US Senator's Son Killed while piloting MU2
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US Senator's Son Killed while piloting MU2
Yes, the MU-2 has a history of being quite unforgiving at low speed with an inop engine. The FAA addressed this several years ago by adopting SFAR 108 which mandates special training and experience requirements applicable to MU-2 PICs. While training SFARs appear to have reduced the incidence of MU-2 loss of control accidents, it's not reasonable to expect all such occurrences to be eliminated by training requirements. The Robinson helicopter training SFAR is another similar example. It's similar to type rating training, but without the issuance of a type rating.
Given the high profile nature of Sen. Inhofe and the past history of MU-2 control loss accidents, I expect the NTSB will be especially interested in performing a detailed investigation of this crash and a review of the effectiveness of SFAR 108. (which IIRC, was instituted at least in part as a result of NTSB recommendations made in past MU-2 accidents)
The TPE-331 engines installed on this aircraft rely upon a negative torque sensing system (NTS) to dump oil pressure from the prop dome to prevent the prop from driving the direct drive turboprop engine. If an engine stops producing positive torque to the prop in flight, the NTS system will release the oil from the prop dome and the prop will increase pitch progressively towards the feather position over a period of time. While this happens automatically, it is not an auto feather system. Fully feathering the prop is accomplished by pulling the stop/feather handle. This operates the prop oil dump and fuel shutoff valves by cable and mechanical linkage in the MU-2. (the FSOV is electrically operated for start and for normal shutdown)
Of course as the investigation progresses, at least some of the elements of the accident will be uncovered and possibly made public. I have in mind several possible scenarios which could produce the results reported thus far, but time will tell how accurate these eyewitness reports were.
I usually don't engage in "condolences" on crash threads anymore, but I do feel something for Senator Inhofe's 50 years of involvement and his dedication to aviation. I hope there is enough evidence to at least find out with some degree of certainty what went wrong. To an aviation family like the Inhofes, at least that might be something...
westhawk
Given the high profile nature of Sen. Inhofe and the past history of MU-2 control loss accidents, I expect the NTSB will be especially interested in performing a detailed investigation of this crash and a review of the effectiveness of SFAR 108. (which IIRC, was instituted at least in part as a result of NTSB recommendations made in past MU-2 accidents)
The TPE-331 engines installed on this aircraft rely upon a negative torque sensing system (NTS) to dump oil pressure from the prop dome to prevent the prop from driving the direct drive turboprop engine. If an engine stops producing positive torque to the prop in flight, the NTS system will release the oil from the prop dome and the prop will increase pitch progressively towards the feather position over a period of time. While this happens automatically, it is not an auto feather system. Fully feathering the prop is accomplished by pulling the stop/feather handle. This operates the prop oil dump and fuel shutoff valves by cable and mechanical linkage in the MU-2. (the FSOV is electrically operated for start and for normal shutdown)
Of course as the investigation progresses, at least some of the elements of the accident will be uncovered and possibly made public. I have in mind several possible scenarios which could produce the results reported thus far, but time will tell how accurate these eyewitness reports were.
I usually don't engage in "condolences" on crash threads anymore, but I do feel something for Senator Inhofe's 50 years of involvement and his dedication to aviation. I hope there is enough evidence to at least find out with some degree of certainty what went wrong. To an aviation family like the Inhofes, at least that might be something...
westhawk
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All performance requirements are met with the propellor "windmilling in the NTS mode"...the NTS system is very rapid and effective...and requires no arming, or electrical circuits to operate....
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there are two ''body lengths" of the MU2...the short sporty one like the one in question
and the longer body one which I flew (J model for anyone who cares).
while they are both demanding, the shorter one is more so, or so I have been told.
they are quite cheap to buy, used...because of their demanding reputation.
However, if you are on your toes, always ready, they can be amazing little machines...the landing gear is off the F104 Starfighter.
I routinely operated out of a 2500' strip and was one of the very few turbine engine planes on the field.
One day I traded an hour flying the MU2 with a King Air 90 guy. He had is hands full, and I said: is that all there is to it?
I shut an engine down in a test flight and the NTS system worked, however the plane, half full of gas and no one but me on board could not hold the pre computed altitude and I started a driftdown.
This tragic crash kind of reminds me...we always practice losing an engine at takeoff...but the most insidious of engine failures is during a long low power descent.
when you add power to level off near the airport, you can be surprised! and if you aren't ready, BAM
and the longer body one which I flew (J model for anyone who cares).
while they are both demanding, the shorter one is more so, or so I have been told.
they are quite cheap to buy, used...because of their demanding reputation.
However, if you are on your toes, always ready, they can be amazing little machines...the landing gear is off the F104 Starfighter.
I routinely operated out of a 2500' strip and was one of the very few turbine engine planes on the field.
One day I traded an hour flying the MU2 with a King Air 90 guy. He had is hands full, and I said: is that all there is to it?
I shut an engine down in a test flight and the NTS system worked, however the plane, half full of gas and no one but me on board could not hold the pre computed altitude and I started a driftdown.
This tragic crash kind of reminds me...we always practice losing an engine at takeoff...but the most insidious of engine failures is during a long low power descent.
when you add power to level off near the airport, you can be surprised! and if you aren't ready, BAM
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2 cents
Really sad to hear about this accident, the NTS system is really easy to check on that type engine, but I feel that a non professional pilot really needs to stick to something like a King Air or 690, both do much better with a caged engine.
I think the MU2 in this accident was one that was manufactured to produce full power on the day it was new, no reserves built it as in later models, no part time pilot should be operating this type of equipment.
I think the MU2 in this accident was one that was manufactured to produce full power on the day it was new, no reserves built it as in later models, no part time pilot should be operating this type of equipment.
no part time pilot should be operating this type of equipment.
The only standard we really have under current regulations is to require them to undergo training and competency evaluation at intervals. When the MU-2 accident rate was noted to be unacceptably high in comparison to other types in class, the standard for training & evaluation and experience in type was increased by the mandates of SFAR 108. What else do you think needs to be done?
westhawk
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I'm not sure what should be recommended, but I'm sure this pilot probably did the simulator training in a simulator that was set up as a Solitaire, possibly quite different than the performance achieved on his own aircraft.
Whether an MU-2, a lowly Seneca I or a high powered jet, it takes rudder to stop the yaw when one engine is making lots more thrust than the other. The MU-2 has a reputation of being less forgiving than many when slow on one engine. This is well known throughout the bizav community. Any pilot transitioning into this type knows (or should know) they need to remain ready for that eventuality. But humans being human...
The two questions that come immediately to mind are:
1) Why did the engine fail?
2) Why didn't the pilot apply sufficient corrective input to maintain control?
There are a multitude of possible answers to each of the above questions and when there is more information available from which to draw inferences, I'll be more willing than I am now to speculate. If no "smoking gun" is found to exist, this one might not be that easy to pin down. We'll see I guess...
westhawk
The two questions that come immediately to mind are:
1) Why did the engine fail?
2) Why didn't the pilot apply sufficient corrective input to maintain control?
There are a multitude of possible answers to each of the above questions and when there is more information available from which to draw inferences, I'll be more willing than I am now to speculate. If no "smoking gun" is found to exist, this one might not be that easy to pin down. We'll see I guess...
westhawk
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Sen. Inhofe had his own near-disaster in 2010. He got away without certificate action, something that would be dished out readily to any other civilian.
44 - Closed runways can't stop pilot-Sen. James Inhofe
44 - Closed runways can't stop pilot-Sen. James Inhofe
Sen. Inhofe had his own near-disaster in 2010. He got away without certificate action, something that would be dished out readily to any other civilian.
It's interesting indeed that none of these issues actually applied in Inhofe's case since he was only required to receive remedial training in lieu of enforcement action, or what is sometimes referred to as an "administrative action". If one presents evidence of having completed the remedial training and has no more violations over the next two years, the matter is not pursued further. So his "free pass" for committing a violation most pilots would consider worthy of sanction seems to have inspired the man to sponsor a Senate bill which actually makes some improvements to enforcement procedures, airman medical reviews and NOTAM dissemination. But then one might make the case that we should expect no less from a member of the senate aviation caucus even if he hadn't made such an egregious screw up! But then he has been sort of a lone voice for GA in an environment where the president himself actively opposes our interests.
In any case the bill is now law. And outside of a little additional paperwork with every new certificate or rating application, seems to be an improvement to a system that can always use improvement. We're lucky to have someone willing to spend any personal political capital on matters of interest to airmen at all these days. BTW, this is not the first good thing he's done for aviation and I hope it's not the last. So thanks Jim! (please read your NOTAMs and keep your eyes open when landing from now on...)
westhawk
NTSB Preliminary report
The preliminary report doesn't really contain any new or "smoking gun" information, but does at least establish the facts as they were known at the time the report was produced. Though it's unlikely that we'll ever really know to a certainty why the pilot wasn't able to maintain control of the airplane, there still remains a good chance of finding a mechanical or physical reason why the left engine was shut down.
westhawk
NTSB Identification: CEN14FA046
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, November 10, 2013 in Owasso, OK
Aircraft: MITSUBISHI MU 2B-25, registration: N856JT
Injuries: 1 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On November 10, 2013, about 1546 central standard time, a Mitsubishi MU-2B-25 twin-engine airplane, N856JT, impacted wooded terrain while maneuvering near Owasso, Oklahoma. The commercial pilot, who was the sole occupant of the airplane, sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was destroyed. The airplane was registered to Anasazi Winds, LLC, Tulsa, Oklahoma, and was operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, and an instrument flight plan had been filed. The flight departed Salina Regional Airport (SLN), Salina, Kansas, about 1500, and was en route to Tulsa International Airport (TUL), Tulsa, Oklahoma.
According to preliminary air traffic control communications and radar data, the airplane was cleared to land on runway 18L at TUL, and the pilot was instructed to reduce the airspeed to 150 knots. The pilot acknowledged the clearance and speed reduction. Radar data showed the airplane on a straight-in approach to runway 18L. After the airplane passed the runway 18L outer marker, the airplane began a left turn. The air traffic control tower controller asked the pilot about the deviation, and the pilot reported that he had a control problem. The left turn continued, and the controller then cleared the pilot to maneuver to the west and asked if he needed assistance. The pilot informed the controller that the left engine was shut down. The controller then declared an emergency for the pilot and asked about the number of souls on-board the airplane and the fuel remaining. No further communications were received from the pilot. Radar data showed the airplane complete a 360-degree left turn near the runway 18L outer marker at 1,100 feet mean sea level, and then radar contact was lost.
Several witnesses observed the airplane in a shallow left turn; the reported altitudes ranged from 400 to 800 feet above ground level. During the turn, the landing gear was in the extended position, and one engine propeller appeared not to be rotating. The airplane continued in a left turn and the wings began to rock back and forth at a 10- to 15-degree bank angle. The airplane was observed to then make a right turn, followed by a left turn, and then a steep spiral to the left. The airplane disappeared from the witnesses' view as it descended.
The accident site was located in wooded terrain about 5 miles north of TUL at a global positioning (GPS) elevation of about 650 feet. The airplane came to rest upright on a measured magnetic heading of 109 degrees. The main wreckage area consisted of all major airplane structure and components. The left engine propeller blades were found in a feathered position. The landing gear was found in the extended position, and the flaps were in the 20-degree position. Postimpact fire consumed a majority of the fuselage and wing structure.
At 1553, the TUL automated surface observing system, located 5 miles south of the accident site, reported the wind from 140 degrees at 6 knots, visibility 10 miles, scattered clouds at 9,000 feet, temperature 19 degrees Celsius, dew point 6 degrees Celsius, and an altimeter setting of 30.26 inches of Mercury.
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, November 10, 2013 in Owasso, OK
Aircraft: MITSUBISHI MU 2B-25, registration: N856JT
Injuries: 1 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On November 10, 2013, about 1546 central standard time, a Mitsubishi MU-2B-25 twin-engine airplane, N856JT, impacted wooded terrain while maneuvering near Owasso, Oklahoma. The commercial pilot, who was the sole occupant of the airplane, sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was destroyed. The airplane was registered to Anasazi Winds, LLC, Tulsa, Oklahoma, and was operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, and an instrument flight plan had been filed. The flight departed Salina Regional Airport (SLN), Salina, Kansas, about 1500, and was en route to Tulsa International Airport (TUL), Tulsa, Oklahoma.
According to preliminary air traffic control communications and radar data, the airplane was cleared to land on runway 18L at TUL, and the pilot was instructed to reduce the airspeed to 150 knots. The pilot acknowledged the clearance and speed reduction. Radar data showed the airplane on a straight-in approach to runway 18L. After the airplane passed the runway 18L outer marker, the airplane began a left turn. The air traffic control tower controller asked the pilot about the deviation, and the pilot reported that he had a control problem. The left turn continued, and the controller then cleared the pilot to maneuver to the west and asked if he needed assistance. The pilot informed the controller that the left engine was shut down. The controller then declared an emergency for the pilot and asked about the number of souls on-board the airplane and the fuel remaining. No further communications were received from the pilot. Radar data showed the airplane complete a 360-degree left turn near the runway 18L outer marker at 1,100 feet mean sea level, and then radar contact was lost.
Several witnesses observed the airplane in a shallow left turn; the reported altitudes ranged from 400 to 800 feet above ground level. During the turn, the landing gear was in the extended position, and one engine propeller appeared not to be rotating. The airplane continued in a left turn and the wings began to rock back and forth at a 10- to 15-degree bank angle. The airplane was observed to then make a right turn, followed by a left turn, and then a steep spiral to the left. The airplane disappeared from the witnesses' view as it descended.
The accident site was located in wooded terrain about 5 miles north of TUL at a global positioning (GPS) elevation of about 650 feet. The airplane came to rest upright on a measured magnetic heading of 109 degrees. The main wreckage area consisted of all major airplane structure and components. The left engine propeller blades were found in a feathered position. The landing gear was found in the extended position, and the flaps were in the 20-degree position. Postimpact fire consumed a majority of the fuselage and wing structure.
At 1553, the TUL automated surface observing system, located 5 miles south of the accident site, reported the wind from 140 degrees at 6 knots, visibility 10 miles, scattered clouds at 9,000 feet, temperature 19 degrees Celsius, dew point 6 degrees Celsius, and an altimeter setting of 30.26 inches of Mercury.
two possible causes come to mind, fuel mismanagement and flameout due to icing
The control difficulty seems to have occurred sometime after the instruction to slow to 150 KIAS. Obviously the airplane would have been much less challenging to control at the previous higher speed and before the flaps and gear were extended. Now with the lower speed, higher drag and the need for more power on the remaining engine, LOTS more rudder will be required. That scenario can get out of hand in a hurry if one isn't practiced and/or doesn't anticipate it. Sawing back and forth with those roll spoilers only makes it worse.
It'll be interesting to see what the NTSB comes up with. Maybe in a year or two...
westhawk
Thread Starter
hmmm
control problems....remember, this plane uses spoilers for roll, BUT has something called: TRIMMER AILERONS
its been 28 years but I seem to recall that the trimmer ailerons are electrically powered
using spoilers, instead of trimmer ailerons adds to drag quickly.
as to what caused the engine to be shut down...wondering when the last power run on the lebaux was made
control problems....remember, this plane uses spoilers for roll, BUT has something called: TRIMMER AILERONS
its been 28 years but I seem to recall that the trimmer ailerons are electrically powered
using spoilers, instead of trimmer ailerons adds to drag quickly.
as to what caused the engine to be shut down...wondering when the last power run on the lebaux was made
