Blackpool 3/2/07

[Islander2]

He would have known his passenger was no longer an Instructor so he knew that hew was still one landing short of legal yet they still took off.

The AAIB say they were unable to establish whether or not he knew the other pilot was not an instructor. On what basis are you able to make that claim? Oh, and my reading of the AAIB suggests it was the same pilot in the right hand seat for both flights, making it more likely that Andrew thought he was PU/T throughout - not known, not definite, but well possible!

[long final]

Bose,

Again agreed. The facts of bad decision-making are very clear and undisputed. But if that first flight was sold as an instructional flight and that was a lie does this not need looking into also? If this happens can the same not happen again unless the people involved change their ways or have their privileges removed?

I struggle with the fact that you don’t seem to want to discuss the issue as a whole, including the initial flight, and consider that, although the guy made mistakes, under the pressure and influence that he was placed under, many low houred PPL’s in his position may have done the same, and this situation may happen again because nothing has changed in the culture.

[S-Works]

LF, I am perfectly happy to discuss the situation as a whole. But at the moment all I can see is attempts at moving the blame from the two pilots on board the aircraft to elsewhere.

Islander may well be right, that Andrew Walker was under the impression that the whole flight was Instructional. If this was the case then I would like to see the evidence that the AIB were not party to.

I am perfectly happy to have it proved to me that this was an illegal instructional flight by an instructor with a lapsed qualification in a private cat aircraft.

What I see at the moment is the peer pressure that says, we need to do this flight, you can have the flying for free, x (other victim) was an Instructor in the past and will see you right. Out they go without problem. On the ground at Exeter, they have the opportunity to refuel and and check the weather and carry out proper flight planning, none of which seems to have happened. Did they just 'blag it' because X was with him? At what point does the failure of the 2 qualified pilots on board to carry out adequate planning becomes someone else's fault?

Being a low hours PPL or not having a strong enough character to over ride the more experienced pilots does not give room for the shift of blame in my mind. Not to mention that fact that the guy had 120hrs of 3.5 years and was in the middle of studying for his ATPL exams. Talking about him like he was some naive kid does him no justice either.

[Lurking123]

Of course, if the flight had successfully landed at Blackpool, Mr Walker would still have had to do another, third landing before legally carrying a passenger. Considering it is not disputed that he pointed-out his lack of currency from the outset, you have to ask what, exactly, made him change his mind. Arguably, he either believed he was going to be legal (ie flying with an instructor or not P1) or he changed his stance and made a conscious decision to fly anyway. Is that not the crux of this whole discussion?

PS. Whenever I fly with another pilot, I ensure we know exactly who is acting as the aircraft commander.

[S-Works]

So the focus then moves to the passenger. Did he hold himself out as being a current Instructor fraudulently? If he indeed was the pilot in command, why did he not refuel, flight plan and ultimately divert? Why did TWO pilots not make good command decisions?

[Lurking123]

Dunno. It is doubtful that anyone will ever get to the bottom of that one.

[Contacttower]

Did he hold himself out as being a current Instructor fraudulently?

Perhaps that is something that will come to light at a later date?

[S-Works]

I suspect that the answer to that one was taken to the grave.

[long final]

Bose

Whoever was P1 (aware of it or not) that day was responsible. We can all look at that and learn and use it to help educate our students and fellow pilots. I personally have not tried to move the blame to anyone else. I have said that the actions of others may well have affected the pilot’s decision making. I also hope I haven’t described him as naive and childlike, I actually tried to do the opposite – maybe that didn’t translate.

Students and low houred PPL’s are often very influenced by pilots who they feel have much more experience than themselves. It does create a false sense of security sometimes. I have seen this, with very well educated professional people I have flown with. In the flying school community there is a fear often to confront people regarding their experience. Again, it shouldn’t be this way but it is. Take the club fly out when one aircraft is crewed by people who don’t know each other. It can go well, but equally I have seen near disastrous outcomes because human beings were involved and the limited experience of the individuals created communication problems.

Again, I reiterate, the crew were to blame whoever was P1 and they paid for that, but, the trail that led to that point involves people who had some responsibility to act in very different ways to the way they did. Making poor decisions themselves is one thing, but knowingly operating a flight (allegedly) illegally does mean they have some responsibility. Not for the return flight but in a professional sense generally. I don’t know if you are an instructor bose, but I do know how people can be influenced by the big fish in the small pond. The whole thing stinks to me.

[mm_flynn]

While the command decisions were clearly poor and those on the accident flight paid the price, collectively 4 pilots set-out on a mission, that as constituted could not be accomplished safely. This speaks to a problem more endemic than poor decisions by a single individual.

As far as I can tell from the AAIB report, there was no relevant information the 4 pilots (plus the de facto CFI) were missing - yet every one of them decided to get into a plane and set off on a mission that would fail.

• The Aircraft was over gross
• The weather was at IR minimums for an ILS
• The aircraft didn't have the navigation equipment to recover into Blackpool in the current and forecast weather
• The weather was forecast to be as bad or worse for the rest of the day
• The flight time was going to result in the crew returning at dusk (assuming a quick turn in Exeter)

All 5 people should have known that this was going to end, at best, in the aircraft and crew having a night out in some diversion airfield - yet they still set off - why?

Furthermore, depending on who was PIC and what rolls if any others were playing a variety of illegalities may have existed around the flight.

[S-Works]

I think there were plenty of illegalities around the flight all of which are wrapped up in the general display of poor decision making by all concerned.

As an Instructor myself I find the fact that there were at least 2 Instructor or former Instructors involved in this reprehensible. Instructors have a moral duty to set a good example and clearly in this case they did not.

But it is still clear that the return flight was badly planned and executed.

In my minds eye I can see the situation and the pressure that may have been applied for the outbound flight. It strikes me that the return flight was get home itus because as far as the other 2 passengers were concerned they were all right.

But at the end of the day peer pressure is not a criminal offense and whilst we all agree the morals are in question this did not remove the responsibility of the crew to plan properly and fly legally. Which is why I am afraid this still smacks of a witch hunt.

[long final]

Well, it appears we agree on most points, though with a different slant on some issues. My last point Bose, would just be my understanding of witch-hunt. Generally I would liken a witch-hunt to a process to expose subversive activities with a hidden agenda to undermine or undeservedly damage the investigated.

Pedantic I know, but personally that is not my intention. Firstly I know first hand the individuals involved here, I have experience of them and secondly, if that is not to be considered, what has come from this already shows that those involved were culpable and don’t need anyone’s help here to undermine them. Certainly, not in any unjust way. So, IMO, not a witch-hunt.

LF

[VFE]

When is comes to IFR minima (nevermind VFR!) the UK AIP states that, for non-public transport flights, the minimum weather conditions for take-off should never be less than 600ft cloud base (recommended) and 1'800 metres in-flight visibility (mandatory).

It is all to do with the chances of a successful landing following EFATO. The definitions of 'shall' and 'should' are covered by a PPL student studying for their Air Law exam therefore should require no explanation here.

So, where might ATC fit into this when they pass take-off clearences to pilots of non-public transport single-engined aircraft on days when the weather is clearly below the above minima? Maybe some recommended practices, if not already in existance, might be of use in the future? Just a suggestion.

Please be aware that my suggestion is not some veiled attempt at suggesting some culpability may lie with the ATC team working that fateful day but as another possible positive step forward following the outcome of this forthcoming inquest, if indeed such reasons are behind an inquest of this nature.

ATC instructions for pilots to check their imimum decent height on SAR procedures are common - why not certain take-offs?

VFE.

[S-Works]

culpable..... See thats where we wont agree. The only people culpable were the crew and it cost them their lives.

There were other outside pressures that existed certainly but culpability would such an element of coercion and that I have not seen.

[S-Works]

When is comes to IFR minima (nevermind VFR!) the UK AIP states that, for non-public transport flights, the minimum weather conditions for take-off should never be less than 600ft cloud base (recommended) and 1'800 metres in-flight visibility (mandatory)

.

Where?

Are you referring to IMC, IR or VFR?

[VFE]

There was no 'crew' on this flight Bose-X. Only a PIC. It is misplaced use of these types of terminology that lead to misunderstandings such as the one which may have occured on Mr.Walker's flight.

VFE.

PS: Re: your question Bose-X; Scrub 'IFR Minima' and insert 'Take off minima'.

[S-Works]

PS: Re: your question Bose-X; Scrub 'IFR Minima' and insert 'Take off minima'.

Thanks, you had me confused for a moment.......

I explained earlier that I was using the term crew as a generic statement for the fact that their were two pilots on board which should have given them twice the capacity for making the right calls.

There is a difference between surmising that the P1 might be other than stated but no evidence to support it. Who do you think the P1 was?

[bookworm]

So, where might ATC fit into this when they pass take-off clearences to pilots of non-public transport single-engined aircraft on days when the weather is clearly below the above minima? Maybe some recommended practices, if not already in existance, might be of use in the future? Just a suggestion.

There's a chance of this tragedy resulting in some positive human factors outcomes, whether in the form of knowledge or regulation. A blurring of the distinction of responsibility between ATC and the aircraft commander would not be one of those positive outcomes. The clearest lesson to be learnt is one about clarity of responsibility.

ATC exists to separate aircraft and manage traffic, with a secondary function of providing information. It does not exist to police the air, nor to provide advice to pilots who have mismanaged their flight.

[VFE]

Who do you think the P1 was?

Not for me to decide altho the AAIB have given their answer it would seem. From the outside there appears to have been an air of misplaced multi-crew operation about this flight. It wouldn't be the first time and it certainly won't be the last either. As you know Bose, the CAA are keen for us instructors not to use the term "we will" when conducting our PPL lessons. "You will" being the prefered term for precisely the reasons highlighted here.

ATC exists to separate aircraft and manage traffic, with a secondary function of providing information. It does not exist to police the air, nor to provide advice to pilots who have mismanaged their flight

.

I agree entirely Bookworm. Hence the reason why I stated 'recommended practices'. It just might bring a halt in an error chain. No suggestion that ATC should be tasked with policing the air. Responsibilty must lie with PIC. To request a SEP pilot check their take-off minima when bad weather exists is not exactly an overstretch of juristriction IMHO.

VFE.

[Lurking123]

Military ATC are required to report to the CAA any approach made by a civil aircraft with a visibility of less than 1000m. Don't ask me why, but it is indicative of a (policing?) process which is already in place.