Mooney accident pilot refused a clearance at 6,500'
Confusion.
And for minimum post length reasons: Confusion.
And for minimum post length reasons: Confusion.
No involvement at all with the incident. I know nothing more than is in the report.
There are two separate aspects to the incident from the ATC perspective - the denial of clearance & 6,500ft, & what happened subsequently. The "C" controller who denied the clearance gave no level instruction & mentioned no other level to the pilot so any change in level is on the pilot or the other controller. Do you understand the differentiation? How does "clearance not available" indicate descend to 1,000ft? It could have been perfectly safely achieved by turning right 30 degrees for a few minutes.
Again I ask how is this any different to avoiding cloud?
There are two separate aspects to the incident from the ATC perspective - the denial of clearance & 6,500ft, & what happened subsequently. The "C" controller who denied the clearance gave no level instruction & mentioned no other level to the pilot so any change in level is on the pilot or the other controller. Do you understand the differentiation? How does "clearance not available" indicate descend to 1,000ft? It could have been perfectly safely achieved by turning right 30 degrees for a few minutes.
Again I ask how is this any different to avoiding cloud?
Put it into perspective and tell me if it's likely...
Old mate is cruising along at 6,500ft and can't get a clearance, so rather than deviate a few miles right of track, he contacts the D tower and misjudges what was offered, so descends on his current track, miles inland towards the mountains, down to 1,000ft where the mountains are 3,500ft high, whilst he still has well over 90 nautical miles to go to his destination.
At 90 miles to run, descending to 1,000ft to get under a tiny little airspace step that could be avoided seems very difficult to believe, doesn't it?
If I'm 90 miles out, descending to 1,000 ft would be the last possible option I would take, especially given that you'd likely want to climb back up again.
I used to run a similar unit. Unless you specifically turned off the terrain warning, it pops up at 500 or 1,000ft depending on what you set it to.
That makes another unknown. He was definitely using this or another GPS (the GTN 650) and both have coloured map and potentially terrain alerts that have been completely missed.
Truly bizarre.
Garmin Aera 500
Garmin GTN650
Old mate is cruising along at 6,500ft and can't get a clearance, so rather than deviate a few miles right of track, he contacts the D tower and misjudges what was offered, so descends on his current track, miles inland towards the mountains, down to 1,000ft where the mountains are 3,500ft high, whilst he still has well over 90 nautical miles to go to his destination.
At 90 miles to run, descending to 1,000ft to get under a tiny little airspace step that could be avoided seems very difficult to believe, doesn't it?
If I'm 90 miles out, descending to 1,000 ft would be the last possible option I would take, especially given that you'd likely want to climb back up again.
Passengers who had flown with the pilot reported that the pilot routinely used a Garmin Aera 500 Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)6 unit carried in their lap. Aera 500 The Aera 500 unit carried by the pilot was not approved as a sole means of navigation. However, the unit did present useful information relating to the progress of the flight. This included topographical and airspace information. The unit had a terrain function that required a valid 3D GNSS position solution and a valid terrain and obstacle database to operate properly. Terrain information was advisory only and could include: • display of altitudes of terrain and obstructions relative to the aircraft’s altitude • pop-up terrain alert messages issued when flight conditions meet parameters set within the terrain system software algorithms • forward looking terrain avoidance alerts The ATSB recovered data from this unit indicating that it was in use at the time of the accident. However, it could not be established which mode was selected at the time of the accident or whether the terrain function was operable and the status of any user and system inhibitions.
That makes another unknown. He was definitely using this or another GPS (the GTN 650) and both have coloured map and potentially terrain alerts that have been completely missed.
Truly bizarre.
Garmin Aera 500
Garmin GTN650
This thread is the equivalent of a car speeding through a red light and crashing in the middle of the intersection and then focusing on why the light was red.
For the sake of balance, there are serious questions that need to be answered about ASA's level of service to VFR aircraft, particularly in light of the recent proposal to lower Class E to 1500ft. I do not deny that at all, I've fallen victim to it like everyone else seems to have, but oh boy oh boy this accident is NOT the starting argument you're looking for to justify a series of changes at ASA.
You absolutely can and should look at ATC as a factor here, but it is beyond ridiculous to blame them for what the PIC elected to do here.
For the sake of balance, there are serious questions that need to be answered about ASA's level of service to VFR aircraft, particularly in light of the recent proposal to lower Class E to 1500ft. I do not deny that at all, I've fallen victim to it like everyone else seems to have, but oh boy oh boy this accident is NOT the starting argument you're looking for to justify a series of changes at ASA.
You absolutely can and should look at ATC as a factor here, but it is beyond ridiculous to blame them for what the PIC elected to do here.
Ixixly, how about training pilots to always have a plan B?
Controllers are trained to say "no" as part of ensuring workload remains manageable, it's part of the job because if the workload exceeds your ability to handle you're no longer in control. You don't just say "yes" without considering the consequences - a random unannounced flight presents a challenge because you need to work out where they are & how you'll separate. You don't just make it up as you go along but continually plan.
There will always be situations where a controller will say "no", there is no way of avoiding that. As I mentioned, airspace is just another obstacle to be avoided if a clearance is denied, no different to weather or terrain, so treat it as such.
Controllers are trained to say "no" as part of ensuring workload remains manageable, it's part of the job because if the workload exceeds your ability to handle you're no longer in control. You don't just say "yes" without considering the consequences - a random unannounced flight presents a challenge because you need to work out where they are & how you'll separate. You don't just make it up as you go along but continually plan.
There will always be situations where a controller will say "no", there is no way of avoiding that. As I mentioned, airspace is just another obstacle to be avoided if a clearance is denied, no different to weather or terrain, so treat it as such.
On the other hand, we DO have the ATC involved on the day, we CAN pick their brains to figure out why they decided not to give this clearance and then we CAN figure out if there is a way to make it easier for ATC in the future, to do something that seems like it should have been relatively easy to do. The persons that have trained this ATC are almost certainly still in the organisation and teaching others so we can much more easily rectify any deficiencies that may exist in the way they're teaching others and disseminate that information across to everyone for the future.
But you're never going to be able to totally eliminate "clearance not available", so there will always be a need for pilots to action. Saying "no" must be a tool that's available to controllers. Trainees get flustered & bugger things up & do things a rated controller wouldn't do. That's just the nature of training. His denying a clearance was a minor contribution.
How hard is it to train pilots that if they're intending to request a clearance that they need a contingency plan in case they're knocked back? You have plan Bs for every phase of flight - abort the take-off, avoid that large patch of cloud, go around to avoid that cow. How hard is it to ask the trainee pilot to explain & implement what they'll do if denied a clearance?
How hard is it to train pilots that if they're intending to request a clearance that they need a contingency plan in case they're knocked back? You have plan Bs for every phase of flight - abort the take-off, avoid that large patch of cloud, go around to avoid that cow. How hard is it to ask the trainee pilot to explain & implement what they'll do if denied a clearance?
So CASA and by association AsA get to micromanage aviation to the point of requiring a calibrated torque wrench on a tire cap, breath test, ramp check, medically inspect and comb youtube and logbooks for infractions, yet claim no responsibility for the actions of a pilot?
This is crazy! Pilots are products of the Aviation environment in which they operate. Crappy environment = crappy decisions.
There is much evidence, in the form of government review after review, that the Australian Aviation environment is toxic to good decision making.
FFS, if Glen Buckley is to be believed, look what CASA did to an organisation, APTA, and its owner, Glen, who were in the process of improving flight training to comply with all CASA dictats.
This is crazy! Pilots are products of the Aviation environment in which they operate. Crappy environment = crappy decisions.
There is much evidence, in the form of government review after review, that the Australian Aviation environment is toxic to good decision making.
FFS, if Glen Buckley is to be believed, look what CASA did to an organisation, APTA, and its owner, Glen, who were in the process of improving flight training to comply with all CASA dictats.
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Plan B was simple - deviate right to go around the CTA at cruising level. He was following that plan.
The question is why did he turn back on track and descend, after he had indicated that he wanted to stay at 6500?
That fateful decision was about plan F in the ranking, not plan B.
But you're never going to be able to totally eliminate "clearance not available", so there will always be a need for pilots to action.
Saying "no" must be a tool that's available to controllers.
Trainees get flustered & bugger things up & do things a rated controller wouldn't do. That's just the nature of training.
Are you saying, in effect, that those who happen to be flying in the system, when a trainee happens to be behind the mic, just have to wear the consequences of the trainee's lack of competence? The training system allows aircraft to be the subject of ATC decisions that a competent controller wouldn't make?
Yer kidding, surely.
And, I'll make the point a final time: We don't know that in this specific case the trainee was flustered and buggered things up. If s/he was, the report should say that. For all we know, the trainee's supervisor said: Tell him: "'Clearance unavailable'. Ya gotta teach these pop-up nobodies a lesson."
If it was a report about an accident involving a student pilot who was flustered and buggered things up, the report would say that (in modern day euphemisms) and - hopefully - analyse why the instructor did not intervene at the point things started to form the shape of a pear.
How hard is it to train pilots that if they're intending to request a clearance that they need a contingency plan in case they're knocked back? You have plan Bs for every phase of flight - abort the take-off, avoid that large patch of cloud, go around to avoid that cow. How hard is it to ask the trainee pilot to explain & implement what they'll do if denied a clearance?
Now I can add to the usual explanation, which is usually already very surprising to punters: "There could be a trainee on duty who's flustered and buggering things up. They could say 'no', even if there's not another aircraft for miles, and the supervisor will just watch it all happen."
This is part of the reason for some private pilots having a fear of controlled airspace.
Now I can add to the usual explanation, which is usually already very surprising to punters: "There could be a trainee on duty who's flustered and buggering things up. They could say 'no', even if there's not another aircraft for miles, and the supervisor will just watch it all happen."
Are you saying, in effect, that those who happen to be flying in the system, when a trainee happens to be behind the mic, just have to wear the consequences of the trainee's lack of competence?
The trainee would have demonstrated "competence" during their training in ATC school. Those who happen to be flying in the system have to cope with the trainees's lack of experience. No one, either pilot, ATC, doctor, dentist, lawyer, engineer etc is competent to the same level as those who have been doing the job for years when they first start. To expect otherwise is ridiculous.
analyse why the instructor did not intervene at the point things started to form the shape of a pear.
I get the frustration with ATC and controlled airspace but as LePing rightly asks, what is the difference between unable to fly a particular route because of weather and unable due to airspace? I get that in the USA pilots have a greater degree of airspace freedom but right here, right now in this country the system is different and pilots have to operate in what exists now. Rant and rave about why we have the current system but when you get airborne none of that matters, its now time to deal with the real world and all its imperfections.
Are you saying, in effect, that those who happen to be flying in the system, when a trainee happens to be behind the mic, just have to wear the consequences of the trainee's lack of competence? The training system allows aircraft to be the subject of ATC decisions that a competent controller wouldn't make?
Yer kidding, surely.
And, I'll make the point a final time: We don't know that in this specific case the trainee was flustered and buggered things up. If s/he was, the report should say that. For all we know, the trainee's supervisor said: Tell him: "'Clearance unavailable'. Ya gotta teach these pop-up nobodies a lesson."
If it was a report about an accident involving a student pilot who was flustered and buggered things up, the report would say that (in modern day euphemisms) and - hopefully - analyse why the instructor did not intervene at the point things started to form the shape of a pear.
Not hard in theory, but sometimes people ask: Why would we be denied a clearance?
Looking at the details of this report I’m not entirely sure a clearance through Coffs airspace could’ve changed the tragic situation - but hopefully this will at least start the conversation of making sure the wheels don’t fall off while training.
The PIC was responsible for keeping himself and all his passengers alive no matter what curve balls ATC threw at him.
An option of last resort would have been for him to climb to 6500 and proceed as planned. Let ATC sort the mess out. Better to be alive and answering to panel of armchair experts the next day than not. This is an option that should not be abused but should always be in the back of any PICs mind. We are not there to make ATC’s life “easier”, rather it’s their rather highly paid job to sort our mess out.
An option of last resort would have been for him to climb to 6500 and proceed as planned. Let ATC sort the mess out. Better to be alive and answering to panel of armchair experts the next day than not. This is an option that should not be abused but should always be in the back of any PICs mind. We are not there to make ATC’s life “easier”, rather it’s their rather highly paid job to sort our mess out.
Then your punters will never fly again if they knew the experience and competence of some of the trainee F/O's that would be receiving training on RPT jet aircraft. ATC is not different to flying in that regard. You have to let the trainee make their own decisions.
We get it: ATC has no responsibility once it says "go away". I hope it makes them feel all warm and fuzzy for a job well done.
As a matter of interest, why do I frequently hear Centre broadcast safety alerts for unidentified aircraft in proximity in G? Why are those broadcasts proactively made, but apparently a transponder altitude for an aircraft that's been rejected a clearance will be watched in silence by ATC as it blips its way towards terrain that is higher than what the transponder's reporting? Dead due CFIT is just as dead due mid-air collision.
Yeah, right. A PIC of an RPT jet will watch while the F/O flies the aircraft into terrain as part of a learning opportunity. C'mon LL, you're better than that.
As to why Centre broadcast safety alerts I can't answer that. The same way I don't understand why sometimes they advise us in case of a TCAS alert that an aircraft will be passing head on 1000' below when we are in class A. Probably they think its helpful but its not a requirement.
How hard is it to train pilots that if they're intending to request a clearance that they need a contingency plan in case they're knocked back
Why would any clearance or instruction in any airspace warrant a VFR aircraft descending into IMC?........This thread is the equivalent of a car speeding through a red light and crashing in the middle of the intersection and then focusing on why the light was red
As a matter of interest, why do I frequently hear Centre broadcast safety alerts for unidentified aircraft in proximity in G? Why are those broadcasts proactively made, but apparently a transponder altitude for an aircraft that's been rejected a clearance will be watched in silence by ATC as it blips its way towards terrain that is higher than what the transponder's reporting? Dead due CFIT is just as dead due mid-air collision.
I get this all the time in the middle of nowhere in central NSW, but two IFR aircraft can collide near Mangalore. Presumably just controller workload one must assume.
Maybe a trainee who was flustered just buggered it up...