Passenger Beware?????
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Passenger Beware?????
The main theme from LCC's these days seems to be "You Get What You Pay For".
This mantra also seems to be driving the mindset of Qantas (the only full service carrier) not only in the domestic (DRW,ADL,PER) market but elsewhere.
I want to know that I have bought a ticket on a carrier who has the highest standards of everything. I do not expect that because the ticket is cheaper I have somehow accepted a greater risk factor. If that is in fact the case then I am sorry, the airline involved must inform me of such and I can make arrangements.
If all carriers are as safe as each other then I have nothing to worry about, right?
This mantra also seems to be driving the mindset of Qantas (the only full service carrier) not only in the domestic (DRW,ADL,PER) market but elsewhere.
I want to know that I have bought a ticket on a carrier who has the highest standards of everything. I do not expect that because the ticket is cheaper I have somehow accepted a greater risk factor. If that is in fact the case then I am sorry, the airline involved must inform me of such and I can make arrangements.
If all carriers are as safe as each other then I have nothing to worry about, right?
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It could be successfully argued that CASA sets the minumum standards for safe airline operations. Anything less than those standards is unsafe. Anything in excess of those standards is wasting money and driving customers to the competition. You want a full service flight? Hire a bizjet.
The fact that CASA is just a skeleton of its former self, is tied to cost recovery efforts and is rarely in a position to enforce any of those standards other than the ones that run up and smack it in the face is neither here nor there.
(Tongue in cheek.)
The fact that CASA is just a skeleton of its former self, is tied to cost recovery efforts and is rarely in a position to enforce any of those standards other than the ones that run up and smack it in the face is neither here nor there.
(Tongue in cheek.)
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Jake good to see you back.
Been on holidays or just sulking after getting kicked out of office.
Big change of face Jake.When you were on commitee what did you do about this so called dreadfull LCC scourge?????
Been on holidays or just sulking after getting kicked out of office.
Big change of face Jake.When you were on commitee what did you do about this so called dreadfull LCC scourge?????
Last edited by max autobrakes; 24th Jul 2006 at 11:36.
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Originally Posted by jakethemuss
I want to know that I have bought a ticket on a carrier who has the highest standards of everything. I do not expect that because the ticket is cheaper I have somehow accepted a greater risk factor. If that is in fact the case then I am sorry, the airline involved must inform me of such and I can make arrangements.
If all carriers are as safe as each other then I have nothing to worry about, right?
If all carriers are as safe as each other then I have nothing to worry about, right?
Last edited by Pass-A-Frozo; 26th Jul 2006 at 06:47.
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Mr Pass-A-Frozo in defence of old Jakethemuss ,
how about comparing a few things before slagging off.
What is the average length of command training in Qantas vs JetStar.
How many hours of sim time is involved with QF vs JQ.
What is the average age/experience level of a QF capt vs JQ captain.
This might go some way towards what I believe Jake may have been angling at.
Ps I know the training is at the companies concerned direction and the pilots only follow those directions.
Not wishing to fight someone else's battles for them ,but what I believe is infered here is not that LCC's are unsafe but rather,due to the overiding drive for cost efficiencies we are now being led by management types who's mantra is no longer about training to a standard but now,the over riding dogma revolves around training to a cost. A big difference my friend.
Lets face it there has not been a total hull loss of a large commercial jet in Australia yet.Therefore things must be safe. Take this logic to it's ultimate conclusion and things will keep getting cut in order to line some managers pocket through the performance bonus scheme. Cut = bonus, cut = bonus, etc etc this will keep going until a limit is reached which of course the primary over riding limits to cutting are the CASA regs.
However these regs are the bare bones minimums and I believe should not be considered the maximums as a result of financial pressures.
The last thing I wish to see is a "I told you so "at some stage in the future just because some management types believe that 1 mouldy old rat gnawed slice of cheese is all that is required to prevent an accident from occuring as per the "risk "model analogy .
how about comparing a few things before slagging off.
What is the average length of command training in Qantas vs JetStar.
How many hours of sim time is involved with QF vs JQ.
What is the average age/experience level of a QF capt vs JQ captain.
This might go some way towards what I believe Jake may have been angling at.
Ps I know the training is at the companies concerned direction and the pilots only follow those directions.
Not wishing to fight someone else's battles for them ,but what I believe is infered here is not that LCC's are unsafe but rather,due to the overiding drive for cost efficiencies we are now being led by management types who's mantra is no longer about training to a standard but now,the over riding dogma revolves around training to a cost. A big difference my friend.
Lets face it there has not been a total hull loss of a large commercial jet in Australia yet.Therefore things must be safe. Take this logic to it's ultimate conclusion and things will keep getting cut in order to line some managers pocket through the performance bonus scheme. Cut = bonus, cut = bonus, etc etc this will keep going until a limit is reached which of course the primary over riding limits to cutting are the CASA regs.
However these regs are the bare bones minimums and I believe should not be considered the maximums as a result of financial pressures.
The last thing I wish to see is a "I told you so "at some stage in the future just because some management types believe that 1 mouldy old rat gnawed slice of cheese is all that is required to prevent an accident from occuring as per the "risk "model analogy .
Last edited by max autobrakes; 30th Jul 2006 at 07:44.
The cuts will continue until there is a major series of accidents (preferably not here), at which time investigators will discover that airlines have :
a) Cut maintenance and engineering too hard.
b) Pushed pilots too hard.
c) The regulators sat on their backsides and watched it happen because of the well studied phenomenon called "regulatory capture" - when the regulators and regulated become "mates".
a) Cut maintenance and engineering too hard.
b) Pushed pilots too hard.
c) The regulators sat on their backsides and watched it happen because of the well studied phenomenon called "regulatory capture" - when the regulators and regulated become "mates".
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It's an old article I know but potentially prophetic none the less , especially with an IOSA safety audit about to start in Qantas.Let us learn from others mistakes and not allow something similar to happen here in Australia.
Dryden Disaster, Three Years Later A Look Back On The Crash Of Air Ontario Fokker F28
Author Martin B Aubury January 1993 On 10 March 1989 an Air Ontario Fokker F28 crashed just after take-off from Dryden Ontario with the loss of 24 lives. The pilot attempted the take-off with ice on the aircraft wings. Why he had done so became the subject of a vast judicial inquiry that delved deeply into the contributing factors which arose from commercial pressures and inadequate safety surveillance.
"The aircraft was hitting trees, hitting trees, and at that point the aircraft I guess was decelerating and we were inside the blender effect... you take a blender, throw in some metal, some trees, people and turn it on." So ended Air Ontario flight 1363 in March 1989. So ended Canada's delusion that the country could have cheap, deregulated air fares without the need for extra air safety surveillance.
The Air Ontario Fokker F28 aircraft crashed immediately after take-off from Dryden Municipal Airport. A routine accident investigation soon found that the aircraft had been unable to gain height because its wings were covered in ice and snow. The pilot should have known that the aircraft could not fly in this condition. When investigators looked at why the pilot had attempted a take off, it became apparent that the real causes of the accident lay at the heart of deregulation and that because of deregulation, traditional air safety standards had been cut.
The accident was all the more tragic because just seven weeks earlier, warnings within the regulatory authority Transport Canada had been leaked to the press. In part the leaked memo said, "Air carrier inspection is no longer capable of meeting even minimum requirements necessary to ensure safety. In fact, it is no longer able to assure the Minister of the safety of large air carrier commercial air services in Canada". It went on with the ominous warning, "The situation is to the point where every ACI (Air Carrier Inspector) and an increasing number of industry pilots are convinced that a major accident is inevitable".
The routine accident investigation was subsumed into a judicial inquiry under the Honourable Virgil P. Moshansky. His report clearly shows that competitive pressures caused by commercial deregulation cut into safety standards. Moreover the regulatory authority was aware of this but could not counter it because the government was cutting regulatory resources.
The two government policies of commercial deregulation of the airlines and fiscal restraint on federal government services together, were a recipe for disaster. Unfortunately it is a recipe which is being repeated in Australia.
Economic deregulation of the airlines started in the USA in 1978, Canada followed in 1984. In December 1985 the Canadian House of Commons Transport Committee was warned that competitive pressures would erode self policing by the industry of its safety standards. At the same time Transport Canada arranged a number of visits to the USA to learn from their experience of deregulation.
To counter safety problems arising from deregulation the US authority eventually had to double its safety surveillance staff. Some of the Canadians knew that they too needed more resources but their pleas fell on deaf ears.
A report by the Director of Licensing and Certification outlined the problems confronting US authorities. It listed more than 50 areas of concern including:
- rapid expansion of airlines into unfamiliar areas of operation
- inexperienced, unqualified and/or over extended management
- incomplete or inaccurate records
- non-compliance with approved procedures
- increased contracting out of training and maintenance
- use of unauthorized or improperly trained maintenance personnel
- improper/inaccurate control of aircraft weight and balance
The report was prophetic in predicting the factors which later contributed to the Air Ontario accident.
Air Ontario Inc. was formed by the merger of Air Ontario Limited and Austin Airways. Under the impetus of deregulation it changed from being mainly a charter and cargo operation with a mix of generally small aircraft, to become a feeder airline for the large national carrier Air Canada. Air Canada effectively owned Air Ontario and wanted to project its corporate image through its subsidiary by way of marketing, logo and decor. Unbeknown to passengers Air Canada deliberately distanced itself from operational and airworthiness aspects of Air Ontario.
Similar deceptions are prevalent in Australia.
The judicial inquiry found that Air Ontario had rushed the introduction of its relatively large and complicated jet powered F28. Some personnel were not properly trained and some manuals and procedures were neither correct nor consistent. These deficiencies were not fully detected nor were they countered by a regulatory authority which was hopelessly under resourced.
On the day of the accident the aircraft was flying shuttle services from Thunder Bay to Winnipeg via Dryden. It was a Friday at the start of school holidays so the aircraft was full. This limited the amount of fuel which could be carried on any one leg of the journey without exceeding the maximum allowable weight of the aircraft. Also the weather was inclement and getting worse, so the aircraft needed to carry enough fuel for a longer than normal diversion. These factors combined to force the airline to schedule refueling during the aircraft's second stop at Dryden.
The aircraft had many unrectified defects. The one which became critical to the accident was an unserviceable Auxiliary Power Unit (APU). This is a small extra engine in the rear of the aircraft which among other functions provides compressed air to start the main engines. The main engines can also be started by an external power supply.
The airline put the pilot in a very difficult predicament when he landed at Dryden. It was not normal to refuel at Dryden. At Dryden there were no ground start facilities so the aircraft was dependent on its APU but the APU was not working. If the pilot stopped the engines he could not start them again. He needed to load fuel but this should never be done with engines running and certainly not with passengers on board. Snow was falling gently. Off-loading and reloading passengers took time and the longer the aircraft stayed on the ground the greater was the need for the wings to be sprayed with deicing fluid. On the Fokker F28 aircraft deicing fluid must not be applied while the engines are running.
The pilot had the aircraft fueled while the engines were running and with passengers on board. Although this is a very dubious procedure it was not then prohibited by Transport Canada and airline instructions were inconsistent. The pilot did not have the wings deiced; again airline instructions were unclear on this point.
With ice on the wings, the wings did not lift properly during take off. The aircraft staggered into the air and crashed just beyond the end of the runway. 24 of the 69 people on board were killed.
The pilot died in the accident and in times gone by the accident would have been dismissed as "pilot error". Now, because aircraft accidents are so horrendously expensive for society, society asks what led the pilot to make his mistake.
Commissioner Moshansky found that the aircraft was operating with an excessive number of unrectified defects, that the aircraft should not have been scheduled to refuel at an airport which did not have proper equipment and that neither training nor manuals had sufficiently warned the pilot of the dangers of ice on the wings. Moshansky blamed Transport Canada for letting Air Ontario expand into operation of bigger, more complicated aircraft without detecting the deficiencies.
Most importantly Moshansky expressed concern that the Government had not appreciated the safety implications of embarking on a policy of promoting increased airline competition at the same time as it was imposing a freeze on safety regulation resources.
Nearly two hundred recommendations arose from the Air Ontario accident but two capture the tenor of the report.
"Transport Canada (should)put in place a policy directive that if resource levels are insufficient to support a regulatory or other program having a direct bearing on aviation safety, the resource shortfall and its impact be communicated without delay to successively higher levels of Transport Canada management until the problem is resolved or until it is communicated to the Minister of Transport".
The Australian Government is still deluding itself that it can trust a deregulated industry to maintain standards and that a strong air safety authority is an expensive luxury. From the Board of the Civil Aviation Authority down, those who accept that a 40% cut in resources has no effect on safety are lauded and promoted. Those who disagree have been ousted.
"Transport Canada establish a mandatory education program to ensure that senior managers and officials of the department who are responsible for or associated with aviation programs are aware of the basis for and the requirement to support policies that affect aviation safety".
How sad that this should be necessary. In Australia, from the Chief Executive of the CAA down, seasoned bureaucrats have been replaced with "agents of change" who adhere to the "right" corporate ethos. From airworthiness, the head of airworthiness, the head of maintenance, the head of training, the head of aircraft certification, the head of aircraft structures and the head of aircraft fatigue have all left.
Canada has suffered a number of air disasters and several resulted in formal inquiries akin to that undertaken by Commissioner Moshansky. When the findings of an earlier Royal Commission by Justice Dubin were reviewed by Australian airworthiness specialists they were gratified to see that virtually all of Dubin's recommendations with regard to aircraft safety were already in place in Australia. Ten years later we should be alarmed at how many of the criticisms and recommendations arising from the Air Ontario accident apply in Australia.
We should be most alarmed because, as happened in Canada, our Government is not funding sufficient surveillance resources to keep the industry honest.
Published in Canberra Times, 7 January 1993 and reproduced with permission of the author Martin B Aubury Author’s Post Script – Within two years Australia suffered several air crashes that led to Parliamentary and judicial inquiries. These inquiries found that deregulation in Australia had caused exactly the same irregularities as happened earlier in Canada and the USA.
Dryden Disaster, Three Years Later A Look Back On The Crash Of Air Ontario Fokker F28
Author Martin B Aubury January 1993 On 10 March 1989 an Air Ontario Fokker F28 crashed just after take-off from Dryden Ontario with the loss of 24 lives. The pilot attempted the take-off with ice on the aircraft wings. Why he had done so became the subject of a vast judicial inquiry that delved deeply into the contributing factors which arose from commercial pressures and inadequate safety surveillance.
"The aircraft was hitting trees, hitting trees, and at that point the aircraft I guess was decelerating and we were inside the blender effect... you take a blender, throw in some metal, some trees, people and turn it on." So ended Air Ontario flight 1363 in March 1989. So ended Canada's delusion that the country could have cheap, deregulated air fares without the need for extra air safety surveillance.
The Air Ontario Fokker F28 aircraft crashed immediately after take-off from Dryden Municipal Airport. A routine accident investigation soon found that the aircraft had been unable to gain height because its wings were covered in ice and snow. The pilot should have known that the aircraft could not fly in this condition. When investigators looked at why the pilot had attempted a take off, it became apparent that the real causes of the accident lay at the heart of deregulation and that because of deregulation, traditional air safety standards had been cut.
The accident was all the more tragic because just seven weeks earlier, warnings within the regulatory authority Transport Canada had been leaked to the press. In part the leaked memo said, "Air carrier inspection is no longer capable of meeting even minimum requirements necessary to ensure safety. In fact, it is no longer able to assure the Minister of the safety of large air carrier commercial air services in Canada". It went on with the ominous warning, "The situation is to the point where every ACI (Air Carrier Inspector) and an increasing number of industry pilots are convinced that a major accident is inevitable".
The routine accident investigation was subsumed into a judicial inquiry under the Honourable Virgil P. Moshansky. His report clearly shows that competitive pressures caused by commercial deregulation cut into safety standards. Moreover the regulatory authority was aware of this but could not counter it because the government was cutting regulatory resources.
The two government policies of commercial deregulation of the airlines and fiscal restraint on federal government services together, were a recipe for disaster. Unfortunately it is a recipe which is being repeated in Australia.
Economic deregulation of the airlines started in the USA in 1978, Canada followed in 1984. In December 1985 the Canadian House of Commons Transport Committee was warned that competitive pressures would erode self policing by the industry of its safety standards. At the same time Transport Canada arranged a number of visits to the USA to learn from their experience of deregulation.
To counter safety problems arising from deregulation the US authority eventually had to double its safety surveillance staff. Some of the Canadians knew that they too needed more resources but their pleas fell on deaf ears.
A report by the Director of Licensing and Certification outlined the problems confronting US authorities. It listed more than 50 areas of concern including:
- rapid expansion of airlines into unfamiliar areas of operation
- inexperienced, unqualified and/or over extended management
- incomplete or inaccurate records
- non-compliance with approved procedures
- increased contracting out of training and maintenance
- use of unauthorized or improperly trained maintenance personnel
- improper/inaccurate control of aircraft weight and balance
The report was prophetic in predicting the factors which later contributed to the Air Ontario accident.
Air Ontario Inc. was formed by the merger of Air Ontario Limited and Austin Airways. Under the impetus of deregulation it changed from being mainly a charter and cargo operation with a mix of generally small aircraft, to become a feeder airline for the large national carrier Air Canada. Air Canada effectively owned Air Ontario and wanted to project its corporate image through its subsidiary by way of marketing, logo and decor. Unbeknown to passengers Air Canada deliberately distanced itself from operational and airworthiness aspects of Air Ontario.
Similar deceptions are prevalent in Australia.
The judicial inquiry found that Air Ontario had rushed the introduction of its relatively large and complicated jet powered F28. Some personnel were not properly trained and some manuals and procedures were neither correct nor consistent. These deficiencies were not fully detected nor were they countered by a regulatory authority which was hopelessly under resourced.
On the day of the accident the aircraft was flying shuttle services from Thunder Bay to Winnipeg via Dryden. It was a Friday at the start of school holidays so the aircraft was full. This limited the amount of fuel which could be carried on any one leg of the journey without exceeding the maximum allowable weight of the aircraft. Also the weather was inclement and getting worse, so the aircraft needed to carry enough fuel for a longer than normal diversion. These factors combined to force the airline to schedule refueling during the aircraft's second stop at Dryden.
The aircraft had many unrectified defects. The one which became critical to the accident was an unserviceable Auxiliary Power Unit (APU). This is a small extra engine in the rear of the aircraft which among other functions provides compressed air to start the main engines. The main engines can also be started by an external power supply.
The airline put the pilot in a very difficult predicament when he landed at Dryden. It was not normal to refuel at Dryden. At Dryden there were no ground start facilities so the aircraft was dependent on its APU but the APU was not working. If the pilot stopped the engines he could not start them again. He needed to load fuel but this should never be done with engines running and certainly not with passengers on board. Snow was falling gently. Off-loading and reloading passengers took time and the longer the aircraft stayed on the ground the greater was the need for the wings to be sprayed with deicing fluid. On the Fokker F28 aircraft deicing fluid must not be applied while the engines are running.
The pilot had the aircraft fueled while the engines were running and with passengers on board. Although this is a very dubious procedure it was not then prohibited by Transport Canada and airline instructions were inconsistent. The pilot did not have the wings deiced; again airline instructions were unclear on this point.
With ice on the wings, the wings did not lift properly during take off. The aircraft staggered into the air and crashed just beyond the end of the runway. 24 of the 69 people on board were killed.
The pilot died in the accident and in times gone by the accident would have been dismissed as "pilot error". Now, because aircraft accidents are so horrendously expensive for society, society asks what led the pilot to make his mistake.
Commissioner Moshansky found that the aircraft was operating with an excessive number of unrectified defects, that the aircraft should not have been scheduled to refuel at an airport which did not have proper equipment and that neither training nor manuals had sufficiently warned the pilot of the dangers of ice on the wings. Moshansky blamed Transport Canada for letting Air Ontario expand into operation of bigger, more complicated aircraft without detecting the deficiencies.
Most importantly Moshansky expressed concern that the Government had not appreciated the safety implications of embarking on a policy of promoting increased airline competition at the same time as it was imposing a freeze on safety regulation resources.
Nearly two hundred recommendations arose from the Air Ontario accident but two capture the tenor of the report.
"Transport Canada (should)put in place a policy directive that if resource levels are insufficient to support a regulatory or other program having a direct bearing on aviation safety, the resource shortfall and its impact be communicated without delay to successively higher levels of Transport Canada management until the problem is resolved or until it is communicated to the Minister of Transport".
The Australian Government is still deluding itself that it can trust a deregulated industry to maintain standards and that a strong air safety authority is an expensive luxury. From the Board of the Civil Aviation Authority down, those who accept that a 40% cut in resources has no effect on safety are lauded and promoted. Those who disagree have been ousted.
"Transport Canada establish a mandatory education program to ensure that senior managers and officials of the department who are responsible for or associated with aviation programs are aware of the basis for and the requirement to support policies that affect aviation safety".
How sad that this should be necessary. In Australia, from the Chief Executive of the CAA down, seasoned bureaucrats have been replaced with "agents of change" who adhere to the "right" corporate ethos. From airworthiness, the head of airworthiness, the head of maintenance, the head of training, the head of aircraft certification, the head of aircraft structures and the head of aircraft fatigue have all left.
Canada has suffered a number of air disasters and several resulted in formal inquiries akin to that undertaken by Commissioner Moshansky. When the findings of an earlier Royal Commission by Justice Dubin were reviewed by Australian airworthiness specialists they were gratified to see that virtually all of Dubin's recommendations with regard to aircraft safety were already in place in Australia. Ten years later we should be alarmed at how many of the criticisms and recommendations arising from the Air Ontario accident apply in Australia.
We should be most alarmed because, as happened in Canada, our Government is not funding sufficient surveillance resources to keep the industry honest.
Published in Canberra Times, 7 January 1993 and reproduced with permission of the author Martin B Aubury Author’s Post Script – Within two years Australia suffered several air crashes that led to Parliamentary and judicial inquiries. These inquiries found that deregulation in Australia had caused exactly the same irregularities as happened earlier in Canada and the USA.
what did you do about this so called dreadfull LCC scourge?????
Co-incidentily Jake, I just did a CRM course over the last couple of days and guess what featured? QF1 and our own AN 747-on-it's-nose, both from so-called "Full service carriers".
Low cost does not mean low saftey any more then full-service means the guys driving are astronaughts.
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Co-incidentily Jake, I just did a CRM course over the last couple of days and guess what featured? QF1 and our own AN 747-on-it's-nose, both from so-called "Full service carriers".
Low cost does not mean low saftey any more then full-service means the guys driving are astronaughts
Low cost does not mean low saftey any more then full-service means the guys driving are astronaughts
What all this lambasting about LCC's doesnt cover is the safety imperative. Put simply, if a LCC has an accident, they are more than likely going to go out of business...in a very very rapid fashion. Now to my mind that says to me that the money men (who are greedy thieving..make the pilots and engineers work to hard..kind of people) would much rather invest a bit more on training/checking, than losing the lot because of a lack of investment.
the money men (who are greedy thieving..make the pilots and engineers work to hard..kind of people) would much rather invest a bit more on training/checking, than losing the lot because of a lack of investment.
QF1 and our own AN 747-on-it's-nose, both from so-called "Full service carriers".
Let's get with the times and add the DJ 737 overrun at DRW. Good CRM job that one!
Nunc est bibendum
Interesting reading
A report by the Director of Licensing and Certification outlined the problems confronting US authorities. It listed more than 50 areas of concern including:
- rapid expansion of airlines into unfamiliar areas of operation
- inexperienced, unqualified and/or over extended management
- incomplete or inaccurate records
- non-compliance with approved procedures
- increased contracting out of training and maintenance
- use of unauthorized or improperly trained maintenance personnel
- improper/inaccurate control of aircraft weight and balance
The report was prophetic in predicting the factors which later contributed to the Air Ontario accident.
Air Ontario Inc. was formed by the merger of Air Ontario Limited and Austin Airways. Under the impetus of deregulation it changed from being mainly a charter and cargo operation with a mix of generally small aircraft, to become a feeder airline for the large national carrier Air Canada. Air Canada effectively owned Air Ontario and wanted to project its corporate image through its subsidiary by way of marketing, logo and decor. Unbeknown to passengers Air Canada deliberately distanced itself from operational and airworthiness aspects of Air Ontario.
- rapid expansion of airlines into unfamiliar areas of operation
- inexperienced, unqualified and/or over extended management
- incomplete or inaccurate records
- non-compliance with approved procedures
- increased contracting out of training and maintenance
- use of unauthorized or improperly trained maintenance personnel
- improper/inaccurate control of aircraft weight and balance
The report was prophetic in predicting the factors which later contributed to the Air Ontario accident.
Air Ontario Inc. was formed by the merger of Air Ontario Limited and Austin Airways. Under the impetus of deregulation it changed from being mainly a charter and cargo operation with a mix of generally small aircraft, to become a feeder airline for the large national carrier Air Canada. Air Canada effectively owned Air Ontario and wanted to project its corporate image through its subsidiary by way of marketing, logo and decor. Unbeknown to passengers Air Canada deliberately distanced itself from operational and airworthiness aspects of Air Ontario.
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In most instances those MM don't have the brains to make the connection between safety and staying in business
Lets see some real world examples then (and not just John Smith, with a couple of 172's, or Dodgy Airways inc)
Nunc est bibendum
Pan Am.
Additional thoughts.....Aloha and Alaskan. Was it Air Florida with the oxy generators on board? The maintenance contractor was called Sabre I think.
Additional thoughts.....Aloha and Alaskan. Was it Air Florida with the oxy generators on board? The maintenance contractor was called Sabre I think.
Last edited by Keg; 24th Aug 2006 at 05:28.
