ATSB Report C90 fatal at Toowoomba November 2001.
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Jamair. The C421's were between the Flight West Beech 58's, (which were air conditioned for the reasons you mentioned) and the Eastland Air C90's.
To my knowledge, there was never an incident with the Bushies/TAA C310's and Flight West Beech 58 Barons. The previous surgeon in charge of the program (in the 1980's) felt the air conditioned Beech 58's were the best solution, in view of the sectors involved etc.
To my knowledge, there was never an incident with the Bushies/TAA C310's and Flight West Beech 58 Barons. The previous surgeon in charge of the program (in the 1980's) felt the air conditioned Beech 58's were the best solution, in view of the sectors involved etc.
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4Dogs. Perhaps I should clarify my point about speedy feathering action. In an engine failure at such a critical time as happened to the C90 and for whatever reason the pilot decides to not reject the take off, then survival may well depend on how quickly the pilot reacts and takes the first actions to reduce drag.
You can argue the toss all day to make the point that a rushed action may result in either incorrect identification or other wrong things done. Quite true, of course.
On the other hand, a leisurely approach to the event where the pilot falls back on his wise old (or grade 2 ME instructor) advice to deliberately slow things up so that mis-identification could not possibly occur, can lead to the same unfortunate result. In other words, a crash due slow reaction and tardiness in feathering and other vital things.
In the deadly serious situation that the pilot of the accident C90 was faced with, the faster he feathered the propellor and reduced other drag items (gear being the first), the greater would be his chances of climbing away safely while no doubt sh..t...ing blue bricks.
There is then a fine dividing line in such circumstances between instant action which must be 100% right first time and a slower response aimed at making absolutely certain that mis-identification cannot possibly happen and then initiating the first action to feather etc. Each second of delay in drag reduction means the chances of a successful outcome is reduced. The Dove accident at Essendon many years ago proved that.
The flying schools invariably teach the slow deliberate approach to engine failure on take off. An experienced well versed instructor will point out the dangers of inappropriate delays in drag reducing actions and point out to trainees that you can rarely afford the luxury of leisurely but certain identifaction of the problem if the chips are down and they face the situation that the C90 pilot was in at Toowoomba.
No one can say for sure that if had been blessed with instant reaction skills and feathered the prop and got the gear coming up, that he may have been able to climb away on one engine.
But in this case, for some reason the prop was not feathered and the gear stayed down.
Correct identification is absolutely vital - few will argue otherwise. Equally vital, where circumstances demand, is speedy action to reduce drag (prop, feather etc).
As an armchair observer, it would seem that the C90 pilot may have opted for certain identification as his first priority. If so, was he right?
You can argue the toss all day to make the point that a rushed action may result in either incorrect identification or other wrong things done. Quite true, of course.
On the other hand, a leisurely approach to the event where the pilot falls back on his wise old (or grade 2 ME instructor) advice to deliberately slow things up so that mis-identification could not possibly occur, can lead to the same unfortunate result. In other words, a crash due slow reaction and tardiness in feathering and other vital things.
In the deadly serious situation that the pilot of the accident C90 was faced with, the faster he feathered the propellor and reduced other drag items (gear being the first), the greater would be his chances of climbing away safely while no doubt sh..t...ing blue bricks.
There is then a fine dividing line in such circumstances between instant action which must be 100% right first time and a slower response aimed at making absolutely certain that mis-identification cannot possibly happen and then initiating the first action to feather etc. Each second of delay in drag reduction means the chances of a successful outcome is reduced. The Dove accident at Essendon many years ago proved that.
The flying schools invariably teach the slow deliberate approach to engine failure on take off. An experienced well versed instructor will point out the dangers of inappropriate delays in drag reducing actions and point out to trainees that you can rarely afford the luxury of leisurely but certain identifaction of the problem if the chips are down and they face the situation that the C90 pilot was in at Toowoomba.
No one can say for sure that if had been blessed with instant reaction skills and feathered the prop and got the gear coming up, that he may have been able to climb away on one engine.
But in this case, for some reason the prop was not feathered and the gear stayed down.
Correct identification is absolutely vital - few will argue otherwise. Equally vital, where circumstances demand, is speedy action to reduce drag (prop, feather etc).
As an armchair observer, it would seem that the C90 pilot may have opted for certain identification as his first priority. If so, was he right?
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Hudson,
And to be fair, he may never have seen what an engine failure with negative auto-feather looked like!
I have seen quite a few folks with good experience misidentify that particular problem (fortunately in simulators) in a couple of different types - the main difference being FAR 25 and much better performance margin during the "arrgh, shet!" phase.
Stay Alive,
And to be fair, he may never have seen what an engine failure with negative auto-feather looked like!
I have seen quite a few folks with good experience misidentify that particular problem (fortunately in simulators) in a couple of different types - the main difference being FAR 25 and much better performance margin during the "arrgh, shet!" phase.
Stay Alive,
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Hiya Hudson and 4Dogs good to see you are both still around.
Of course all of the above begs the question as to why the authorities and manufacturers thought that "Auto- Feather" was necessary in the first place.
I haven't got the time to check the FARs/CARs but a penny gets you a pound (I reckon at least we remember what one of those looks like
) that it is REQUIRED for RPT operations.
Yup "tame consultant" shopping gaurantees that the professional ones become even as the dinosaur.
Although I managed to get a Coroners recommendation in West Aus that will make it very very difficult for the company to avoid serious financial damage should they now not get "fully qualified" advice and follow it.
It's not to do with regs but the "Duty of Care" to staff and contractors.
If they are made, or become aware, of a demonstrable differentiation in "safety margin" and "choose" the lesser either on behalf of or without their staff's knowledge and consent and it all comes unravelled , they are right in it.
The Mining Act would have the whole chain of command upwards fined/goaled.
In the particular case it was arguable that their "consultant"? simply did not know and was simply "ticking compliance boxes", the same compliance boxes CASA are required to do.
IMHO this role traditionally run by consultants, may in the past, have been justified by the failure of the regulator to do so is no longer justifiable.
I am sure you will agree it goes and always went, way beyond that.
I always made sure that the client signed a copy of my fional report as a receipt for the advice and followed up with a review should they choose not to implement it. Maybe that is why many of them thought I was "too expensive".
Funny, I never had any trouble with the ones who really understood that a "duty of care" could be mutually exclusive with a "it's legal".
It's the unique to Australia 2 airline policy again. The protective legislation and subsequent regulatory environment fatally skewed the Public v Private category perceptions, regulations and philosophy. Most US corporations understand the issues very clearly and run their flight departments to higher than airline standards.
Of course all of the above begs the question as to why the authorities and manufacturers thought that "Auto- Feather" was necessary in the first place.
I haven't got the time to check the FARs/CARs but a penny gets you a pound (I reckon at least we remember what one of those looks like
) that it is REQUIRED for RPT operations.
the poor old consultant is faced with satisfying the client in regard to the number one priority - competitive advantage - with only lip service being paid to the smoke and mirrors that are used to get there. If he doesn't do it, there are plenty who are more ignorant waiting in the wings.
Although I managed to get a Coroners recommendation in West Aus that will make it very very difficult for the company to avoid serious financial damage should they now not get "fully qualified" advice and follow it.
It's not to do with regs but the "Duty of Care" to staff and contractors.
If they are made, or become aware, of a demonstrable differentiation in "safety margin" and "choose" the lesser either on behalf of or without their staff's knowledge and consent and it all comes unravelled , they are right in it.
The Mining Act would have the whole chain of command upwards fined/goaled.
In the particular case it was arguable that their "consultant"? simply did not know and was simply "ticking compliance boxes", the same compliance boxes CASA are required to do.
IMHO this role traditionally run by consultants, may in the past, have been justified by the failure of the regulator to do so is no longer justifiable.
I am sure you will agree it goes and always went, way beyond that.
I always made sure that the client signed a copy of my fional report as a receipt for the advice and followed up with a review should they choose not to implement it. Maybe that is why many of them thought I was "too expensive".
Funny, I never had any trouble with the ones who really understood that a "duty of care" could be mutually exclusive with a "it's legal".
It's the unique to Australia 2 airline policy again. The protective legislation and subsequent regulatory environment fatally skewed the Public v Private category perceptions, regulations and philosophy. Most US corporations understand the issues very clearly and run their flight departments to higher than airline standards.
Props are for boats!
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Hi Stallie,
Thanks for starightening out that one, if Autofeather was fitted then , and because the ATSB couldnt determine weather it was armed or weather the Pilot attempted to Manual Feather engine, we will sadly not know. Lift off close to VMCA, with gear down and an unfeather prop, doesnt add up to Performance in anyones book. Doing a VMCA DEMONSTRTATION at altitude should be incorporated in Multi Turbine Training I believe. Operating at VMCA in any TurboProp Including a Twotter proves how vulnerable we really are especailly with one unfeathered. Spin into the ground on its back is a high posssible outcome. AUTOFEATHER make sure its armed.
Sheep
Thanks for starightening out that one, if Autofeather was fitted then , and because the ATSB couldnt determine weather it was armed or weather the Pilot attempted to Manual Feather engine, we will sadly not know. Lift off close to VMCA, with gear down and an unfeather prop, doesnt add up to Performance in anyones book. Doing a VMCA DEMONSTRTATION at altitude should be incorporated in Multi Turbine Training I believe. Operating at VMCA in any TurboProp Including a Twotter proves how vulnerable we really are especailly with one unfeathered. Spin into the ground on its back is a high posssible outcome. AUTOFEATHER make sure its armed.
Sheep
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VMCA demonstrations at altitude.
The figure obtained must always be taught as being a very optomistic figure, and would be lower than the Aircraft Flight Manual figure, or should be. Reciprocating engine reduced power would be developed at full throttle setting, if not turbocharged. Aircraft light, surely no one would give a VMCA demonstration with anything but minimum weight.
The following is transcript from Aviation Occurrence Report 95-004 Beechcraft 65-A80-8800, this was a fatal following a double engine failure, the information taken from 1.18 Additional Information, given by a former Chief Pilot when the aircraft was operated in Australia as VH-NAU/VH-NQU.
1.18.2. He also described a situation which occurred during his conversion training on the aircraft, where a spin was entered inadvertently during a manoeuvre at altitude. The spin was described as very steep nose down and difficult to recover from using the standard recovery technique. Inspin aileron and assymmetric power was used to assist recovery, which was achieved after about six full turns.
As you can see, not an exercise to be treated lightly.
There is however more to consider in certain cases than would be expected. During a delivery of Beechcraft B80 ex VH-AEQ from Melbourne to Palmerston North it was noted that the VMCA figure in the Australian Flight Manual was 87 knots, the Beechcraft Pilots operating Manual P/N 50-590211-3 requires the overhead panel in cockpit to be placarded as per the enclosed page from the manual.
Minimum Single Engine Control Speed 87 knots.
The New Zealand Aircraft Flight Manual states, for the same aircraft,
Minimum Single Engine Control Speed 86mph (75 knots)
This discrepancy was pointed out to the powers that be in NZCAA on the 25th Feb 2003, it cant be that important though as I am still awaiting reply.
(Edited for insertion)
Prospector
The figure obtained must always be taught as being a very optomistic figure, and would be lower than the Aircraft Flight Manual figure, or should be. Reciprocating engine reduced power would be developed at full throttle setting, if not turbocharged. Aircraft light, surely no one would give a VMCA demonstration with anything but minimum weight.
The following is transcript from Aviation Occurrence Report 95-004 Beechcraft 65-A80-8800, this was a fatal following a double engine failure, the information taken from 1.18 Additional Information, given by a former Chief Pilot when the aircraft was operated in Australia as VH-NAU/VH-NQU.
1.18.2. He also described a situation which occurred during his conversion training on the aircraft, where a spin was entered inadvertently during a manoeuvre at altitude. The spin was described as very steep nose down and difficult to recover from using the standard recovery technique. Inspin aileron and assymmetric power was used to assist recovery, which was achieved after about six full turns.
As you can see, not an exercise to be treated lightly.
There is however more to consider in certain cases than would be expected. During a delivery of Beechcraft B80 ex VH-AEQ from Melbourne to Palmerston North it was noted that the VMCA figure in the Australian Flight Manual was 87 knots, the Beechcraft Pilots operating Manual P/N 50-590211-3 requires the overhead panel in cockpit to be placarded as per the enclosed page from the manual.
Minimum Single Engine Control Speed 87 knots.
The New Zealand Aircraft Flight Manual states, for the same aircraft,
Minimum Single Engine Control Speed 86mph (75 knots)
This discrepancy was pointed out to the powers that be in NZCAA on the 25th Feb 2003, it cant be that important though as I am still awaiting reply.
(Edited for insertion)
Prospector
Last edited by prospector; 30th Jun 2004 at 02:54.
Props are for boats!
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Prospector,
]Yes it is very dangerous and your example very chilling indeed. VMCA stay the F^&* away from it. Disregrad my recommendation in my previous post
Sheep
]Yes it is very dangerous and your example very chilling indeed. VMCA stay the F^&* away from it. Disregrad my recommendation in my previous post
Sheep
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Folks;
I'm not an instructor or regulator, but I'd be interested in your thoughts on why it should it be ? or is? necessary to demonstrate what is clearly this or any other hazardous manoeuvre other than in a simulator or even at altitude.
I am not suprised at the B80 antics, nothing to do necessarily with the type, but the genre.
In any event any misrigging (more prevalent than you imagine) will simply either introduce or exacerbate such behaviour.
Also I suspect there is often a bit of "hairy chested" or "macho" stuff in this.
We know what will happen the test pilots with parachutes and anti spin drogues etc etc have already been there so, other than curiosity (and we know what happened to the cat), why do we need to go there.
My new Volvo S60 2.5T has AWD, full time traction control, ABS, 5 sets of airbags, side aircurtains, Global crash capsule with extra string and all manner of fancy things that are designed do save my life.
Do I need to go work out how to drive it sideways at high speed into an immoveable object to see that it all works as advertised?
Yeah another bloody Volvo driver
I'm not an instructor or regulator, but I'd be interested in your thoughts on why it should it be ? or is? necessary to demonstrate what is clearly this or any other hazardous manoeuvre other than in a simulator or even at altitude.
I am not suprised at the B80 antics, nothing to do necessarily with the type, but the genre.
In any event any misrigging (more prevalent than you imagine) will simply either introduce or exacerbate such behaviour.
Also I suspect there is often a bit of "hairy chested" or "macho" stuff in this.
We know what will happen the test pilots with parachutes and anti spin drogues etc etc have already been there so, other than curiosity (and we know what happened to the cat), why do we need to go there.
My new Volvo S60 2.5T has AWD, full time traction control, ABS, 5 sets of airbags, side aircurtains, Global crash capsule with extra string and all manner of fancy things that are designed do save my life.
Do I need to go work out how to drive it sideways at high speed into an immoveable object to see that it all works as advertised?
Yeah another bloody Volvo driver
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Gaunty,
Why indeed is there any need to demonstrate more than once, at initial multi issue, in an aircraft that is docile enough not to bite hard if mishandled, this business of VMCA.
However, I have been advised by a senior NZCAA person that the discrepancy between NZ AFM and Australian AFM in the Beechcraft B80 is not important as VMCA should be demonstrated before issuing a type rating (endorsement) for aircraft.
With this line of thought from above I am quite happy to be hanging up my headset after 45 years involvement in Aviation.
Prospector
Why indeed is there any need to demonstrate more than once, at initial multi issue, in an aircraft that is docile enough not to bite hard if mishandled, this business of VMCA.
However, I have been advised by a senior NZCAA person that the discrepancy between NZ AFM and Australian AFM in the Beechcraft B80 is not important as VMCA should be demonstrated before issuing a type rating (endorsement) for aircraft.
With this line of thought from above I am quite happy to be hanging up my headset after 45 years involvement in Aviation.
Prospector
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prospector
I'd go along with all of that.
Whether the aircraft bites really really hard or not, in the end is not the point.
Just don't go there
You cant go there in real life if you want to stay alive so whats the point of taking the risk beyond the aforesaid initial demo.
Or do we "add" some words or a star rating to the VMCA placard that says something like.
"actually a real pussy cat = *"
"there be monsters beyond here = **"
"macho macho man, just make sure you write up the high Gs = ***"
" you were warned, ground the aircraft until inspected = ****"
"stick your head between you legs and kiss your........*****"
Yup maybe time to hang up the spurs
I'd go along with all of that.
Whether the aircraft bites really really hard or not, in the end is not the point.
Just don't go there
You cant go there in real life if you want to stay alive so whats the point of taking the risk beyond the aforesaid initial demo.
Or do we "add" some words or a star rating to the VMCA placard that says something like.
"actually a real pussy cat = *"
"there be monsters beyond here = **"
"macho macho man, just make sure you write up the high Gs = ***"
" you were warned, ground the aircraft until inspected = ****"
"stick your head between you legs and kiss your........*****"
Yup maybe time to hang up the spurs
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And in any event most later model "properly designed" aircraft have VMCA below VS which renders it a non issue.
It's when you do the "mod" routine that it all goes pear shaped.
The main philosophy being not to give the pilot any more opportunities to kill your aeroplane than is possible. Because if he can he will find a way.
It's when you do the "mod" routine that it all goes pear shaped.
The main philosophy being not to give the pilot any more opportunities to kill your aeroplane than is possible. Because if he can he will find a way.
