What's the latest on tilt rotors?
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Thank you John,
As usual your words of wisdom are right on the money. I’m afraid that both Unctuous and myself allowed our discussion to degenerate to the level we have seen on other threads in recent times. I was quite pleased that we had been able to conduct good discussions of the issues until lately. I must share the blame, as I too allowed the comments to become personal rather than an impartial discussion of what are important matters in both the development of civil aviation technology and defense acquisition concerns.
Jim,
I apologize for getting a little too personal in my comments to you. You are certainly entitled to your opinion, and in spite of the fact that I strongly disagree with your methodology of analysis and theories, I respect your right to voice your opinion.
I will not spend time and use space on the forum in responding to what has become a discussion with too great an emphasis on individuals rather than the issues. It is more important that discussions are conducted in a courteous and professional manner if they are to achieve anything at all.
I will not engage you in personal exchanges again. If anyone has questions as to the validity of your statements, they should feel free to e-mail me at PTI [email protected] and I will research their questions and respond.
Good luck in your future.
[This message has been edited by PTI UAE (edited 08 February 2001).]
As usual your words of wisdom are right on the money. I’m afraid that both Unctuous and myself allowed our discussion to degenerate to the level we have seen on other threads in recent times. I was quite pleased that we had been able to conduct good discussions of the issues until lately. I must share the blame, as I too allowed the comments to become personal rather than an impartial discussion of what are important matters in both the development of civil aviation technology and defense acquisition concerns.
Jim,
I apologize for getting a little too personal in my comments to you. You are certainly entitled to your opinion, and in spite of the fact that I strongly disagree with your methodology of analysis and theories, I respect your right to voice your opinion.
I will not spend time and use space on the forum in responding to what has become a discussion with too great an emphasis on individuals rather than the issues. It is more important that discussions are conducted in a courteous and professional manner if they are to achieve anything at all.
I will not engage you in personal exchanges again. If anyone has questions as to the validity of your statements, they should feel free to e-mail me at PTI [email protected] and I will research their questions and respond.
Good luck in your future.
[This message has been edited by PTI UAE (edited 08 February 2001).]
Guest
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PTI UAE and Unctuous
OK, moving on to details
You may view the following as off the wall or as common sense. Only time will tell…
When I was fortunate to fly the first prototype P1127 in 1964, I found it a real handful. taking off and landing in whatever mode. It seemed to me to require more skill than I could guarantee and each time I got out I was grateful that I had not bent it. I was clearly leaning pretty heavily on my luck. During the next five years the P1127 produced the Kestrel and that produced the Harrier. By 1971 I was at Pax River helping Lt Harry Blot decide how the USMC should go about their business in it.
This AV-8A needed the pilot to operate two controls with his left hand - a conventional throttle and a nozzle selection lever. Thirty years later as the AV-8B it is still the same and needs special training in techniques as a result. However, it is no longer a difficult aircraft to control and needs no special piloting skills (whatever the mates may try and tell you in the bar)
BUT, if you accidentally move the wrong lever you will likely crash. For example raising
the nozzles in the hover or closing the throttle in the hover. There are plenty more in the same category (all tried and tested) such as raising the nozzles on a VTO and charging across the ground on a demo fully armed into the nearest bunker, closing the throttle off the bow of a ship during an STO instead of putting the nozzles down, This sort of simple mistake (not an error of handling skill) can of course be made by anyone. Just like the Blottle case that Unctuous explained so well.
OK, so how do we prevent such mistakes and thus save the cost of specialist conversion training let alone the accidents? An obvious start is to use the possibilities offered by automation to require only one left hand control. In this case the blottle or a collective. Perhaps a bit better, but still (as we know) far from perfect depending on the pilot’s background.
So my preferred solution is to only use one hand, the right one, to fly the aircraft. I will rephrase that, use only one hand, the right one to steer the aircraft. I don’t think pilots (any more) should fly (ie use skill to control) aircraft. Rather they should only tell the aircraft the manoeuvre they want it to perform.
From 1971 to the current date a research Harrier has been flying looking at simplifying the piloting task for a powered lift aircraft. This VAAC Harrier can be flown in many different modes. The one I far and away prefer (and all the current Harrier mates hate) is to use the right hand only. It is just two years since I last had an opportunity to look at the latest software standard but in the way of things I am sure it will be even better now than then.
Both of you could both go out to that aeroplane and with no more brief than I am going to give you below do a VTO go out to Vmax, decelerate and come back and do a VL.
How so? Strap in, take the pins out (after all there are such things as bird strikes) and when you are ready pull the stick back. (that means you want to go up by the way) The computer will say OK we have no airspeed so it puts the nozzles down, opens the throttle fully and up you go. At 50 feet (say) you let the stick go to centre. The computer says OK not up and not down so it hovers. Being real test pilots you then say Ha! - and wedge the stick fully forward. Oh dear says the computer, we have a right one here, doesn’t he realise we are at only 50 feet I am going to creep down from here.
Pull back again to go up, and when clear of obstacles ahead hold the trim type switch on the top of the stick fully forward. That is the go faster signal. If you hold it there the aircraft will take you through transition and when the nozzles are aft reduce the flap appropriate to the speed.
Do what you want to in the - go left - go right - go up - go down - business and enjoy your trip. Adjust your speed as you wish on the - go faster - go slower - switch.
When you want to land you know what to do, hold the switch back until it stops where you want it to and push the stick forward to go down.
Now that is what I call progress from the P1127
Of course the mates HATE it, because it makes them all the same as each other.
So gentlemen, what’s wrong with “flying” your tiltrotor like that?
OK, moving on to details
You may view the following as off the wall or as common sense. Only time will tell…
When I was fortunate to fly the first prototype P1127 in 1964, I found it a real handful. taking off and landing in whatever mode. It seemed to me to require more skill than I could guarantee and each time I got out I was grateful that I had not bent it. I was clearly leaning pretty heavily on my luck. During the next five years the P1127 produced the Kestrel and that produced the Harrier. By 1971 I was at Pax River helping Lt Harry Blot decide how the USMC should go about their business in it.
This AV-8A needed the pilot to operate two controls with his left hand - a conventional throttle and a nozzle selection lever. Thirty years later as the AV-8B it is still the same and needs special training in techniques as a result. However, it is no longer a difficult aircraft to control and needs no special piloting skills (whatever the mates may try and tell you in the bar)
BUT, if you accidentally move the wrong lever you will likely crash. For example raising
the nozzles in the hover or closing the throttle in the hover. There are plenty more in the same category (all tried and tested) such as raising the nozzles on a VTO and charging across the ground on a demo fully armed into the nearest bunker, closing the throttle off the bow of a ship during an STO instead of putting the nozzles down, This sort of simple mistake (not an error of handling skill) can of course be made by anyone. Just like the Blottle case that Unctuous explained so well.
OK, so how do we prevent such mistakes and thus save the cost of specialist conversion training let alone the accidents? An obvious start is to use the possibilities offered by automation to require only one left hand control. In this case the blottle or a collective. Perhaps a bit better, but still (as we know) far from perfect depending on the pilot’s background.
So my preferred solution is to only use one hand, the right one, to fly the aircraft. I will rephrase that, use only one hand, the right one to steer the aircraft. I don’t think pilots (any more) should fly (ie use skill to control) aircraft. Rather they should only tell the aircraft the manoeuvre they want it to perform.
From 1971 to the current date a research Harrier has been flying looking at simplifying the piloting task for a powered lift aircraft. This VAAC Harrier can be flown in many different modes. The one I far and away prefer (and all the current Harrier mates hate) is to use the right hand only. It is just two years since I last had an opportunity to look at the latest software standard but in the way of things I am sure it will be even better now than then.
Both of you could both go out to that aeroplane and with no more brief than I am going to give you below do a VTO go out to Vmax, decelerate and come back and do a VL.
How so? Strap in, take the pins out (after all there are such things as bird strikes) and when you are ready pull the stick back. (that means you want to go up by the way) The computer will say OK we have no airspeed so it puts the nozzles down, opens the throttle fully and up you go. At 50 feet (say) you let the stick go to centre. The computer says OK not up and not down so it hovers. Being real test pilots you then say Ha! - and wedge the stick fully forward. Oh dear says the computer, we have a right one here, doesn’t he realise we are at only 50 feet I am going to creep down from here.
Pull back again to go up, and when clear of obstacles ahead hold the trim type switch on the top of the stick fully forward. That is the go faster signal. If you hold it there the aircraft will take you through transition and when the nozzles are aft reduce the flap appropriate to the speed.
Do what you want to in the - go left - go right - go up - go down - business and enjoy your trip. Adjust your speed as you wish on the - go faster - go slower - switch.
When you want to land you know what to do, hold the switch back until it stops where you want it to and push the stick forward to go down.
Now that is what I call progress from the P1127
Of course the mates HATE it, because it makes them all the same as each other.
So gentlemen, what’s wrong with “flying” your tiltrotor like that?
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John :
I'm only adding my two penn'orth because if I don't mention it now I'll forget.
The brief you mention is so simple even I could have a go at it. However, it relies on lots of clever electronics doing the right thing at the same time. If they decide they're the master, rather than a willing slave, then some sort of manual reversion is needed, rather than throw an expensive aircraft away just because Bill Gates expanded into mission-critical systems. Where does that leave our one-handed pilot ?
I'm only adding my two penn'orth because if I don't mention it now I'll forget.
The brief you mention is so simple even I could have a go at it. However, it relies on lots of clever electronics doing the right thing at the same time. If they decide they're the master, rather than a willing slave, then some sort of manual reversion is needed, rather than throw an expensive aircraft away just because Bill Gates expanded into mission-critical systems. Where does that leave our one-handed pilot ?
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John,
Interesting point you make as it parallels some of the discussions that have gone on over 609 flight control. The flight control computers in today’s aircraft have become so sophisticated that you can program almost anything you want into them. Triple redundancy is of course required to counter the fact that the weak link in the chain (us humans) are doing the programming.
During the transition from helicopter to aeroplane mode (and vice versa), the flight control computers can be made to automatically compensate for a combination of the changing thrust vector produced by the proprotors as the nacelles are tilted, and the gradual increase/decrease in lift being developed as the airflow changes over the wings caused by the variance in forward airspeed. The question comes up as to what the pilot would prefer to be feeling on the flight controls during the conversion (again anything desired can be programmed into the computers). Some pilots prefer to have a requirement to put in physical inputs to counter the change in the direction of the thrust vector so that they “feel” they have control over the varying forces during transition (i.e. when the proprotors tilt up, they want to be pushing forward on the stick to counter the change). Others prefer to let the computer do all the work so that they never have to know what the thrust vector and increasing/decreasing wing lift status is at any given moment in time. I tend to agree with the latter, as there will occasionally be those situations when the weather is down to minimums with driving rain, turbulence, a difficult approach, at night, etc., and the pilot workload will already be difficult enough without adding “normal” control variances into the mixture.
I don’t consider myself particularly lazy, but I like to have everything as easy as possible when the chips start piling up on the other side (although, like your mates, I must confess that I prefer to have two sticks in my hands rather than one -- no Blottle though thank you!).
Nr Fairy,
Perhaps not my place to respond to your question, but I think that technology has already put us at the point where there is too much going on for us simple human-beings to be able to handle. Most modern fighters and airliners have already made the transition to fly-by-wire systems (mandating computer control) for weight, rapid response and other concerns. The pilot will always be the final authority, but just as with the space shuttle, modern aircraft with greater capabilities than we have ever seen before are going to need the power of computers to control them.
[This message has been edited by PTI UAE (edited 08 February 2001).]
Interesting point you make as it parallels some of the discussions that have gone on over 609 flight control. The flight control computers in today’s aircraft have become so sophisticated that you can program almost anything you want into them. Triple redundancy is of course required to counter the fact that the weak link in the chain (us humans) are doing the programming.
During the transition from helicopter to aeroplane mode (and vice versa), the flight control computers can be made to automatically compensate for a combination of the changing thrust vector produced by the proprotors as the nacelles are tilted, and the gradual increase/decrease in lift being developed as the airflow changes over the wings caused by the variance in forward airspeed. The question comes up as to what the pilot would prefer to be feeling on the flight controls during the conversion (again anything desired can be programmed into the computers). Some pilots prefer to have a requirement to put in physical inputs to counter the change in the direction of the thrust vector so that they “feel” they have control over the varying forces during transition (i.e. when the proprotors tilt up, they want to be pushing forward on the stick to counter the change). Others prefer to let the computer do all the work so that they never have to know what the thrust vector and increasing/decreasing wing lift status is at any given moment in time. I tend to agree with the latter, as there will occasionally be those situations when the weather is down to minimums with driving rain, turbulence, a difficult approach, at night, etc., and the pilot workload will already be difficult enough without adding “normal” control variances into the mixture.
I don’t consider myself particularly lazy, but I like to have everything as easy as possible when the chips start piling up on the other side (although, like your mates, I must confess that I prefer to have two sticks in my hands rather than one -- no Blottle though thank you!).
Nr Fairy,
Perhaps not my place to respond to your question, but I think that technology has already put us at the point where there is too much going on for us simple human-beings to be able to handle. Most modern fighters and airliners have already made the transition to fly-by-wire systems (mandating computer control) for weight, rapid response and other concerns. The pilot will always be the final authority, but just as with the space shuttle, modern aircraft with greater capabilities than we have ever seen before are going to need the power of computers to control them.
[This message has been edited by PTI UAE (edited 08 February 2001).]
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I am of the school mentioned above that doesn’t like the potential effects of electronic failure. I believe in the simplistic view that if the level of automatic function in the flight control arena is not supported by redundancy and reliability well beyond my wildest fear, I don't want to find that out while trying to build a vertical learning curve re-learning how the fly an aircraft that hasn’t had much need of me up to the "ah s***" point.
And maybe a different perspective is valid; how much automation is really necessary. I bought a television so I'm not completely against progress. But, I don't think symbiotic shuld mean the pilot should be outvoted by the machine with finality, or that the pilot can’t function without the machine. Modern commercial aircraft obviously don’t subscribe to my view. Don't know about their pilots.
I do however believe the pilots of military aircraft need help keeping things organized and executed when their decision per second ratio is at combat speed.
Mr. Farley, why is it you say that asymmetrical VR requires such a high rate of descent. The inference I read was a higher rate than single rotor VR. I’m curious.
And maybe a different perspective is valid; how much automation is really necessary. I bought a television so I'm not completely against progress. But, I don't think symbiotic shuld mean the pilot should be outvoted by the machine with finality, or that the pilot can’t function without the machine. Modern commercial aircraft obviously don’t subscribe to my view. Don't know about their pilots.
I do however believe the pilots of military aircraft need help keeping things organized and executed when their decision per second ratio is at combat speed.
Mr. Farley, why is it you say that asymmetrical VR requires such a high rate of descent. The inference I read was a higher rate than single rotor VR. I’m curious.
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PTI UAE and Nr Fairy
I’m not keen on the term fly-by-wire because it is does not actually tell you much. Control through computer is literally more accurate, but for me the term that best describes what we are talking about lately in this thread is Manoeuvre Demand. Sadly, although much in use in the RAE during the 1950s, this apposite phrase never came into general use.
Back to aeroplanes. Once I had my first personal experience of an automatic system that FLEW the aircraft better than I could (actually an autoland trials Comet IV back in the 60s in a howling crosswind that was beyond my capabilities) I became a sucker for augmented and automatic systems.
Of course they can fail, and this is Nr Fairy’s valid point. Personally I do not think the answer to failures lies in manual reversion. Even without the complexity, weight and cost of installing both the automatic and the manual systems, there are the issues of training and currency in the reverted state, to say nothing of the fact that the job may well have moved on to one where it is beyond the pilot (like fog landings). No, the answer to failures is redundancy. It has to be.
So, in my simple world the question regarding synthetic handling and using computers is not “can it do the job?” (we know it can do that) but “will it be reliable enough?”
How reliable is that? Well ten times less likely to crash the aeroplane than a human pilot was what was chosen in the 60’s for certification of early autolanders. As one in every million civil landings (in those days) was a fatal accident due to pilot error (of whatever sort) the failure rate for autolands was set at one in ten to the 7th. Seemed to work. Come to think of it I don’t ever recall an autoland crash in line ops.
I promise to let it drop now!
I’m not keen on the term fly-by-wire because it is does not actually tell you much. Control through computer is literally more accurate, but for me the term that best describes what we are talking about lately in this thread is Manoeuvre Demand. Sadly, although much in use in the RAE during the 1950s, this apposite phrase never came into general use.
Back to aeroplanes. Once I had my first personal experience of an automatic system that FLEW the aircraft better than I could (actually an autoland trials Comet IV back in the 60s in a howling crosswind that was beyond my capabilities) I became a sucker for augmented and automatic systems.
Of course they can fail, and this is Nr Fairy’s valid point. Personally I do not think the answer to failures lies in manual reversion. Even without the complexity, weight and cost of installing both the automatic and the manual systems, there are the issues of training and currency in the reverted state, to say nothing of the fact that the job may well have moved on to one where it is beyond the pilot (like fog landings). No, the answer to failures is redundancy. It has to be.
So, in my simple world the question regarding synthetic handling and using computers is not “can it do the job?” (we know it can do that) but “will it be reliable enough?”
How reliable is that? Well ten times less likely to crash the aeroplane than a human pilot was what was chosen in the 60’s for certification of early autolanders. As one in every million civil landings (in those days) was a fatal accident due to pilot error (of whatever sort) the failure rate for autolands was set at one in ten to the 7th. Seemed to work. Come to think of it I don’t ever recall an autoland crash in line ops.
I promise to let it drop now!
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VLift
Sorry I did not mean to give that impression
I talked of Asymm VR just 'cos I think that it is quite likely that one side will get VR just before the other. No reason for thinking that, just guessing that control activity will happen to cause one side to go first. Could be quite wrong.
JF
Sorry I did not mean to give that impression
I talked of Asymm VR just 'cos I think that it is quite likely that one side will get VR just before the other. No reason for thinking that, just guessing that control activity will happen to cause one side to go first. Could be quite wrong.
JF
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Having flown in both the 107 and the 234 in logging/fire fighting operations I would like to let all know that a tandem rotor can indeed get into settling with power. It is normally in the aft rotor, perhaps due to extreme decel angles but it does happen. The best method of recovery is to kick in pedal (sorry, forget if left or right is best) to get the head into clean air. I have experienced it so this is not a story. I suspect that the C130 driver/pilot did the natural thing when a wing started to drop and applied opposite lateral cyclic. This would have aggrivated the situation. Had he applied a pedal input to advance the rotor, he may have been able to recover. Since the Marines apparently do not train in Settling with Power recovery and since they seem convinced that a helicopter driver cant handle going more than 150kts in cruise, I expect they will continue to have problems. I still havent heard any feed back on the latest accident, if it was mechanical or pilot induced. Any info?
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Sorry, my last post was a bit behind considering where the Vert Lift conversation is at this point.
John brings up some very good points about using computers to eliminate some of the pilot "ooops" input. I started flying in the TH55 and I am now in a Bell 430, complete with a Rogerson Krados IIDS/EFIS display. Autopilot and Weather Radar as well. I have to admit that it makes life a lot easier when you turn on cruise control, coupled to the GPS and able to display your course/weather/4 closest airports etc. Even with this capability, we still practice manual IFR approaches in case of "black box" failure. I guess my point is that all the electronics are very nice but you still need some type of "two hands" backup in case electrons dont want to play.
Another problem is the FAA. When I was at Bell, I asked the test pilots why there wasnt a max power button on the collective that would use the FADEC to give you max engine power without exceeding any limitations. You currently have to bring the aircraft to a hover, then look inside to beep up the engines, a bit of a task when at max gross/gusty winds near a building. The response was that the FAA was concerned about the pilot having an overide in case of emergency. Which is more apt to cause a problem, the once in a blue moon engine malfunction or contact with an obstruction while hovering the aircraft? Bell said they came up with an overide but there were other issues that made it prohibitive. From what I'm reading, I think it is a major concern for Bell that if they use this available technology, the FAA is not going to be able to cope (accept) its cababilities.
John brings up some very good points about using computers to eliminate some of the pilot "ooops" input. I started flying in the TH55 and I am now in a Bell 430, complete with a Rogerson Krados IIDS/EFIS display. Autopilot and Weather Radar as well. I have to admit that it makes life a lot easier when you turn on cruise control, coupled to the GPS and able to display your course/weather/4 closest airports etc. Even with this capability, we still practice manual IFR approaches in case of "black box" failure. I guess my point is that all the electronics are very nice but you still need some type of "two hands" backup in case electrons dont want to play.
Another problem is the FAA. When I was at Bell, I asked the test pilots why there wasnt a max power button on the collective that would use the FADEC to give you max engine power without exceeding any limitations. You currently have to bring the aircraft to a hover, then look inside to beep up the engines, a bit of a task when at max gross/gusty winds near a building. The response was that the FAA was concerned about the pilot having an overide in case of emergency. Which is more apt to cause a problem, the once in a blue moon engine malfunction or contact with an obstruction while hovering the aircraft? Bell said they came up with an overide but there were other issues that made it prohibitive. From what I'm reading, I think it is a major concern for Bell that if they use this available technology, the FAA is not going to be able to cope (accept) its cababilities.
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Attention UNCTUOUS:
Uh oh....did you read the above post- there goes another one of your theories-tandem helicopters do experience settling with power unlike your earlier claim. And not only that-they have ASSYMETRICAL settling with power!!!
Sounds like another fatal flaw in the technology as you describe it. Guess this must happen at the flick of the wrist so we better permanently ground and cancel all production of Chinooks and Ch-46s before they start experiencing a crash every few flight hours. (too dangerous for military missions especially)
This could be a mission for UNCTUOUS II - the sequel!! Better Rev up your posting motor!!! (and find lots of good articles about it that all say the same thing in different words so you can post them one after another to really keep people interested)
Uh oh....did you read the above post- there goes another one of your theories-tandem helicopters do experience settling with power unlike your earlier claim. And not only that-they have ASSYMETRICAL settling with power!!!
Sounds like another fatal flaw in the technology as you describe it. Guess this must happen at the flick of the wrist so we better permanently ground and cancel all production of Chinooks and Ch-46s before they start experiencing a crash every few flight hours. (too dangerous for military missions especially)
This could be a mission for UNCTUOUS II - the sequel!! Better Rev up your posting motor!!! (and find lots of good articles about it that all say the same thing in different words so you can post them one after another to really keep people interested)
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This link was posted on another site. Contains some interesting information.
http://www.insidedefense.com/public/special.asp
http://www.insidedefense.com/public/special.asp
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Unctuous:
You have been posting e-mail from Rhett Flater the Director of the American Helicopter Society as though he was one of your biggest supporters. All of the items showed him asking questions that would make us believe you and him were in total agreement on the V-22. The letter from him below to the NY Times should set the record straight.
************************************************************ ******
Editor
The New York Times
229 West 43rd Street
New York, NY 10036
Sir:
Your editorial, “Dangerous Deceptions on the Osprey,” omits several facts essential to understanding the importance of the Marine’s V-22 Osprey program. The unique tiltrotor technology embodied in the V-22 provides capabilities unmatched by any other aircraft anywhere in the world. For the US Marine Corps, the V-22 Osprey proffers speed and range unsurpassed by existing helicopter designs, coupled with the ability to take off or land anywhere; this performance is vital to meet the Marine’s mission of rapid deployment anywhere in the world. It may be a “20-year old idea,” as your editorial states, but there is nothing – whether existing today or on the drawing boards – which offers comparable performance, capability, and operational flexibility.
Tiltrotor technology has been demonstrated by more than 4,000 hours of flight tests under the most rigorous standards. There have been four crashes during the life of the program, three of which involved tragic loss of life. The history of military aircraft development, however, suggests that risk is regrettably inherent in all programs featuring advanced design. None of the V-22 accident reports issued thus far suggests a fundamental flaw in tiltrotor technology.
The three investigations currently underway – the accident investigation, the Inspector General’s inquiry into Colonel Leberman’s conduct, and the oversight study ordered by the Secretary of Defense led by a panel of independent experts - are wholly appropriate. All Marine V-22 aircraft have been grounded pending evaluation of these reports. In the meantime, the media and the public should avoid a rush to judgment to terminate the program as recommended in your editorial, until – at the least – the reports become public and the facts are on the table for all to see.
Very truly yours,
M.E. Rhett Flater
Executive Director
AHS International
(The American Helicopter Society International)
You have been posting e-mail from Rhett Flater the Director of the American Helicopter Society as though he was one of your biggest supporters. All of the items showed him asking questions that would make us believe you and him were in total agreement on the V-22. The letter from him below to the NY Times should set the record straight.
************************************************************ ******
Editor
The New York Times
229 West 43rd Street
New York, NY 10036
Sir:
Your editorial, “Dangerous Deceptions on the Osprey,” omits several facts essential to understanding the importance of the Marine’s V-22 Osprey program. The unique tiltrotor technology embodied in the V-22 provides capabilities unmatched by any other aircraft anywhere in the world. For the US Marine Corps, the V-22 Osprey proffers speed and range unsurpassed by existing helicopter designs, coupled with the ability to take off or land anywhere; this performance is vital to meet the Marine’s mission of rapid deployment anywhere in the world. It may be a “20-year old idea,” as your editorial states, but there is nothing – whether existing today or on the drawing boards – which offers comparable performance, capability, and operational flexibility.
Tiltrotor technology has been demonstrated by more than 4,000 hours of flight tests under the most rigorous standards. There have been four crashes during the life of the program, three of which involved tragic loss of life. The history of military aircraft development, however, suggests that risk is regrettably inherent in all programs featuring advanced design. None of the V-22 accident reports issued thus far suggests a fundamental flaw in tiltrotor technology.
The three investigations currently underway – the accident investigation, the Inspector General’s inquiry into Colonel Leberman’s conduct, and the oversight study ordered by the Secretary of Defense led by a panel of independent experts - are wholly appropriate. All Marine V-22 aircraft have been grounded pending evaluation of these reports. In the meantime, the media and the public should avoid a rush to judgment to terminate the program as recommended in your editorial, until – at the least – the reports become public and the facts are on the table for all to see.
Very truly yours,
M.E. Rhett Flater
Executive Director
AHS International
(The American Helicopter Society International)
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Feingold Floor Statement on Proposed V-22 Legislation
V-22 Special Report Main Page
Click here to view Bill Text
S. 272. A bill to rescind fiscal year 2001 procurement funds for the V-22 Osprey aircraft program other than as necessary to maintain the production base and to require certain reports to Congress concerning that program; to the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on the Budget, concurrently, pursuant to the order of January 30, 1975, as modified by the order of April 11, 1986, with instructions that the Budget Committee be authorized to report its views to the Appropriations Committee, and that the latter alone be authorized to report the bill.
Mr. Feingold: Mr. President, today I am introducing the Osprey Safety, Performance, and Reliability Evaluation Act of 2001. This legislation would delay the procurement of the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft for one year, and would require reports from the Secretary of the Navy and the Department of Defense's Inspector General regarding the program.
The Osprey is an experimental tilt-rotor aircraft that takes off and lands like a helicopter, but flies like an airplane by tilting its wing-mounted rotors forward to serve as propellers. The premise for the aircraft is to combine the operational flexibility of a helicopter with the speed, range, and efficiency of a fixed-wing aircraft.
The Marines, Air Force, and Navy all want to purchase versions of this aircraft. The MV-22 would be used by the Marines for missions such as troop and cargo transport and amphibious assault; the CV-22 would be used by the Air Force for special operations; and the HV-22 would be used by the Navy for search and rescue missions.
I want to be very clear. This bill does not terminate the V-22 program. It does not affect the Marine Corps' ability to continue the research, development, testing, and evaluation of this aircraft.
This bill delays the start of full-rate procurement of the MV-22 Osprey, the Marines' version of this aircraft, for one year. It also delays the procurement of four CV-22s, the Air Force's version of this aircraft, for one year.
There are serious allegations and serious questions surrounding the V-22 program. Thirty Marines have died in Osprey crashes since 1991. Many questions regarding the validity of maintenance records and the safety and viability of this aircraft remain unanswered.
We cannot, in good conscience, move forward with the full-scale procurement of the MV-22 until these allegations have been investigated fully and until these questions have been answered.
We should not move forward with the procurement of this aircraft until further testing has been done to address potentially serious design flaws that could continue to endanger the lives of our military personnel.
We owe it to our men and women in uniform to put their safety first. They are willing to go into harm's way while serving their country. That service should not include being put into harm's way by a potentially unsafe aircraft. We should not move forward with the procurement of an aircraft that crashed as recently as December. We should not procure this aircraft until the Department of Defense is absolutely certain that all major design flaws have been corrected.
The legislation that I am introducing today will delay full-rate production of the MV-22 for one year. This delay is prudent given the ongoing controversy that has loomed over this program during the last weeks and months.
I want to reiterate that this legislation does not require the Department of Defense to terminate the Osprey program. I appreciate the importance of this program to the Marine Corps. I agree that they need to replace the aging CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters that they currently have. However, I am not sure that the Osprey is the safest and most cost-effective alternative to the Sea Knight.
I know that the leaders of the Marines and the Air Force have the greatest concern for the safety of their personnel who are and who will be assigned to the Osprey program. I share that concern. My bill would require the Marine Corps to wait one year to move to full-rate production of the MV-22. Because the airframes for the MV-22 and the CV-22 are 90 percent similar, it follows that the four CV-22s the Air Force plans to buy this year may be subject to many of the same design flaws that have been found in the MV-22. For that reason, my bill would also require the Air Force to wait one year to procure the four CV-22s, which would be used to train their pilots.
I realize that an effort is being made to address the design flaws found during testing of this aircraft resulting in some changes in the new planes that are scheduled to go into production in fiscal year 2001. However, I remain concerned about the many unanswered questions, and the potentially costly retrofits that these aircraft would require as more information about the safety and reliability of the Osprey continues to come to light. In my view, it would be more prudent and more cost effective to wait to move to full-rate production until these questions have been answered.
For those reasons, my bill rescinds most of the fiscal year 2001 procurement funds for the MV-22 and the CV-22, but leaves enough funding in place to maintain the integrity of the production line. These rescissions would return to the taxpayers more than $1.2 billion dollars. This kind of investment should not go forward until we are sure that the Osprey is safe.
The bill does not affect the $148 million in research and development funding for this program. During the next year, vigorous research and testing on the problems that remain should continue once the decision has been made to resume test flights.
This program has a troubled history. Thirty Marines have been killed in Osprey crashes since 1991, twenty-three of them in the past eleven months alone. The Osprey program has been grounded since the December crash that killed four Marines. Following that crash, former Secretary of Defense William Cohen appointed a blue ribbon panel to study the Osprey program. That panel's report is due to be presented to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in March or April of this year. In addition, two investigations on the December crash are ongoing.
The safety of our men and women in uniform should be the top priority every time the Department of Defense develops and procures new technology, whether it be weapons, ships, or aircraft.
During his tenure as Secretary of Defense, Vice President Cheney tried to cancel the V-22 program in each of his budget requests from fiscal year 1990 through 1993 because he believed the program was too costly. Congress disagreed, and the program continued to receive funds.
When asked about the Osprey program last month, the Vice President said, ?Given the track record and the loss of life so far, it would appear to me that there are very serious questions that can and should be--and I hope will be--raised about the Osprey.?
I agree with Vice President Cheney's statement, and I hope that this legislation will help to get answers to these serious concerns.
One additional concern about this program is its cost. The Marines, the Air Force, and the Navy each want to buy a version of this aircraft, for a total of 458 aircraft at a cost of $38.1 billion, or about $83 million per Osprey. Some defense observers have argued that the mission of the Osprey could be performed by less costly helicopters.
Another concern is the safety of the aircraft. One of the newspapers in my home state of Wisconsin, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, has called the Osprey a ?lemon with wings.? Is that a fair description? There is reason to pause and take a good look at the program and find out. In addition to the four crashes that have occurred since 1991, there are also a number of unanswered questions regarding the design and performance of the aircraft.
The MV-22 underwent operational evaluation, OPEVAL, between October 1999 and August 2000. During OPEVAL, in June 2000, a draft DOD Inspector General's report cited 23 major operational effectiveness and suitability requirements that would not be met prior to the scheduled December 2000 Milestone III decision on whether to enter into full-rate production of the MV-22 in June 2001. The Marine Corps conceded that these problems exist, and said they had been aware of these deficiencies prior to the beginning of the OPEVAL.
In October 2000, the Navy announced that the MV-22 had been judged operationally effective and suitable for land-based operations. In November 2000, the MV-22 was also judged operationally effective and suitable for sea-based operations.
Following the completion of OPEVAL, the Department of Defense's Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation, Philip Coyle, released his report on the MV-22. This report, which was issued on November 17, 2000, makes a number of recommendations regarding further testing that should be conducted on this aircraft, including testing on a number of requirements for the aircraft that were waived during OPEVAL.
Particularly troubling are the MV-22's Mission Capable, MC, and Full Mission Capable, FMC, rates at the end of OPEVAL. These ratings demonstrate the availability of the aircraft--the amount of time that each MV-22 is able to fly versus the amount of time that each MV-22 is unavailable due to maintenance needs.
The Mission Capable rating represents the percentage of time that the test aircraft were able to perform at least one of their assigned missions. The Marine Corps' objective for the MC rate is between 82 and 87 percent. At the end of OPEVAL, the MC rate for the MV-22 was 49 percent. That means, Mr. President, that the MV-22 test fleet was capable of performing at least one of its missions only 49 percent of the time during OPEVAL. From 1995-1999, the entire CH-46 fleet Sea Knight fleet, which the Osprey is supposed to replace, was rated Mission Capable 79 percent of the time.
The Full Mission Capable rate, FMC, is defined as the percentage of time that the aircraft could perform all of its assigned missions. The Marine Corps' objective for FMC is 75 percent. At the end of OPEVAL, the MV-22 had a FMC rate of only 20 percent. From 1995-1999, the CH-46 fleet had a FMC rate of 74 percent.
I want to say this again--at the end of OPEVAL, the MV-22 test fleet was capable of performing all of its assigned missions only 20 percent of the time. The Coyle report says that part of this low rating can be attributed to problems with the blade fold wing stow, BFWS, system, and that measures to address this problem will be incorporated into all new MV-22s.
While both the MC and the FMC both improved over the course of OPEVAL, both rates are still well below the Marines' own requirements. By delaying the full rate production of the MV-22 for one year, the Marines will have the opportunity to further improve these crucial rates, including testing the modifications to the BFWS system, and potentially save countless maintenance hours and costs over the life of this program.
In addition to the problems outlined in the Coyle report, a General Accounting Office report released last month titled ?Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense? also expresses concern about the Osprey program. The report states that ?the DOD . . . begins production on many major and nonmajor weapons without first ensuring that the systems will meet critical performance requirements.? The report cites a number of examples, including the Osprey. GAO reports that ?the Navy was moving toward a full-rate production decision on the MV-22 Osprey aircraft without having an appropriate level of confidence that the program would meet design parameters as well as cost and schedule objectives.?
This finding is just another of the many reasons why the full-rate procurement of the MV-22 and the procurement of four CV-22s should be delayed. I share GAO's concern about the frequency with which DOD moves into full-rate production of systems that may not have been adequately tested. This rush to production often raises safety concerns and costs the taxpayers large sums for costly retrofits to address problems that were often evident -- but not fixed -- before full-rate production began. And even if the Osprey is proven to be safe, questions still remain about its cost.
I am also deeply troubled by the allegations that the Commander of the Marine Tilt-Rotor Training Squadron 204 may have ordered his team to falsify maintenance records for the MV-22. An anonymous DOD whistle blower released a letter and documentation, including an audio tape on which it is reported that the Commander is heard telling his squadron to ?lie? about maintenance reports on the MV-22 until the Milestone III decision to move into full-rate production of the aircraft had been made. This decision was scheduled to be made in December 2000, but has been postponed indefinitely. The Commander has been relieved of his command pending a full investigation by the DOD Inspector General's office.
There have been reports that high-ranking Marine Corps officers may have known about the low MC and FMC rates for the MV-22 in November 2000, and that one of them may have released inaccurate information to the press regarding the Mission Capable rates of the MV-22.
An electronic mail message from one of these officers to a superior officer dated November 11, 2000, states that the information regarding the MV-22 MC and FMC rates for November contained in the message should be ?close held? and that the MC and FMC rates for Squadron 204 were 26.7 percent and 7.9 percent, respectively. The message also said that the sender ?had hoped to be able to use some recent numbers next month when [his superior] meet[s] with Dr. Buchanan for his Milestone III/FRP decision in December . . . this isn't going to help.?
Later that month, on November 30, 2000, the officer who reportedly sent that electronic mail message participated in a DOD press briefing at which the Osprey was discussed in some detail. During this press briefing, the officer said the following regarding the Mission
Capable rates of the MV-22s being tested by Squadron 204: ? . . . as I was walking down here [to the briefing], I pulled the first 13 days of November, mission-capable rate on those airplanes, and the average is 73.2 percent for the first 13 days in November of those nine airplanes. So when we start talking about the airplane, even since OPEVAL, improving and getting better, the answer is it is absolutely a resounding yes.?
This information is contrary to the electronic mail message that the officer in question reportedly sent to a superior officer only nine days before, which stated that the MC rate for the MV-22s being tested by Squadron 204 for November 2000 was only 26.7 percent. That is a difference of 46.5 percent. News reports last week said that the officer admitted sending the message and attributes the discrepancy in the MC rate figures to a new software system.
I understand that these very serious allegations are still being investigated, and I agree that all of those involved deserve a fair and impartial investigation. We should not rush to judgment about the alleged conduct of any of these personnel, all of whom who have dedicated their lives to serving and protecting this country. However, we must remain cognizant of the fact that the outcome of this investigation could have an enormous impact on the Osprey program.
This still unfolding situation is another reason why the full rate procurement of the MV-22 should be delayed. Until these disturbing allegations have been fully investigated to determine whether records were falsified in order to make the Osprey appear safe and reliable, the Department of Defense should not move ahead with this program.
Because of the safety concerns outlined above, Mr. President, my bill requires the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the Congress on the V-22 program that includes: a description of the planned uses for the fiscal year 2001 research and development funding for the Osprey program; a description of the actions taken as a result of the Coyle report; and a description of the manner in which the Navy and the Marine Corps have responded to the allegations of the falsification of maintenance records at Squadron 204. The bill also requires the DOD Inspector General to report to
the Congress on the results of its investigation into the alleged falsification of maintenance records at Squadron 204. It would require that these reports be submitted three months after the enactment of this legislation or on the date of the Milestone III decision regarding full-rate production of the MV-22 Osprey, whichever is earlier.
The safety of our men and women in uniform should be the principle that guides this important decision. We should not begin to procure the MV-22 in mass quantities until we know for certain that this aircraft is safe, that its maintenance records are accurate, and that the design flaws described in the Coyle report have been adequately addressed.
S. 272
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ?Osprey Safety, Performance, and Reliability Evaluation Act of 2001?.
SEC. 2. RESCISSIONS.
(a) IN GENERAL.--Of the funds made available in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2001 (Public Law 106-259), the following amounts are rescinded from the following accounts:
(1) ?Aircraft Procurement, Navy?, $856,618,000, of which $776,760,000 shall be derived from ?V-22 (Medium Lift)? and $79,858,000 shall be derived from ?V-22 (Medium Lift) (AP-CY)?.
(2) ?Aircraft Procurement, Air Force?, $358,440,000, of which $335,766,000 shall be derived from ?V-22 Osprey? and $22,674,000 shall be derived from ?V-22 Osprey (AP-CY)?.
(b) LIMITATION ON USE OF REMAINING FUNDS.--Following the rescission made by subsection (a)(1), the balance of the funds remaining available for obligation in the account involved for ?V-22 (Medium Lift)? may be used only to carry out activities necessary to maintain the production base for such aircraft program.
SEC. 3. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.
(a) SECRETARY OF THE NAVY REPORT.--The Secretary of the Navy shall submit to Congress a report on the V-22 Osprey aircraft program. The report shall include the following:
(1) A description of the activities carried out, and programmed to be carried out, using funds appropriated for that program for research, development, test, and evaluation for fiscal year 2001.
(2) A description of the actions taken by the Secretary as a result of the report on that program issued by the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of Defense dated November 17, 2000.
(3) A description of the manner in which the Marine Corps and the Department of the Navy have responded to the reports of data falsification concerning the Osprey aircraft by Marine Corps personnel assigned to Marine Medium Tilt-Rotor Training Squadron 204.
(b) INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT.--The Inspector General of the Department of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the results, as of the submission of the report, of the investigation of the Inspector General into the V-22 Osprey aircraft program.
(c) TIME FOR SUBMISSION OF REPORTS.--The reports under subsections (a) and (b) shall each be submitted not later than the earlier of the following:
(1) The date that is three months after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) The date of the Milestone III decision for the V-22 Osprey aircraft program approving the entry of that program into full-rate production.
MAIN ARTICLE
V-22 Special Report Main Page
Click here to view Bill Text
S. 272. A bill to rescind fiscal year 2001 procurement funds for the V-22 Osprey aircraft program other than as necessary to maintain the production base and to require certain reports to Congress concerning that program; to the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on the Budget, concurrently, pursuant to the order of January 30, 1975, as modified by the order of April 11, 1986, with instructions that the Budget Committee be authorized to report its views to the Appropriations Committee, and that the latter alone be authorized to report the bill.
Mr. Feingold: Mr. President, today I am introducing the Osprey Safety, Performance, and Reliability Evaluation Act of 2001. This legislation would delay the procurement of the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft for one year, and would require reports from the Secretary of the Navy and the Department of Defense's Inspector General regarding the program.
The Osprey is an experimental tilt-rotor aircraft that takes off and lands like a helicopter, but flies like an airplane by tilting its wing-mounted rotors forward to serve as propellers. The premise for the aircraft is to combine the operational flexibility of a helicopter with the speed, range, and efficiency of a fixed-wing aircraft.
The Marines, Air Force, and Navy all want to purchase versions of this aircraft. The MV-22 would be used by the Marines for missions such as troop and cargo transport and amphibious assault; the CV-22 would be used by the Air Force for special operations; and the HV-22 would be used by the Navy for search and rescue missions.
I want to be very clear. This bill does not terminate the V-22 program. It does not affect the Marine Corps' ability to continue the research, development, testing, and evaluation of this aircraft.
This bill delays the start of full-rate procurement of the MV-22 Osprey, the Marines' version of this aircraft, for one year. It also delays the procurement of four CV-22s, the Air Force's version of this aircraft, for one year.
There are serious allegations and serious questions surrounding the V-22 program. Thirty Marines have died in Osprey crashes since 1991. Many questions regarding the validity of maintenance records and the safety and viability of this aircraft remain unanswered.
We cannot, in good conscience, move forward with the full-scale procurement of the MV-22 until these allegations have been investigated fully and until these questions have been answered.
We should not move forward with the procurement of this aircraft until further testing has been done to address potentially serious design flaws that could continue to endanger the lives of our military personnel.
We owe it to our men and women in uniform to put their safety first. They are willing to go into harm's way while serving their country. That service should not include being put into harm's way by a potentially unsafe aircraft. We should not move forward with the procurement of an aircraft that crashed as recently as December. We should not procure this aircraft until the Department of Defense is absolutely certain that all major design flaws have been corrected.
The legislation that I am introducing today will delay full-rate production of the MV-22 for one year. This delay is prudent given the ongoing controversy that has loomed over this program during the last weeks and months.
I want to reiterate that this legislation does not require the Department of Defense to terminate the Osprey program. I appreciate the importance of this program to the Marine Corps. I agree that they need to replace the aging CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters that they currently have. However, I am not sure that the Osprey is the safest and most cost-effective alternative to the Sea Knight.
I know that the leaders of the Marines and the Air Force have the greatest concern for the safety of their personnel who are and who will be assigned to the Osprey program. I share that concern. My bill would require the Marine Corps to wait one year to move to full-rate production of the MV-22. Because the airframes for the MV-22 and the CV-22 are 90 percent similar, it follows that the four CV-22s the Air Force plans to buy this year may be subject to many of the same design flaws that have been found in the MV-22. For that reason, my bill would also require the Air Force to wait one year to procure the four CV-22s, which would be used to train their pilots.
I realize that an effort is being made to address the design flaws found during testing of this aircraft resulting in some changes in the new planes that are scheduled to go into production in fiscal year 2001. However, I remain concerned about the many unanswered questions, and the potentially costly retrofits that these aircraft would require as more information about the safety and reliability of the Osprey continues to come to light. In my view, it would be more prudent and more cost effective to wait to move to full-rate production until these questions have been answered.
For those reasons, my bill rescinds most of the fiscal year 2001 procurement funds for the MV-22 and the CV-22, but leaves enough funding in place to maintain the integrity of the production line. These rescissions would return to the taxpayers more than $1.2 billion dollars. This kind of investment should not go forward until we are sure that the Osprey is safe.
The bill does not affect the $148 million in research and development funding for this program. During the next year, vigorous research and testing on the problems that remain should continue once the decision has been made to resume test flights.
This program has a troubled history. Thirty Marines have been killed in Osprey crashes since 1991, twenty-three of them in the past eleven months alone. The Osprey program has been grounded since the December crash that killed four Marines. Following that crash, former Secretary of Defense William Cohen appointed a blue ribbon panel to study the Osprey program. That panel's report is due to be presented to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in March or April of this year. In addition, two investigations on the December crash are ongoing.
The safety of our men and women in uniform should be the top priority every time the Department of Defense develops and procures new technology, whether it be weapons, ships, or aircraft.
During his tenure as Secretary of Defense, Vice President Cheney tried to cancel the V-22 program in each of his budget requests from fiscal year 1990 through 1993 because he believed the program was too costly. Congress disagreed, and the program continued to receive funds.
When asked about the Osprey program last month, the Vice President said, ?Given the track record and the loss of life so far, it would appear to me that there are very serious questions that can and should be--and I hope will be--raised about the Osprey.?
I agree with Vice President Cheney's statement, and I hope that this legislation will help to get answers to these serious concerns.
One additional concern about this program is its cost. The Marines, the Air Force, and the Navy each want to buy a version of this aircraft, for a total of 458 aircraft at a cost of $38.1 billion, or about $83 million per Osprey. Some defense observers have argued that the mission of the Osprey could be performed by less costly helicopters.
Another concern is the safety of the aircraft. One of the newspapers in my home state of Wisconsin, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, has called the Osprey a ?lemon with wings.? Is that a fair description? There is reason to pause and take a good look at the program and find out. In addition to the four crashes that have occurred since 1991, there are also a number of unanswered questions regarding the design and performance of the aircraft.
The MV-22 underwent operational evaluation, OPEVAL, between October 1999 and August 2000. During OPEVAL, in June 2000, a draft DOD Inspector General's report cited 23 major operational effectiveness and suitability requirements that would not be met prior to the scheduled December 2000 Milestone III decision on whether to enter into full-rate production of the MV-22 in June 2001. The Marine Corps conceded that these problems exist, and said they had been aware of these deficiencies prior to the beginning of the OPEVAL.
In October 2000, the Navy announced that the MV-22 had been judged operationally effective and suitable for land-based operations. In November 2000, the MV-22 was also judged operationally effective and suitable for sea-based operations.
Following the completion of OPEVAL, the Department of Defense's Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation, Philip Coyle, released his report on the MV-22. This report, which was issued on November 17, 2000, makes a number of recommendations regarding further testing that should be conducted on this aircraft, including testing on a number of requirements for the aircraft that were waived during OPEVAL.
Particularly troubling are the MV-22's Mission Capable, MC, and Full Mission Capable, FMC, rates at the end of OPEVAL. These ratings demonstrate the availability of the aircraft--the amount of time that each MV-22 is able to fly versus the amount of time that each MV-22 is unavailable due to maintenance needs.
The Mission Capable rating represents the percentage of time that the test aircraft were able to perform at least one of their assigned missions. The Marine Corps' objective for the MC rate is between 82 and 87 percent. At the end of OPEVAL, the MC rate for the MV-22 was 49 percent. That means, Mr. President, that the MV-22 test fleet was capable of performing at least one of its missions only 49 percent of the time during OPEVAL. From 1995-1999, the entire CH-46 fleet Sea Knight fleet, which the Osprey is supposed to replace, was rated Mission Capable 79 percent of the time.
The Full Mission Capable rate, FMC, is defined as the percentage of time that the aircraft could perform all of its assigned missions. The Marine Corps' objective for FMC is 75 percent. At the end of OPEVAL, the MV-22 had a FMC rate of only 20 percent. From 1995-1999, the CH-46 fleet had a FMC rate of 74 percent.
I want to say this again--at the end of OPEVAL, the MV-22 test fleet was capable of performing all of its assigned missions only 20 percent of the time. The Coyle report says that part of this low rating can be attributed to problems with the blade fold wing stow, BFWS, system, and that measures to address this problem will be incorporated into all new MV-22s.
While both the MC and the FMC both improved over the course of OPEVAL, both rates are still well below the Marines' own requirements. By delaying the full rate production of the MV-22 for one year, the Marines will have the opportunity to further improve these crucial rates, including testing the modifications to the BFWS system, and potentially save countless maintenance hours and costs over the life of this program.
In addition to the problems outlined in the Coyle report, a General Accounting Office report released last month titled ?Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense? also expresses concern about the Osprey program. The report states that ?the DOD . . . begins production on many major and nonmajor weapons without first ensuring that the systems will meet critical performance requirements.? The report cites a number of examples, including the Osprey. GAO reports that ?the Navy was moving toward a full-rate production decision on the MV-22 Osprey aircraft without having an appropriate level of confidence that the program would meet design parameters as well as cost and schedule objectives.?
This finding is just another of the many reasons why the full-rate procurement of the MV-22 and the procurement of four CV-22s should be delayed. I share GAO's concern about the frequency with which DOD moves into full-rate production of systems that may not have been adequately tested. This rush to production often raises safety concerns and costs the taxpayers large sums for costly retrofits to address problems that were often evident -- but not fixed -- before full-rate production began. And even if the Osprey is proven to be safe, questions still remain about its cost.
I am also deeply troubled by the allegations that the Commander of the Marine Tilt-Rotor Training Squadron 204 may have ordered his team to falsify maintenance records for the MV-22. An anonymous DOD whistle blower released a letter and documentation, including an audio tape on which it is reported that the Commander is heard telling his squadron to ?lie? about maintenance reports on the MV-22 until the Milestone III decision to move into full-rate production of the aircraft had been made. This decision was scheduled to be made in December 2000, but has been postponed indefinitely. The Commander has been relieved of his command pending a full investigation by the DOD Inspector General's office.
There have been reports that high-ranking Marine Corps officers may have known about the low MC and FMC rates for the MV-22 in November 2000, and that one of them may have released inaccurate information to the press regarding the Mission Capable rates of the MV-22.
An electronic mail message from one of these officers to a superior officer dated November 11, 2000, states that the information regarding the MV-22 MC and FMC rates for November contained in the message should be ?close held? and that the MC and FMC rates for Squadron 204 were 26.7 percent and 7.9 percent, respectively. The message also said that the sender ?had hoped to be able to use some recent numbers next month when [his superior] meet[s] with Dr. Buchanan for his Milestone III/FRP decision in December . . . this isn't going to help.?
Later that month, on November 30, 2000, the officer who reportedly sent that electronic mail message participated in a DOD press briefing at which the Osprey was discussed in some detail. During this press briefing, the officer said the following regarding the Mission
Capable rates of the MV-22s being tested by Squadron 204: ? . . . as I was walking down here [to the briefing], I pulled the first 13 days of November, mission-capable rate on those airplanes, and the average is 73.2 percent for the first 13 days in November of those nine airplanes. So when we start talking about the airplane, even since OPEVAL, improving and getting better, the answer is it is absolutely a resounding yes.?
This information is contrary to the electronic mail message that the officer in question reportedly sent to a superior officer only nine days before, which stated that the MC rate for the MV-22s being tested by Squadron 204 for November 2000 was only 26.7 percent. That is a difference of 46.5 percent. News reports last week said that the officer admitted sending the message and attributes the discrepancy in the MC rate figures to a new software system.
I understand that these very serious allegations are still being investigated, and I agree that all of those involved deserve a fair and impartial investigation. We should not rush to judgment about the alleged conduct of any of these personnel, all of whom who have dedicated their lives to serving and protecting this country. However, we must remain cognizant of the fact that the outcome of this investigation could have an enormous impact on the Osprey program.
This still unfolding situation is another reason why the full rate procurement of the MV-22 should be delayed. Until these disturbing allegations have been fully investigated to determine whether records were falsified in order to make the Osprey appear safe and reliable, the Department of Defense should not move ahead with this program.
Because of the safety concerns outlined above, Mr. President, my bill requires the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the Congress on the V-22 program that includes: a description of the planned uses for the fiscal year 2001 research and development funding for the Osprey program; a description of the actions taken as a result of the Coyle report; and a description of the manner in which the Navy and the Marine Corps have responded to the allegations of the falsification of maintenance records at Squadron 204. The bill also requires the DOD Inspector General to report to
the Congress on the results of its investigation into the alleged falsification of maintenance records at Squadron 204. It would require that these reports be submitted three months after the enactment of this legislation or on the date of the Milestone III decision regarding full-rate production of the MV-22 Osprey, whichever is earlier.
The safety of our men and women in uniform should be the principle that guides this important decision. We should not begin to procure the MV-22 in mass quantities until we know for certain that this aircraft is safe, that its maintenance records are accurate, and that the design flaws described in the Coyle report have been adequately addressed.
S. 272
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ?Osprey Safety, Performance, and Reliability Evaluation Act of 2001?.
SEC. 2. RESCISSIONS.
(a) IN GENERAL.--Of the funds made available in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2001 (Public Law 106-259), the following amounts are rescinded from the following accounts:
(1) ?Aircraft Procurement, Navy?, $856,618,000, of which $776,760,000 shall be derived from ?V-22 (Medium Lift)? and $79,858,000 shall be derived from ?V-22 (Medium Lift) (AP-CY)?.
(2) ?Aircraft Procurement, Air Force?, $358,440,000, of which $335,766,000 shall be derived from ?V-22 Osprey? and $22,674,000 shall be derived from ?V-22 Osprey (AP-CY)?.
(b) LIMITATION ON USE OF REMAINING FUNDS.--Following the rescission made by subsection (a)(1), the balance of the funds remaining available for obligation in the account involved for ?V-22 (Medium Lift)? may be used only to carry out activities necessary to maintain the production base for such aircraft program.
SEC. 3. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.
(a) SECRETARY OF THE NAVY REPORT.--The Secretary of the Navy shall submit to Congress a report on the V-22 Osprey aircraft program. The report shall include the following:
(1) A description of the activities carried out, and programmed to be carried out, using funds appropriated for that program for research, development, test, and evaluation for fiscal year 2001.
(2) A description of the actions taken by the Secretary as a result of the report on that program issued by the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of Defense dated November 17, 2000.
(3) A description of the manner in which the Marine Corps and the Department of the Navy have responded to the reports of data falsification concerning the Osprey aircraft by Marine Corps personnel assigned to Marine Medium Tilt-Rotor Training Squadron 204.
(b) INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT.--The Inspector General of the Department of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the results, as of the submission of the report, of the investigation of the Inspector General into the V-22 Osprey aircraft program.
(c) TIME FOR SUBMISSION OF REPORTS.--The reports under subsections (a) and (b) shall each be submitted not later than the earlier of the following:
(1) The date that is three months after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) The date of the Milestone III decision for the V-22 Osprey aircraft program approving the entry of that program into full-rate production.
MAIN ARTICLE
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UNCTUOUS:
The articles in the post above have some very good points. And we all appreciated it when Cyclic Hotline posted the above links on the MV-22 Osprey Accident thread yesterday. It is very good that you did not add any silly artificial stories at the end for a change. But posting the entire text of a legal proposal that does not give us any new facts except that this proposal was made (not even voted on yet,-even if it passes only delays purchases) can only mean you are making “a filibustering attempt to deflect the reader's attention from the very real problems facing your flaws and foibles in a desperate bid to recapture your credibility” to use your own words.
Maybe if you open two or three more threads and post it there too it might be even more interesting for everybody. You probably knew we all like reading the same thing several times as long as you like it. But it’s a little incredible that right after you accuse PTIUAE of using a too much space (even though you use 10 x as much). Maybe you should change the name from UNCTUOUS to MEGABYTE-MONGER. But if it makes you feel good then go ahead and post it 4 or 5 more times.I guess if you don’t have quality in your arguments you might as well go for quantity. Good thing you don’t have to pay by the KB.
Maybe time to listen to The Sultan in the post above. Looks like the silent (but getting fed up) majority are beginning to get vocal. New and relevant facts are great and interesting no matter what side it supports, but don’t repeat other people’s posts when you can’t find your own- just print it out a couple of times on your printer so we don’t all have to keep reading with you.
Looks like you pulled another UNCTUOUS.
And by the way…you don’t need the big red nose to go with the long floppy shoes any more. After your posts on the MV-22 Osprey Accident thread-, that long Pinocchio nose will be plenty to get you that Circus job!
The articles in the post above have some very good points. And we all appreciated it when Cyclic Hotline posted the above links on the MV-22 Osprey Accident thread yesterday. It is very good that you did not add any silly artificial stories at the end for a change. But posting the entire text of a legal proposal that does not give us any new facts except that this proposal was made (not even voted on yet,-even if it passes only delays purchases) can only mean you are making “a filibustering attempt to deflect the reader's attention from the very real problems facing your flaws and foibles in a desperate bid to recapture your credibility” to use your own words.
Maybe if you open two or three more threads and post it there too it might be even more interesting for everybody. You probably knew we all like reading the same thing several times as long as you like it. But it’s a little incredible that right after you accuse PTIUAE of using a too much space (even though you use 10 x as much). Maybe you should change the name from UNCTUOUS to MEGABYTE-MONGER. But if it makes you feel good then go ahead and post it 4 or 5 more times.I guess if you don’t have quality in your arguments you might as well go for quantity. Good thing you don’t have to pay by the KB.
Maybe time to listen to The Sultan in the post above. Looks like the silent (but getting fed up) majority are beginning to get vocal. New and relevant facts are great and interesting no matter what side it supports, but don’t repeat other people’s posts when you can’t find your own- just print it out a couple of times on your printer so we don’t all have to keep reading with you.
Looks like you pulled another UNCTUOUS.
And by the way…you don’t need the big red nose to go with the long floppy shoes any more. After your posts on the MV-22 Osprey Accident thread-, that long Pinocchio nose will be plenty to get you that Circus job!
Guest
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UNCTUOUS:
Uh Oh......
http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/For...ML/000751.html
Looks like we're both pulling an UNCTUOUS
Uh Oh......
http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/For...ML/000751.html
Looks like we're both pulling an UNCTUOUS
Guest
Posts: n/a
Top Marine Clears Osprey's Design in Crash
By JAMES DAO
WASHINGTON, Feb. 12 — The Marine Corps has conclusively determined that the Dec. 11 crash of a V-22 Osprey that killed four marines was a result of hydraulic and computer failures, not the aircraft's hybrid tilt-rotor design, the commandant of the corps said today.
The Marines are hoping that the finding, part of a crash report they expect to send to Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld as early as this week, will be the first step toward rehabilitating the costly and troubled V-22 program, which has been plagued by two fatal accidents and accusations of falsified maintenance reports in the last year alone.
"The thing I would say now is it doesn't appear to be anything that has to do with tilt-rotor physics," the commandant, Gen. James L. Jones, said of the December crash in an interview today. More generally, the commandant said that "there is sometimes out there an idea that an aircraft that takes off like a helicopter and flies like a plane can't do either very well," but that "so far the physics of the tilt rotor doesn't lend itself to that type of criticism."
Some aircraft experts have questioned the inherent safety of the Osprey, on whose wings are rotors that can tilt up like a helicopter's or forward like a plane's. Those questions, dealing with the craft's aerodynamic stability, are being reviewed by an expert panel appointed late last year by William S. Cohen, then the secretary of defense.
General Jones said he was optimistic that the Marines' final crash report would include assurances from the Defense Department's inspector general that the December crash, as well as a fatal crash last April, were not a result of falsified maintenance records at the Osprey squadron's headquarters at the New River Marine Corps Air Station in North Carolina. That case is a subject of a separate inquiry.
"You want to be sure that you can de-link any insinuation that there might have been a maintenance problem or anything that could have been, and should have been, caught with either crash," General Jones said. "I'm reasonably optimistic that we're going to be able to do that."
The Osprey, built by the Boeing Company's helicopter division and Textron Inc.'s Bell Helicopter unit, has been one of the Pentagon's most controversial programs for over a decade. The aircraft, still experimental, will have a price tag of well over $30 billion should full production proceed, and already had a record of crashes before the one last April.
In 1989, Dick Cheney, then the defense secretary, tried to cancel the Osprey to save money. But Congress kept it alive. Then, last April, safety questions that had already emerged grew all the more serious when an Osprey crashed in the Arizona desert, killing all 19 marines on board. Those questions multiplied with the December crash, near the New River station.
And in January, the Marines opened in investigation of the Osprey squadron at New River after receiving an anonymous letter accusing the squadron commander of ordering subordinates to cover up maintenance problems. In addition to the letter was a tape recording that appeared to implicate the commander, Lt. Col. Odin F. Leberman. Colonel Leberman has been relieved of command, and the inquiry has been taken over by the Pentagon's inspector general, who is investigating whether high-ranking Marine officers might have pressured the colonel to falsify the records.
General Jones declined today to provide details about the causes of the hydraulic and computer malfunctions that he said led to the December crash. But he said investigators had found amid the debris a broken hydraulic line that, he said, proved their hypothesis that a hydraulic failure had caused the pilot, considered the best in the V-22 squadron, to lose control.
The hydraulic system enables the pilot to control the speed and direction of the aircraft by adjusting its wings, rotors and rotor engine casings. Pentagon officials in charge of testing the craft had warned of worn hydraulic lines in existing Ospreys in the weeks before the crash.
Investigators have also concluded that because of a computer software malfunction, an emergency backup for the hydraulic system did not work. One person familiar with elements of the investigation said the software appeared to have been incorrectly written, creating even greater problems for the pilot as he struggled to regain control in the seconds before the crash.
General Jones said today that the Osprey was extremely important to the Marine Corps, because it can fly much farther and faster than the Vietnam-era helicopters it is supposed to replace. But he said he would be the first to support canceling the program if it were proved to be inherently unsafe. "We should never have preconceived notions that you can't receive bad news," he said. "And if it's bad news, I'll be the first to stand up as a moral issue and say, `We ought not to do this.' "
By JAMES DAO
WASHINGTON, Feb. 12 — The Marine Corps has conclusively determined that the Dec. 11 crash of a V-22 Osprey that killed four marines was a result of hydraulic and computer failures, not the aircraft's hybrid tilt-rotor design, the commandant of the corps said today.
The Marines are hoping that the finding, part of a crash report they expect to send to Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld as early as this week, will be the first step toward rehabilitating the costly and troubled V-22 program, which has been plagued by two fatal accidents and accusations of falsified maintenance reports in the last year alone.
"The thing I would say now is it doesn't appear to be anything that has to do with tilt-rotor physics," the commandant, Gen. James L. Jones, said of the December crash in an interview today. More generally, the commandant said that "there is sometimes out there an idea that an aircraft that takes off like a helicopter and flies like a plane can't do either very well," but that "so far the physics of the tilt rotor doesn't lend itself to that type of criticism."
Some aircraft experts have questioned the inherent safety of the Osprey, on whose wings are rotors that can tilt up like a helicopter's or forward like a plane's. Those questions, dealing with the craft's aerodynamic stability, are being reviewed by an expert panel appointed late last year by William S. Cohen, then the secretary of defense.
General Jones said he was optimistic that the Marines' final crash report would include assurances from the Defense Department's inspector general that the December crash, as well as a fatal crash last April, were not a result of falsified maintenance records at the Osprey squadron's headquarters at the New River Marine Corps Air Station in North Carolina. That case is a subject of a separate inquiry.
"You want to be sure that you can de-link any insinuation that there might have been a maintenance problem or anything that could have been, and should have been, caught with either crash," General Jones said. "I'm reasonably optimistic that we're going to be able to do that."
The Osprey, built by the Boeing Company's helicopter division and Textron Inc.'s Bell Helicopter unit, has been one of the Pentagon's most controversial programs for over a decade. The aircraft, still experimental, will have a price tag of well over $30 billion should full production proceed, and already had a record of crashes before the one last April.
In 1989, Dick Cheney, then the defense secretary, tried to cancel the Osprey to save money. But Congress kept it alive. Then, last April, safety questions that had already emerged grew all the more serious when an Osprey crashed in the Arizona desert, killing all 19 marines on board. Those questions multiplied with the December crash, near the New River station.
And in January, the Marines opened in investigation of the Osprey squadron at New River after receiving an anonymous letter accusing the squadron commander of ordering subordinates to cover up maintenance problems. In addition to the letter was a tape recording that appeared to implicate the commander, Lt. Col. Odin F. Leberman. Colonel Leberman has been relieved of command, and the inquiry has been taken over by the Pentagon's inspector general, who is investigating whether high-ranking Marine officers might have pressured the colonel to falsify the records.
General Jones declined today to provide details about the causes of the hydraulic and computer malfunctions that he said led to the December crash. But he said investigators had found amid the debris a broken hydraulic line that, he said, proved their hypothesis that a hydraulic failure had caused the pilot, considered the best in the V-22 squadron, to lose control.
The hydraulic system enables the pilot to control the speed and direction of the aircraft by adjusting its wings, rotors and rotor engine casings. Pentagon officials in charge of testing the craft had warned of worn hydraulic lines in existing Ospreys in the weeks before the crash.
Investigators have also concluded that because of a computer software malfunction, an emergency backup for the hydraulic system did not work. One person familiar with elements of the investigation said the software appeared to have been incorrectly written, creating even greater problems for the pilot as he struggled to regain control in the seconds before the crash.
General Jones said today that the Osprey was extremely important to the Marine Corps, because it can fly much farther and faster than the Vietnam-era helicopters it is supposed to replace. But he said he would be the first to support canceling the program if it were proved to be inherently unsafe. "We should never have preconceived notions that you can't receive bad news," he said. "And if it's bad news, I'll be the first to stand up as a moral issue and say, `We ought not to do this.' "
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LU the answer to your last post (differences between autorotation and VR) is at: http://www.helicoptersonly.com/Train...ith_power.html
Hoist: Dec 11th Crash Theory: see http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/For...ML/000658.html and below
Totally irrelevant non-issues:
a. The XV-15 did (or did not) originally have a 90 degree (only) tilt?
b. I still cannot see how contra-rotating and overlapping tandem rotors could suffer from VR. Nature abhors a discontinuity (i.e. a helical vortex consisting of a figure-of-eight with two intersecting annulus of opposite rotation??). However I accept that someone posted earlier that he had, despite my information from an experienced CH47 pilot that he'd never - and precisely why this was an impossibility. So it's all weakly anecdotal and it's also mightily irrelevant. It was originally introduced by me simply to illustrate one of the aspects of VR - but then became a giant red-herring. I'm always suspicious of those who seize upon inconsequentialities - because it clearly indicates that they'd rather obfuscate than get into the narrower basic issue.
JF adroitly addressed the probable irrelevance of AsymmVR to the T/R in its sedate civil guise and I think he may be right - but a four-bladed prop-rotor would be a better idea on the 609 for the reasons given below. Four-bladed would also resolve some of the Blade Vortex Interaction noise that dictates the approach area acoustic foot-print. JF nailed the concerns regarding the MV-22 in the tactical combat arena. That remains the big question. It will be a long while before grunts are happy down back, the same guys who'd jump into a CH-53, UH-1 or UH-60 without a thought. But I think JF neatly side-stepped the quintessential issues on serviceability (reliability and availability) and maintainability/supportability. At this juncture, some short time after that first big MEU lift over the beach, a high percentage of MV-22's will be found to be unflyable (scattered between the LZ, beach and flattop). As LU has pointed out, it's too intricate and vulnerable - too many potentially downing discrepancies. That's why the US Army pulled out 15 years ago, it's why the CV-22 might yet be assessed as not suitable for USAF Special Ops.
The basic question remains unanswered. Susceptibility to AsymmVR has been demonstrated at Marana and in the transient incident (rapid wing-drop) as it crossed the Saipan's fan-tail wake on deck-trials. The USMC position is that the aircraft has to be flown way outside the approved envelope to encounter it. But it may also be that the condition can be encountered because of environmentals (a mild downwind component at height that leads to an arcing-over steepening approach …. or……dynamic control inputs in challenging gusty conditions) or avoidance action (pylon wires).
"the biggest tailwind that I could ever personally find in looking at the CSMU data, the Crash Survivable Memory Unit, was eight knots". LtGen McCorkle dissent from JAG Report
One hope is that tilt-rotors can be instrumented and fitted with a warning and/or reaction control system. The reality is that a number of aircraft (V-22 and XV-15) have been fitted with blade pressure transducers for ten years as part of the TRAM trials for acoustic mapping - and all that needs to be known about prop-rotor airfoil behaviour (vortices) is documented. Blade Vortex Interaction (BVI) is the main component of T/R noise. It's also a fact that the only way in which the T/R can be made more neighbourhood noise-friendly would be to now opt for a four-bladed prop-rotor or the Boeing five-blade config (active control of blade pitch having only a limited effect). Both noise signature (for more covert approach) and AsymmVR problems would be thereby alleviated, as well as rotor downwash for hoisting, roping, rapelling and external load slinging. Undoubtedly SHCT, QTR (and possibly the follow-on 609 models) will go that way. At present all the pro T/R Vertiport blurbs are talking about "community acceptance" and steering clear of any mention of "noise" - and for good reason.
this email received today probably adds to the knowledge-base:
"Hi, I've been following the Pprune discussion on the Osprey and thought I'd pass on a few observations. My background was a long-term association with the CL-84 tilt-wing. It was a bygone era and a different technology but the basic problems remain the same and I've kept in touch. Something you seem to have overlooked is the basic difference between the prop-rotor and the rotor in evaluating vortex ring effect. The onset characteristics for T/R VR are yet to be quantified but they are demonstrably different to helo VR because the prop-rotors are a semi-rigid, underslung and teetering compromise. The smaller rotor diameters, high blade-loadings, stiff graphite-epoxy, high aspect ratio, high-twist tapered format blades, elastomeric mount, wing interaction and diff collective lateral flight-control, IMO create an aerodynamic phenomena similar to helo VR but unique to tilt-rotors.
In the T/W the wing tended to dampen any vortex ring formation but in the T/R the flat wing would tend to laminate and reinforce the condition. The CL-84 had two four-bladed 28ft prop-rotors and with a low blade-loading and higher disc solidity showed no signs of VR.. To go on, the XC142 had four three-bladed 14ft propellers (propellers not being vulnerable to VR, it wasn't). The V-22 has 38ft diam three-bladed high-twist rotors with low solidity and obviously is. But we always had ejection seats and that saved our pilots on each of the CL-84 crashes.
Certainly the one big factor for the Osprey is that any wing-drop correction will always be toward or further into the incipient VR condition - lateral control being by differential collective. But there's another factor also. It is also a well-known fact that the rate of descent plays a large role in how well the initial instability of the vortex-ring condition establishes itself (stabilises) and how long the condition will then last. Introducing collective pitch shortly after the onset of a helo vortex-ring condition can demonstrate how easily the vortex-ring condition and inflow through the disk can diverge, making it an extremely difficult condition from which to then recover. Because of the Osprey's lateral control automatically (via the AFCS) increasing collective pitch at the outset of VR formation, the condition becomes similarly "locked in". i.e. you achieve something similar to a helicopter pilot failing to recognise VR and attempting to resolve the increased descent rate by adding power. Flt ctrl Load Limiting won't ever protect against that. There's one other error in your post. The engines, transmission and proprotors actually tilt through 97º 30' between forward flight and steepest approach gradient or tail-down hover, not 95º. So it's actually a 7.5º steeper forward projection of the tilt-rotor downwash in helicopter approach mode. The Osprey would get an earlier VR onset because of both it and the simultaneous use of the interim/contingency power feature that cuts in for use at over 80 degree nacelle-tilt. I think you will also find that the XV-15 has always had 95º nacelle-tilt. You can confirm that by talking to Brent Wellman of the Army/NASA Rotorcraft Division at Moffett. He was the XV-15 TRRA Test Director.
With regard to your analysis of the possible cause of the 11 Dec crash, you blamed the
automatic control of configuration change during conversion (i.e. its auto-transfer of control from aerodynamic surfaces to rotor-blade pitch changing). But the flaperons and ailerons also automatically go to droop during hover to reduce downloads on the wing and failure of one nacelle actuator automatically results in both nacelles reverting to helicopter mode for a vertical or run-on emergency landing. Following hyd failure either of these last two software-automated aspects could also have caused a rapid loss of control.
regards"
Hoist: Dec 11th Crash Theory: see http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/For...ML/000658.html and below
Totally irrelevant non-issues:
a. The XV-15 did (or did not) originally have a 90 degree (only) tilt?
b. I still cannot see how contra-rotating and overlapping tandem rotors could suffer from VR. Nature abhors a discontinuity (i.e. a helical vortex consisting of a figure-of-eight with two intersecting annulus of opposite rotation??). However I accept that someone posted earlier that he had, despite my information from an experienced CH47 pilot that he'd never - and precisely why this was an impossibility. So it's all weakly anecdotal and it's also mightily irrelevant. It was originally introduced by me simply to illustrate one of the aspects of VR - but then became a giant red-herring. I'm always suspicious of those who seize upon inconsequentialities - because it clearly indicates that they'd rather obfuscate than get into the narrower basic issue.
JF adroitly addressed the probable irrelevance of AsymmVR to the T/R in its sedate civil guise and I think he may be right - but a four-bladed prop-rotor would be a better idea on the 609 for the reasons given below. Four-bladed would also resolve some of the Blade Vortex Interaction noise that dictates the approach area acoustic foot-print. JF nailed the concerns regarding the MV-22 in the tactical combat arena. That remains the big question. It will be a long while before grunts are happy down back, the same guys who'd jump into a CH-53, UH-1 or UH-60 without a thought. But I think JF neatly side-stepped the quintessential issues on serviceability (reliability and availability) and maintainability/supportability. At this juncture, some short time after that first big MEU lift over the beach, a high percentage of MV-22's will be found to be unflyable (scattered between the LZ, beach and flattop). As LU has pointed out, it's too intricate and vulnerable - too many potentially downing discrepancies. That's why the US Army pulled out 15 years ago, it's why the CV-22 might yet be assessed as not suitable for USAF Special Ops.
The basic question remains unanswered. Susceptibility to AsymmVR has been demonstrated at Marana and in the transient incident (rapid wing-drop) as it crossed the Saipan's fan-tail wake on deck-trials. The USMC position is that the aircraft has to be flown way outside the approved envelope to encounter it. But it may also be that the condition can be encountered because of environmentals (a mild downwind component at height that leads to an arcing-over steepening approach …. or……dynamic control inputs in challenging gusty conditions) or avoidance action (pylon wires).
"the biggest tailwind that I could ever personally find in looking at the CSMU data, the Crash Survivable Memory Unit, was eight knots". LtGen McCorkle dissent from JAG Report
One hope is that tilt-rotors can be instrumented and fitted with a warning and/or reaction control system. The reality is that a number of aircraft (V-22 and XV-15) have been fitted with blade pressure transducers for ten years as part of the TRAM trials for acoustic mapping - and all that needs to be known about prop-rotor airfoil behaviour (vortices) is documented. Blade Vortex Interaction (BVI) is the main component of T/R noise. It's also a fact that the only way in which the T/R can be made more neighbourhood noise-friendly would be to now opt for a four-bladed prop-rotor or the Boeing five-blade config (active control of blade pitch having only a limited effect). Both noise signature (for more covert approach) and AsymmVR problems would be thereby alleviated, as well as rotor downwash for hoisting, roping, rapelling and external load slinging. Undoubtedly SHCT, QTR (and possibly the follow-on 609 models) will go that way. At present all the pro T/R Vertiport blurbs are talking about "community acceptance" and steering clear of any mention of "noise" - and for good reason.
this email received today probably adds to the knowledge-base:
"Hi, I've been following the Pprune discussion on the Osprey and thought I'd pass on a few observations. My background was a long-term association with the CL-84 tilt-wing. It was a bygone era and a different technology but the basic problems remain the same and I've kept in touch. Something you seem to have overlooked is the basic difference between the prop-rotor and the rotor in evaluating vortex ring effect. The onset characteristics for T/R VR are yet to be quantified but they are demonstrably different to helo VR because the prop-rotors are a semi-rigid, underslung and teetering compromise. The smaller rotor diameters, high blade-loadings, stiff graphite-epoxy, high aspect ratio, high-twist tapered format blades, elastomeric mount, wing interaction and diff collective lateral flight-control, IMO create an aerodynamic phenomena similar to helo VR but unique to tilt-rotors.
In the T/W the wing tended to dampen any vortex ring formation but in the T/R the flat wing would tend to laminate and reinforce the condition. The CL-84 had two four-bladed 28ft prop-rotors and with a low blade-loading and higher disc solidity showed no signs of VR.. To go on, the XC142 had four three-bladed 14ft propellers (propellers not being vulnerable to VR, it wasn't). The V-22 has 38ft diam three-bladed high-twist rotors with low solidity and obviously is. But we always had ejection seats and that saved our pilots on each of the CL-84 crashes.
Certainly the one big factor for the Osprey is that any wing-drop correction will always be toward or further into the incipient VR condition - lateral control being by differential collective. But there's another factor also. It is also a well-known fact that the rate of descent plays a large role in how well the initial instability of the vortex-ring condition establishes itself (stabilises) and how long the condition will then last. Introducing collective pitch shortly after the onset of a helo vortex-ring condition can demonstrate how easily the vortex-ring condition and inflow through the disk can diverge, making it an extremely difficult condition from which to then recover. Because of the Osprey's lateral control automatically (via the AFCS) increasing collective pitch at the outset of VR formation, the condition becomes similarly "locked in". i.e. you achieve something similar to a helicopter pilot failing to recognise VR and attempting to resolve the increased descent rate by adding power. Flt ctrl Load Limiting won't ever protect against that. There's one other error in your post. The engines, transmission and proprotors actually tilt through 97º 30' between forward flight and steepest approach gradient or tail-down hover, not 95º. So it's actually a 7.5º steeper forward projection of the tilt-rotor downwash in helicopter approach mode. The Osprey would get an earlier VR onset because of both it and the simultaneous use of the interim/contingency power feature that cuts in for use at over 80 degree nacelle-tilt. I think you will also find that the XV-15 has always had 95º nacelle-tilt. You can confirm that by talking to Brent Wellman of the Army/NASA Rotorcraft Division at Moffett. He was the XV-15 TRRA Test Director.
With regard to your analysis of the possible cause of the 11 Dec crash, you blamed the
automatic control of configuration change during conversion (i.e. its auto-transfer of control from aerodynamic surfaces to rotor-blade pitch changing). But the flaperons and ailerons also automatically go to droop during hover to reduce downloads on the wing and failure of one nacelle actuator automatically results in both nacelles reverting to helicopter mode for a vertical or run-on emergency landing. Following hyd failure either of these last two software-automated aspects could also have caused a rapid loss of control.
regards"
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Posts: n/a
from the Washington Post:
Perhaps most importantly, the GAO briefing details previously unreleased conclusions by the Marine Corps' own Judge Advocate General Manual investigation of the V-22 accident last April. GAO quotes the JAG report as saying the V-22 "appears to be less forgiving than conventional helicopters," and it was a cause for concern "to see how 'easy' it was for the recipe of uncontrolled flight to be concocted."
Before the JAG's conclusions surfaced publicly in this GAO briefing, Marine Corps officials pointed to "a combination of human factors" as the cause of the April crash, which occurred in Arizona and killed 19. The service said the pilots put the Osprey into too rapid a descent given its relatively slow airspeed, a dangerous combination Marine officials say was proscribed in the official flying manual. These conditions, officials said, could potentially leading to "power settling" or "vortex ring state."
GAO quotes Philip Coyle, then-director of operational test and evaluation for the Pentagon, as saying the onset of vortex ring state in the V-22 "can occur in the proprotor on one side without the other side losing lift. In such a case, the aircraft tends to roll sharply into the side that first loses lift, resulting in large, unexpected bank angles, followed immediately by rapid dropping of the nose of the aircraft and a steep dive. At low altitudes, there may be no opportunity for recovery."
"There may be little or no warning for a V-22 pilot that the aircraft is about to enter this phenomenon," Coyle said.
The Marine Corps JAG Manual report agreed. "The fact that this aircraft found itself in a vortex ring state condition with no apparent warning to the aircrew, but also departed controlled flight, is particularly concerning," the JAG report stated. Moreover, the manual cited by the Marine Corps as offering restrictions that could have prevented such a crash is unclear on this point, the JAG Manual investigation found.
The Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization manual, known as NATOPS, as well as the V-22 ground school syllabus, provide "insufficient guidance/warning as to high rate of descent/slow airspeed conditions and the potential consequences," the JAG found.
Perhaps most importantly, the GAO briefing details previously unreleased conclusions by the Marine Corps' own Judge Advocate General Manual investigation of the V-22 accident last April. GAO quotes the JAG report as saying the V-22 "appears to be less forgiving than conventional helicopters," and it was a cause for concern "to see how 'easy' it was for the recipe of uncontrolled flight to be concocted."
Before the JAG's conclusions surfaced publicly in this GAO briefing, Marine Corps officials pointed to "a combination of human factors" as the cause of the April crash, which occurred in Arizona and killed 19. The service said the pilots put the Osprey into too rapid a descent given its relatively slow airspeed, a dangerous combination Marine officials say was proscribed in the official flying manual. These conditions, officials said, could potentially leading to "power settling" or "vortex ring state."
GAO quotes Philip Coyle, then-director of operational test and evaluation for the Pentagon, as saying the onset of vortex ring state in the V-22 "can occur in the proprotor on one side without the other side losing lift. In such a case, the aircraft tends to roll sharply into the side that first loses lift, resulting in large, unexpected bank angles, followed immediately by rapid dropping of the nose of the aircraft and a steep dive. At low altitudes, there may be no opportunity for recovery."
"There may be little or no warning for a V-22 pilot that the aircraft is about to enter this phenomenon," Coyle said.
The Marine Corps JAG Manual report agreed. "The fact that this aircraft found itself in a vortex ring state condition with no apparent warning to the aircrew, but also departed controlled flight, is particularly concerning," the JAG report stated. Moreover, the manual cited by the Marine Corps as offering restrictions that could have prevented such a crash is unclear on this point, the JAG Manual investigation found.
The Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization manual, known as NATOPS, as well as the V-22 ground school syllabus, provide "insufficient guidance/warning as to high rate of descent/slow airspeed conditions and the potential consequences," the JAG found.
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Seems like in typical military fashion you beleive that plank pilots have the answers, helo pilots should shut up and go sleep in a tent, and a gadget will solve all your problems :-(
VRS at low altitude is a killer for all helicopters, but we manage not to die in droves. We use our ROTARY wing EXPERIENCE to AVOID the problem, RECOGNIZE the onset if it happens, and apply APPROPRIATE recovery action.
This was for you UNCTUOUS.
VRS at low altitude is a killer for all helicopters, but we manage not to die in droves. We use our ROTARY wing EXPERIENCE to AVOID the problem, RECOGNIZE the onset if it happens, and apply APPROPRIATE recovery action.
This was for you UNCTUOUS.
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Nice try HeloTeacher, but old Pinochy-Unc has his head so far up an unnamed location he can’t see or hear what anybody says if its not in line with his fantasy world. He’s been disproven with the FACTS and testimony from the people that actually fly the aircraft over and over but he will not listen to the truth. He has been so badly humiliated on a public forum that he is not capable of backing away from it. His only chance is to tell a thousand lies and hope somebody will eventually believe it is the truth.
He’s obviously punch drunk after haven been beaten up so badly by earlier posts. He actually posted an e mail message on another thread that completely contradicts his theory –and he didn’t even realize it! We shouldn’t feel too bad for ourselves having to see his endless dribble that’s been repeatedly disproven… imagine how his poor mother feels!!!
He’s obviously punch drunk after haven been beaten up so badly by earlier posts. He actually posted an e mail message on another thread that completely contradicts his theory –and he didn’t even realize it! We shouldn’t feel too bad for ourselves having to see his endless dribble that’s been repeatedly disproven… imagine how his poor mother feels!!!