What's the latest on tilt rotors?
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January 25, 2001
Defense Dept. Takes Over Marine Inquiry Into Osprey Records
By JAMES DAO
WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 — The Department of Defense inspector general took control today of the investigation into accusations of falsified maintenance records for the Marine Corps' V-22 Osprey aircraft program, raising the possibility that the inquiry would be broadened to include high-ranking Marine officials.
The announcement by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld came less than one week after the Marine Corps began investigating whether the commanding officer of its only V- 22 squadron had ordered subordinates to cover up problems in the program. The innovative aircraft has been plagued by production delays and crashes that have killed 23 marines in the past year.
Rear Adm. Craig Quigley, a Pentagon spokesman, said the Department of Defense inspector general typically assumed control of investigations when there was evidence that wrongdoing might extend above the rank of rear admiral or one-star general.
But Admiral Quigley and Marine officials said they knew of no evidence suggesting that the misconduct extended above the V-22 squadron commander, Lt. Col. Odin F. Leberman. Pentagon officials say Colonel Leberman has acknowledged falsifying records; he has been relieved of his command and transferred to Camp Lejeune, N.C.
The Marine Corps asserted that the Marine Corps commandant, Gen. James L. Jones, independently asked Mr. Rumsfeld this morning to have the Department of Defense inspector general take over the investigation to dispel even the appearance of a conflict of interest.
Still, a senior senator said today that he had heard that Marine officials above Colonel Leberman might have been implicated in the wrongdoing.
"Recently I have heard that it may well have" gone above Colonel Leberman, the senator, Carl Levin of Michigan, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said in an interview.
Mr. Levin and Senator John W. Warner, the Virginia Republican who is chairman of the Armed Services Committee, sent a letter today to Mr. Rumsfeld urging him to appoint an independent panel to investigate the charges of falsified records. Both senators said that they were satisfied to have the Department of Defense inspector general conduct that inquiry.
In their letter, the two senators threatened to block financing of the Osprey program unless "the Defense Department has restored confidence in the integrity of the V-22 program and the people managing it."
A second panel, created late last year by Mr. Rumsfeld's predecessor, William S. Cohen, is reviewing the entire V-22 program.
The Osprey, a tilt-rotor aircraft, takes off and lands like a helicopter, but flies like a propeller plane. The Marine Corps wants to buy a total of 360 of the aircraft, at a total cost of over $30 billion, to replace its fleet of Vietnam-era transport helicopters.
Although the Pentagon has postponed a decision on whether to begin full production of the Osprey, the Marine Corps is still scheduled to receive 20 more V-22's in the coming two years.
The investigation into Colonel Leberman began when the Navy received an anonymous letter two weeks ago from someone claiming to be a Marine mechanic who asserted that efforts to falsify maintenance and performance reports had been "going on for over two years."
Marine officials contend that there is no link between the the two crashes last year and the maintenance records that are said to have been falsified.
Defense Dept. Takes Over Marine Inquiry Into Osprey Records
By JAMES DAO
WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 — The Department of Defense inspector general took control today of the investigation into accusations of falsified maintenance records for the Marine Corps' V-22 Osprey aircraft program, raising the possibility that the inquiry would be broadened to include high-ranking Marine officials.
The announcement by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld came less than one week after the Marine Corps began investigating whether the commanding officer of its only V- 22 squadron had ordered subordinates to cover up problems in the program. The innovative aircraft has been plagued by production delays and crashes that have killed 23 marines in the past year.
Rear Adm. Craig Quigley, a Pentagon spokesman, said the Department of Defense inspector general typically assumed control of investigations when there was evidence that wrongdoing might extend above the rank of rear admiral or one-star general.
But Admiral Quigley and Marine officials said they knew of no evidence suggesting that the misconduct extended above the V-22 squadron commander, Lt. Col. Odin F. Leberman. Pentagon officials say Colonel Leberman has acknowledged falsifying records; he has been relieved of his command and transferred to Camp Lejeune, N.C.
The Marine Corps asserted that the Marine Corps commandant, Gen. James L. Jones, independently asked Mr. Rumsfeld this morning to have the Department of Defense inspector general take over the investigation to dispel even the appearance of a conflict of interest.
Still, a senior senator said today that he had heard that Marine officials above Colonel Leberman might have been implicated in the wrongdoing.
"Recently I have heard that it may well have" gone above Colonel Leberman, the senator, Carl Levin of Michigan, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said in an interview.
Mr. Levin and Senator John W. Warner, the Virginia Republican who is chairman of the Armed Services Committee, sent a letter today to Mr. Rumsfeld urging him to appoint an independent panel to investigate the charges of falsified records. Both senators said that they were satisfied to have the Department of Defense inspector general conduct that inquiry.
In their letter, the two senators threatened to block financing of the Osprey program unless "the Defense Department has restored confidence in the integrity of the V-22 program and the people managing it."
A second panel, created late last year by Mr. Rumsfeld's predecessor, William S. Cohen, is reviewing the entire V-22 program.
The Osprey, a tilt-rotor aircraft, takes off and lands like a helicopter, but flies like a propeller plane. The Marine Corps wants to buy a total of 360 of the aircraft, at a total cost of over $30 billion, to replace its fleet of Vietnam-era transport helicopters.
Although the Pentagon has postponed a decision on whether to begin full production of the Osprey, the Marine Corps is still scheduled to receive 20 more V-22's in the coming two years.
The investigation into Colonel Leberman began when the Navy received an anonymous letter two weeks ago from someone claiming to be a Marine mechanic who asserted that efforts to falsify maintenance and performance reports had been "going on for over two years."
Marine officials contend that there is no link between the the two crashes last year and the maintenance records that are said to have been falsified.
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Report itemizes risks of Osprey; GAO says full production a threat to Defense budget
By Tony Capaccio
Bloomberg News
WASHINGTON -- The U.S. Defense Department will incur "significant risk" if it approves full production now of the V-22 Osprey, according to the U.S. General Accounting Office.
The $83 million aircraft -- designed to fly like a plane but take off and land like a helicopter -- may prove unsafe and cost more than forecast to maintain, the GAO says in a 31-page assessment obtained by Bloomberg News.
The Osprey, manufactured by Fort Worth-based Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing's Pennsylvania-based helicopter unit, has a history of safety and reliability problems including two crashes last year that killed 23 Marines. And last week, the Marines said they're reviewing evidence that V-22 maintenance records were falsified.
The Marine Corps on Wednesday turned over to the Defense Department a week- old investigation into allegations that records were falsified.
The decision by the Marine Corps commandant, Gen. James I. Jones, was aimed at preventing the inquiry from being compromised by an "unwarranted" perception that the Marine Corps investigators would try to protect the program, the service said in a statement.
The development came as the top Republican and Democratic members on the Senate Armed Services Committee called on Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to convene an independent review of the allegations.
The panel's chairman, Sen. John Warner, R-Va., and Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., warned the new Pentagon chief that the crash-tainted aircraft could be in trouble on Capitol Hill.
"Congress has consistently supported this program," they said in a letter to Rumsfeld. "However, this program will not be able to move forward unless and until the Defense Department has restored confidence in the integrity of the V- 22 program and the people managing it."
An independent investigation is important because there is a possibility that, if maintenance records were fabricated, people other than Marines may have been involved,
Warner said in an interview.
He said he was referring to a letter written by a whistle- blower that said the fabrication of records had begun more than two years ago while the V- 22 was still being tested. He said he was satisfied with Jones' decision to turn over the investigation to the Pentagon.
The Marines say there is no link between the crashes and the maintenance records that are being investigated.
The analysis by the GAO, Congress's independent audit agency, said there is "significant risk with proceeding with full-rate production. Knowledge of V-22 design and performance falls short of what should be known before beginning production."
A decision to authorize production "poses risks for Department of Defense operations and budgets," the GAO said.
The V-22 is susceptible to a steep rate of descent and it " appears to be less forgiving than conventional helicopters" when that happens, the GAO said. A "loss of controlled flight can occur at any time, and consequences are exceedingly grave."
The Jan. 12 assessment was submitted to an independent panel of defense experts convened by former Defense Secretary William Cohen after the Dec. 11 crash.
The GAO report is the latest bad news and will likely fuel opposition in Congress to the Osprey, the Pentagon's sixth- largest weapons program with a price tag of about $38 billion.
"For every one congressman who has been a fervent defender there are three who will look at it as a place to get cash for other programs," said Richard Aboulafia, a military aircraft analyst for the Teal Group in Washington.
"I think there's a good chance the production decision will slip but I still think it will go through," he said. "It's just a matter of time. You don't spend billions developing a totally new way to fly and then abandon it."
The V-22 is to be the Marine Corps' primary aircraft for ferrying troops into combat and for hostage rescues, embassy evacuations and peacekeeping missions. Deployment is scheduled to begin in 2003. Full-scale development of the V-22 started in 1986. About one-third of Bell's 6,400 workers in Fort Worth and Arlington are engaged in V-22 related work. The companies split V-22 revenue.
An earlier deadline for a decision on whether to approve the aircraft for full production was postponed after an accident on Dec. 11 that killed four Marines. A previous crash, on April 8, killed 19 Marines.
The GAO assessment, which melds and interprets the findings of three earlier reports, echoes a Marine Corps legal opinion compiled after the April 8 crash, the GAO said. That opinion hasn't been made public.
Marine Corps spokesman Lt. David Nevers said it would be "inappropriate" for the service to comment on a document submitted to the panel before it has completed its overall evaluation." Spokesmen for Textron's Bell Helicopter unit and Boeing declined to comment.
The GAO assessment will likely be part of the Bush administration's review of tactical aircraft programs, including the Lockheed Martin Corp. F-22 fighter and the experimental joint strike fighter.
Vice President Dick Cheney attempted to cancel the V-22 when he was Defense secretary in the early 1990s because of long-term cost concerns.
Ten years later, those concerns remain. The V-22's poor maintenance record poses long-term risks to Marine and Navy weapons budgets "as cost increases beyond already budgeted funds are likely," the GAO said.
Boeing shares fell 6 cents to $57.43 in trading of 2.9 million shares on the New York Stock Exchange. Boeing shares have risen 29 percent in the past year. Textron shares rose 81 cents to $47.93 in trading of 725,000 shares. Textron shares have dropped 21 percent.
Jonathan S. Landay of Knight Ridder Newspapers contributed to this report.
------------------
The Cat
By Tony Capaccio
Bloomberg News
WASHINGTON -- The U.S. Defense Department will incur "significant risk" if it approves full production now of the V-22 Osprey, according to the U.S. General Accounting Office.
The $83 million aircraft -- designed to fly like a plane but take off and land like a helicopter -- may prove unsafe and cost more than forecast to maintain, the GAO says in a 31-page assessment obtained by Bloomberg News.
The Osprey, manufactured by Fort Worth-based Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing's Pennsylvania-based helicopter unit, has a history of safety and reliability problems including two crashes last year that killed 23 Marines. And last week, the Marines said they're reviewing evidence that V-22 maintenance records were falsified.
The Marine Corps on Wednesday turned over to the Defense Department a week- old investigation into allegations that records were falsified.
The decision by the Marine Corps commandant, Gen. James I. Jones, was aimed at preventing the inquiry from being compromised by an "unwarranted" perception that the Marine Corps investigators would try to protect the program, the service said in a statement.
The development came as the top Republican and Democratic members on the Senate Armed Services Committee called on Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to convene an independent review of the allegations.
The panel's chairman, Sen. John Warner, R-Va., and Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., warned the new Pentagon chief that the crash-tainted aircraft could be in trouble on Capitol Hill.
"Congress has consistently supported this program," they said in a letter to Rumsfeld. "However, this program will not be able to move forward unless and until the Defense Department has restored confidence in the integrity of the V- 22 program and the people managing it."
An independent investigation is important because there is a possibility that, if maintenance records were fabricated, people other than Marines may have been involved,
Warner said in an interview.
He said he was referring to a letter written by a whistle- blower that said the fabrication of records had begun more than two years ago while the V- 22 was still being tested. He said he was satisfied with Jones' decision to turn over the investigation to the Pentagon.
The Marines say there is no link between the crashes and the maintenance records that are being investigated.
The analysis by the GAO, Congress's independent audit agency, said there is "significant risk with proceeding with full-rate production. Knowledge of V-22 design and performance falls short of what should be known before beginning production."
A decision to authorize production "poses risks for Department of Defense operations and budgets," the GAO said.
The V-22 is susceptible to a steep rate of descent and it " appears to be less forgiving than conventional helicopters" when that happens, the GAO said. A "loss of controlled flight can occur at any time, and consequences are exceedingly grave."
The Jan. 12 assessment was submitted to an independent panel of defense experts convened by former Defense Secretary William Cohen after the Dec. 11 crash.
The GAO report is the latest bad news and will likely fuel opposition in Congress to the Osprey, the Pentagon's sixth- largest weapons program with a price tag of about $38 billion.
"For every one congressman who has been a fervent defender there are three who will look at it as a place to get cash for other programs," said Richard Aboulafia, a military aircraft analyst for the Teal Group in Washington.
"I think there's a good chance the production decision will slip but I still think it will go through," he said. "It's just a matter of time. You don't spend billions developing a totally new way to fly and then abandon it."
The V-22 is to be the Marine Corps' primary aircraft for ferrying troops into combat and for hostage rescues, embassy evacuations and peacekeeping missions. Deployment is scheduled to begin in 2003. Full-scale development of the V-22 started in 1986. About one-third of Bell's 6,400 workers in Fort Worth and Arlington are engaged in V-22 related work. The companies split V-22 revenue.
An earlier deadline for a decision on whether to approve the aircraft for full production was postponed after an accident on Dec. 11 that killed four Marines. A previous crash, on April 8, killed 19 Marines.
The GAO assessment, which melds and interprets the findings of three earlier reports, echoes a Marine Corps legal opinion compiled after the April 8 crash, the GAO said. That opinion hasn't been made public.
Marine Corps spokesman Lt. David Nevers said it would be "inappropriate" for the service to comment on a document submitted to the panel before it has completed its overall evaluation." Spokesmen for Textron's Bell Helicopter unit and Boeing declined to comment.
The GAO assessment will likely be part of the Bush administration's review of tactical aircraft programs, including the Lockheed Martin Corp. F-22 fighter and the experimental joint strike fighter.
Vice President Dick Cheney attempted to cancel the V-22 when he was Defense secretary in the early 1990s because of long-term cost concerns.
Ten years later, those concerns remain. The V-22's poor maintenance record poses long-term risks to Marine and Navy weapons budgets "as cost increases beyond already budgeted funds are likely," the GAO said.
Boeing shares fell 6 cents to $57.43 in trading of 2.9 million shares on the New York Stock Exchange. Boeing shares have risen 29 percent in the past year. Textron shares rose 81 cents to $47.93 in trading of 725,000 shares. Textron shares have dropped 21 percent.
Jonathan S. Landay of Knight Ridder Newspapers contributed to this report.
------------------
The Cat
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Triple Redundancy in the Osprey
Bell V-22 Osprey - correct sensor outvoted
"John Wodehouse" <[email protected]>
25 Sep 91 09:23:00 EST
Further information about the V-22 crash from Flight International 18-24
September 1991.
"A Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey tiltrotor is flying again for the first
time since the crash of aircraft number five on its first flight in
June. Aircraft number three has made at least three flights, after
extensive checks by the US Navy (USN).
The USN has also released a brief report on the accident, which
reveals that similar faults have been found in two other aircraft.
It says that TWO roll-rate sensors (my capitals), know as vyros,
which provide signals to the flight control computer, were
reverse-wired. In the triple-redundant system the two faulty units
"outvoted" the correct sensor, leading to divergent roll cycles and
a crash shortly after take-off.
The report says the cockpit interface unit is connected by a
120-wire plug connector in which the vyro unit uses numbers 59 and
60 - which were reversed. Examination of aircraft one and three
revealed that one vyro in each was also reversed.
The number three aircraft flew for 18min on 10 September in a flight
cut short by extremely poor visibility. It flew again the next day,
and was to complete a third flight on 13 September."
What worries me is that aircraft one and three were obviously flying
with one vyro reversed-wired for quite sometime. The triple-redundant
system would have outvoted this vyro, but why was no indication given
that there was a problem at all. What confidence does that provide for
other systems, which depend on voting, if the failure is not reported.
My feeling about triple-redundancy and voting are worried, not so much because
two bad units outvoted the good one in this case, but that the systems design
allowed two aircraft with one bad unit to continue to fly for quite some time without
alerting anyone to the problem.
If the same sort of system allowed an airliner to fly with only two out of
three unit working correctly and a further failure then occurred over
mid-Atlantic, I think passengers might give up flying. From the USN report, we
are lead to believe that this problem existed from aircraft build time and thus
the whole testing of the triple-redundant system must thus be flawed. I just
cannot see how a system can be built that does not allow for the check to see
if all units are working correctly and providing the correct data before
take-off. The facts show that I am not correct here.
Lord John --- the programming peer
[We have reported on similar cases in RISKS before. For example, see
J.E. Brunelle and D.E. Eckhardt, Jr.,
Fault-Tolerant Software: An Experiment with the SIFT Operating System,
Proc. Fifth AIAA Computers in Aerospace Conference, 355-360, 1985,
where two programs written by different people to the spec of a correct
program had a common flaw, and outvoted the correct program. PGN]
Bell V-22 Osprey - correct sensor outvoted
"John Wodehouse" <[email protected]>
25 Sep 91 09:23:00 EST
Further information about the V-22 crash from Flight International 18-24
September 1991.
"A Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey tiltrotor is flying again for the first
time since the crash of aircraft number five on its first flight in
June. Aircraft number three has made at least three flights, after
extensive checks by the US Navy (USN).
The USN has also released a brief report on the accident, which
reveals that similar faults have been found in two other aircraft.
It says that TWO roll-rate sensors (my capitals), know as vyros,
which provide signals to the flight control computer, were
reverse-wired. In the triple-redundant system the two faulty units
"outvoted" the correct sensor, leading to divergent roll cycles and
a crash shortly after take-off.
The report says the cockpit interface unit is connected by a
120-wire plug connector in which the vyro unit uses numbers 59 and
60 - which were reversed. Examination of aircraft one and three
revealed that one vyro in each was also reversed.
The number three aircraft flew for 18min on 10 September in a flight
cut short by extremely poor visibility. It flew again the next day,
and was to complete a third flight on 13 September."
What worries me is that aircraft one and three were obviously flying
with one vyro reversed-wired for quite sometime. The triple-redundant
system would have outvoted this vyro, but why was no indication given
that there was a problem at all. What confidence does that provide for
other systems, which depend on voting, if the failure is not reported.
My feeling about triple-redundancy and voting are worried, not so much because
two bad units outvoted the good one in this case, but that the systems design
allowed two aircraft with one bad unit to continue to fly for quite some time without
alerting anyone to the problem.
If the same sort of system allowed an airliner to fly with only two out of
three unit working correctly and a further failure then occurred over
mid-Atlantic, I think passengers might give up flying. From the USN report, we
are lead to believe that this problem existed from aircraft build time and thus
the whole testing of the triple-redundant system must thus be flawed. I just
cannot see how a system can be built that does not allow for the check to see
if all units are working correctly and providing the correct data before
take-off. The facts show that I am not correct here.
Lord John --- the programming peer
[We have reported on similar cases in RISKS before. For example, see
J.E. Brunelle and D.E. Eckhardt, Jr.,
Fault-Tolerant Software: An Experiment with the SIFT Operating System,
Proc. Fifth AIAA Computers in Aerospace Conference, 355-360, 1985,
where two programs written by different people to the spec of a correct
program had a common flaw, and outvoted the correct program. PGN]
Guest
Posts: n/a
Re: V-22 Osprey (Wodehouse, RISKS-12.41)
A. Padgett Peterson <padgett%[email protected]>
Thu, 26 Sep 91 08:25:34 -0400
Not having the wiring diagram, second-guessing is dangerous but
consider the case in which the triple sensors are not "reverse-wired" but
cross-wired (e.g. sensor 2 is connected to input 1 & vs). In this case, with
"all good" everything is fine. If 3 fails all is ok. However if 1 or 2 fails,
the other is reported failed, voted out, and an immediate mismatch occurs
between 3 and the failed sensor (still considered good). The flight control
must now rely on some other (and often lesser) means of selection (usually a
calculated value or range checker) of the proper value.
This is an inherent problem in any flight-critical design that relies
on detection of "first-fail". In this case the failed sensor was evidently
a "second-fail" condition but thought "first-fail" & is a very real concern.
Another concern not mentioned (and again merely hypothesised) is that
from the text, it would appear that at least two of the critical triplex sensor
signals are routed through a single connector, not a good idea since connectors
are one of the major failure areas. (there are some other equally dangerous
possibilities that also have to be considered, i.e., if the signals have
redundant routing shouldn't that have caused a mismatch).
On the quadruplex AFTI-F16, one of our concerns that influenced
a number of routing decisions was the number of simultaneous faults that
could be caused by one 20mm cannon shell.
Of course, it is all too easy to second guess a design team after
the fact, on first flight everyone is crossing their fingers, anyone who
isn't shouldn't be there.
Padgett
A. Padgett Peterson <padgett%[email protected]>
Thu, 26 Sep 91 08:25:34 -0400
Not having the wiring diagram, second-guessing is dangerous but
consider the case in which the triple sensors are not "reverse-wired" but
cross-wired (e.g. sensor 2 is connected to input 1 & vs). In this case, with
"all good" everything is fine. If 3 fails all is ok. However if 1 or 2 fails,
the other is reported failed, voted out, and an immediate mismatch occurs
between 3 and the failed sensor (still considered good). The flight control
must now rely on some other (and often lesser) means of selection (usually a
calculated value or range checker) of the proper value.
This is an inherent problem in any flight-critical design that relies
on detection of "first-fail". In this case the failed sensor was evidently
a "second-fail" condition but thought "first-fail" & is a very real concern.
Another concern not mentioned (and again merely hypothesised) is that
from the text, it would appear that at least two of the critical triplex sensor
signals are routed through a single connector, not a good idea since connectors
are one of the major failure areas. (there are some other equally dangerous
possibilities that also have to be considered, i.e., if the signals have
redundant routing shouldn't that have caused a mismatch).
On the quadruplex AFTI-F16, one of our concerns that influenced
a number of routing decisions was the number of simultaneous faults that
could be caused by one 20mm cannon shell.
Of course, it is all too easy to second guess a design team after
the fact, on first flight everyone is crossing their fingers, anyone who
isn't shouldn't be there.
Padgett
Guest
Posts: n/a
Too many questions remain about the Osprey
J. Stryker Meyer
Commentary
At least one Marine Corps aviator in the troubled MV-22 tilt-rotor hybrid aircraft program has done something to "the proud, the few" that no military enemy accomplished in the Corps¹ 225-year history: He has tarnished its integrity.
Ten days ago, Pentagon investigators raided the Marine Corps MV-22 headquarters in New River, N.C., searching for evidence against the commanding officer of the air squadron who allegedly told his troops to falsify MV-22 maintenance records to ensure that the test aircraft would go into full production. It was a sad day for the Marine Corps.
If the green light were given for full production, it would have allowed the Defense Department to begin spending $30 billion to produce 360 MV-22s despite unanswered questions about whether the high-tech aircraft can perform at the level Marines need to survive in combat.
Many members of Congress want the contracts to flow to the businesses in more than 40 states that will share in the lucrative construction contracts.
But the Dec. 11 crash of an MV-22 that killed four Marine aviators was the second fatal crash in 2000.
The criminal investigation of possible falsification of records has diverted the public's attention from several disturbing flaws in the MV-22, flaws which must be corrected. Because the Corps¹ integrity has been damaged, drastic actions must be taken to restore America's confidence in the Marine Corps' aviation wing.
A presidential panel should be convened, with subpoena power and the ability to offer witnesses immunity from prosecution. Because the Marine Corps¹ integrity is at stake, this panel should have a limited number of Marine or Navy personnel on it. Experts in the Air Force, the General Accounting Office and the Institute for Defense Analysis know the strengths and the flaws of the MV-22. They should be on the panel, whose findings must be made public.
The so-called Blue Ribbon Commission that former Secretary of Defense William Cohen hastily threw together to look into the last MV-22 crash should be terminated. None of its four members are familiar with helicopters, let along a hybrid machine like the Osprey. Evidence from this panel's early hearings indicated it is just another rubber stamp to certify the Corps¹ desire to see this aircraft go into full production.
The Marine Corps¹ top aviation general, Lt. Gen. Fred McCorkle, should be asked to retire, or removed from his position in aviation. The buck stops at his desk. He should step down and insist that the Commandant of the Marine Corps, James Jones, appoint a new director of aviation.
The criminal investigation should be expanded to include the staff of the Defense Department's Officer of Testing and Evaluation. Until Jan 19, Phil Coyle headed that department, which is mandated to study all new weapons systems before they go into full production.
Coyle developed a reputation as a no-nonsense evaluator. However, he was removed from his post Jan19. Government and Pentagon insiders said key staff members under Coyle ignored, misreported and distorted critical comments about the MV-22. Yet no one in the Pentagon appears to be addressing that conduct, conduct which may be criminal.
For example, during a hearing this month, Coyle told the Blue Ribbon Commission that the Navy had a database containing more than 1,000 pages of reports and test results, many of which contained detailed criticisms of the MV-22. However, it is unclear whether Coyle has reviewed that information.
Have officials at the GAO seen it? Have officials from the Institute of Defense Analysis, which studied the MV-22 and handed a critical report to Coyle, been given the database?
In November, Coyle issued a 154-page report on the MV-22 based on the institute's research. However, Coyle must be asked how much more critical his report would have been had he been able to review the Navy data base.
Test officials from Boeing and Bell, who are working on getting the MV-22 approved for full production, should be subpoenaed and forced to testify under oath about these questions:
Why there was no provision for testing and training pilots of the MV-22 on how to cope with the phenomenon called power settling or asymmetrical vortex ring state ---- a condition in which one of the tilt-rotors essentially stalls when the plane is in helicopter mode. When that happens, the other tilt-rotor drives the aircraft upward until it turns toward the earth and plows into the ground. This is what happened in Arizona eight months ago, when 19 Marines died during a test flight.
Why there was no testing for autorotation, again when the aircraft is in its helicopter mode?
The Chief of Naval Operations should be forced to testify why he signed off on so many waivers on the MV-22, making it easier to get the aircraft approved for full production before critical tests were completed. One item waived was a requirement that pilots get a specific number of flight hours documented before they carry passengers.
The Air Force has rigid standards for every new passenger aircraft. Yet for reasons unexplained, that requirement was waived for the MV-22. Navy officials will not release details about that waiver.
The Marine Corps should be ordered to release the complete accident reports on both MV-22 crashes in 2000. The Corps is withholding elements of the April investigation. Why? The report on the December crash has not yet been completed.
The Defense Department's entire weapons purchasing procedure must be reviewed and improved to protect taxpayers' dollars. The system in place today, whether by intent or ineptitude, hides too much from the public and the people who need to know the truth about a new weapons system.
Marine Commandant Jones recently reiterated his confidence in the MV-22. During a June interview, after he and his wife flew in an MV-22 and Jones announced the return to test and evaluation flights, he remained high on the aircraft and the platform which will transport his Marines deep into enemy territory faster than any conventional helicopter in the world.
I've interviewed Jones and remain impressed with his sense of duty and his love and devotion to the Marine Corps. I'm not convinced that Gen. Jones has been given the entire truth about the MV-22, particularly the many critical assessments from Marine aviators who filed complaints in the Navy database that has been hidden from Coyle, the public and investigators.
As a vote of confidence, Jones should be appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has earned that appointment by his outstanding leadership as Commandant.
This reporter is alive today because Marine aviators saved my reconnaissance team several times during missions deep into enemy territory during the Vietnam War. I believe in Marine aviation and wish this series of tragic events had been avoided altogether. Marine aviators have distinguished themselves throughout history.
For Jones, all Marines and the families of the troops killed in MV-22 crashes, a full probe into the aircraft must be conducted publicly. The ongoing criminal cases should resolve the integrity issues.
No more Marines should die in the MV-22 killer albatross until the probe into the MV-22's airworthiness is concluded. Then Jones will be able to make a clear decision based on all of the facts.
North County Times staff writer J. Stryker Meyer served in the U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam from 1968-70.
1/28/01
[email protected]
©1997-2001 North County Times [email protected]
J. Stryker Meyer
Commentary
At least one Marine Corps aviator in the troubled MV-22 tilt-rotor hybrid aircraft program has done something to "the proud, the few" that no military enemy accomplished in the Corps¹ 225-year history: He has tarnished its integrity.
Ten days ago, Pentagon investigators raided the Marine Corps MV-22 headquarters in New River, N.C., searching for evidence against the commanding officer of the air squadron who allegedly told his troops to falsify MV-22 maintenance records to ensure that the test aircraft would go into full production. It was a sad day for the Marine Corps.
If the green light were given for full production, it would have allowed the Defense Department to begin spending $30 billion to produce 360 MV-22s despite unanswered questions about whether the high-tech aircraft can perform at the level Marines need to survive in combat.
Many members of Congress want the contracts to flow to the businesses in more than 40 states that will share in the lucrative construction contracts.
But the Dec. 11 crash of an MV-22 that killed four Marine aviators was the second fatal crash in 2000.
The criminal investigation of possible falsification of records has diverted the public's attention from several disturbing flaws in the MV-22, flaws which must be corrected. Because the Corps¹ integrity has been damaged, drastic actions must be taken to restore America's confidence in the Marine Corps' aviation wing.
A presidential panel should be convened, with subpoena power and the ability to offer witnesses immunity from prosecution. Because the Marine Corps¹ integrity is at stake, this panel should have a limited number of Marine or Navy personnel on it. Experts in the Air Force, the General Accounting Office and the Institute for Defense Analysis know the strengths and the flaws of the MV-22. They should be on the panel, whose findings must be made public.
The so-called Blue Ribbon Commission that former Secretary of Defense William Cohen hastily threw together to look into the last MV-22 crash should be terminated. None of its four members are familiar with helicopters, let along a hybrid machine like the Osprey. Evidence from this panel's early hearings indicated it is just another rubber stamp to certify the Corps¹ desire to see this aircraft go into full production.
The Marine Corps¹ top aviation general, Lt. Gen. Fred McCorkle, should be asked to retire, or removed from his position in aviation. The buck stops at his desk. He should step down and insist that the Commandant of the Marine Corps, James Jones, appoint a new director of aviation.
The criminal investigation should be expanded to include the staff of the Defense Department's Officer of Testing and Evaluation. Until Jan 19, Phil Coyle headed that department, which is mandated to study all new weapons systems before they go into full production.
Coyle developed a reputation as a no-nonsense evaluator. However, he was removed from his post Jan19. Government and Pentagon insiders said key staff members under Coyle ignored, misreported and distorted critical comments about the MV-22. Yet no one in the Pentagon appears to be addressing that conduct, conduct which may be criminal.
For example, during a hearing this month, Coyle told the Blue Ribbon Commission that the Navy had a database containing more than 1,000 pages of reports and test results, many of which contained detailed criticisms of the MV-22. However, it is unclear whether Coyle has reviewed that information.
Have officials at the GAO seen it? Have officials from the Institute of Defense Analysis, which studied the MV-22 and handed a critical report to Coyle, been given the database?
In November, Coyle issued a 154-page report on the MV-22 based on the institute's research. However, Coyle must be asked how much more critical his report would have been had he been able to review the Navy data base.
Test officials from Boeing and Bell, who are working on getting the MV-22 approved for full production, should be subpoenaed and forced to testify under oath about these questions:
Why there was no provision for testing and training pilots of the MV-22 on how to cope with the phenomenon called power settling or asymmetrical vortex ring state ---- a condition in which one of the tilt-rotors essentially stalls when the plane is in helicopter mode. When that happens, the other tilt-rotor drives the aircraft upward until it turns toward the earth and plows into the ground. This is what happened in Arizona eight months ago, when 19 Marines died during a test flight.
Why there was no testing for autorotation, again when the aircraft is in its helicopter mode?
The Chief of Naval Operations should be forced to testify why he signed off on so many waivers on the MV-22, making it easier to get the aircraft approved for full production before critical tests were completed. One item waived was a requirement that pilots get a specific number of flight hours documented before they carry passengers.
The Air Force has rigid standards for every new passenger aircraft. Yet for reasons unexplained, that requirement was waived for the MV-22. Navy officials will not release details about that waiver.
The Marine Corps should be ordered to release the complete accident reports on both MV-22 crashes in 2000. The Corps is withholding elements of the April investigation. Why? The report on the December crash has not yet been completed.
The Defense Department's entire weapons purchasing procedure must be reviewed and improved to protect taxpayers' dollars. The system in place today, whether by intent or ineptitude, hides too much from the public and the people who need to know the truth about a new weapons system.
Marine Commandant Jones recently reiterated his confidence in the MV-22. During a June interview, after he and his wife flew in an MV-22 and Jones announced the return to test and evaluation flights, he remained high on the aircraft and the platform which will transport his Marines deep into enemy territory faster than any conventional helicopter in the world.
I've interviewed Jones and remain impressed with his sense of duty and his love and devotion to the Marine Corps. I'm not convinced that Gen. Jones has been given the entire truth about the MV-22, particularly the many critical assessments from Marine aviators who filed complaints in the Navy database that has been hidden from Coyle, the public and investigators.
As a vote of confidence, Jones should be appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has earned that appointment by his outstanding leadership as Commandant.
This reporter is alive today because Marine aviators saved my reconnaissance team several times during missions deep into enemy territory during the Vietnam War. I believe in Marine aviation and wish this series of tragic events had been avoided altogether. Marine aviators have distinguished themselves throughout history.
For Jones, all Marines and the families of the troops killed in MV-22 crashes, a full probe into the aircraft must be conducted publicly. The ongoing criminal cases should resolve the integrity issues.
No more Marines should die in the MV-22 killer albatross until the probe into the MV-22's airworthiness is concluded. Then Jones will be able to make a clear decision based on all of the facts.
North County Times staff writer J. Stryker Meyer served in the U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam from 1968-70.
1/28/01
[email protected]
©1997-2001 North County Times [email protected]
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Top Marine Generals implicated in Osprey maintenance and safety cover-up:
CBS News:
http://cbsnews.com/now/story/0,1597,268618-412,00.shtml
CBS News:
http://cbsnews.com/now/story/0,1597,268618-412,00.shtml
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http://www.capitolhillblue.com/Artic...Submit&ID=1197
Conflicts of Interest on Osprey Probe Panel
Friday, February 02, 2001
By JOHN WAGNER
McClatchy Newspapers
A four-member panel appointed to evaluate the future of the Marine's troubled V-22 Osprey program may not be quite as independent as the Pentagon advertised, critics say.
One member of the panel, appointed after a fatal Dec. 11 crash in North Carolina, is Eugene Covert, a retired Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor who held a university position funded by Boeing Co., one of the Pentagon's two primary contractors for the Osprey.
More generally, critics question whether panel members are too tightly connected to the military and the defense industry to render an objective judgment on whether the Marines should move forward with a program that the corps' leaders say is essential to their future.
Besides Covert, the panel includes:
_ Retired Marine Gen. John Dailey, a life-long flight enthusiast who now heads the National Air and Space Museum in Washington.
_ Retired Air Force Gen. James Davis, a lobbyist whose post-military career includes a stint as "safety czar" for discount airline ValuJet.
_ Norman Augustine, the retired chief executive officer of Lockheed Martin Corp., the largest defense contractor in the country.
Former Defense Secretary William Cohen appointed the group, promising "an independent, high-level review" of the performance and safety of the Osprey, a unique aircraft that flies like a plane but takes off and lands like a helicopter.
The $40 billion program was abruptly halted after the Dec. 11 crash in Onslow County, N.C., that killed all four Marines on board. Four of the 15 Ospreys delivered to the Marines thus far have now crashed, killing 30.
The group is scheduled to deliver its findings to new Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld within three to four months, and its recommendations could prove pivotal as to whether the program continues.
But not everyone thinks Cohen found the best men for the job.
"Anytime anything in Washington is billed as 'independent,' it rarely is," said Luke Warren, an analyst for the Council for a Livable World, a watchdog group critical of the V-22. "In my mind, an independent panel on something like this should have no connection to the Pentagon whatsoever. The question is whether this thing can fly. There are plenty of civilian engineers who could answer that."
While doubts about the Osprey are growing among key members of Congress, the leadership of the Marines continues to express confidence in the program, even in the wake of recent allegations of doctored maintenance records at Air Station New River, where the V-22 training squadron is based.
Retired Adm. Eugene Carroll, now a weapons analyst with a Washington think tank, said that because of the panel members' military ties, they may feel "institutional pressures" to give the Osprey the benefit of the doubt.
"They're members of the club, and they may not want to jeopardize their membership," Carroll said.
Lt. Col. George Rhynedance, a Pentagon spokesman, said Rumsfeld supports "the process and procedures" of the panel, but he referred all questions about its composition to a Washington consulting firm led by Cohen. A spokesman for the firm did not return phone calls.
Under instructions from the Pentagon, panel members also declined to be interviewed.
Conflicts of Interest on Osprey Probe Panel
Friday, February 02, 2001
By JOHN WAGNER
McClatchy Newspapers
A four-member panel appointed to evaluate the future of the Marine's troubled V-22 Osprey program may not be quite as independent as the Pentagon advertised, critics say.
One member of the panel, appointed after a fatal Dec. 11 crash in North Carolina, is Eugene Covert, a retired Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor who held a university position funded by Boeing Co., one of the Pentagon's two primary contractors for the Osprey.
More generally, critics question whether panel members are too tightly connected to the military and the defense industry to render an objective judgment on whether the Marines should move forward with a program that the corps' leaders say is essential to their future.
Besides Covert, the panel includes:
_ Retired Marine Gen. John Dailey, a life-long flight enthusiast who now heads the National Air and Space Museum in Washington.
_ Retired Air Force Gen. James Davis, a lobbyist whose post-military career includes a stint as "safety czar" for discount airline ValuJet.
_ Norman Augustine, the retired chief executive officer of Lockheed Martin Corp., the largest defense contractor in the country.
Former Defense Secretary William Cohen appointed the group, promising "an independent, high-level review" of the performance and safety of the Osprey, a unique aircraft that flies like a plane but takes off and lands like a helicopter.
The $40 billion program was abruptly halted after the Dec. 11 crash in Onslow County, N.C., that killed all four Marines on board. Four of the 15 Ospreys delivered to the Marines thus far have now crashed, killing 30.
The group is scheduled to deliver its findings to new Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld within three to four months, and its recommendations could prove pivotal as to whether the program continues.
But not everyone thinks Cohen found the best men for the job.
"Anytime anything in Washington is billed as 'independent,' it rarely is," said Luke Warren, an analyst for the Council for a Livable World, a watchdog group critical of the V-22. "In my mind, an independent panel on something like this should have no connection to the Pentagon whatsoever. The question is whether this thing can fly. There are plenty of civilian engineers who could answer that."
While doubts about the Osprey are growing among key members of Congress, the leadership of the Marines continues to express confidence in the program, even in the wake of recent allegations of doctored maintenance records at Air Station New River, where the V-22 training squadron is based.
Retired Adm. Eugene Carroll, now a weapons analyst with a Washington think tank, said that because of the panel members' military ties, they may feel "institutional pressures" to give the Osprey the benefit of the doubt.
"They're members of the club, and they may not want to jeopardize their membership," Carroll said.
Lt. Col. George Rhynedance, a Pentagon spokesman, said Rumsfeld supports "the process and procedures" of the panel, but he referred all questions about its composition to a Washington consulting firm led by Cohen. A spokesman for the firm did not return phone calls.
Under instructions from the Pentagon, panel members also declined to be interviewed.
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(From Aviation Week magazine, January 29, 2001)
V-22 Support Fades Amid Accidents, Accusations, Probes
ROBERT WALL/WASHINGTON
The second largest customer for Bell, Boeing's V-22 tiltrotor, the U.S. Air
Force Special Operations Command, is reconsidering its commitment to the
system in the wake of technical problems and revelations about
maintenance irregularities that have thrown the program into turmoil.
Pentagon officials said there is increasing concern
about the V-22 within the Air Force. However, service officials have not
yet decided whether to drop out. Two development CV-22s, the special
operations version of the Osprey, are among the aircraft still grounded
after the Dec. 11 crash of an MV-22 in which four Marines died.
LOSING AFSOC SUPPORT would be an immense blow to the V-22's main proponent,
the Marine Corps, and not only because it could further undermine confidence in
the program. The loss--reducing the tiltrotor procurement by 50
aircraft, the number AFSOC plans to buy--would increase the $66-million
average cost of the aircraft. Some say the cost is actually higher,
although the Marines quote a lower price.
Signs that confidence in the
program is waning also could be detected last week in Congress. Sens.
John Warner (R-Va.) and Carl Levin (D-Mich.), the senior members of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, wrote Defense Secretary Donald H.
Rumsfeld that "this program will not be able to move forward unless and
until the Defense Dept. has restored confidence in the integrity of the
V-22 program and the people managing it."
Additionally, the Senators
asked Rumsfeld to order-up an investigation into charges that the
Marines falsified V-22 maintenance records. The tip came from an
anonymous mechanic at the V-22 training squadron, VMMT-204, who stated
that the squadron commander, Lt. Col. O. Fred Leberman, ordered the
doctoring of information to improve the aircraft's poor reliability
rate. The Marines dispatched a team of eight to Marine Corps Air
Station New River, N.C., home of VMMT-204, to investigate and they
relieved Leberman, who now faces the possibility of a courts-martial. He
was replaced by Marine Col. Richard H. Dunnivan. The senators called on
Rumsfeld to ensure the allegations would be reviewed independent of
other examinations of the program, which include a blue-ribbon panel set
up by former Defense Secretary William Cohen, and two separate accident
investigations. The lawmakers stressed that the latest look should not
involve the Navy Dept., which was investigating the charges. Hearings on
the V-22 are expected later this year, once the findings of several of
these program assessments are completed, said one congressional staffer.
IN AN UNUSUAL MOVE, apparently aimed at defusing the lawmakers' ire, the
Marines announced only hours after the senators' announcement that the
Marine Corps Inspector General (IG) investigation into the fraud charges
was being transferred to the Pentagon IG. "While I have complete
confidence that the (Marine Corps) IG and his staff would conduct a
thorough, complete and unbiased investigation into these allegations, I
am concerned that the nature and gravity of the allegations may invite
unwarranted perceptions of command influence or institutional bias,"
Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James L. Jones said in a statement. He
added that the Air Force also would benefit more from an independent
investigation. Although much of the recent attention has focused on the
falsification of information, perhaps one of the most damning
indictments in the whistle-blower letter was the view that "this plane
is not ready for the fleet." The writer added that "it needs to spend at
least another two years in test, with people who will identify the
problems so they can be fixed." The Marines contend the aircraft has
been tested thoroughly and that further efforts aren't needed. But
serious technical issues remain unresolved. That became clear as the
Marines laid out more information from the nearly complete mishap
investigation into the Dec. 11 crash. The accident was caused by a
confluence of technical problems. Essentially, a combination of
hydraulics and software failure led to the crash, according to Marine
Corps Lt. Gen. Fred McCorkle, who oversees Marine aviation. The flight,
designated Crossbow-8, was on its final approach into New River, about 7
mi. from the airfield. The aircraft was suffering a leak in its No. 1
hydraulic system that drives flight-critical systems, such as actuators
changing the angle of the nacelles and swashplate actuators which are
used to control collective and cyclic blade pitch that allow thrust
control when in airplane mode. At the moment the pilot started
converting the aircraft from its forward-flight, fixed-wing mode into
helicopter mode for landing, the hydraulics failed. The pilot pushed the
rotors from the 90% fixed-wing mode they had reached back to full 100%
fixed-wing settings but the aircraft crashed moments later nonetheless.
The V-22 is equipped with a triple-redundant hydraulic system and a
mechanism that is supposed to be able to compensate for hydraulics
problems in one line within 0.3 sec. Hydraulic levels are monitored by
the flight control computers that monitor system pressure, reservoir
fluid levels and changes in those levels. If an anomaly is detected, a
combination of local switching isolation valve and remote switching
valve are supposed to reroute hydraulics fluid from other systems, in
this case the second and third, to compensate for the loss in the
primary system. But that emergency system failed because of a software
problem, although the Marines wouldn't identify if the faulty logic was
in the flight control computer or another subsystem. Bell has opted for
a less risky hydraulics system in its BA609 civil tiltrotar which will
operate at 3,000 psi. Despite a history of hydraulic problems, McCorkle
contends that the fact that the latest crash was associated with
hydraulics doesn't raise questions about the aircraft. "[T]his
hydraulics failure has zero to do with technology with the tiltrotor or
with the MV-22," he insisted. He said the hydraulics failure was caused
by "a line that was rubbed through." The Marines ruled out that it was
simply a bad hydraulics line, but were unwilling to explain how it could
fail after only 160 flight hours.
THE V-22'S HYDRAULIC system has been
a headache for the Marines for some time ( AW&ST Jan. 1, p. 32). It was
the single largest failure item during the 804.5 hr. of operational
testing. The system was designed to operate at 5,000 psi rather than the
more traditional 2,000-3,000 psi. because it allowed for lighter and
smaller components. But it has also made the hydraulic system
leak-prone, the Pentagon test officials found. Although the Marines
insist the MV-22 is production ready, they are still working on a number
of design changes, particularly in hydraulics. Development testing led
to seven immediate changes, with four more in the works and additional
fixes being considered. The Marines and the informant both said the
falsified maintenance records had nothing to do with the Dec. 11
accident or one last April in which 19 Marines died. "This is not what
caused the previous two mishaps this year, but if it continues it will
cause many more," the anonymous mechanic said. However, it is unclear
whether accurate maintenance records may have led to safety-related
design changes on the aircraft.
Returning V-22s to flying status isn't
expected anytime soon, noted one Marine Corps official. It would have to
wait at the very least until the IG investigation is almost complete.
©January 29, 2001 The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc.
V-22 Support Fades Amid Accidents, Accusations, Probes
ROBERT WALL/WASHINGTON
The second largest customer for Bell, Boeing's V-22 tiltrotor, the U.S. Air
Force Special Operations Command, is reconsidering its commitment to the
system in the wake of technical problems and revelations about
maintenance irregularities that have thrown the program into turmoil.
Pentagon officials said there is increasing concern
about the V-22 within the Air Force. However, service officials have not
yet decided whether to drop out. Two development CV-22s, the special
operations version of the Osprey, are among the aircraft still grounded
after the Dec. 11 crash of an MV-22 in which four Marines died.
LOSING AFSOC SUPPORT would be an immense blow to the V-22's main proponent,
the Marine Corps, and not only because it could further undermine confidence in
the program. The loss--reducing the tiltrotor procurement by 50
aircraft, the number AFSOC plans to buy--would increase the $66-million
average cost of the aircraft. Some say the cost is actually higher,
although the Marines quote a lower price.
Signs that confidence in the
program is waning also could be detected last week in Congress. Sens.
John Warner (R-Va.) and Carl Levin (D-Mich.), the senior members of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, wrote Defense Secretary Donald H.
Rumsfeld that "this program will not be able to move forward unless and
until the Defense Dept. has restored confidence in the integrity of the
V-22 program and the people managing it."
Additionally, the Senators
asked Rumsfeld to order-up an investigation into charges that the
Marines falsified V-22 maintenance records. The tip came from an
anonymous mechanic at the V-22 training squadron, VMMT-204, who stated
that the squadron commander, Lt. Col. O. Fred Leberman, ordered the
doctoring of information to improve the aircraft's poor reliability
rate. The Marines dispatched a team of eight to Marine Corps Air
Station New River, N.C., home of VMMT-204, to investigate and they
relieved Leberman, who now faces the possibility of a courts-martial. He
was replaced by Marine Col. Richard H. Dunnivan. The senators called on
Rumsfeld to ensure the allegations would be reviewed independent of
other examinations of the program, which include a blue-ribbon panel set
up by former Defense Secretary William Cohen, and two separate accident
investigations. The lawmakers stressed that the latest look should not
involve the Navy Dept., which was investigating the charges. Hearings on
the V-22 are expected later this year, once the findings of several of
these program assessments are completed, said one congressional staffer.
IN AN UNUSUAL MOVE, apparently aimed at defusing the lawmakers' ire, the
Marines announced only hours after the senators' announcement that the
Marine Corps Inspector General (IG) investigation into the fraud charges
was being transferred to the Pentagon IG. "While I have complete
confidence that the (Marine Corps) IG and his staff would conduct a
thorough, complete and unbiased investigation into these allegations, I
am concerned that the nature and gravity of the allegations may invite
unwarranted perceptions of command influence or institutional bias,"
Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James L. Jones said in a statement. He
added that the Air Force also would benefit more from an independent
investigation. Although much of the recent attention has focused on the
falsification of information, perhaps one of the most damning
indictments in the whistle-blower letter was the view that "this plane
is not ready for the fleet." The writer added that "it needs to spend at
least another two years in test, with people who will identify the
problems so they can be fixed." The Marines contend the aircraft has
been tested thoroughly and that further efforts aren't needed. But
serious technical issues remain unresolved. That became clear as the
Marines laid out more information from the nearly complete mishap
investigation into the Dec. 11 crash. The accident was caused by a
confluence of technical problems. Essentially, a combination of
hydraulics and software failure led to the crash, according to Marine
Corps Lt. Gen. Fred McCorkle, who oversees Marine aviation. The flight,
designated Crossbow-8, was on its final approach into New River, about 7
mi. from the airfield. The aircraft was suffering a leak in its No. 1
hydraulic system that drives flight-critical systems, such as actuators
changing the angle of the nacelles and swashplate actuators which are
used to control collective and cyclic blade pitch that allow thrust
control when in airplane mode. At the moment the pilot started
converting the aircraft from its forward-flight, fixed-wing mode into
helicopter mode for landing, the hydraulics failed. The pilot pushed the
rotors from the 90% fixed-wing mode they had reached back to full 100%
fixed-wing settings but the aircraft crashed moments later nonetheless.
The V-22 is equipped with a triple-redundant hydraulic system and a
mechanism that is supposed to be able to compensate for hydraulics
problems in one line within 0.3 sec. Hydraulic levels are monitored by
the flight control computers that monitor system pressure, reservoir
fluid levels and changes in those levels. If an anomaly is detected, a
combination of local switching isolation valve and remote switching
valve are supposed to reroute hydraulics fluid from other systems, in
this case the second and third, to compensate for the loss in the
primary system. But that emergency system failed because of a software
problem, although the Marines wouldn't identify if the faulty logic was
in the flight control computer or another subsystem. Bell has opted for
a less risky hydraulics system in its BA609 civil tiltrotar which will
operate at 3,000 psi. Despite a history of hydraulic problems, McCorkle
contends that the fact that the latest crash was associated with
hydraulics doesn't raise questions about the aircraft. "[T]his
hydraulics failure has zero to do with technology with the tiltrotor or
with the MV-22," he insisted. He said the hydraulics failure was caused
by "a line that was rubbed through." The Marines ruled out that it was
simply a bad hydraulics line, but were unwilling to explain how it could
fail after only 160 flight hours.
THE V-22'S HYDRAULIC system has been
a headache for the Marines for some time ( AW&ST Jan. 1, p. 32). It was
the single largest failure item during the 804.5 hr. of operational
testing. The system was designed to operate at 5,000 psi rather than the
more traditional 2,000-3,000 psi. because it allowed for lighter and
smaller components. But it has also made the hydraulic system
leak-prone, the Pentagon test officials found. Although the Marines
insist the MV-22 is production ready, they are still working on a number
of design changes, particularly in hydraulics. Development testing led
to seven immediate changes, with four more in the works and additional
fixes being considered. The Marines and the informant both said the
falsified maintenance records had nothing to do with the Dec. 11
accident or one last April in which 19 Marines died. "This is not what
caused the previous two mishaps this year, but if it continues it will
cause many more," the anonymous mechanic said. However, it is unclear
whether accurate maintenance records may have led to safety-related
design changes on the aircraft.
Returning V-22s to flying status isn't
expected anytime soon, noted one Marine Corps official. It would have to
wait at the very least until the IG investigation is almost complete.
©January 29, 2001 The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc.
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Posts: n/a
FEBRUARY 5, 2001 VOL. 157 NO. 5
NATION
Wounded Osprey
Revelations show that the revolutionary new plane is in deeper trouble than the Marines have said
BY MARK THOMPSON/WASHINGTON
When the Marines stripped Lieut. Colonel Odin Leberman of his command of the corps' lone V-22 Osprey squadron, Leberman admitted that he had told his mechanics to falsify maintenance records to make the troubled aircraft look better. The Osprey, despite 18 years of work and a $12 billion taxpayer investment, needed all the help it could get. Two crashes in the space of eight months had killed 23 Marines, aggravating concerns of the Pentagon about the aircraft's reliability as it weighed going into full-scale production. But now, as the Pentagon begins full-blown probes into both the Osprey and Leberman's conduct, new doubts are being raised about the plane's safety, utility and readiness that go far deeper than the Marines have yet acknowledged.
Some challenges are to be expected when building a revolutionary aircraft that takes off and lands like a helicopter but cruises like an airplane--at twice a chopper's speed. As pilots like to say, military flight manuals are written in blood. The growing question around the Osprey is whether its rotor design has a tendency to push the aircraft into a roll that quickly turns into a fatal plunge. Such dives "can occur at any time and consequences are exceedingly grave," according to an unreleased General Accounting Office report circulating on Capitol Hill. "The V-22 appears to be less forgiving than conventional helicopters."
But even if the plane is safe, there are pressing concerns about the military value of the V-22. While the Marines insist the Osprey is ready for production, it has not been approved for combat maneuvers and lacks its required gun. The winds created by its dual 38-ft. rotors are so strong that landing in a desert kicks up sand "brownouts" that can blind pilots and rescuing someone from the sea is made extremely difficult. Marines climbing down ropes from Ospreys in combat simulations aboard ships or oil platforms have to hit the deck and stay there until the aircraft departs or risk being blown overboard. Communications gear aboard the Osprey is so ineffective that the plane cannot efficiently contact other aircraft, nor can it land at some airports without escort planes outfitted with better electronics to guide it safely through the skies.
But the Osprey's real bugaboo is the amount of maintenance it requires, which is why Leberman ordered his troops to falsify records. "Maintainers are being told they have to lie on maintenance records to make the numbers look good," a V-22 mechanic said in an anonymous letter to the Pentagon. What is amazing is how bad the numbers are--even after the deception. A recent independent review, apparently incorporating the misleading data, said the V-22s were fully prepared for their missions just 20% of the time, well short of the corps' 75% requirement. An Osprey crash last April in Arizona, killing 19 Marines, highlights the plane's maintenance woes. The Osprey had spent only 135 hours in the air during the three months the Marines owned it. Yet it needed 600 repairs--one fix for every 15 minutes of flying time. The Osprey is far less ready for action than the Vietnam-era CH-46 chopper it is supposed to replace.
And then there are the nickel-and-dime problems that many in the Pentagon say shouldn't be cropping up in a planned $38 billion program on the verge of production by Bell Helicopter and the Boeing Co. The doors on each $83 million craft are difficult to open, the interiors lack hand grips so that passengers can safely move about the cabin in flight, and the heating and cooling systems can't maintain comfortable cabin temperatures. In the hot confines of the cabin, Pentagon testers noted, Marines will have to drink a lot of water to be ready to fight, which highlights another shortcoming: the V-22 has no toilet facilities.
Despite these concerns, Marine officers say, the Pentagon was well on its way to approving full-scale production. Then a December Osprey crash killed four Marines and, a month later, disclosures about the fudged records put that decision on hold. For now, the Pentagon's 12 Ospreys remain grounded.
It was more than a decade ago that Dick Cheney, who was then running the Pentagon, tried to kill the program because of its high price tag. But the corps and its allies on Capitol Hill waged war against him and won. Now a new battle over the Osprey looms. If Vice President Cheney decides to wage war again, this time he will come far better armed.
END
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ar...,97098,00.html
NATION
Wounded Osprey
Revelations show that the revolutionary new plane is in deeper trouble than the Marines have said
BY MARK THOMPSON/WASHINGTON
When the Marines stripped Lieut. Colonel Odin Leberman of his command of the corps' lone V-22 Osprey squadron, Leberman admitted that he had told his mechanics to falsify maintenance records to make the troubled aircraft look better. The Osprey, despite 18 years of work and a $12 billion taxpayer investment, needed all the help it could get. Two crashes in the space of eight months had killed 23 Marines, aggravating concerns of the Pentagon about the aircraft's reliability as it weighed going into full-scale production. But now, as the Pentagon begins full-blown probes into both the Osprey and Leberman's conduct, new doubts are being raised about the plane's safety, utility and readiness that go far deeper than the Marines have yet acknowledged.
Some challenges are to be expected when building a revolutionary aircraft that takes off and lands like a helicopter but cruises like an airplane--at twice a chopper's speed. As pilots like to say, military flight manuals are written in blood. The growing question around the Osprey is whether its rotor design has a tendency to push the aircraft into a roll that quickly turns into a fatal plunge. Such dives "can occur at any time and consequences are exceedingly grave," according to an unreleased General Accounting Office report circulating on Capitol Hill. "The V-22 appears to be less forgiving than conventional helicopters."
But even if the plane is safe, there are pressing concerns about the military value of the V-22. While the Marines insist the Osprey is ready for production, it has not been approved for combat maneuvers and lacks its required gun. The winds created by its dual 38-ft. rotors are so strong that landing in a desert kicks up sand "brownouts" that can blind pilots and rescuing someone from the sea is made extremely difficult. Marines climbing down ropes from Ospreys in combat simulations aboard ships or oil platforms have to hit the deck and stay there until the aircraft departs or risk being blown overboard. Communications gear aboard the Osprey is so ineffective that the plane cannot efficiently contact other aircraft, nor can it land at some airports without escort planes outfitted with better electronics to guide it safely through the skies.
But the Osprey's real bugaboo is the amount of maintenance it requires, which is why Leberman ordered his troops to falsify records. "Maintainers are being told they have to lie on maintenance records to make the numbers look good," a V-22 mechanic said in an anonymous letter to the Pentagon. What is amazing is how bad the numbers are--even after the deception. A recent independent review, apparently incorporating the misleading data, said the V-22s were fully prepared for their missions just 20% of the time, well short of the corps' 75% requirement. An Osprey crash last April in Arizona, killing 19 Marines, highlights the plane's maintenance woes. The Osprey had spent only 135 hours in the air during the three months the Marines owned it. Yet it needed 600 repairs--one fix for every 15 minutes of flying time. The Osprey is far less ready for action than the Vietnam-era CH-46 chopper it is supposed to replace.
And then there are the nickel-and-dime problems that many in the Pentagon say shouldn't be cropping up in a planned $38 billion program on the verge of production by Bell Helicopter and the Boeing Co. The doors on each $83 million craft are difficult to open, the interiors lack hand grips so that passengers can safely move about the cabin in flight, and the heating and cooling systems can't maintain comfortable cabin temperatures. In the hot confines of the cabin, Pentagon testers noted, Marines will have to drink a lot of water to be ready to fight, which highlights another shortcoming: the V-22 has no toilet facilities.
Despite these concerns, Marine officers say, the Pentagon was well on its way to approving full-scale production. Then a December Osprey crash killed four Marines and, a month later, disclosures about the fudged records put that decision on hold. For now, the Pentagon's 12 Ospreys remain grounded.
It was more than a decade ago that Dick Cheney, who was then running the Pentagon, tried to kill the program because of its high price tag. But the corps and its allies on Capitol Hill waged war against him and won. Now a new battle over the Osprey looms. If Vice President Cheney decides to wage war again, this time he will come far better armed.
END
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ar...,97098,00.html
Guest
Posts: n/a
PTI-UAE
a. I think Lu Zuckerman's first post on this thread says it all regarding your motivation (in addition to his later email to me). I refer to your emailing him (before he'd posted) and asking him not to post on this thread. But as various people kept bringing the thread back onto the page, and thereby accessible, I guess the mystic reason for your last lengthy unfathomable post was to volumetrically (and pastily) consign the thread to readable obscurity. Condescending homilies about basic aerodynamics and glib obfuscations merely constitute a filibustering attempt to deflect the reader's attention from the very real problems facing tilt-rotor design, (flaws and foibles). So that was a bit desperate IMHO and if you'd like to recapture your credibility I suggest you (and inept henchman HeliFlight) try to concentrate on the core issues - as they've latterly emerged. If I appear to be questioning your "impartiality" re the Osprey, perhaps anyone would get the impression from this next thread that your future is very much tied to tilt-rotor success - so your bias and denial is quite understandable. http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/For...ML/000389.html
We'll assume that you're not personally implicated in the great tilt-rotor "tilt".
Reference your 19 Jan post (on the "Another MV-22 Lost"???.thread) and your taking exception to the reference to the "hierarchy having little concern for the troops..":
Well, apart from that being one of the express motivations of the whistle-blower:
a. You must somehow consider that a reported 73.2% (just below min acceptable for full production) versus the real MC rate of 20% does not at all compromise the integrity of the OPEVAL and the fixes that may have otherwise been put in place (and which would have obviously made it a safer operation).
b. Bearing in mind that Generals James Amos and Fred McCorkle are now fully implicated in the maintenance and serviceability data fraud (by their emails), it would seem that the hierarchy was focussing on something other than safety.
c. But don't fret because, looking at the J. Wagner article (on that thread), about the make-up of the "independent" review team (Blue Ribbon Commission), one cannot be at all reassured that the review, as constituted by Cohen, will be impartial at all. i.e. The MV-22B will assuredly go on - as intended by that rubber-stamp exercise.
So perhaps, now having taken in all those points, you might consider your criticism to have been a little unfair. And that is apart from the fact that it was a direct post of an email that accompanied the article - it came from very close aboard. There was nothing emotive about it at all for someone with a little insight into what has been happening on the inside - and the likely outcome of the review.
to mention a few relevant specifics:
a. Cautions about rates of descent at low IAS were added in June (after Marana) to the MV22B's pilot's Manual (NATOPS).
b. The JAG REPORT agrees fully with AsymmVR being a problem:
When the service released copies of the JAG report, the opinions and recommendations sections were deliberately omitted, leaving unresolved key questions about their contents. However as Head of the Civil TiltRotor Consortium you will have seen these (as have I) and know that AsymmVR is assessed as a real problem (as confirmed by the Pax River Flight Trials in August). Abiding concerns about AsymmVR were also reflected in both Director Phil Coyle's OT Report and the recent GAO Report.
Some Telling Quotes:
"Coyle (Dir OT) developed a reputation as a no-nonsense evaluator. However, he was removed from his post Jan19. Government and Pentagon insiders said key staff members under Coyle ignored, misreported and distorted critical comments about the MV-22. Yet no one in the Pentagon appears to be addressing that conduct, conduct which may be criminal." NC Times
"The growing question around the Osprey is whether its rotor design has a tendency to push the aircraft into a roll that quickly turns into a fatal plunge. Such dives "can occur at any time and consequences are exceedingly grave," according to an unreleased General Accounting Office report circulating on Capitol Hill. "The V-22 appears to be less forgiving than conventional helicopters." "The GAO assessment, which melds and interprets the findings of three earlier reports, echoes a Marine Corps legal opinion compiled after the April 8 crash, the GAO said. That opinion hasn't yet been made public in full."
"The contributing factors to the mishap -- a steep approach with a high rate of descent and slow airspeed, poor aircrew coordination, and diminished situational awareness -- are also not peculiar to tiltrotors, the report continues. "However, the end result, rapid departure from controlled flight, is more extreme than results experienced in most rotorcraft to date," the JAG report concludes.
"There's a GAO Report out that says there's a fundamental flaw in the design of the aircraft" Dick Cheney in a PBS interview.
"A recent independent review, apparently incorporating the misleading data, said the V-22s were fully prepared for their missions just 20% of the time, well short of the Corps' 75% requirement. The Osprey had spent only 135 hours in the air during the three months the Marines owned it. Yet it needed 600 repairs--one fix for every 15 minutes of flying time. The Osprey is far less ready for action than the Vietnam-era CH-46 chopper it is supposed to replace." Time Magazine (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,97098,00.html)
"As the Bush defense mavens settle in, they are expressing an early predilection to press on with the F-22 (fighter) program. More vulnerable than the F-22 is the V-22 tiltrotor. Said one (military) briefer of the new senior civilian leaders: 'It's still not ready for production after 10 years of development, and the Bush Administration doesn't want to be tainted by supporting it.' They think the Marines could buy UH-60 variants, CH-53's, and the improved CH-47 for vertical lift assignments". Jan 01 Aviation Week magazine in the WASHINGTON OUTLOOK column on page 25:
Now remember that these aren't UNCTUOUS opinions, but quotes from reports based on the JAG report, GAO assessments and the PAX River Trials' Findings.
by contrast:
some PTI-UAE Quotes:
"?.add warning devices such as temperature gauges, pressure gauges, warning lights (temp & press), and chip detectors so that an impending failure will be recognized in order to provide the pilot with enough time to get the a/c on the ground before complete failure occurs." - suggest you check timings on Dec 11th crash.
"?your theory that a warning device is not possible." -waiting anxiously (but not expectantly). The dynamic nature of the asymmVR onset (two secs to unrecoverable) would likely be such that any software-based warnings would be coincident with the terminal roll.
"It was believed that the conditions required to encounter it were too extreme to consider. They were wrong. The fact that the accident did occur shows greater understanding is required and it will now be studied further. No matter how extreme the conditions must be to get you into it, the point is it can happen." << consider that 95 degree tilt plus interim power may be a deadly combination for AsymmVR entry.>>
I concede that 95 degree rotor-tilt was a later add-on to the XV-15
Problems (a continuing lack of understanding) exemplified by:
"No, absolutely not," Lt. Gen. Fred McCorkle told reporters on May 9 (and again at a later date) when asked if there was is any evidence to suggest the V-22 is more susceptible than other rotorcraft to power settling or settling with power. McCorkle, the assistant commandant for aviation, said he believes the V-22 is less susceptible to such conditions when compared to other helicopters. "In fact, I would say [the V-22 is] less [susceptible] because of the amount of power that it's got."
Solutions
The only way to stave off the lethal potentiality of asymmVR as a rapid onset terminal handling problem is to go for greater disk solidity (more blades means a progressively less intense vortex-sheet and delayed ring formation). Three is not enough, five would be good - but of course there is a great weight penalty for that, as well as prohibitive complexity in a five-bladed hub.
There are some politicial obstacles to cancelling the V-22. Assembly to be in Texas (Bush's home state) and in Pennsylvania (in district of Rep. Kurt Weldon, conservative Republican). Is Sikorsky an option? The plant is in Connecticut, home of Sen. Joe Lieberman, Gore's ex-running mate. Politics may triumph over performance.
I'd guess that only about 50% of soft orders for 609's will fold. But being "soft" orders, the funds are quite productively sitting in escrow - so maybe none at all in the long interim.
BTW John Farley and I don't have any disagreements at all. We're long-time friends - and from the same service. His first post to the thread was at my instigation. You can have copies of our emails at the time if you'd like. JF knows exactly who I am and my background. He's always been a gentleman and me a pragmatist. At least, if he's disagreed with what I've had to say, he's not brought it to my attention. Not trying to put him on the spot here at all. It's just that you (PTI UAE) brought it up (although the point was lost on me).
http://www.g2mil.com/V-22.htm The V-22 Fiasco
http://cbsnews.com/now/story/0,1597,268618-412,00.shtml Top Marines in Osprey Cover-up
http://www.angelfire.com/me/swissair...ortexRing.html
(six pages)
[This message has been edited by UNCTUOUS (edited 05 February 2001).]
a. I think Lu Zuckerman's first post on this thread says it all regarding your motivation (in addition to his later email to me). I refer to your emailing him (before he'd posted) and asking him not to post on this thread. But as various people kept bringing the thread back onto the page, and thereby accessible, I guess the mystic reason for your last lengthy unfathomable post was to volumetrically (and pastily) consign the thread to readable obscurity. Condescending homilies about basic aerodynamics and glib obfuscations merely constitute a filibustering attempt to deflect the reader's attention from the very real problems facing tilt-rotor design, (flaws and foibles). So that was a bit desperate IMHO and if you'd like to recapture your credibility I suggest you (and inept henchman HeliFlight) try to concentrate on the core issues - as they've latterly emerged. If I appear to be questioning your "impartiality" re the Osprey, perhaps anyone would get the impression from this next thread that your future is very much tied to tilt-rotor success - so your bias and denial is quite understandable. http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/For...ML/000389.html
We'll assume that you're not personally implicated in the great tilt-rotor "tilt".
Reference your 19 Jan post (on the "Another MV-22 Lost"???.thread) and your taking exception to the reference to the "hierarchy having little concern for the troops..":
Well, apart from that being one of the express motivations of the whistle-blower:
a. You must somehow consider that a reported 73.2% (just below min acceptable for full production) versus the real MC rate of 20% does not at all compromise the integrity of the OPEVAL and the fixes that may have otherwise been put in place (and which would have obviously made it a safer operation).
b. Bearing in mind that Generals James Amos and Fred McCorkle are now fully implicated in the maintenance and serviceability data fraud (by their emails), it would seem that the hierarchy was focussing on something other than safety.
c. But don't fret because, looking at the J. Wagner article (on that thread), about the make-up of the "independent" review team (Blue Ribbon Commission), one cannot be at all reassured that the review, as constituted by Cohen, will be impartial at all. i.e. The MV-22B will assuredly go on - as intended by that rubber-stamp exercise.
So perhaps, now having taken in all those points, you might consider your criticism to have been a little unfair. And that is apart from the fact that it was a direct post of an email that accompanied the article - it came from very close aboard. There was nothing emotive about it at all for someone with a little insight into what has been happening on the inside - and the likely outcome of the review.
to mention a few relevant specifics:
a. Cautions about rates of descent at low IAS were added in June (after Marana) to the MV22B's pilot's Manual (NATOPS).
b. The JAG REPORT agrees fully with AsymmVR being a problem:
When the service released copies of the JAG report, the opinions and recommendations sections were deliberately omitted, leaving unresolved key questions about their contents. However as Head of the Civil TiltRotor Consortium you will have seen these (as have I) and know that AsymmVR is assessed as a real problem (as confirmed by the Pax River Flight Trials in August). Abiding concerns about AsymmVR were also reflected in both Director Phil Coyle's OT Report and the recent GAO Report.
Some Telling Quotes:
"Coyle (Dir OT) developed a reputation as a no-nonsense evaluator. However, he was removed from his post Jan19. Government and Pentagon insiders said key staff members under Coyle ignored, misreported and distorted critical comments about the MV-22. Yet no one in the Pentagon appears to be addressing that conduct, conduct which may be criminal." NC Times
"The growing question around the Osprey is whether its rotor design has a tendency to push the aircraft into a roll that quickly turns into a fatal plunge. Such dives "can occur at any time and consequences are exceedingly grave," according to an unreleased General Accounting Office report circulating on Capitol Hill. "The V-22 appears to be less forgiving than conventional helicopters." "The GAO assessment, which melds and interprets the findings of three earlier reports, echoes a Marine Corps legal opinion compiled after the April 8 crash, the GAO said. That opinion hasn't yet been made public in full."
"The contributing factors to the mishap -- a steep approach with a high rate of descent and slow airspeed, poor aircrew coordination, and diminished situational awareness -- are also not peculiar to tiltrotors, the report continues. "However, the end result, rapid departure from controlled flight, is more extreme than results experienced in most rotorcraft to date," the JAG report concludes.
"There's a GAO Report out that says there's a fundamental flaw in the design of the aircraft" Dick Cheney in a PBS interview.
"A recent independent review, apparently incorporating the misleading data, said the V-22s were fully prepared for their missions just 20% of the time, well short of the Corps' 75% requirement. The Osprey had spent only 135 hours in the air during the three months the Marines owned it. Yet it needed 600 repairs--one fix for every 15 minutes of flying time. The Osprey is far less ready for action than the Vietnam-era CH-46 chopper it is supposed to replace." Time Magazine (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,97098,00.html)
"As the Bush defense mavens settle in, they are expressing an early predilection to press on with the F-22 (fighter) program. More vulnerable than the F-22 is the V-22 tiltrotor. Said one (military) briefer of the new senior civilian leaders: 'It's still not ready for production after 10 years of development, and the Bush Administration doesn't want to be tainted by supporting it.' They think the Marines could buy UH-60 variants, CH-53's, and the improved CH-47 for vertical lift assignments". Jan 01 Aviation Week magazine in the WASHINGTON OUTLOOK column on page 25:
Now remember that these aren't UNCTUOUS opinions, but quotes from reports based on the JAG report, GAO assessments and the PAX River Trials' Findings.
by contrast:
some PTI-UAE Quotes:
"?.add warning devices such as temperature gauges, pressure gauges, warning lights (temp & press), and chip detectors so that an impending failure will be recognized in order to provide the pilot with enough time to get the a/c on the ground before complete failure occurs." - suggest you check timings on Dec 11th crash.
"?your theory that a warning device is not possible." -waiting anxiously (but not expectantly). The dynamic nature of the asymmVR onset (two secs to unrecoverable) would likely be such that any software-based warnings would be coincident with the terminal roll.
"It was believed that the conditions required to encounter it were too extreme to consider. They were wrong. The fact that the accident did occur shows greater understanding is required and it will now be studied further. No matter how extreme the conditions must be to get you into it, the point is it can happen." << consider that 95 degree tilt plus interim power may be a deadly combination for AsymmVR entry.>>
I concede that 95 degree rotor-tilt was a later add-on to the XV-15
Problems (a continuing lack of understanding) exemplified by:
"No, absolutely not," Lt. Gen. Fred McCorkle told reporters on May 9 (and again at a later date) when asked if there was is any evidence to suggest the V-22 is more susceptible than other rotorcraft to power settling or settling with power. McCorkle, the assistant commandant for aviation, said he believes the V-22 is less susceptible to such conditions when compared to other helicopters. "In fact, I would say [the V-22 is] less [susceptible] because of the amount of power that it's got."
Solutions
The only way to stave off the lethal potentiality of asymmVR as a rapid onset terminal handling problem is to go for greater disk solidity (more blades means a progressively less intense vortex-sheet and delayed ring formation). Three is not enough, five would be good - but of course there is a great weight penalty for that, as well as prohibitive complexity in a five-bladed hub.
There are some politicial obstacles to cancelling the V-22. Assembly to be in Texas (Bush's home state) and in Pennsylvania (in district of Rep. Kurt Weldon, conservative Republican). Is Sikorsky an option? The plant is in Connecticut, home of Sen. Joe Lieberman, Gore's ex-running mate. Politics may triumph over performance.
I'd guess that only about 50% of soft orders for 609's will fold. But being "soft" orders, the funds are quite productively sitting in escrow - so maybe none at all in the long interim.
BTW John Farley and I don't have any disagreements at all. We're long-time friends - and from the same service. His first post to the thread was at my instigation. You can have copies of our emails at the time if you'd like. JF knows exactly who I am and my background. He's always been a gentleman and me a pragmatist. At least, if he's disagreed with what I've had to say, he's not brought it to my attention. Not trying to put him on the spot here at all. It's just that you (PTI UAE) brought it up (although the point was lost on me).
http://www.g2mil.com/V-22.htm The V-22 Fiasco
http://cbsnews.com/now/story/0,1597,268618-412,00.shtml Top Marines in Osprey Cover-up
http://www.angelfire.com/me/swissair...ortexRing.html
(six pages)
[This message has been edited by UNCTUOUS (edited 05 February 2001).]
Guest
Posts: n/a
To: All
The individual that requested that I not add credence to the various posts by posting a reply has asked me to clarify one point. It was not PTI that made the request alluded to in the post by Unctuous. So, I guess an apology is in order
------------------
The Cat
The individual that requested that I not add credence to the various posts by posting a reply has asked me to clarify one point. It was not PTI that made the request alluded to in the post by Unctuous. So, I guess an apology is in order
------------------
The Cat
Guest
Posts: n/a
Lu
You were asked not to add creedence to an argument? From your post above.
"One other theoretical question, if the aircraft is in an autorotational situation and the proprotors are being propelled by the upward flow of the onrushing relative wind can the vortex ring state be initiated when the flow of air is up and not down. Get out your thinking caps and figure this out."
First understand that the vortex ring we worry about in the context of this discussion as opeators of rotory wing aircraft is not normally the one at the blade tip but the one created near the center of the rotor system at the line of demarcation between the normally downflowing air and the upflow of air caused by the aircraft descending at a rate faster than the air from the rotor system in this area is descending. No bonus for sentence structure is claimed.
Helicopter pilots are taught this as a basic part of operational theory. No thinking caps required.
If the aircraft is in an autorotational situation and has no appreciable forward speed component the rotor RPM will slow, as the resultant realitive wind is at too great an angle to provide for the forward rotation of the blades.
As the rotor slows the air being pushed down in the center of the system is even less and more of the center area is occupied by air going up through the rotor system. So, more of the rotor system is not contributing lift, aircraft descends faster.
Now increase pitch and further increase the resultant angle and make all above worse.
With sufficient forward speed in autorotation, the resultant wind is at a sufficient angle to not exceed stall angle of the blade section. Also remember that a forward speed autorotation and a too steep descent at a too slow airspeed are different maneuvers, hopefully.
So, vortex ring state is not a problem associated with what a helicopter pilot considers an autorotation, a maneuver designed to help deal with a problem, not cause it. (Hovering auto not considerd)
[This message has been edited by VLift (edited 06 February 2001).]
You were asked not to add creedence to an argument? From your post above.
"One other theoretical question, if the aircraft is in an autorotational situation and the proprotors are being propelled by the upward flow of the onrushing relative wind can the vortex ring state be initiated when the flow of air is up and not down. Get out your thinking caps and figure this out."
First understand that the vortex ring we worry about in the context of this discussion as opeators of rotory wing aircraft is not normally the one at the blade tip but the one created near the center of the rotor system at the line of demarcation between the normally downflowing air and the upflow of air caused by the aircraft descending at a rate faster than the air from the rotor system in this area is descending. No bonus for sentence structure is claimed.
Helicopter pilots are taught this as a basic part of operational theory. No thinking caps required.
If the aircraft is in an autorotational situation and has no appreciable forward speed component the rotor RPM will slow, as the resultant realitive wind is at too great an angle to provide for the forward rotation of the blades.
As the rotor slows the air being pushed down in the center of the system is even less and more of the center area is occupied by air going up through the rotor system. So, more of the rotor system is not contributing lift, aircraft descends faster.
Now increase pitch and further increase the resultant angle and make all above worse.
With sufficient forward speed in autorotation, the resultant wind is at a sufficient angle to not exceed stall angle of the blade section. Also remember that a forward speed autorotation and a too steep descent at a too slow airspeed are different maneuvers, hopefully.
So, vortex ring state is not a problem associated with what a helicopter pilot considers an autorotation, a maneuver designed to help deal with a problem, not cause it. (Hovering auto not considerd)
[This message has been edited by VLift (edited 06 February 2001).]
Guest
Posts: n/a
To: V Lift
I guess I didn’t have my thinking cap on when I formulated the question.
The problem as I see it is covered in the second and second last paragraphs in my post. It was my understanding that the pilot tried to arrest his descent rate by pulling aft cyclic and at that time he entered into the Vortex Ring State and the aircraft fell out from underbneath him and he crashed. At that time he was falling at 2000 FPM. My question was if a V22 pilot has to enter into an autorotation (with no other conversion available) and his rate of descent is 4-6000 FPM and he enters into a cyclic flare (which is what the pilot in Arizona did) to arrest his rate of descent will he or, will he not enter into Vortex Ring State. The two situations appear to be the same. Even if he doesn’t enter into Vortex Ring State he is still unable to arrest his rate of descent in order to keep from crashing the aircraft.
IMHO
------------------
The Cat
I guess I didn’t have my thinking cap on when I formulated the question.
The problem as I see it is covered in the second and second last paragraphs in my post. It was my understanding that the pilot tried to arrest his descent rate by pulling aft cyclic and at that time he entered into the Vortex Ring State and the aircraft fell out from underbneath him and he crashed. At that time he was falling at 2000 FPM. My question was if a V22 pilot has to enter into an autorotation (with no other conversion available) and his rate of descent is 4-6000 FPM and he enters into a cyclic flare (which is what the pilot in Arizona did) to arrest his rate of descent will he or, will he not enter into Vortex Ring State. The two situations appear to be the same. Even if he doesn’t enter into Vortex Ring State he is still unable to arrest his rate of descent in order to keep from crashing the aircraft.
IMHO
------------------
The Cat
Guest
Posts: n/a
UNCTUOUS,
Here we go again…some kids just never learn. Once again you have driven off the cliff of absurdity, but this time you forgot to fasten your safety belt.
____________________________________________________________ _________
a. (the first ‘a’
) Starting at the top, you have completely missed the mark again (or pulled an “Unctuous” as we like to say). I made no request of Lu Zuckerman to refrain from posting on this thread. The individual who e-mailed him also contacted me to request that I not make any posts on a thread that Mr. Zuckerman was posting to at that time. The reason given was to “maintain thread integrity” by keeping posts related to the Marana accident only on that thread, and posts pertaining to the North Carolina accident only on that thread. If you read the P.S. on the bottom of my post on 19 January on the ‘Marine V-22 Maint Falsification’ thread, you will see where I described that request which was made to both myself and Mr. Zuckerman. Once again you have failed to get the facts straight before posting. I will give you credit for one thing though – consistency.
____________________________________________________________ ________
As far as your comments on the length of my previous post – ‘those who live in glass houses should not throw rocks.’ If you do a side by side comparison, I would imagine you have taken up at least five times as much space with your posts than I have with mine. Take a look at the length of the post you made above compared to my previous post that you were complaining about – were you making “a filibustering attempt to deflect the reader's attention from the very real problems facing your flaws and foibles in a desperate bid to recapture your credibility”? Furthermore, my two posts were in response to seven unanswered posts of yours, some of which were more “voluminous” than mine (but if you want to say mine is bigger than yours, that’s fine with me). The bottom line is: if you stop posting so much BS, I can reduce the amount of anti-BS postings.
____________________________________________________________ ________
Regarding my involvement as a future operator of the 609, I have always been forthcoming on this forum. A better forum link than the one you chose to show my exact involvement would be: http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/For...ML/000289.html
I have provided my name, contact numbers, and other background details so that all are free to evaluate my comments knowing my perspective. I have no connection with the V-22 program, and although we are an operator of Bell Helicopters, I have no direct affiliation with any manufacturer including Bell or Boeing. As a participant on the 609 Steering Committee, we are bringing our views as rotorcraft operators to the process at Bell’s request to ensure the end-users point of view is not overlooked.
You on the other hand make continuous but vague claims to having “inside information” (which invariably turns out to be false). I take great care to ‘footnote’ sources of information to prove reliability, while you make great efforts not to. Perhaps it’s time for you to come out of the closet.
____________________________________________________________ _________
It appears you lost the plot again after your in-depth and highly illuminating discussion on ‘length of posts.’ I could not locate a sequential “b.” to respond to, so I will go on to your subsequent a. through c. I have made my position on the Marine falsification of records known on previous posts, but as you apparently missed those comments, I will reiterate:
Those with knowledge of records falsification appear to be at the highest levels in Marine Corp. aviation. The inexcusable cover-up they participated in is having an effect opposite of what they had planned, and is doing far more harm to the program than the maintainability problems they were trying to hide. The exceedingly low mission capable rates that were being experienced should have been dealt with openly and head-on.
If the MV-22 is showing a 26% mission capable rate, the only reasonable response is to determine why the rate is so low, and then decide how it can be brought up to acceptable levels. If it is not possible to bring the rate up to where it needs to be, then the program should be cut without question. If the rate can be improved to where it needs to be (as the Marines involved obviously believe it can be), then additional acquisitions should be put on hold until the required fixes are in place. Attempting to push the aircraft into a high acquisition rate before it is ready makes no sense. The result would be the large-scale acquisition of an aircraft not up to the job, and might create unnecessary potential risk to those who fly in it. Resolving problems before accelerating acquisition was the only logical path, and it is incredible that there are those in positions of control who were not able to recognize that. Obviously “percentages” can be misleading when you are dealing with a “fleet” of only ten aircraft (ex., simply pouring the wrong hydraulic fluid into five a/c could ground them and knock your mission-capable rate down by 50% for an extended period). But it is clear that some with hands-on experience believe real problems exist that need to be addressed. This can be seen in the statement made by the mechanic that blew the whistle on the Marine falsification when he wrote to the Secretary of the Navy, “This might be a great plane one day, but not today..”
The exposing of this attempted cover-up should serve as a warning to anyone that may consider maintenance falsification in the future, and the system as a whole should be thoroughly investigated and restructured as necessary to restore credibility. The loss of credibility by those in command of Marine aviation makes the Pentagon decision to take charge of the investigation the correct one. As I’ve said before, those involved must be made accountable for their actions.
As far as my criticism of your comment, Marine “hierarchy would try to get the aircraft a “tick in the box” no matter how many Marines’ blood was spilt in the process” – the criticism stands without question. When looking at the actions of individuals like the Marines that had knowledge of the records falsification, only someone with great arrogance and ignorance would dare say that they thought it would be a OK if their fellow Marines died as a result of raising mission-capable numbers. When the facts are in, what they did may warrant court martial and dismissal from the service, but their actions were not a malicious intent to allow Marines to die.
____________________________________________________________ _________
As to your miscellaneous quotes and disconnected ramblings about the Pentagon report by Philip Coyle, you provided the summation of what you were getting at in your own words. You made a post to the ‘Marine Falsification’ thread on 5 February that you subsequently deleted when a concerned reader had reached the limit of his tolerance with your claims. That post actually contained the final clue needed to confirm your intense motivation for tearing down tiltrotor technology regardless of the facts – you showed us it is pure, unadulterated EGO. Prior to this it was a bit baffling as to why you demonstrated such enthusiastic glee in both instances when Marines lost their lives in V-22 crashes, but it is now clear. Here is your last paragraph (verbatim) in the post that you deleted:
“It's also been quite gratifying to see Unctuous being quoted directly (although without attribution) in Phillip Coyle's (Director OT&E) Report as well as the GAO Report (I'm sure you've also got copies as head of the Civil Tilt-Rotor Consortium).”
You have hung your vanity out the bedroom window for all to see with this and the other comments in that post. You need to understand that you have looked with ‘tunnel vision’ and taken a few comments in Mr. Coyle’s report that are similar to yours, and declared yourself ‘famous.’ It is time to come back down to earth and listen to some of us lowly humans. If you read the report with a subjective outlook (your great self-proclaimed omniscience should give you that ability) you will find that there are a much larger number of positive comments for the technology than negative. Many of these are identical to the points myself and others have been trying to get across to you in this forum. I do not even remotely believe that Mr. Coyle made his comments because he reads PTI UAE on PPRuNe, and you would be better off to ‘reel’ in the EGO, and get a ‘real’ life. As ‘The Sultan’ tried to explain to you on another thread, ‘you are not Jesus, contrary to your personal beliefs.’ (Or perhaps you should just call your ‘insider’ friends at the Pentagon and demand that Mr. Coyle give you credit for your outstanding contributions)
____________________________________________________________ _________
Responses to “some PTI Quotes:”
1) Your childish attempt at distortion by taking a quote of mine regarding the methods of detection for impending transmission failure currently used on all helicopters being operated around the globe, and applying it to a probable catastrophic hydraulic failure on an accident currently under investigation deserves no response (other than: there you go again….
2) As to your statement regarding warning devices for AssymVR, see the ‘John Farley’ response below.
3) The fact that you finally conceded that you posted false information devoid of the facts regarding the XV-15 tilt-angle was very promising. And knowing this admission would discredit the lengthy dissertation on your theory of how the V-22 developed AssymVR on this thread, it was a big step for you. But the fact that you blatantly lied and tried to pretend that it was an ‘add-on’ is disappointing and a sign the old UNCTUOUS is still with us. According to the NASA engineers that worked on the project, the XV-15 was built with 95 degree capability from the original design.
Having succeeded in conceding ‘half a point’ above, go back to the beginning of this thread and read through the posts with a new and more honest outlook. You will find that you have literally dozens of points you made (or tried to make) that have been clearly been proven false to an objective reader. You’ve started something good, see if you can carry on.
____________________________________________________________ _______
Your comment on the 609 options contains one falsehood (you speculate without a basis of knowledge) and one complete lie (you make a claim of knowledge when the truth is completely opposite – a very common thread throughout your posts).
The falsehood, “only about 50% of the soft order for 609’s will fold.” You couldn’t be much further from reality here (what else is new). The cost of development of the technological advances incorporated into the 609 have caused the value of locked-in orders to rise sharply. Options are now worth a tremendous amount more, and are being treated like gold.
The lie: “the funds are quite productively sitting in escrow…” There is no interest accrued that would be returned to an option holder in the event they claim back their deposit. Hence, ‘productive escrow’ is not a motivation for customers not to cancel orders. There is no penalty or gain relating to the initial deposit if a customer decides not to purchase an aircraft
____________________________________________________________ ________
As to your last comments, you may know Mr. Farley, but as you have proven time and again on this forum, You are no John Farley! Trying to put yourself even remotely in the same category with him is like comparing a Great White Shark to a neutered minnow.
Your comment, “if he’s disagreed with what I have to say, he’s not brought it to my attention” really hits at the heart of your problem – you don’t understand what people are saying to you. Look at the two quotes I took from posts in this thread:
UNCTUOUS: “The dynamic nature of the asymmVR onset (two secs to unrecoverable) would likely be such that any software-based warnings would be coincident with terminal roll.”
John Farley: ”…From this I conjecture that perhaps a couple of such sensors (optimally positioned) on each Osprey blade might just produce the necessary error signal of DIFFERENT aerodynamic circumstances on parts of the SAME blade, to satisfy a solution to the warning system requirement.”
When you read the following quote posted earlier by Mr. Farley, do you think that he is not ‘disagreeing’ with your repeated claim that AssymVR is a fatal flaw in tiltrotor technology:
John Farley: VR is by all accounts not a very stable state of affairs (as the RAE found when trying to stay in it for the trials I mentioned earlier) so I have a gut feel that a quick AUTO nudge forward (5 deg?) of the engine nacelle tilt angle might be sufficient to kill the build-up of VR before it spreads to the whole blade.
Mr. Farley also mentions in detail that the Harrier had a similar characteristic which was resolved. Try going back and read his posts again. At least I see one good thing from your comments: you have proven that you are not selective as to who you choose to ignore – it’s everyone that doesn’t agree with you.
____________________________________________________________ _________
Now do you see how I responded to your points one by one above? It is really quite easy when we stick to the facts. The reason you repeatedly come out on the short end of the stick is your inability to focus on what is true. When you start inventing facts, you lose credibility. Despite requests from forum readers, you have repeatedly avoided answering all of the challenges that were posed to you with regard to falsehoods contained in your “theories.” Your avoidance is a natural reaction to having been so badly discredited on this forum, as is engaging in irrational and false attacks as you have done above. You can run, but you cannot hide from the facts.
Now that I have indulged you in your ‘tit for tat’ exchange, I think it is time to return to professionalism. Personal attacks, and false accusations do not benefit anyone, and worse, it takes away from the point of the forum – to engage in constructive discussions of aviation issues.
[This message has been edited by PTI UAE (edited 09 February 2001).]
Here we go again…some kids just never learn. Once again you have driven off the cliff of absurdity, but this time you forgot to fasten your safety belt.
____________________________________________________________ _________
a. (the first ‘a’
) Starting at the top, you have completely missed the mark again (or pulled an “Unctuous” as we like to say). I made no request of Lu Zuckerman to refrain from posting on this thread. The individual who e-mailed him also contacted me to request that I not make any posts on a thread that Mr. Zuckerman was posting to at that time. The reason given was to “maintain thread integrity” by keeping posts related to the Marana accident only on that thread, and posts pertaining to the North Carolina accident only on that thread. If you read the P.S. on the bottom of my post on 19 January on the ‘Marine V-22 Maint Falsification’ thread, you will see where I described that request which was made to both myself and Mr. Zuckerman. Once again you have failed to get the facts straight before posting. I will give you credit for one thing though – consistency.____________________________________________________________ ________
As far as your comments on the length of my previous post – ‘those who live in glass houses should not throw rocks.’ If you do a side by side comparison, I would imagine you have taken up at least five times as much space with your posts than I have with mine. Take a look at the length of the post you made above compared to my previous post that you were complaining about – were you making “a filibustering attempt to deflect the reader's attention from the very real problems facing your flaws and foibles in a desperate bid to recapture your credibility”? Furthermore, my two posts were in response to seven unanswered posts of yours, some of which were more “voluminous” than mine (but if you want to say mine is bigger than yours, that’s fine with me). The bottom line is: if you stop posting so much BS, I can reduce the amount of anti-BS postings.
____________________________________________________________ ________
Regarding my involvement as a future operator of the 609, I have always been forthcoming on this forum. A better forum link than the one you chose to show my exact involvement would be: http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/For...ML/000289.html
I have provided my name, contact numbers, and other background details so that all are free to evaluate my comments knowing my perspective. I have no connection with the V-22 program, and although we are an operator of Bell Helicopters, I have no direct affiliation with any manufacturer including Bell or Boeing. As a participant on the 609 Steering Committee, we are bringing our views as rotorcraft operators to the process at Bell’s request to ensure the end-users point of view is not overlooked.
You on the other hand make continuous but vague claims to having “inside information” (which invariably turns out to be false). I take great care to ‘footnote’ sources of information to prove reliability, while you make great efforts not to. Perhaps it’s time for you to come out of the closet.
____________________________________________________________ _________
It appears you lost the plot again after your in-depth and highly illuminating discussion on ‘length of posts.’ I could not locate a sequential “b.” to respond to, so I will go on to your subsequent a. through c. I have made my position on the Marine falsification of records known on previous posts, but as you apparently missed those comments, I will reiterate:
Those with knowledge of records falsification appear to be at the highest levels in Marine Corp. aviation. The inexcusable cover-up they participated in is having an effect opposite of what they had planned, and is doing far more harm to the program than the maintainability problems they were trying to hide. The exceedingly low mission capable rates that were being experienced should have been dealt with openly and head-on.
If the MV-22 is showing a 26% mission capable rate, the only reasonable response is to determine why the rate is so low, and then decide how it can be brought up to acceptable levels. If it is not possible to bring the rate up to where it needs to be, then the program should be cut without question. If the rate can be improved to where it needs to be (as the Marines involved obviously believe it can be), then additional acquisitions should be put on hold until the required fixes are in place. Attempting to push the aircraft into a high acquisition rate before it is ready makes no sense. The result would be the large-scale acquisition of an aircraft not up to the job, and might create unnecessary potential risk to those who fly in it. Resolving problems before accelerating acquisition was the only logical path, and it is incredible that there are those in positions of control who were not able to recognize that. Obviously “percentages” can be misleading when you are dealing with a “fleet” of only ten aircraft (ex., simply pouring the wrong hydraulic fluid into five a/c could ground them and knock your mission-capable rate down by 50% for an extended period). But it is clear that some with hands-on experience believe real problems exist that need to be addressed. This can be seen in the statement made by the mechanic that blew the whistle on the Marine falsification when he wrote to the Secretary of the Navy, “This might be a great plane one day, but not today..”
The exposing of this attempted cover-up should serve as a warning to anyone that may consider maintenance falsification in the future, and the system as a whole should be thoroughly investigated and restructured as necessary to restore credibility. The loss of credibility by those in command of Marine aviation makes the Pentagon decision to take charge of the investigation the correct one. As I’ve said before, those involved must be made accountable for their actions.
As far as my criticism of your comment, Marine “hierarchy would try to get the aircraft a “tick in the box” no matter how many Marines’ blood was spilt in the process” – the criticism stands without question. When looking at the actions of individuals like the Marines that had knowledge of the records falsification, only someone with great arrogance and ignorance would dare say that they thought it would be a OK if their fellow Marines died as a result of raising mission-capable numbers. When the facts are in, what they did may warrant court martial and dismissal from the service, but their actions were not a malicious intent to allow Marines to die.
____________________________________________________________ _________
As to your miscellaneous quotes and disconnected ramblings about the Pentagon report by Philip Coyle, you provided the summation of what you were getting at in your own words. You made a post to the ‘Marine Falsification’ thread on 5 February that you subsequently deleted when a concerned reader had reached the limit of his tolerance with your claims. That post actually contained the final clue needed to confirm your intense motivation for tearing down tiltrotor technology regardless of the facts – you showed us it is pure, unadulterated EGO. Prior to this it was a bit baffling as to why you demonstrated such enthusiastic glee in both instances when Marines lost their lives in V-22 crashes, but it is now clear. Here is your last paragraph (verbatim) in the post that you deleted:
“It's also been quite gratifying to see Unctuous being quoted directly (although without attribution) in Phillip Coyle's (Director OT&E) Report as well as the GAO Report (I'm sure you've also got copies as head of the Civil Tilt-Rotor Consortium).”
You have hung your vanity out the bedroom window for all to see with this and the other comments in that post. You need to understand that you have looked with ‘tunnel vision’ and taken a few comments in Mr. Coyle’s report that are similar to yours, and declared yourself ‘famous.’ It is time to come back down to earth and listen to some of us lowly humans. If you read the report with a subjective outlook (your great self-proclaimed omniscience should give you that ability) you will find that there are a much larger number of positive comments for the technology than negative. Many of these are identical to the points myself and others have been trying to get across to you in this forum. I do not even remotely believe that Mr. Coyle made his comments because he reads PTI UAE on PPRuNe, and you would be better off to ‘reel’ in the EGO, and get a ‘real’ life. As ‘The Sultan’ tried to explain to you on another thread, ‘you are not Jesus, contrary to your personal beliefs.’ (Or perhaps you should just call your ‘insider’ friends at the Pentagon and demand that Mr. Coyle give you credit for your outstanding contributions)
____________________________________________________________ _________
Responses to “some PTI Quotes:”
1) Your childish attempt at distortion by taking a quote of mine regarding the methods of detection for impending transmission failure currently used on all helicopters being operated around the globe, and applying it to a probable catastrophic hydraulic failure on an accident currently under investigation deserves no response (other than: there you go again…
.2) As to your statement regarding warning devices for AssymVR, see the ‘John Farley’ response below.
3) The fact that you finally conceded that you posted false information devoid of the facts regarding the XV-15 tilt-angle was very promising. And knowing this admission would discredit the lengthy dissertation on your theory of how the V-22 developed AssymVR on this thread, it was a big step for you. But the fact that you blatantly lied and tried to pretend that it was an ‘add-on’ is disappointing and a sign the old UNCTUOUS is still with us. According to the NASA engineers that worked on the project, the XV-15 was built with 95 degree capability from the original design.
Having succeeded in conceding ‘half a point’ above, go back to the beginning of this thread and read through the posts with a new and more honest outlook. You will find that you have literally dozens of points you made (or tried to make) that have been clearly been proven false to an objective reader. You’ve started something good, see if you can carry on.
____________________________________________________________ _______
Your comment on the 609 options contains one falsehood (you speculate without a basis of knowledge) and one complete lie (you make a claim of knowledge when the truth is completely opposite – a very common thread throughout your posts).
The falsehood, “only about 50% of the soft order for 609’s will fold.” You couldn’t be much further from reality here (what else is new). The cost of development of the technological advances incorporated into the 609 have caused the value of locked-in orders to rise sharply. Options are now worth a tremendous amount more, and are being treated like gold.
The lie: “the funds are quite productively sitting in escrow…” There is no interest accrued that would be returned to an option holder in the event they claim back their deposit. Hence, ‘productive escrow’ is not a motivation for customers not to cancel orders. There is no penalty or gain relating to the initial deposit if a customer decides not to purchase an aircraft
____________________________________________________________ ________
As to your last comments, you may know Mr. Farley, but as you have proven time and again on this forum, You are no John Farley! Trying to put yourself even remotely in the same category with him is like comparing a Great White Shark to a neutered minnow.
Your comment, “if he’s disagreed with what I have to say, he’s not brought it to my attention” really hits at the heart of your problem – you don’t understand what people are saying to you. Look at the two quotes I took from posts in this thread:
UNCTUOUS: “The dynamic nature of the asymmVR onset (two secs to unrecoverable) would likely be such that any software-based warnings would be coincident with terminal roll.”
John Farley: ”…From this I conjecture that perhaps a couple of such sensors (optimally positioned) on each Osprey blade might just produce the necessary error signal of DIFFERENT aerodynamic circumstances on parts of the SAME blade, to satisfy a solution to the warning system requirement.”
When you read the following quote posted earlier by Mr. Farley, do you think that he is not ‘disagreeing’ with your repeated claim that AssymVR is a fatal flaw in tiltrotor technology:
John Farley: VR is by all accounts not a very stable state of affairs (as the RAE found when trying to stay in it for the trials I mentioned earlier) so I have a gut feel that a quick AUTO nudge forward (5 deg?) of the engine nacelle tilt angle might be sufficient to kill the build-up of VR before it spreads to the whole blade.
Mr. Farley also mentions in detail that the Harrier had a similar characteristic which was resolved. Try going back and read his posts again. At least I see one good thing from your comments: you have proven that you are not selective as to who you choose to ignore – it’s everyone that doesn’t agree with you.
____________________________________________________________ _________
Now do you see how I responded to your points one by one above? It is really quite easy when we stick to the facts. The reason you repeatedly come out on the short end of the stick is your inability to focus on what is true. When you start inventing facts, you lose credibility. Despite requests from forum readers, you have repeatedly avoided answering all of the challenges that were posed to you with regard to falsehoods contained in your “theories.” Your avoidance is a natural reaction to having been so badly discredited on this forum, as is engaging in irrational and false attacks as you have done above. You can run, but you cannot hide from the facts.
Now that I have indulged you in your ‘tit for tat’ exchange, I think it is time to return to professionalism. Personal attacks, and false accusations do not benefit anyone, and worse, it takes away from the point of the forum – to engage in constructive discussions of aviation issues.
[This message has been edited by PTI UAE (edited 09 February 2001).]
Guest
Posts: n/a
Uncy doodle doo:
After this typical blunder of yours charging ahead without knowing what you are talking about, you have really made yourself the laughing stock. If you can get a hold of a big red nose and long floppy shoes, there’s a good job opening for you in the CIRCUS.
I take it back…THAT was this biggest public spanking since Saddam in the Persian Gulf War! Uncy you dropped your pants and bent over for him with that post, so you did it to yourself. Talk about asking for it!
I was the one who sent e-mails to both LU Zuckerman and PTIUAE. I asked them to keep the different accident threads separate so people can see the difference between the ridiculous fiction you were trying to push about the Arizona accident “theory””, and the serious discussion going on about hydraulics on the other thread.
And tell your “HENCHMAN” he can stop posting different articles ad nauseam that all say the same thing using different words. We heard it all…and nobody is disagreeing!
Anyway…Don’t worry about your credibility…. You don’t have any on this Forum.(yes...Lu Zuckerman e-mailed me your message to find out who said you had no credibility)
And by the way….How does that foot taste??? The facts speak louder than fiction-but I am sure you learned nothing, I’ll bet anything you’ll be back for more of the same. It would be hilarious if it wasn’t so sad. You actually believe yourself, but luckily you are the only who does(except for your biggest fan Philip Coyle of course)
For PTIUAE:
I really like that “pull an Unctuous one…that is going to be REALLY popular over here.
[This message has been edited by HeliFlight (edited 08 February 2001).]
After this typical blunder of yours charging ahead without knowing what you are talking about, you have really made yourself the laughing stock. If you can get a hold of a big red nose and long floppy shoes, there’s a good job opening for you in the CIRCUS.
I take it back…THAT was this biggest public spanking since Saddam in the Persian Gulf War! Uncy you dropped your pants and bent over for him with that post, so you did it to yourself. Talk about asking for it!
I was the one who sent e-mails to both LU Zuckerman and PTIUAE. I asked them to keep the different accident threads separate so people can see the difference between the ridiculous fiction you were trying to push about the Arizona accident “theory””, and the serious discussion going on about hydraulics on the other thread.
And tell your “HENCHMAN” he can stop posting different articles ad nauseam that all say the same thing using different words. We heard it all…and nobody is disagreeing!
Anyway…Don’t worry about your credibility…. You don’t have any on this Forum.(yes...Lu Zuckerman e-mailed me your message to find out who said you had no credibility)
And by the way….How does that foot taste??? The facts speak louder than fiction-but I am sure you learned nothing, I’ll bet anything you’ll be back for more of the same. It would be hilarious if it wasn’t so sad. You actually believe yourself, but luckily you are the only who does(except for your biggest fan Philip Coyle of course)
For PTIUAE:
I really like that “pull an Unctuous one…that is going to be REALLY popular over here.
[This message has been edited by HeliFlight (edited 08 February 2001).]
Guest
Posts: n/a
What is it about the number 22 that gets some people's blood boiling to the point where they lose all sense of perspective? Lu, have you checked the out-of-trim characteristics of the Osprey yet? 
QED
------------------
You are welcome to visit HELIDRVR here
Guest
Posts: n/a
Sorry about that helidrvr. I think your right, I'm afraid I got a bit carried away.
I'm feeling a little out of trim myself.
I guess you could say I "Pulled an UNCTUOUS"
HeliFlight
[This message has been edited by HeliFlight (edited 08 February 2001).]
I'm feeling a little out of trim myself.
I guess you could say I "Pulled an UNCTUOUS"
HeliFlight
[This message has been edited by HeliFlight (edited 08 February 2001).]
Guest
Posts: n/a
PTI UAE and Unctuous now hear this…………..
Cor chaps! Heavy posts!
May I be allowed some comments on the bit of a duel that has developed?
From my perspective it seems that PTI UAE is pro a civvy tiltrotor application and Unctuous is anti the USMC using the MV-22 as a device with which to force their way in to a defended area day and night.
I don’t see any conflict between those views. Or if you prefer it I think you are both right
on the big issues (if not all the little ones)
Why?
Asymmetric VR
Asymmetric VR requires such a high rate of descent before it can threaten safety that it should be perfectly straightforward to stay well clear of it while landing a civvy tiltrotor. I do not see it lurking in the background of every civvy tiltrotor approach any more than the stall or spin lurks in the background of every airliner landing. So I back PTI UAE’s efforts to press ahead with attempts to obtain high speed cruise as well as VTO/VL
So far as the military combat application is concerned I fear the jury is still out on the asymmetric VR thing. Exactly where is the boundary on the MV-22? If it is established that the boundary is clear and can be reliably stated in suitable terms (a big if) the next issue is how close can it be cuddled up to – given whatever aids or warning devices may be developed? Clearly a combat landing needs EVERY bit of manoeuvrability the device can provide. If this turns out to be too restricted (less than current choppers for example) the job starts to look dodgy. I am certain a lot of good minds are currently wrapped round those issues and the likes of us can only wait and see what transpires.
Reliability
History suggests that mechanical/electrical problems and even software issues can be hacked in time whatever aircraft we are talking about. My crystal ball suggests the potential benefits that the tiltrotor has to offer civvy and military alike are so big that the engineering aspects WILL be solved in time. It’s called progress and on a scale of Wright flyer to today’s best military and civil aircraft in less than 100 years the current tiltrotor issues look pretty small beer.
You have a good day, both of you. JF
Cor chaps! Heavy posts!
May I be allowed some comments on the bit of a duel that has developed?
From my perspective it seems that PTI UAE is pro a civvy tiltrotor application and Unctuous is anti the USMC using the MV-22 as a device with which to force their way in to a defended area day and night.
I don’t see any conflict between those views. Or if you prefer it I think you are both right
on the big issues (if not all the little ones)
Why?
Asymmetric VR
Asymmetric VR requires such a high rate of descent before it can threaten safety that it should be perfectly straightforward to stay well clear of it while landing a civvy tiltrotor. I do not see it lurking in the background of every civvy tiltrotor approach any more than the stall or spin lurks in the background of every airliner landing. So I back PTI UAE’s efforts to press ahead with attempts to obtain high speed cruise as well as VTO/VL
So far as the military combat application is concerned I fear the jury is still out on the asymmetric VR thing. Exactly where is the boundary on the MV-22? If it is established that the boundary is clear and can be reliably stated in suitable terms (a big if) the next issue is how close can it be cuddled up to – given whatever aids or warning devices may be developed? Clearly a combat landing needs EVERY bit of manoeuvrability the device can provide. If this turns out to be too restricted (less than current choppers for example) the job starts to look dodgy. I am certain a lot of good minds are currently wrapped round those issues and the likes of us can only wait and see what transpires.
Reliability
History suggests that mechanical/electrical problems and even software issues can be hacked in time whatever aircraft we are talking about. My crystal ball suggests the potential benefits that the tiltrotor has to offer civvy and military alike are so big that the engineering aspects WILL be solved in time. It’s called progress and on a scale of Wright flyer to today’s best military and civil aircraft in less than 100 years the current tiltrotor issues look pretty small beer.
You have a good day, both of you. JF