Southern airlines, vortex?
Heard it all before. Nothing new so far!
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...a-8-march-2024
VH-AMF. Report seems a little sparse on detail for an aircraft operated by a Part 135 company nearly running out of fuel over bass strait.
VH-AMF. Report seems a little sparse on detail for an aircraft operated by a Part 135 company nearly running out of fuel over bass strait.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...a-8-march-2024
VH-AMF. Report seems a little sparse on detail for an aircraft operated by a Part 135 company nearly running out of fuel over bass strait.
VH-AMF. Report seems a little sparse on detail for an aircraft operated by a Part 135 company nearly running out of fuel over bass strait.
There's no mention of conditions attached to the MEL with an unreliable fuel gauge. Usually it requires use of dipsticks or filling to a known mark (tabs etc). Relying on the fuel bowser alone isn't wise.
Being pedantic, but it didn't 'nearly run out of fuel'. There was enough on board - problem was that the pilot appears to have lost track of where it needed to go to get the tanks back in balance.
There's no mention of conditions attached to the MEL with an unreliable fuel gauge. Usually it requires use of dipsticks or filling to a known mark (tabs etc). Relying on the fuel bowser alone isn't wise.
There's no mention of conditions attached to the MEL with an unreliable fuel gauge. Usually it requires use of dipsticks or filling to a known mark (tabs etc). Relying on the fuel bowser alone isn't wise.
The aircraft had well below the minimum fuel for the sector. It’s only luck that the left ran out when it did. Had it happened 10-15 minutes later into the flight, the aircraft would have been well into reserves to get back to King or press on to Moorabbin.
The report suggests that the apparently functional RH gauge might have read 450-475lb on King prior to start, so assume the pilot thought he had 950lb FOB departing King. Zero margin for that sector is around 850lb. Going with a known 100lb margin with an unserviceable fuel gauge seems a bit implausible, particularly given the perfectly serviceable Jet A1 bowser on the tarmac at King. It also seems like a 100lb margin for a sector with a broken fuel gauge would be the perfect memory jogger for that imbalance of fuel you added only hours earlier.
Is the above speculation? Yeah. But this is the reason we have the ATSB to conduct detailed investigations into incidents like these, rather than an occurrence brief that doesn’t identify the operator, doesn’t list important details like crew experience and doesn’t delve into enough detail to really understand how the incident happened.
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I agree that the report lacks proper analysis and is weak on recommendations. Any organisation that uses the pronoun plural ‘they’ to describe a single pilot is more concerned with today’s political correctness than presenting useful information.
The FAA B200 MMEL allows one fuel gauge to be unserviceable if ‘reliable alternative means’ are established to determine fuel quantity. I’d be surprised if a bowser meter alone meets that criteria. You’d not trust it in certain parts of the world, where it may be tweaked to over read in order to siphon off fuel to run the locals’ generators etc or increase profits. I’ve encountered that!
The FAA B200 MMEL allows one fuel gauge to be unserviceable if ‘reliable alternative means’ are established to determine fuel quantity. I’d be surprised if a bowser meter alone meets that criteria. You’d not trust it in certain parts of the world, where it may be tweaked to over read in order to siphon off fuel to run the locals’ generators etc or increase profits. I’ve encountered that!
From the limited amount of information in the 'brief', it states the left fuel gauge was found to be in error and an MEL placed on it. It would have been of interest to include what the MEL stated and/or the operators guidance as the required conditions for operating under such MEL. Then there is the possibility that the MEL had no conditions associated with it, in which case the operator should have added to that with regard to having a proper method of calculating fuel on board before start, using the other gauge as a 'mirror' is in no way an acceptable method. The operator should have a statement about how fuel on board is to be calculated in any operation, which normally involves two separate methods if just using aircraft gauges, that is at least one other method to verify the gauges. The following is a list of possible methods from the ATSB report into fuel starvation related incidents/accidents;
There's no mention of how much fuel was on board at start, but if the pilot used the mirror method as suggested the total fuel estimated was around 200kg more than actual.
It sounds more like they just assumed the left was the same as the right gauge, which is definitely not an acceptable method. I'd trust the bowser meter if the fuel put in was more than the fuel required for flight, in conjunction with a gauge indication or drip stick. But if you don't really know how much was in the tank to start with then you also have a weight and balance calculation issue.
Unless assured and verified by the PIC that the aircraft fuel tanks are completely full, or a totally reliable and accurately graduated dipstick, sight gauge, drip gauge or tank tab reading can be made, the PIC should endeavour to use the best available cross-check process before engine start. The cross-check should use at least two different verification methods to determine the amount of fuel on board. The following are examples of recommended verification combinations:
− check of visual readings (e.g. tank tab, dipstick, drip gauge, sight gauges) against fuel consumed indicator readings
− having regard to previous readings, a check of cockpit fuel quantity indications or visual readings against fuel consumed indicator readings
− after refuelling and having regard to any recorded post-flight fuel quantities, a check of cockpit fuel quantity indications or visual readings against the refuelling uplift readings
− when a series of flights is undertaken by the same pilot and refuelling is not carried out at intermediate stops, checking of the cockpit fuel quantity indications against computed fuel on board and/or fuel consumed indicator readings, provided the particular system is known to be reliable.
− check of visual readings (e.g. tank tab, dipstick, drip gauge, sight gauges) against fuel consumed indicator readings
− having regard to previous readings, a check of cockpit fuel quantity indications or visual readings against fuel consumed indicator readings
− after refuelling and having regard to any recorded post-flight fuel quantities, a check of cockpit fuel quantity indications or visual readings against the refuelling uplift readings
− when a series of flights is undertaken by the same pilot and refuelling is not carried out at intermediate stops, checking of the cockpit fuel quantity indications against computed fuel on board and/or fuel consumed indicator readings, provided the particular system is known to be reliable.
I’d be surprised if a bowser meter alone meets that criteria. You’d not trust it in certain parts of the world, where it may be tweaked to over read in order to siphon off fuel to run the locals’ generators etc or increase profits. I’ve encountered that!
