E Operational Test and Evaluation Report Quotes
• Executive Summary - “I believe that ongoing developmental testing should
continue to explore the ability to detect proximity to the danger area in the flight
envelope, with the objective of providing meaningful warning to the pilot, or control
limitations, to avoid entry into this danger area and loss of control….This area is
historically left unexamined in other military rotorcraft which put in place restrictions
that rely on information non-specific to their particular airframe.”
•“In addition, follow-on developmental and operational tests should involve multiple
MV-22s, at heavy weights, in close time and space proximity as might be
anticipated in the conduct of a combat assault mission. Such operational test
would increase confidence that appropriate tactics exist to enable the MV-22s to
deliver assault forces to a small area in a short time while avoiding undue exposure
to enemy threats-without subjecting the aircraft to potential loss of control
situations.”
• Operational Effectiveness Areas of Concern - “As noted previously, I fully
endorse ongoing testing activities and recommend research efforts to better
understand the Vortex Ring State phenomenon and the potential danger posed to
the safe operation of the MV-22.”
•“A second, related concern involves the effects of maneuvering limitations imposed
to avoid the vortex ring state danger area...Despite the OPEVAL finding that the
restrictions had no operational impact, I am concerned that this constraint imposed
to avoid loss of control may limit the maneuver capability and hence the
effectiveness of the MV-22 in some operational scenarios. Ongoing developmental
flight testing is intended to more accurately define the danger zone beyond the
NATOPS flight envelope.”

DOT&E Operational Test and Evaluation Report Quotes
•“A second phase of testing is planned by Naval Air Systems Command to fully
explore the potential aerodynamic interactions between MV-22 aircraft in proximity
to each other. Until the final operational constraints upon descent rates and aircraft
separation are established based upon ongoing developmental testing, and the
appropriate tactics are confirmed in operational testing, the potential impact on the
effectiveness of the MV-22 in performing some combat assault missions must be
viewed with some reservations.”
• Assessment of OPEVAL Adequacy - “Examine thoroughly the circumstances in
which the V-22 may depart from controlled flight in low-airspeed, high rates of
descent. Investigate the potential for airflow interactions between nearby V-22s to
initiate or aggravate vortex ring state.”
•“Demonstrate the end-to-end conduct of ‘typical OMFTS scenarios’ involving
multiple MV-22s making repeated back-to-back flights in close proximity in time and
space to each other and other aircraft needed for the operations - as might be
expected during the conduct of combat assault operations.”
•“Confirm the shipboard compatibility of multiple MV-22s operating simultaneously
as would be needed in the conduct of a substantive amphibious assault.”

JAG Report - Opinion Section Quotes
•“The maintenance/removal rate of swashplate actuators, though not causal in this
mishap, is concerning. The MOTT replaced 17 actuators during the OPEVAL
period. Given their critical role in the aircraft’s drive system, reliability of these
actuators is imperative.”
•“The frequency of servicing/maintenance requirements, for aircraft hydraulic
systems, though not causal in this mishap, is concerning. Many maintenance man-hours
have been spent maintaining and servicing the various aircraft hydraulic
systems.”

[HeliFlight]

Sorry Pinnochi-Unc:
The mis-informed OPINIONS of those with no experience in aerodynamics or tiltrotors will not compare to this NEXT Article

Pay close attention to what Ray Prouty has to say. I know that you always disregard what the EXPERTS say, but this is for the rest of us in the REAL world that know Mr. Prouty is the foremost aerodynamicist in the Rotorcraft world.

You just keep humming a tune and look the other way while the rest of us read...

Bye, Bye P-U

[HeliFlight]

Defense: Catch-22 for the V-22
February 2001-02-26
by John R. Guardiano, Defense Editor


TO MILITARY STRATEGISTS AND rotorcraft enthusiasts, the performance parameters of the V-22 Osprey are inspiring. With twice the speed and range of a helicopter, the tiltrotor can self-deploy over a 500 nautical mile radius and transport 24 combat ready Marines or 15,000 pounds of equipment.

It is not without reason that Lt. Col. Jim Shaffer, operational test director for the Air Force Special Ops CV-22, calls the Osprey the "first revolution in aviation to hit Edwards Air Force Base since the breaking of the sound barrier."

We know, after all, what this aircraft can do and how it will affect America’s ability to project military power. As recently departed defense secretary William Cohen has observed, "The V-22 is the revolution in military affairs."

The cruelest month
V-22 development dates back to 1977, the year of the XV-15 prototype’s first flight. But for all that we know about this technological marvel, these is a great deal that we don’t know.

Such as why, exactly, the Osprey crashed on April 8. The accident board identified a combination of "human factors," the most significant of which were the pilot’s high rate of descent and low forward air speed. This, it was believed, precipitated power settling, or a vortex ring state.

However, subsequent flight tests by the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) at Patuxent River, Maryland, have shown that the Osprey is a lot more forgiving than had been thought, and that vortex ring may not be all that significant a bugaboo.
The upshot of this testing, ironically, may be an expansion of the V-22 flight envelope to a maximum descent rate of 1,400 fpm at less than 40 knots of forward airspeed. To be sure, the pilots in command on April 8 were descending in excess of 2,000 fpm, and this is believed to have contributed heavily to the crash. NAVAIR, though, is increasingly skeptical that this precipitated a vortex ring state.

"The best thinking right now is that the Osprey suffered some kind of rotor stall that we don’t yet fully understand," says one industry analyst.

"The vortex ring explanation never made any sense to me," adds noted aerodynamicist and R&W columnist Ray Prouty. "By my calculations, the Osprey should have been coming down a lot faster than it was to get into a classic vortex ring state." The doomed MV-22, he concludes, "must have been hit by a meteorite."

Prouty is jesting of course, but he also is making a larger and more salient point—to wit, that rotorcraft development historically has been mired with a great many "unknown unknowns."

Unfortunately, it is what we don’t know that hurts us. Witness last year’s crashes on April 8 and December 11. The V-22, though, is not unique in this regard. Accidents and mishaps seem to be an inevitable byproduct of rotorcraft development, more so than with fixed-wing aircraft.

It’s all part and parcel of the many "unknown unknowns" that afflict helicopters—especially revolutionary new rotorcraft like the Osprey, Prouty says. Or, as military aviators bluntly put it: the flight manuals are written in blood.

None of this is meant to minimize the tragic loss of life that results from these accidents. Rather, it is an attempt to provide some much-needed context.

Media assertions to the contrary, the Osprey is no more "experimental" and "unproven" than the CH-46, CH-53, and HH-60G helicopters that it is replacing.

In fact, the V-22 has been subject to more rigorous testing over a much longer time period than any other rotorcraft. Yet, critics call for the Osprey’s termination. But when a CH-46 crash in December 1998 killed six Marines and one sailor, there were no ringing editorials calling for the aircraft to be grounded before it kills again.

In fairness to the critics, there have been four Osprey accidents in less than a decade and two fatal crashes in eight months. None of these accidents, however, share a common thread, and all have separate causes. They are unrelated, moreover, to tiltrotor technology.

The first (1991) mishap occurred when two of three stabilizing gyros were wired incorrectly and the Osprey’s flight control system malfunctioned. The second (1992) crash involved an engine fire that resulted from oil spillage. The April 8 tragedy, it seems, resulted from a rotor stall. These are risks inherent in any flight test development program. "I would say the V-22 has had some really bad luck," Prouty says.

At presstime, the cause of the December 11 crash remains unknown. Investigators have identified a hydraulic malfunction in the doomed aircraft, but are unsure whether it relates to the mishap.

What distinguishes the V-22 from other rotorcraft isn’t just its novel, hybrid design, but also its high cost ($43 million to $83 million a copy). This has made it an attractive target for budget hawks.

Today, policymakers and the public seem to demand bloodless conflicts. This is a laudable desire, but it ignores history. For example, the Navy and Marine Corps lost 776 aircraft in 1954 versus 24 in the year 2000. This demand also makes it difficult for the military to push the envelope and develop new aircraft like the Osprey.
Hence, the paradox of rotorcraft development: The Osprey promises to save lives by virtue of its superior capabilities, but this promise cannot be realized without the assumption of risk.

[HeliFlight]

Hey Pinnochy-Unc!!!:
The Defense Editor that wrote this is the SAME REPORTER from Rotor & Wing Magazine that asked for an interview earlier on this very same thread!!!
http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/For.../000289-2.html

Oh…that’s right, sorry P-U….I forgot…
He only asked to speak to John Farley and PTIUAE
Boy, the Press is really involved with the discussions here (just not with you)
But why on earth would he leave you out when you are the originator of the thread AND the most predominat poster to it???

Oh… that’s right:
C-R-E-D-I-B-I-L-I-T-Y
(…remember what PaPa Jeppeto told you)

By the Way P-U…. about your “flick of the wrist” fantasy (sorry, I meant “theory&#8221 :

"The vortex ring explanation never made any sense to me," adds noted aerodynamicist and R&W columnist Ray Prouty. "By my calculations, the Osprey should have been coming down a lot faster than it was to get into a classic vortex ring state."

Another “Uncy-Theory” de-bunked (Gee… what a surprise… guess that makes all of them P-U… Better start manufacturing some more )

[Ed Winchester]

Hmmmm, is it just me or is there a well-established ritual to this thread?

1. UNCTUOUS (Definition: Unpleasingly flattering/OILY) spends at least half of his life in front of his keyboard regurgitating the same old guff again and again and again.

2. Heliflight rips him to shreds (rather humorously IMHO).

3. BUNKTUOUS types in another ream or 3 of eye torture.

4. See 2.

Heliflight - I'm with you on this one.

BUNKTUOUS - Put down the whip, the horse died months ago.

[Ed Winchester]

Ding Ding, Round 35....

"I've got Heliflight clearly ahead on points, but this OILY chap just won't stay down! He doesn't know when he's been beat. Oh no, Heliflight "DUCK!", the unpleasantly flattering one is attempting another left hook followed by a mind-numbingly boring 'War and Peace'-esque posting containing no original thought whatsoever.

Ah, Heliflight has easily deflected that onslaught with an uppercut and a few slick one-liners to put the Pinochy-Unc back on the canvas. What's this - surely he's not going to get back up? How much telling does this man/keyboard interface need?

Ding, ding. End of Round...........

[Cyclic Hotline]

Beginning of the end for the V-22?

Sikorsky will be licking their lips, a ready buyer for the military S-92! Of course, maybe Boeing will crank up the Boeing 360 programme again.

By the time the military leaders are announcing this, you know that their political masters are way beyond this point in the decision making process.

I think that this may be a portent for the future of current procurement plans for the MV-22; maybe a scaled back purchase, but with a controlled inception into service. The other benefit, is to ensure that a future problem on the aircraft does not compromise the Marine Corps ability to maintain an aviation capability.

Top Marine Calls for a Backup Plan to Replace Osprey

By JAMES DAO The New York Times
The Marine Corps commandant ordered a search for helicopter alternatives to the V-22 Osprey as concerns grew within the Pentagon that the $40 billion aircraft program would be canceled.

WASHINGTON, March 6 — The Marine Corps commandant, Gen. James Jones, has ordered the Marines to search for helicopter alternatives to the V-22 Osprey, the innovative but problem-plagued aircraft, as within the Pentagon concerns grow that the $40 billion Osprey program will be canceled, Marine officials said.

General Jones's order is the first clear acknowledgment by the Marines that the program is in peril. The Osprey faces a series of potentially debilitating inquiries into its safety, cost and reliability. Two Osprey crashes killed 23 marines last year, and the Pentagon is investigating accusations of falsified maintenance records at the Marines' lone Osprey squadron, in North Carolina.

Marine officials asserted today that General Jones's move did not mean he had lost faith in the safety or capability of the Osprey, which can land and take off like a helicopter and cruise like an airplane. If the Osprey survives the investigations, the Marines still hope to buy 358 of them to replace their Vietnam-era troop transport helicopters.

But there is also a growing sense within the Pentagon that support for the Osprey in the White House and Congress, as well as among many marines, has waned in recent weeks, as newly released reports by Congressional and Pentagon officials have raised questions about the Osprey's effectiveness, affordability and safety — as well as the Marines' management of the program.

"We've got to be pragmatic about this," one senior Marine Corps officer said, noting that General Jones wanted to have a backup plan for replacing aging CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters if the Osprey program was killed.

Senior Marine officials continue to be unenthusiastic about the available helicopter alternatives, none of which can fly as fast or as far as the Osprey.

The main alternative, Marine officials said, would probably be some version of the H-60 Black Hawk, which is made by Sikorsky and is one of the Army's main infantry transport helicopters.

Another option would be to build a new version of the CH-53E Super Stallion, also by Sikorsky, which can carry more troops than the Osprey but is slower and has less range.

In 1991, Dick Cheney, who was then defense secretary and is now vice president, canceled the Osprey program, calling it too expensive. But Mr. Cheney was overruled by Congress, led by delegations from Texas and Pennsylvania where the Osprey is being built by Boeing and Textron's Bell Helicopter unit.

Mr. Cheney has declined to comment on the Osprey since taking office. But Bush administration officials have said the aircraft is high on a list of expensive military programs being reviewed for potential cuts.

A four-member panel conducting a review of the Osprey program is preparing to hold its first public hearing this Friday. Witness are expected to include relatives of marines killed in an Osprey crash last year and their lawyers, who are contemplating suing the manufacturers.

The panel, which is expected to send its final report to Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld next month, has already received private briefings from a number of experts who contend that the Osprey may be more aerodynamically unstable, harder to maintain and costlier to operate than the Marines have been willing to acknowledge.

In one briefing, a Navy investigator reported that between 1998 and 2000, two Osprey caught fire after hydraulic lines broke. A frayed hydraulic line, combined with a computer malfunction, is thought to have caused an Osprey crash last December that killed four marines.

In another briefing, the General Accounting Office reported that the Marines canceled important tests on the Osprey in 1997 and 1998 to save time and money. Those tests might have shed light on a potentially dangerous aerodynamic condition known as vortex ring state, which was later ruled the primary cause of an Osprey crash in April 2000 that killed 19 marines, the report said.

"Major concerns about the aircraft's performance and operations remain unresolved," the accounting office said. "These known and potential problems and their associated costs leave open the question of the V-22's real value, as demonstrated, for Marine Corps operations."

Yet another report to the panel, by the Pentagon's chief testing office, raised concerns about the apparent inability of the Osprey to "autorotate," a crash-landing maneuver used when a helicopter loses all power. The Marines contend that the Osprey can glide down to a crash landing like an airplane.

The Department of Defense's inspector general is conducting a separate investigation into accusations that maintenance records were falsified at the Osprey's home base, New River Air Station in North Carolina.

Although the former commander of that squadron, Lt. Col. Odin F. Leberman, is at the center of that inquiry, the investigators are also looking into the possibility that Marine generals who oversaw the Osprey program knew of and perhaps even encouraged improper behavior at New River, military officials say. Colonel Leberman has been reassigned pending the investigation.

The swirl of inquiries and public criticism of the V-22 program have contributed to rising concern within the Marine Corps itself about the safety of the Osprey and the integrity of the program, Marine Corps officials said. It is in part to assuage those fears that General Jones has ordered the search for potential alternatives, those officials said.

In addition, General Jones has made a point in recent weeks of declaring his willingness to cancel the program if the Osprey is proven unsafe, to assure marines and their families that he is not "a zealot" about the aircraft, a senior Marine Corps official said.

"I think what we have to do is essentially not be blinded and not have tunnel vision on this," General Jones said in a recent interview.

He added that he would try to make sure the Marines "never get so far down the road that we have no other options" other than the Osprey.

The option the corps seems to favor most would be to avoid killing the Osprey by putting it back into research and development for possibly a year or longer. The Marines could then spend the money saved on keeping their aging helicopters flying or buying a small number of Black Hawks as an interim measure while the Osprey undergoes new tests or even a redesign.

It is unclear whether efforts by the Bush administration or the Marines to delay or cancel the Osprey program will run into opposition on Capitol Hill. Many members of Congress still view the V-22 program as an important source of jobs for their constituents. And many aerospace industry officials contend that the Osprey's tilt-rotor technology could have commercial applications.

But several Pentagon officials say the driving force behind the Osprey has always been the Marines. If the Marines cool to the program, Congress is likely to follow, one Pentagon official said.

"If the Marines aren't willing to fight for it, people will back away from it," the official said.

[RW-1]

No offense cyclic, wouldn't it be easier to post a link to the article?

Anyways, Yes, I think that we might be looking at its end. With the revelations of other tests that were skipped, etc. Congress certainly will not want to spend more on it, even to bring the issues to a close.

Whether this would hurt the 609? I don't think so, as it was a Bell project all it's own.

------------------
Marc

[Cyclic Hotline]

Or then again, maybe not!

Reason for not posting a link from a news source is the story gets archived and the link changes. Kinda hard to read a dead link? Also some people (like me) aren't very interested in opening the links, and would rather shoot a cursory eye over the story to see if it is of any interest.

US Marines deny Osprey alternatives study report

NEW YORK, March 7 (Reuters) - The U.S. Marine Corps denied on Wednesday a newspaper report that its commandant, General James Jones, has ordered the Marines to search for helicopter alternatives to the innovative but problem-plagued hybrid V-22 Osprey aircraft.

The report in the New York Times online edition on Wednesday was disputed by a Marine Corps spokesman.

"General Jones has not ordered any study of alternatives to the V-22 Osprey to be conducted at the present time,'' the spokesman, Major Patrick Gibbons, told Reuters.

Concerns were growing within the Pentagon that the $40 billion Osprey programme would be cancelled, the newspaper had reported Marine officials as saying.

General Jones's order is the first clear acknowledgment by the Marines that the programme was in peril, the paper said.

The Osprey, which can land and take off like a helicopter and cruise like an airplane, faces a series of potentially debilitating inquiries into its safety, cost and reliability, the paper noted.

Two Osprey crashes killed 23 marines last year, and the Pentagon is investigating accusations of falsified maintenance records at the Marines' lone Osprey squadron, in North Carolina, the paper said.

The Osprey was built and developed by a joint venture of Boeing Co (NYSE:BA - news) and Textron Inc (NYSE:TXT - news) unit Bell Helicopters.

Marine officials asserted on Tuesday that General Jones's move did not mean he had lost faith in the safety or capability of the Osprey, the paper said.

"We've got to be pragmatic about this,'' one senior Marine Corps officer was quoted as saying.

The main alternative, Marine officials were reported as saying, would probably be some version of the H-60 Black Hawk, which is made by Unitied Technologies (NYSE:UTX - news) unit Sikorsky and is one of the Army's main infantry transport helicopters, the paper said.

Another option would be to build a new version of the CH-53E Super Stallion, also by Sikorsky, which can carry more troops than the Osprey but is slower and has less range, it said.

[The Sultan]

Cyclic,

The Marines have stated that your posted article is bull**** (my words not theirs). They just said it was in error.

If this article was true, I wonder what aircraft they would choose:

The CH-53? This type embarrassed the US in Cambodia and at Desert One: against third world opposition in the first case, and self inflicted wounds in the second case. Do not forget the current habit of this type to fall out of the sky on a whim with fatal results due to control system failures (and this after 30 years). Lu, did you work on this one?

The S-92? Hell, I saw a report that this aircraft had to demonstrate a takeoff at 31K lbs to show it might be able to fly 19 civilian passengers 400 miles. If the Marines chose this option you would have to add personal combat gear, FLIR, ECM, RWS, NBC gear, defensive weapons, etc to have a chance in combat. I would bet with this load the S-92 would be lucky to reach 1/4 of the required distance the Osprey can with the same number of passengers before ditching.

The EH-101? Enough said! Lu did work on this one, HUMMMMM!

The UH-60? Just another want-a-be Huey. It would be the safest option as it will not even get off the deck with the required load.

The Sultan

[HeliFlight]

C. Hotline:
If Sikorsky starts licking their lips over a possible V-22 replacement- my bet is the only thing they will get is WET LIPS!!!

The Marines have already done in depth studies on the alternatives out there. If the General does ask to have another comparison done it will be for one purpose- to show investigators that no aircraft in existence or on the drawing board comes anywhere near the capabilities of the V-22. The only purpose of the report would be to lay down that information in front of the investigators in the form of a RECENTLY prepared report (the Marines already know what the numbers will show).

Think of it this way- if they say OK let's write off the billions spent on the V-22 right now, so what are the alternatives-
the additional billions to purchase a Sikorsky or other heli replacement (that won't come close to the V-22 speed and range) would be more than spending the ADDITIONAL money to get the bugs out of the V-22 hydraulics and software and carry 0n with Osprey acquisitions. Maybe if everybody knew what the total costs of the program would be when the decision was first made- they might not have went for it (there are limits to what people will pay for an aircraft that goes twice as fast and three times as far as anything else with vertical landing capability). But CONTINUING the program now would be more cost effective than if you dropped the program AND you would wind up with a far superior aircraft.

I would take bets that the MV-22 program WILL eventually move ahead to full production (admittedly they have some maintainability problems to work out first). And that the Air Force WILL approve the special ops version (NOT till the hydr and computer bugs are worked out though).

RW-1:
I think you are right that the V-22 problems will not hurt the 609- it is fully funded through Bell and Agusta and customers are still lining up. But I would take it one step further to say that if the V-22 program were canceled- it would actually be a PLUS for the 609 program. Those military organizations out there that would have loved to have gotten their hands on an aircraft with the V-22s' capabilities would have to settle on the smaller 609. Not a desirable combat aircraft by any means, but for some special ops it would be the ONLY aircraft with anywhere near the capabilities.

The Sultan of smooth made the point well- there just are not comparable options out there that can compete with the tiltrotor for the 21st century. (and none in sight)

[This message has been edited by HeliFlight (edited 08 March 2001).]

[mckpave]

To Sultan: I take considerable offense to your comments about the H-53, and no, I don't work for Sikorsky. Without starting a huge debate that doesn't relate to this topic, your comments are way off the mark and you need to research the true events that occurred at Koh Tang and Desert One. The H-53 has been there when other helos haven't and their exploits have saved this nation's butt many times. I'd happily debate this with you in another forum, but I will not, like others, take a discussion off on a tangent.
Secondly, I will state that I am and have been, a huge proponent of the V-22 but must admit that I'm having my doubts about some issues, not simply because of the accidents, but other things I've learned through the years. I still hope for it's introduction into service, I think this represents the greatest advance in aviation since the introduction of the jet engine. I will also say that there are helo alternatives for many of the proposed V-22 missions that will work, but when speed and range are the critical success factors, the V-22 is the only aircraft currently able to meet the standards. Anyway, I'll step from my soap box.