Air Crash Investigations 9.30pm CH#7 Wed
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Air Crash Investigations 9.30pm CH#7 Wed
Just a reminder that Air Crash Investigations is on again tonight Wed 27th April.
From 9msn TV guide:
Air Crash Investigations - Lost (60 mins , Rated: M)
Genre: Documentary
This episode is on the American Airlines Flight 965 which was held on the tarmac in Miami for two hours causing the experienced pilots, wanting to make up for lost time, to push the state-of-the-art Boeing 757 to its limit. As the plane prepared to descend into Cali Airport, Peru an alarm sounded in the cockpit as they head straight for a mountain. Despite their sophisticated navigation system they are 12 miles of course and crash and only four survive. What does the black box reveal about this explicable disaster and how can future pilots learn from the mistakes of the past?
From 9msn TV guide:
Air Crash Investigations - Lost (60 mins , Rated: M)
Genre: Documentary
This episode is on the American Airlines Flight 965 which was held on the tarmac in Miami for two hours causing the experienced pilots, wanting to make up for lost time, to push the state-of-the-art Boeing 757 to its limit. As the plane prepared to descend into Cali Airport, Peru an alarm sounded in the cockpit as they head straight for a mountain. Despite their sophisticated navigation system they are 12 miles of course and crash and only four survive. What does the black box reveal about this explicable disaster and how can future pilots learn from the mistakes of the past?
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9:30pm???
That's IF Channel 7 actually get it right this time and show it at the advertised slot. Last couple of times it's been early/late and as I am from home, and recording (trying to get them 3 on a tape) the
stuffing around they do is really starting to p*ss me off!
Usually a good program though. Seems less 'technical' this time round for some reason...
That's IF Channel 7 actually get it right this time and show it at the advertised slot. Last couple of times it's been early/late and as I am from home, and recording (trying to get them 3 on a tape) the
stuffing around they do is really starting to p*ss me off!Usually a good program though. Seems less 'technical' this time round for some reason...
Of course you could avoid the morbid fascination and just read the report. Would that spoil your "fun"?
http://sunnyday.mit.edu/accidents/calirep.html
http://sunnyday.mit.edu/accidents/calirep.html
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Not sure i would describe the 757/67 cockpit as "State of the art!" In anycase, the AA incident is another eg of Super-Mario (FMC) doing exactly what it was told to do. Good lesson to all of us.
Luckily VH-VXF back in Sept had EGPWS or it also would have been toast. “CAUTION TERRAIN” “TERRAIN TERRAIN PULL UP !”
ATSB Report
Luckily VH-VXF back in Sept had EGPWS or it also would have been toast. “CAUTION TERRAIN” “TERRAIN TERRAIN PULL UP !”
ATSB Report
Last edited by Woomera; 5th May 2005 at 07:31.
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BTW Cali is in Colombia NOT Peru! (Small point I know!)
At that time the B757 was arguably not far behind "state of the art" cockpits at all...
The main cause being a confused and tired crew under pressure who didn't understand the STAR given then programmed the FMC incorrectly. Basically poor time management and get there-on- time-itis.
That crash report is available for free on the NTSB website along with a few others. Makes interesting reading.
At that time the B757 was arguably not far behind "state of the art" cockpits at all...
The main cause being a confused and tired crew under pressure who didn't understand the STAR given then programmed the FMC incorrectly. Basically poor time management and get there-on- time-itis.
That crash report is available for free on the NTSB website along with a few others. Makes interesting reading.
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One of the main things that the program highlighted which can be applied to most people who are involved with the flight is not to rush for the company's sake.
I'm not saying to work slow on purpose but if something engineering wise normally takes 2 hours to do and you do it in just over an hour, you may have helped the company but if anything goes wrong they will hang you out for not doing your job properly. This is not just for engineering but anyone who has a direct role in the safety of a flight.
I'm not saying to work slow on purpose but if something engineering wise normally takes 2 hours to do and you do it in just over an hour, you may have helped the company but if anything goes wrong they will hang you out for not doing your job properly. This is not just for engineering but anyone who has a direct role in the safety of a flight.
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Absolutely well said Rammel.
The 757 crew looked as though the made very simple mistakes in dealing with the FMS, yet put anyone in that position, tired confused and intent on geting there, and it could happen to anyone.
I have two questions that has been bugging me (no pun intended), why after they had [unknowingly] selected the incorrect waypoint, did they not notice the turn to the left, or is it that gentle , or they were pre-occupied by workload ?
Question 2, are there any "bugs" on the analogue DI's ? that maintain the previous settings, or once you clear the FMS and reset is that it ? Or is it all done on the FMS ? can you toggle back to see what your previous "picture" was , and then compare it with your current "picture" ?
The 757 crew looked as though the made very simple mistakes in dealing with the FMS, yet put anyone in that position, tired confused and intent on geting there, and it could happen to anyone.
I have two questions that has been bugging me (no pun intended), why after they had [unknowingly] selected the incorrect waypoint, did they not notice the turn to the left, or is it that gentle , or they were pre-occupied by workload ?
Question 2, are there any "bugs" on the analogue DI's ? that maintain the previous settings, or once you clear the FMS and reset is that it ? Or is it all done on the FMS ? can you toggle back to see what your previous "picture" was , and then compare it with your current "picture" ?
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Since the 757/767 were dual endorsement, with approx. 4hrs. differences training, I am assuming that the basic systems operations were the same.
That said, why was it that the spoilers stayed deployed with max power selected? I understood that fire-walling the throttles automatically stowed the spoilers on both types.
Is my thinking incorrect?
Kind regards,
TheNightOwl.
That said, why was it that the spoilers stayed deployed with max power selected? I understood that fire-walling the throttles automatically stowed the spoilers on both types.
Is my thinking incorrect?
Kind regards,
TheNightOwl.
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Not quite correct NightOwl The automatic retraction of speedbrakes following an increase of thrust from idle is designed for the rejected landing scenario.
If the speedbrakes are ARMED, and both gear truck tilt sensors have hydraulic pressure, and both truck tilt sensors detect a no-tilt condition (aeroplane on the ground), and the thrust levers are at idle, the speedbrake lever will move to the UP position and all spoilers will extend.
Following automatic speedbrake extension, if any of the three conditions are no longer met, the speedbrake lever moves to the DOWN position and the spoiler panels retract.
In my 12 years on the 767, it was company policy for the captain to keep his hand on the speedbrake lever whenever they were deployed in flight. That was to avoid just such a situation as the 757 accident under discussion.
If the speedbrakes are ARMED, and both gear truck tilt sensors have hydraulic pressure, and both truck tilt sensors detect a no-tilt condition (aeroplane on the ground), and the thrust levers are at idle, the speedbrake lever will move to the UP position and all spoilers will extend.
Following automatic speedbrake extension, if any of the three conditions are no longer met, the speedbrake lever moves to the DOWN position and the spoiler panels retract.
In my 12 years on the 767, it was company policy for the captain to keep his hand on the speedbrake lever whenever they were deployed in flight. That was to avoid just such a situation as the 757 accident under discussion.
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Thanks to the last few posters re: auto retraction of speed brakes. I had been wondering about this and we were discussing the incident in class last week. Will mention it next time, as a lot were wondering the same thing. I didn't see the end of the program, I'm assuming they didn't explain the changes that came about as a result of this accident?
Pity, as it would do a lot to ease the concerns of the general public after seeing this program about such an accident - then again, maybe that is the point - to keep 'em scared?
Tenerife on tomorrow night, should be interesting to see how they handle that one...
Think this may be the final episode, not sure about that though...
Sky
Pity, as it would do a lot to ease the concerns of the general public after seeing this program about such an accident - then again, maybe that is the point - to keep 'em scared?
Tenerife on tomorrow night, should be interesting to see how they handle that one...
Think this may be the final episode, not sure about that though...
Sky
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Hi all,
Hi NightOwl, haven't you done or seen done the Captain lower the speedbrakes after landing by momentarily advancing a thrust lever, at which time the speedbrake handle drives to down posn.
That was a pretty common technique in the '74 Classics.
Also, did you notice that the aural alert they used on TV, at the GPWS 'Pull Up' point was that of the autopilot disconnect, not 'Whoop, Whoop' as I was expecting!
(I read the report quite some time ago)
Also, having operated into the airport on this weeks' KLM/PanAm story, there is still plenty of debris (very small bits) scattered about the grassed areas adjacent to the runway!
Cheers, FD
Hi NightOwl, haven't you done or seen done the Captain lower the speedbrakes after landing by momentarily advancing a thrust lever, at which time the speedbrake handle drives to down posn.
That was a pretty common technique in the '74 Classics.
Also, did you notice that the aural alert they used on TV, at the GPWS 'Pull Up' point was that of the autopilot disconnect, not 'Whoop, Whoop' as I was expecting!
(I read the report quite some time ago)
Also, having operated into the airport on this weeks' KLM/PanAm story, there is still plenty of debris (very small bits) scattered about the grassed areas adjacent to the runway!
Cheers, FD
Evertonian
Rammel does make a good point & it reminded me of the small part those of us that were on the ground can play in this.
It reminds me of a scenario that occurred a couple of years ago. I won't bore you all with the details, suffice to say that it was:
a. A late freighter op.
b. Diverted to ADL due WX (fog) in MEL
c. Some confusion as to the validity of this which had a bearing later on
d. Sector was KUL-MEL-AKL (3 crew CA, FO, SO) BOC
e. If memory serves, the normal block time was about 11-13 hours and ended somewhere in the vicinity of 16-18 hours.
Rather than pulling the pin as was their right, the crew opted to continue the delayed service through to AKL. I personally, did not exert any influence in this decision, but the CA was Italian & the Senior Loco Bloko/Rep was & I don't know if he did.
Anyway, it made me think that regardless of any direct pressure applied, the indirect pressure must be enormous! You pull in at the gate & haven't even completed your final checks & there's a guy asking for the logbook, another guy wanting fuel and us handing over the CFP, NOTAMS etc, etc. You'd eventually wander downstairs to watch the ramp guys working flat out because they've been told to hurry so that "we can make up time". You would see all this and the "puppy dog eyes" from the groundstaff who know that their night will be hell if the flight is cancelled. The subtle pressure must be enormous.
Don't get me wrong, I've been in the other situation where the crew has walked & worked 24 hours to get it sorted...it is hell. (Although it can be fun when they return for the reschedulled service to see you still there!)
Bottom line is that fatigue is a killer & I don't think they've scratched the surface to determine everything that contributes to it. More needs to be done.
It reminds me of a scenario that occurred a couple of years ago. I won't bore you all with the details, suffice to say that it was:
a. A late freighter op.
b. Diverted to ADL due WX (fog) in MEL
c. Some confusion as to the validity of this which had a bearing later on
d. Sector was KUL-MEL-AKL (3 crew CA, FO, SO) BOC
e. If memory serves, the normal block time was about 11-13 hours and ended somewhere in the vicinity of 16-18 hours.
Rather than pulling the pin as was their right, the crew opted to continue the delayed service through to AKL. I personally, did not exert any influence in this decision, but the CA was Italian & the Senior Loco Bloko/Rep was & I don't know if he did.
Anyway, it made me think that regardless of any direct pressure applied, the indirect pressure must be enormous! You pull in at the gate & haven't even completed your final checks & there's a guy asking for the logbook, another guy wanting fuel and us handing over the CFP, NOTAMS etc, etc. You'd eventually wander downstairs to watch the ramp guys working flat out because they've been told to hurry so that "we can make up time". You would see all this and the "puppy dog eyes" from the groundstaff who know that their night will be hell if the flight is cancelled. The subtle pressure must be enormous.
Don't get me wrong, I've been in the other situation where the crew has walked & worked 24 hours to get it sorted...it is hell. (Although it can be fun when they return for the reschedulled service to see you still there!)
Bottom line is that fatigue is a killer & I don't think they've scratched the surface to determine everything that contributes to it. More needs to be done.
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Wasn't it a case of selecting the wrong station because he only punched in the first letter of the waypoint and assumed that was the correct one in the LEGS page ?
I think they did notice the turn when the Capt said "where are we going ?" after he pressed the Execute button and as the 757 turned left. More confusion when the Capt said "No turn right to go back to waypoint TULUA although the station wasn't being picked up in the VHF NAV freq.
I think he was confused at that stage whether to go to TULUA first or direct to the CALI VOR for a CALI 1 approach.
At the end of the program, it said that it was a case of LOST SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.
hmmmmm .............
D6
I think they did notice the turn when the Capt said "where are we going ?" after he pressed the Execute button and as the 757 turned left. More confusion when the Capt said "No turn right to go back to waypoint TULUA although the station wasn't being picked up in the VHF NAV freq.
I think he was confused at that stage whether to go to TULUA first or direct to the CALI VOR for a CALI 1 approach.
At the end of the program, it said that it was a case of LOST SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.
hmmmmm .............
D6
D6,
Read the report pages 19 and 20. "R" was the designator for both Rozo (where they wanted to go to) and Romeo, 100 miles to the east. R(omeo) came up first when typed in to the FMS, and that's why the jet turned left when it was entered. In fact, the only way they could have got ROZO out of the database was to type in the full name. They were expecting R (the chart indetifier?), but they needed to type in ROZO.
Sure, in our armchairs, they should have checked the lat/long of the R that appeared, (or even the track and distance, but I don't know whether this was displayed on the 757 "legs" page as you describe), but the fact is there were two naviads, with same ident, within 100nm of each other. Now that is a real gotcha.
Read the report pages 19 and 20. "R" was the designator for both Rozo (where they wanted to go to) and Romeo, 100 miles to the east. R(omeo) came up first when typed in to the FMS, and that's why the jet turned left when it was entered. In fact, the only way they could have got ROZO out of the database was to type in the full name. They were expecting R (the chart indetifier?), but they needed to type in ROZO.
Sure, in our armchairs, they should have checked the lat/long of the R that appeared, (or even the track and distance, but I don't know whether this was displayed on the 757 "legs" page as you describe), but the fact is there were two naviads, with same ident, within 100nm of each other. Now that is a real gotcha.
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Capn Bloggs
I saw the FMC display when he punched in the "R" and all it displayed was all the waypoints with only R's on it instead of the fullname Rozo or Romeo or whatever - which is a bit odd.
That's what got him. He selected the first one which was Romeo as you know. You're right, maybe he should've punched in the full name and got all the listing for Rozo instead of just R.
He was already under pressure to go to Rozo so he didnt check the lat/long and neither did the F/O.
There were at least 10 waypoints listed in the screen with only R on the Legs page. So, a bit confusing and time consuming for someone under pressure. He didnt even want to check the charts for the Tulua waypoint because of time constraints.
So we agree that the failure occured in the waypoint selection. The 757 would've been on course if the waypoint was selected properly.
D6
I saw the FMC display when he punched in the "R" and all it displayed was all the waypoints with only R's on it instead of the fullname Rozo or Romeo or whatever - which is a bit odd.
That's what got him. He selected the first one which was Romeo as you know. You're right, maybe he should've punched in the full name and got all the listing for Rozo instead of just R.
He was already under pressure to go to Rozo so he didnt check the lat/long and neither did the F/O.
There were at least 10 waypoints listed in the screen with only R on the Legs page. So, a bit confusing and time consuming for someone under pressure. He didnt even want to check the charts for the Tulua waypoint because of time constraints.
So we agree that the failure occured in the waypoint selection. The 757 would've been on course if the waypoint was selected properly.
D6
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Tonight 930 Ch7: (i think someone mentioned it)
From nines TV guide:
Air Crash Investigations - Collision on the Runway (60 mins , Rated: PG)
Genre: Documentary
Due to a bomb scare, two jumbo jets are diverted to Los Rodeos Airport, Tenerife. When both planes prepare to take off on the same runway, disaster strikes as they collide in thick and low lying clouds. The KLM plane crashes into the top of the Pan Am jumbo. Both planes, fully loaded with fuel, burst into flames and 583 people die in what is considered the world's worst air disaster. So, apart from the bad weather, what could have gone wrong with two fully functional jumbos? It is only when they turn to analyse the cockpit recordings of the two jumbos that they find the answer - a chain of catastrophic events.
From nines TV guide:
Air Crash Investigations - Collision on the Runway (60 mins , Rated: PG)
Genre: Documentary
Due to a bomb scare, two jumbo jets are diverted to Los Rodeos Airport, Tenerife. When both planes prepare to take off on the same runway, disaster strikes as they collide in thick and low lying clouds. The KLM plane crashes into the top of the Pan Am jumbo. Both planes, fully loaded with fuel, burst into flames and 583 people die in what is considered the world's worst air disaster. So, apart from the bad weather, what could have gone wrong with two fully functional jumbos? It is only when they turn to analyse the cockpit recordings of the two jumbos that they find the answer - a chain of catastrophic events.
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Well that was a c_rap program. I believe it was actually a TV series called "Seconds from disaster", somehow retitled Air Crash Investigations by channel 7.
Nothing more annoying than a program designed for people with an attention span of 10 seconds, having to replay the same commentry over and over - and replaying video footage of a tape player every time they mention ATC tapes......
It kept on saying it was going to do a thorough investigation, but it just glossed over half the topics, in an American, "hard hitting" (read cr_ap) documentary.
Nothing more annoying than a program designed for people with an attention span of 10 seconds, having to replay the same commentry over and over - and replaying video footage of a tape player every time they mention ATC tapes......
It kept on saying it was going to do a thorough investigation, but it just glossed over half the topics, in an American, "hard hitting" (read cr_ap) documentary.