Mildura 2023 near miss final report out

[43Inches]

You are making up stuff to fit your own interpretation. Nothing says as directly as possible or most into wind runway. It just says into wind.

I think you have no idea how to read legal documents. The law is quite clear, it states that you must take off into wind as much as practicable. The practicable part is to allow for the fact wind varies and runways are not aligned with wind direction often. It then states if your flight manual says you can accept crosswind or tailwind you can do that, provided section 2. Why would it have a dispensation for operating with a crosswind if the intent of section 1 was not that if operating directly into wind.

It's quite clear that the definition of 'into wind' means 'directly opposite to the direction from which the wind is blowing' (as per the dictionary). This is not a reference to 'some' headwind component. Any other direction will result not into wind, it would be a crosswind or tailwind, which section 2 takes care of. Sailing has some better definitions that are much clearer, as tracking 'into wind' is not possible, however you can track or 'beat' 'windward' by 'close hauling' or 'reaching'. By angling across the wind and having the sail angled like a wing, and using the hulls force against the water, thus allowing movement towards the wind direction.

Otherwise the rule would be written "an aircraft must take-off with a headwind component"

I suggest you write to CASA and get a response on the interpretation of that CASR, since I have several FOI friends I have already got such an answer over a cup of tea.

That's defamatory and actually horsesh*t. Quite offensive to the pilot group. Clearly you have a grudge against QantasLink.

Not defamatory at all, I've been involved with Qlink and Rex in the past and this is from discussions with pilots past and present. It's a pity DiVosh is no longer with us to add his 2 cents. The report clearly states that QLink has amended their procedure to make rolling calls part of their operation.

You are the one showing you are willing to defend a brand to the death by ignoring quite clear facts listed in the report.

If you have contrary information that suggests otherwise you should post it. That fact you are still beating a dead horse about this is making it continue, so if you do work for QLink, your masters may not like that too much, considering their social media policies... BTW you do realize this whole occurrence involved a QLink Dash 8 and a Warrior, if it was Rex/Link or any other RPT and they had done similarly I would make the same comments, as this is an argument over improving safety at these ports. However I hear Rex pilots and others making regular rolling calls, so there is no problem there in regard to this, what I do know is that in the past QLink pilots in general did not make this call and now they do.

You appear to have overlooked the bit about the pilot's duty of care and standard of care at common law.

Which applies in general life and will be tested if somebody is injured, were you acting in a manner that minimized the risk in a recognized environment of high risk. Did you specifically object to procedures that would have prevented this from happening, that is you failed to do something simple that everyone else does, and it led to an accident. If not, you pay, either financially or with some jail term. It's a bit like road use, the right of way rules only count in 'accident' resolution. If you intentionally fail to prevent a collision by not braking or hitting another car when you could have stopped, you will now be at fault and at much higher penalty. Hence why having a dashcam is so important these days, intentional braking in front of cars and so on, now with the video evidence you can claim they intentionally did it and they pay and are charged with driving offences.

[Chronic Snoozer]

Originally Posted by 43Inches

just shooting down those that think these sort of events happen because they happen and people make mistakes.

The mistakes were not identifying ENL as conflicting traffic because they had used "35" in a radio call, and erroneously referring to RWY 36 as "35" so yes, these things happen because people make mistakes. The lack of a "rolling" call, whether you think it is good airmanship or not, was legally compliant.

Originally Posted by john_tullamarine

I don't think this is a case of not enough talking. I think it's a case of not enough listening and thinking about the implications of what was said and actually known, exacerbated by comms and visibility limitations due to the physical layout of the runways and buildings. Tick.

Originally Posted by 43Inches

That's it in a nutshell.

You agree with JT's summary then bang on about non-mandatory R/T, runway selection and QLINK for the remainder of the thread.

[43Inches]

The mistakes were not identifying ENL as conflicting traffic because they had used "35" in a radio call, and erroneously referring to RWY 36 as "35" so yes, these things happen because people make mistakes. The lack of a "rolling" call, whether you think it is good airmanship or not, was legally compliant.

If we want to go there, the QLink crew also admitted for some time the com 2 was turned down to enable listening on com 1. Which is how they missed the initial taxi call. At what point com 2 was turned back up again was not published, but they claim they only heard the part about runway 35 when ENL entered and backtracked and nothing else, even though the CTAF recorder picked up on the complete call, which all calls ENL broadcast made reference to "Mildura". The parts where many are assuming interference or blocking were picked up clearly by the CTAF recording. The only talk about shielding is that the QLink crew claim to have not heard any of the calls except the tail end of one mentioning runway 35. We have no actual evidence of broken, shielded or whatever calls, it's just part of the ATSBs investigation and possible reasons why the QLink did not clearly hear ENL.

So the QLink crew assumed just on a runway number that the traffic was not at Mildura, this is the exact same mistake that led to the requirement for the phrase "Cleared for Take-off" and your callsign to be clearly heard and responded to in controlled airspace. A crew heard part of a transmission and assumed it was something else and departed causing one of the worst aviation disasters in history. Again, what are we learning from this event that hasn't been learned with blood before. If the KLM had just missed the Pan Am and it was a close call, would you say, bad luck, it was just a mistake...it had probably happened with a near miss before, and it continues to just be an innocent mistake until 300 people are killed. As professional airline crew you should not accept these sort of mistakes as 'get over it moments' or 'its just a simple mistake'. And I'm in no way saying the crew should be hung drawn and quartered for it, but it should be called out for the situation it could be, and not just part of CTAF operations, which it is not if you practice proper radio procedure.

I hear traffic mix up runways all the time, that's why you listen to the whole broadcast.

As LB has stated the legal compliance here matters nothing, It's quite obvious that the ATSB and probably CASA have had a chat with the operator and the airport and they have both opted to mandate rolling calls. That in itself tells you what everyone involved is thinking about the need for such... I really don't know what you guys are trying to prove otherwise, some feeble attempt to say that ENL was somehow the cause of this and deflect away from what is quite a serious error by a professional crew.

Here's some report extracts that hint at more than just a missed radio call;

In addition, the volume on the aircraft radio that was tuned to the Mildura CTAF was turned down (likely to facilitate the crew’s focus on receiving the pre-departure transponder code). This would have further reduced the likelihood of the crew noticing the PA-28 broadcasts.

Although the operator suggested VHF radio shielding may have affected the receipt of the PA-28 radio call by the Dash 8 crew, the ATSB had no direct evidence of such radio shielding.

Due to topography and buildings at Mildura Airport, aircraft are not directly visible to each other on the threshold of runway 09, 27 and 36. The lack of a requirement for mandatory rolling calls increased the risk of aircraft not being aware of each other immediately prior to take-off.

I'll add that the next report regarding the Dash vs the Lancair at Mildura will be interesting, as this time the Dash responded to the Lancairs rolling call at which point the Lancair held while the Dash continued.

[Capn Bloggs]

43 inches, this is going from the sublime to the ridiculous. You obviously have a vendatta against Eastern for not mandating the recommended rolling call and are therefore blind to the real reasons for the incident.

the QLink crew also admitted for some time the com 2 was turned down to enable listening on com 1. Which is how they missed the initial taxi call.

rae tr
Rubbish. "Admitted". Are you serious? Have you done any real two-crew ops? The greatest hazard in this stupid airspace system is the "need" to use two radios at once. Full marks to the Dash crew for not listening to the CTAF while they were conversing with Centre. What if they had had the CTAF turned up and misread a traffic statement from Centre?

There is no requirement to monitor CTAF before making that first call, and I admire them for calling Centre first, because I have seen, too often, calls to Centre go pearshaped after the CTAF taxi call because of a busy CTAF. Yes, it takes time costs you offblocks time, but it is the safer of the two methods. As for your previously-mentioned 10 minutes waiting. listening, the real world doesn't operate like that.

​​​​​​​The parts where many are assuming interference or blocking were picked up clearly by the CTAF recording. The only talk about shielding is that the QLink crew claim to have not heard any of the calls except the tail end of one mentioning runway 35. We have no actual evidence of broken, shielded or whatever calls, it's just part of the ATSBs investigation and possible reasons why the QLink did not clearly hear ENL.

So what's your point, apart from a thinly veiled accusation that the QLink crew were lying. I assume that they were monitoring the Beepback to check their CTAF radio volume. Of course the CTAF recording worked; it's probably perched on top of a building somewhere.

​​​​​​​So the QLink crew assumed just on a runway number that the traffic was not at Mildura,

Thanks for the lecture on Tenerife. And yes (as I have already stated), I believe the QLink inaction on the only call they heard was one of the factors that led to this incident.

​​​​​​​I hear traffic mix up runways all the time, that's why you listen to the whole broadcast.

Huh? is there any suggestion the QLink crew didn't listen to the whole broadcast?

​​​​​​​It's quite obvious that the ATSB and probably CASA have had a chat with the operator and the airport and they have both opted to mandate rolling calls.

"Intention to takeoff" was one of three calls that were put in their own box in AIP on the 28th of Feb, 2019. Those three calls, including the intention to takeoff call, are recommended in all situations.

​​​​​​​I really don't know what you guys are trying to prove otherwise, some feeble attempt to say that ENL was somehow the cause of this and deflect away from what is quite a serious error by a professional crew.

You are so blinkered that you fail to see reality. The fact of the matter is that ENL messed up his calls and by his own admission knew exactly what the dash was doing but did absolutely nothing about it. He deliberately took off crossing a runway that he knew was about to be used for takeoff by a Dash 8 but made zero attempt to ascertain if the Dash even knew about him.

Originally Posted by From the report

​​​​​​​Whenever pilots determine that there is a potential for traffic conflict, they should make radio broadcasts as necessary to avoid the risk of a collision or an Airprox event. Pilots should not be hesitant to call and clarify another aircraft’s position and intentions if there is any uncertainty.

The pilot of ENL did nothing in this regard. Either they didn't think there was a potential conflict or they did and just were waiting for the "Rolling" call. Either way, this (non) communication highlights the fundamental flaw in our current poxy system; we rely on both parties to do the right thing but with zero way of knowing if they aren't. Not helping is the apparent notion that as long as you make your broadcasts, all will be well. The single-worst thing that has happened to aviation in this country was the infamous exhortation to shut up, keep off the airwaves, you don't need to talk. That is precisely what happened here (no communicating with the other aircraft) and there was a serious incident as a result.

I don't direct this next bit to 43inches or Lead Balloon or any others on this forum. I find it pathetic that seasoned aviators have to argue about radio-call legalese over pages and pages of a topic because of the almost non-sensical diatribic tone and words that are used. The drafters of this nonsense should hang their heads in shame.

Tell lighties to talk and put in a CAGRO!

[43Inches]

ENL was a private operation in a light aircraft. They made one simple error of a runway heading on taxi (which wasn't heard by the QLink anyway) and entering the runway, and failed to mention Mildura at the end of the entering broadcast. Otherwise they made all require broadcasts and an additional rolling broadcast. They failed to recognise QLink had commenced their departure without a broadcast. Apart from the runway heading error, nothing else there is in contravention to the law up to the roll. ENL made an assumption the QLink was still backtracking, made a rolling call which they expected a response if the QLink was in conflict. The law aspect is that ENL commenced the take-off roll while a collision risk existed, although without their knowledge, CASR 91.340. We have no evidence other than the CTAF recordings of any shielding or broken transmission. ENL never mentioned operations at Wentworth other than a runway heading that could be confused with its operation.

Facts for QLK 402, they had a prolonged conversation with center regarding a clearance, during which they had turned down the com 2 to a point where reception of the other traffic broadcasts are doubtful. We don't know the status of com 2 during the taxi, there is no mention of receiving beep backs, however their calls were recorded so they were on the correct frequency. After making the taxi call the dash made a further entering call 70 seconds later. The first mention of receiving a CTAF call was that they caught the end of a broadcast that mentioned runway 35, a minute or so after entering the runway, and assumed they meant Wentworth. The dash made no further calls for over three minutes which is when they made the departure call. Airlaw wise, QLK from necessity had to use runway 09 which was not the into wind runway, which made it the most practicable into wind runway for that aircraft, 36 being the closest to wind,but not available for use by that aircraft. Therefore there was additional onus on the crew to ensure traffic was appropriate for their departure, however this is not relevant as they were unaware that ENL was traffic, however if there was a collision it would be an obvious conclusion that the crew had failed to take into account the traffic situation. Where it gets messy is if you consider it a need to broadcast intentions to depart. The Dash had only stated they were backtracking a runway, that takes 2-3 minutes to complete the backtrack. There was no further mention of them intending to line up or roll, which was not mandated, however it was common practice to do so.

Now some basic issues that others seem to also have in their mind, center passes on possible conflicts of mainly IFR nature, this is for consideration AFTER departure, that is you plan your departure to fit in with that traffic in the future. The immediate danger is the CTAF traffic, that's what will kill you in the immediate future, so taking time to listen to CTAF and ascertain the traffic situation is paramount. The Dash made an assumption about the radio calls it heard and continued, ENL made assumptions about what the Dash would do and continued. Where it gets messy is if you consider it a need to broadcast intentions to depart. The Dash had only stated they were backtracking a runway, that takes 2-3 minutes to complete the backtrack. There was no further mention of them intending to line up or roll, and this was not mandated, but has become standard practice by most operators and private pilots for some time.

I personally believe that many operators still have a lot to learn in regard to CTAF radio procedure. As said previously many operators still make calls AS they are doing something, like an entering runway call as they enter, rather than before entering, rolling calls as they roll, not before and so on. That shows they are not expecting a response to challenge their mental traffic picture, when you are making the call specifically to get a response if there is conflict, otherwise whats the point of the call, if you know where all the traffic is and its not a conflict, why make any calls? Many operators don't have a robust confirmation that their transmission is on CTAF, like a two crew acknowledgement that they heard the AFRU or such, like on first broadcast both crew respond "AFRU noted". Robust procedures on when a checklist can be actioned, such as not when entering or backtracking and so on. Or simple things like coming to a stop at a runway entry point and making a broadcast before a thorough lookout and then proceed to enter. Then there's things like making a taxi broadcast on center when unable to contact them, which is actually a legal requirement, not just a nicety, I've noticed a few operators that assume because they can't hear center they just depart radio silent without regard for the intent of the law which is to alert possible local traffic, although there's still the many that use "pending clearance" which shows a complete disregard for how radio communication/procedure works. There's also a creeping lack of awareness of other types performance and capabilities. This I can expect from the typical private operator, but it should be something professional crews are aware of. Which comes to the point that there is a much higher standard of operation required from and expected of a professional crew operating for an airline.

You can't go around blaming the wildcard in the system when it's your job to neutralize that threat. You have training, experience, recency and currency, two sets of eyes and ears, a training department that highlights and publishes threats and how to deal with them, yearly courses on threat and error management and SOPs that focus on threat reduction and often much better equipment to hear, see and avoid threats. Add to that additional internal company publications that add to ERSA and AIP information about local threats. The Private guy could be two years out from an flight with any sort of instructor and flies once every 3 months, never seen a SAAB or Dash let alone how it performs, travels to a CTAF with traffic once a year to visit his GP. Do we get the point?

By the way, what would a CAGRO have acheived? Other than telling the Dash ENL was there. ENL knew the Dash was there and was waiting for a rolling call, so ENL was going until such a call was heard, the Dash was already rolling when ENL made its rolling call, so the die were already cast. Would the Dash have then made a Rolling call, would they have actually contacted ENL for further information? we don't know. Would the CAGRO be subject to the same broken/shielded radio coms the aircraft were? What is known is that in the subsequent event when the Lancair made it's rolling call this time the Dash responded and the Lancair held position as a result, so no actual conflict occurred.

I deleted the previous as I thought it was argumentative and not useful.

[Capn Bloggs]

I am not even going to bother responding. Wrong or misguided on so many levels.

[VH-FTS]

RE Mildura event two it wasn't the departing Dash8 that made contact with the light aircraft prior to rolling - there was a second Dash8 on the apron that could hear what was going on.

43I time to step away from the computer and touch some grass. Ask the grandkids what that means.

[43Inches]

I'm actually down the pub for an early catch up, with a QLink mate And good that you add something useful rather than just trolling...

[Capn Bloggs]

43 Inches, in response to your PM, I don't consider a statement "I'm not going to even bother responding" to be trolling but since you continue posting...

I'm actually down the pub for an early catch up, with a QLink mate

I should have guessed. Nothing like having insider info to help you prosecute your vendetta.

[itsnotthatbloodyhard]

43Inches, you make some fair points, but to me you seem overly fixated on what QLink did or didn’t do, while downplaying the role of ENL. Sorry, but the excuse of being ‘just a private guy’ isn’t really good enough. All of us need to be able to operate in a competent and professional manner. A midair collision doesn’t care if you’re a 200 hr PPL or a 20000 hr 747 driver, it’ll kill everyone just the same. In this case, ENL announced the wrong runway and didn’t state ‘Mildura’ at the end of their entering broadcast. They were fully aware that a Dash 8 would be departing in potential conflict, but did absolutely nothing about it. They might as well have had no radio at all, for all the use it was.

I’ve never operated regional turboprops, but I imagine it’s already a fairly demanding operation without having to deal with the shortcomings of other operators (and I’m certainly not saying QLink was without fault here). It doesn’t matter if “The Private guy could be two years out from an flight with any sort of instructor and flies once every 3 months, never seen a SAAB or Dash let alone how it performs, travels to a CTAF with traffic once a year to visit his GP” - said private guy still has to be able to operate in a competent and professional manner, or I’d suggest he shouldn’t be there.

[On eyre]

Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs

43 inches, this is going from the sublime to the ridiculous. You obviously have a vendatta against Eastern for not mandating the recommended rolling call and are therefore blind to the real reasons for the incident.

rae tr
Rubbish. "Admitted". Are you serious? Have you done any real two-crew ops? The greatest hazard in this stupid airspace system is the "need" to use two radios at once. Full marks to the Dash crew for not listening to the CTAF while they were conversing with Centre. What if they had had the CTAF turned up and misread a traffic statement from Centre?

There is no requirement to monitor CTAF before making that first call, and I admire them for calling Centre first, because I have seen, too often, calls to Centre go pearshaped after the CTAF taxi call because of a busy CTAF. Yes, it takes time costs you offblocks time, but it is the safer of the two methods. As for your previously-mentioned 10 minutes waiting. listening, the real world doesn't operate like that.


So what's your point, apart from a thinly veiled accusation that the QLink crew were lying. I assume that they were monitoring the Beepback to check their CTAF radio volume. Of course the CTAF recording worked; it's probably perched on top of a building somewhere.


Thanks for the lecture on Tenerife. And yes (as I have already stated), I believe the QLink inaction on the only call they heard was one of the factors that led to this incident.


Huh? is there any suggestion the QLink crew didn't listen to the whole broadcast?


"Intention to takeoff" was one of three calls that were put in their own box in AIP on the 28th of Feb, 2019. Those three calls, including the intention to takeoff call, are recommended in all situations.


You are so blinkered that you fail to see reality. The fact of the matter is that ENL messed up his calls and by his own admission knew exactly what the dash was doing but did absolutely nothing about it. He deliberately took off crossing a runway that he knew was about to be used for takeoff by a Dash 8 but made zero attempt to ascertain if the Dash even knew about him.


The pilot of ENL did nothing in this regard. Either they didn't think there was a potential conflict or they did and just were waiting for the "Rolling" call. Either way, this (non) communication highlights the fundamental flaw in our current poxy system; we rely on both parties to do the right thing but with zero way of knowing if they aren't. Not helping is the apparent notion that as long as you make your broadcasts, all will be well. The single-worst thing that has happened to aviation in this country was the infamous exhortation to shut up, keep off the airwaves, you don't need to talk. That is precisely what happened here (no communicating with the other aircraft) and there was a serious incident as a result.

I don't direct this next bit to 43inches or Lead Balloon or any others on this forum. I find it pathetic that seasoned aviators have to argue about radio-call legalese over pages and pages of a topic because of the almost non-sensical diatribic tone and words that are used. The drafters of this nonsense should hang their heads in shame.

Tell lighties to talk and put in a CAGRO!

With respect read your second last paragraph and look in the mirror.

[Lead Balloon]

Originally Posted by itsnotthatbloodyhard

43Inches, you make some fair points, but to me you seem overly fixated on what QLink did or didn’t do, while downplaying the role of ENL. Sorry, but the excuse of being ‘just a private guy’ isn’t really good enough. All of us need to be able to operate in a competent and professional manner. A midair collision doesn’t care if you’re a 200 hr PPL or a 20000 hr 747 driver, it’ll kill everyone just the same. In this case, ENL announced the wrong runway and didn’t state ‘Mildura’ at the end of their entering broadcast. They were fully aware that a Dash 8 would be departing in potential conflict, but did absolutely nothing about it. They might as well have had no radio at all, for all the use it was.

I’ve never operated regional turboprops, but I imagine it’s already a fairly demanding operation without having to deal with the shortcomings of other operators (and I’m certainly not saying QLink was without fault here). It doesn’t matter if “The Private guy could be two years out from an flight with any sort of instructor and flies once every 3 months, never seen a SAAB or Dash let alone how it performs, travels to a CTAF with traffic once a year to visit his GP” - said private guy still has to be able to operate in a competent and professional manner, or I’d suggest he shouldn’t be there.

All true. But…

The possibility of ‘less competent’ pilots operating in the vicinity of e.g. Mildura is obvious, the possibility of those pilots choosing to or being compelled to use 36 when there’s a NNE wind blowing is obvious and the inability to see, from the threshold of 09, aircraft taxing to the threshold of or commencing a roll on, or on right base or final for 36, is obvious. And all of those obvious circumstances are relevant to what steps an aircraft taxiing to take off on 09 is obliged to take – whether under CASR or as matter of duty of care - to address the risk of collision.

Another ENL is not the biggest risk. The biggest risk is someone using 36 who is not heard at all, either because of shielding or interference issues or because of equipment failure or because of finger trouble. And that risk is obvious. It’s not hindsight.

Someone will pipe up – perfectly reasonably - and say: “Well what can the pilot taxiing for 09 do to mitigate that risk”? I can tell you what the answer is not. The answer is not: "Roll and hope".

And I think we need to stop falling into the trap of dichotomising. Fault does not have to be attributed entirely to one pilot or the other. As I observed in the thread about the Caboolture tragedy, crusty old seafarers who invented the COLREGS for maritime, from which COLREGS the rules of the air evolved, will tell you that if there’s a collision at sea it's almost inevitable that both masters failed to comply in some way.

To me, the pilots are put into an obvious trap by the disaster waiting to happen that is RPT ops at and in the vicinity of aerodromes in G, especially ones like Mildura. That’s why the pilots are not in the ‘top 3’ of my list of who’ll be ‘most to blame’ in the event of the disaster.

[itsnotthatbloodyhard]

Fully agree, LB

[Traffic_Is_Er_Was]

But, as I said, that would render the rule practically meaningless.

When the "rules" say that an action has to be performed only when the person has decided for themselves whether it applies to them or not, there will always be variation in its application. Even the fact that the kicker for the rule in the first place, "In the vicinity...", contains another example of interpretation in order for it to apply ..‘in the vicinity’ is within 10 nm, and at a height where your operations could be in the way of other traffic' (my italic and bolding).
Should a pilot consider both situations and then not make a broadcast based on his/her findings, then they have still adhered to the actual rules, Whether those decisions result in an action that also follows some nebulous "general" rule is as I (and you) said, something for the coroner or lawyers to decide. Unfortunately, it is always going to be deliberated on after an event.
Even in designated airspaces where certain broadcasts were/are mandatory, a rolling call was/is not one of them.

[Lead Balloon]

But do you agree or disagree with the proposition that someone can be under a legal duty to do something, even if that something is not contained in a written rule? A common law duty of care is a legal duty. The assessment of whether a duty of care exists in particular circumstances and the content of that duty are objective assessments.

If you wish to assert that the PIC of an RPT jet owes no duty of care to, among others, the pax on board, to take reasonable care not to involve them in a collision, and the PIC is only ever legally obliged to do what the PIC is compelled to by CASR etc, we'll have to agree to disagree.

I suspect that in the 'designated airspaces' to which you referred, there is some kind of third party monitoring/advising/controlling?

[Capn Bloggs]

Originally Posted by Me

I don't direct this next bit to 43inches or Lead Balloon or any others on this forum. I find it pathetic that seasoned aviators have to argue about radio-call legalese over pages and pages of a topic because of the almost non-sensical diatribic tone and words that are used. The drafters of this nonsense should hang their heads in shame.

Originally Posted by On Eyre

With respect read your second last paragraph and look in the mirror.

If you are insinuating that I had a hand in the drafting of said nonsense, I most certainly did not.

[Aimpoint]

Originally Posted by 43Inches

Facts for QLK 402, they had a prolonged conversation with center regarding a clearance, during which they had turned down the com 2 to a point where reception of the other traffic broadcasts are doubtful.

Looks like you have more facts wrong. Turning down the radio has nothing to do with reception. The buildings, trees and slope between 09 and 36 cause radio shielding, which combined with an antenna under the belly makes it worse. Ask the guys at Ramair, they live next to the 36 threshold and know all about it.

Apparently the crew didn't turn the radio down either and it's been misreported by the ATSB. They just were listening to Centre and missed the call.

[43Inches]

Originally Posted by Aimpoint

Looks like you have more facts wrong. Turning down the radio has nothing to do with reception. The buildings, trees and slope between 09 and 36 cause radio shielding, which combined with an antenna under the belly makes it worse. Ask the guys at Ramair, they live next to the 36 threshold and know all about it.

Apparently the crew didn't turn the radio down either and it's been misreported by the ATSB. They just were listening to Centre and missed the call.

You do realise all parties get a copy of the report before release and can make comment in regard to it so that corrections can be made. The crew must have read and not disagreed with what has since been released. If I was in the crew involved I would be getting that corrected, as the ATSB record is the final word on it.

[Aimpoint]

If you really do have a friend that works at QantasLink, get him to ask the pilots what happened.

You've been around the industry for a long time, you know the ATSB gets facts wrong from time to time. They are also stubborn when you give them the feedback that something is wrong in a preliminary report.

[43Inches]

Originally Posted by Aimpoint

If you really do have a friend that works at QantasLink, get him to ask the pilots what happened.

You've been around the industry for a long time, you know the ATSB gets facts wrong from time to time. They are also stubborn when you give them the feedback that something is wrong in a preliminary report.

You completely miss the point that the crew are involved in the investigation. It would be stupid not to be, and that the crew get to view the final report for comment before its released. Like I said it would be in the crews and QLinks interest to fix this, if it were true. However the ATSB refers to the information coming from QLinks report itself. This is also a final report, not prelim, or do you mean the final report draft.

Its also in the factual parts of the report, so its something that the crew would have either written in a report or were questioned regarding. You can't just write into a report that the crew said they had turned down a volume when there is no evidence at all about that, ie no way you can verify that. The ATSB has no access to the cvr or such in this event, and com volume is not an fdr parameter. So only the crew can say they did so.