Sea Jet
MM you make the point that the retention of the Sea Harrier is not viable from a financial viewpoint, and I in some ways I find myself agreeing with you - reluctantly of course. However, surely keeping some in store (as some are speculating on the net) would seem to be a reasonable compromise?
The news that six are going to Culdrose for use at the School of Flight Deck Ops raises a faint possibility that they could be returned to frontline service in a genuine crisis. However, maintenance and storage issues make that possibility a small one, at least within any sort of reasonably fast timescale. That said, a number of the ships sent South in 1982 were hurriedly brought out of mothballs but I guess issues with wiring, controls etc would make this sort of thing more difficult.
As to costs perhaps cutting down on the amount of needless paperwork and pointless bureaucracy would help? And like Jacko I'm sceptical about the value of the nuclear deterrent. Surely some savings can be made there?
The above was written before your last PM (haven't read it yet), so don't have a go at me over that.
Jacko I may be wrong, but I think I heard someone (a Staff Officer) state that the UK will soon have the second greatest amphibious capability in the world.
We no longer need (nor can we affford) a balanced ocean going navy capable of handling any level of operation autonomously. We merely need to be able to make a useful contribution to very large scale coalition operations and to be able to undertake more modest ops on our own.
UK contributions to coalition operations often include autonomous operations with operations. That is what is the US expects and wants. Yes that would mean an amphibious force with its own area of operations, and expected to cope without significant US support.
As you may have noticed there appears to be a potential crisis in the Middle East, as discussed here. In the event of a Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, a US attack, or the imposition of sanctions Iran has threatened to stop the flow of oil from the Gulf. Depending on what happened politics may make it impossible for some Gulf states to offer support.
Iran's extensive coastline (about 1500 miles long) means shipping in the whole Persian Gulf/Northern Arabian Gulf could be under threat. There would be a myriad of threats - air, surface, submarine, mines, land based missiles, assymmetric. The Iranian Air Force still exists as do the other possible threats, and the potential for mayhem is high. There will be times when ships, both merchant and naval, are closer to the Iran bases than the nearest friendly bases or US carrier group. This sort of crisis would inevitably involve the UK.
The news that six are going to Culdrose for use at the School of Flight Deck Ops raises a faint possibility that they could be returned to frontline service in a genuine crisis. However, maintenance and storage issues make that possibility a small one, at least within any sort of reasonably fast timescale. That said, a number of the ships sent South in 1982 were hurriedly brought out of mothballs but I guess issues with wiring, controls etc would make this sort of thing more difficult.
As to costs perhaps cutting down on the amount of needless paperwork and pointless bureaucracy would help? And like Jacko I'm sceptical about the value of the nuclear deterrent. Surely some savings can be made there?
The above was written before your last PM (haven't read it yet), so don't have a go at me over that.
Jacko I may be wrong, but I think I heard someone (a Staff Officer) state that the UK will soon have the second greatest amphibious capability in the world.
We no longer need (nor can we affford) a balanced ocean going navy capable of handling any level of operation autonomously. We merely need to be able to make a useful contribution to very large scale coalition operations and to be able to undertake more modest ops on our own.
UK contributions to coalition operations often include autonomous operations with operations. That is what is the US expects and wants. Yes that would mean an amphibious force with its own area of operations, and expected to cope without significant US support.
As you may have noticed there appears to be a potential crisis in the Middle East, as discussed here. In the event of a Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, a US attack, or the imposition of sanctions Iran has threatened to stop the flow of oil from the Gulf. Depending on what happened politics may make it impossible for some Gulf states to offer support.
Iran's extensive coastline (about 1500 miles long) means shipping in the whole Persian Gulf/Northern Arabian Gulf could be under threat. There would be a myriad of threats - air, surface, submarine, mines, land based missiles, assymmetric. The Iranian Air Force still exists as do the other possible threats, and the potential for mayhem is high. There will be times when ships, both merchant and naval, are closer to the Iran bases than the nearest friendly bases or US carrier group. This sort of crisis would inevitably involve the UK.
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Originally Posted by Navaleye
Why get rid of the Jag? Because its knackered. I was at an airshow a year or two ago and the plane concerned flew a great routine only to be destined for scrap because its airframe life was up. Can you say the same for a 6yr old Shar? No of course not.
The Jaguar is not "knackered" and is being withdrawn purely on cost grounds in the same way as the Harrier. That air show story sounds a bit suspect too!
Fine, well as your naval double dolphin type people would no doubt say, send 3 SSNs down there, and tell the Argentinians they are going - not a great task group full of naval aviation - prevention is better than cure!!
I seem to remember seeing a documentary about the Falklands affair, in which a Foreign Office Minister from 1982 (David Luce?) stated that in his view the worst thing to happen in the crisis was the press getting hold of the news that three SSNs were being sent South. Why? Because it told the Junta that if they were to act they needed to before the submarines arrived.
We may have a similar number of SSNs now as we did in 1982, I suspect someone else will be able to say for certain. However we also had quite a few diesel electric boats, and they did a lot of routine tasks. Now all tasks have to be handled by the dwindling SSN numbers (to be reduced to eight) and the force is rather busy. Relying on being able to suddenly deploy three to the South Atlantic seems risky.
We may have a similar number of SSNs now as we did in 1982, I suspect someone else will be able to say for certain. However we also had quite a few diesel electric boats, and they did a lot of routine tasks. Now all tasks have to be handled by the dwindling SSN numbers (to be reduced to eight) and the force is rather busy. Relying on being able to suddenly deploy three to the South Atlantic seems risky.
Probably Richard Luce WEBF. He resigned along with Lord Carrington at the time of the Falklands. David Luce (or Sir David Luce, to be exact) was 1SL from 63-66, and resigned over the decision to cancel CVA01. I can't recall whether Richard and David Luce were related.
Got the names mixed up. Oops. However had CVA01 not been cancelled the whole affair would probably not have happened, the ability to send a task force (also remembering the damge Nott's cuts did) who have made the Junta think twice. Which brings us back to the theme of the thread.
Suspicion breeds confidence
His grandfather (Captain Luce) was the Captain of HMS Bristol which fought at Coronel and the 1st Battle of the Falkland Islands in 1914. Small world.
Last edited by Navaleye; 28th Feb 2006 at 17:33.
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Falklands and CVA-01
>However had CVA01 not been cancelled the whole affair would probably not
>have happened, the ability to send a task force (also remembering the
>damge Nott's cuts did) who have made the Junta think twice. Which brings
>us back to the theme of the thread.
(Sorry to do this to everyone who rightly wants to see this thread RIP, but this is interesting.)
WEBF - Are you saying that Galtieri et al would've been deterred by CVA-01 simply existing? Or that CVA-01 + large number of Bristol Class escorts would've made it much easier to retake the islands? If so, how much easier?
It's certainly possible that CTOL naval air power would've kept the task force entirely free of enemy air attack; Gannet AEW would have been very good but presumably would have required it's own CAP when well forward on picket duty. And as there was no CVA-02, there would have been one deck (albeit a large one) in the South Atlantic, and arguably Woodward's concerns about bringing the carrier inshore would presumably have been greater. (All of this presuming that our one carrier would have helpfully have been in commission and ready to sail at a moment's notice.) In other words, whilst the AEW would certainly have been a massive bonus, I'm sceptical that iit would have meant no losses to the task force, and as a result, the troops on the ground may have had more helicopters. Hence, I'm not sure that a single CVA-01 would have been the sword of Damocles you imply.
Secondly, what would the early 1980s airwing of CVA-01 have looked like? Presumably F-4Ks and Buccaneers, with Gannet AEW. It is possible of course that the longer ranged Phantoms and Buccs (vs. SHar) would have found 25 de Mayo and allowed an attack on her before the Belgrano was sunk. But once the over-water attack phase was out of the way - remember, 25 de Mayo kept well out of the way after the Belgrano sinking - would the Phantoms and the Buccaneers have been much more useful to the ground forces in CAS/BAI than the Harrier GR3s were? Hard to see; harder to see that they would have been able to close the Stanley runway, either.
Thoughts?
BTW, has anyone else seen Vol 2 of the "Official History" by Lawrence Freedman - full of interesting stuff, including details of the RAF operations out of Chile.... fascinating, but I suppose it was all a long time ago now.
S41
>have happened, the ability to send a task force (also remembering the
>damge Nott's cuts did) who have made the Junta think twice. Which brings
>us back to the theme of the thread.
(Sorry to do this to everyone who rightly wants to see this thread RIP, but this is interesting.)
WEBF - Are you saying that Galtieri et al would've been deterred by CVA-01 simply existing? Or that CVA-01 + large number of Bristol Class escorts would've made it much easier to retake the islands? If so, how much easier?
It's certainly possible that CTOL naval air power would've kept the task force entirely free of enemy air attack; Gannet AEW would have been very good but presumably would have required it's own CAP when well forward on picket duty. And as there was no CVA-02, there would have been one deck (albeit a large one) in the South Atlantic, and arguably Woodward's concerns about bringing the carrier inshore would presumably have been greater. (All of this presuming that our one carrier would have helpfully have been in commission and ready to sail at a moment's notice.) In other words, whilst the AEW would certainly have been a massive bonus, I'm sceptical that iit would have meant no losses to the task force, and as a result, the troops on the ground may have had more helicopters. Hence, I'm not sure that a single CVA-01 would have been the sword of Damocles you imply.
Secondly, what would the early 1980s airwing of CVA-01 have looked like? Presumably F-4Ks and Buccaneers, with Gannet AEW. It is possible of course that the longer ranged Phantoms and Buccs (vs. SHar) would have found 25 de Mayo and allowed an attack on her before the Belgrano was sunk. But once the over-water attack phase was out of the way - remember, 25 de Mayo kept well out of the way after the Belgrano sinking - would the Phantoms and the Buccaneers have been much more useful to the ground forces in CAS/BAI than the Harrier GR3s were? Hard to see; harder to see that they would have been able to close the Stanley runway, either.
Thoughts?
BTW, has anyone else seen Vol 2 of the "Official History" by Lawrence Freedman - full of interesting stuff, including details of the RAF operations out of Chile.... fascinating, but I suppose it was all a long time ago now.
S41
TheVillagePhotographer.co.uk
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The end is nigh... Vidlcip of the last carrier take off and a bit of splurge from the BBC for your delectation.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/help/3681938.stm
Conan
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/help/3681938.stm
Conan
Suspicion breeds confidence
There can be little doubt that CVA-01 with her airgroup would have been a quantum leap over anything that Invincible and Hermes could do.
Strike:
The buccaneer could operate deep strike missions over the islands and onto the mainland if necessary. Although this could be achieved from beyond the range of the Arg air force.
Defence:
F4 supersonic, with medium range missiles and multiple AIM-9s, so far more combat persistence then the Shar.
All of the above would be suported by the Gannet. No no surprise packages coming over the horizon at you.
I don't think the Args would have had a go if we still had the old Ark let alone CVA-01.
Strike:
The buccaneer could operate deep strike missions over the islands and onto the mainland if necessary. Although this could be achieved from beyond the range of the Arg air force.
Defence:
F4 supersonic, with medium range missiles and multiple AIM-9s, so far more combat persistence then the Shar.
All of the above would be suported by the Gannet. No no surprise packages coming over the horizon at you.
I don't think the Args would have had a go if we still had the old Ark let alone CVA-01.
S41 The Argies would have not invaded had they thought that Britain would be both willing and able to send a task force. The 1981 Nott cuts said that we wouldn't and couldn't. Fortunately, they had not been fully implemented by April 1982.
This may interest you: 2005 in Review by Richard Beedall.
This may interest you: 2005 in Review by Richard Beedall.
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WEBF,
As I have said several times before, the UK needs to stop trying to be a global player. We cannot afford it.
As the op/ed piece you just linked to stated "The Economist magazine suggested a decade ago that in order to cut the defence budget the RN could be reduced to just a coastal force for economic zone duties without any risk to national security".
This is what is going to have to happen.
Cheers
BHR
As I have said several times before, the UK needs to stop trying to be a global player. We cannot afford it.
As the op/ed piece you just linked to stated "The Economist magazine suggested a decade ago that in order to cut the defence budget the RN could be reduced to just a coastal force for economic zone duties without any risk to national security".
This is what is going to have to happen.
Cheers
BHR
Last edited by BillHicksRules; 2nd Mar 2006 at 10:15.
Suspicion breeds confidence
BHR,
What we buy is driven by operational requirements. The government's stated operational doctrine is one of expeditionary warfare. For that we require, strike, counter air and amphibious capability, supported by screening forces. That's what's on the plan.
What we buy is driven by operational requirements. The government's stated operational doctrine is one of expeditionary warfare. For that we require, strike, counter air and amphibious capability, supported by screening forces. That's what's on the plan.