Sea Jet
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Re: Sea Jet
http://www.parliament.the-stationery...79/2050104.htm
I have to admit that I wasn't looking for Sea Jet stuff when I found the above document. I was actually looking to see what was going on in parliament on my birthday.
Yes, that is really, really sad and I'm not proud.
However, I can't help thinking that Sir Jock Stirrup is not a good choice of person to ask about the Sea Harrier.
I have to admit that I wasn't looking for Sea Jet stuff when I found the above document. I was actually looking to see what was going on in parliament on my birthday.
Yes, that is really, really sad and I'm not proud.
However, I can't help thinking that Sir Jock Stirrup is not a good choice of person to ask about the Sea Harrier.
Re: Sea Jet
Yes. Why ask an officer whose entire career has been built on making the most cost effective use of Air Power, and juggling priorities and scarce recources to do so?
An officer whose own flying career included service in the regional reinforcement and rapid deployment roles?
What would he have to say about SHar?
And for the benefit of the lazy.
"Examination of Witness (Questions 180 - 199)
WEDNESDAY 1 MAY 2002
AIR MARSHAL SIR JOCK STIRRUP
**180. Against that background, what would you say to the proposition, which some might say, that, under the procurement system as we have it at the minute, there is far too much emphasis on project deadlines, cost budgets and not enough on what they might term and, for all I know you might term, customer value?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) We have three key parameters when dealing with our projects: time, cost and performance and we consider them all. The performance is set by us in terms of key user requirements which are set after detailed consultation with those who are going to have to use the equipment. Obviously, we are always alive to the possibility of trade-offs between them. If somebody comes along to us and says, "Look, we cannot deliver this capability but we can deliver 80 per cent of it for half the cost", then we would take a very close look at it. If delivering 80 per cent of the capability meant that you could not win, we would not be interested. If it meant that you could, perhaps you might have to do something else with another system, perhaps you might have to change your processes a little but you could alter things and deliver the necessary outcome for 50 per cent of the cost, then of course that is what we would wish to do. We need to use the money as wisely as possible. We have a responsibility to the taxpayer, but also of course I have a much closer interest which is squeezing as much capability out of the resources available as I possibly can.
**181. Just so that I understand, is that a "yes" or a "no" to the proposition? In other words, did you agree with that proposition about customer value versus project deadlines and cost budgets or not?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) No, I did not agree because your proposition, as I understand it—and forgive me if I have it wrong—was that we did not really worry about customer value, we just worried about time and cost.
**182. Again, just so that I understand this, what is your definition of customer value?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) We set key user requirements for our capability and whatever system is delivered has to meet those key user requirements. That is then delivering the value, the outcome that the customer needs. As I said, if there were an opportunity to deliver slightly less than that for a significantly reduced cost or much, much quicker, then we would of course look at it. However, we would need to be sure that the capability required would produce the desired outcome. If it did not, there would be no point in it.
**183. Do you have any thoughts about how customer value might be better recognised or measured because of course measurement is always the key thing, is it not?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) I think that we have a good system with our key user requirements because we do not any longer, in my area, specify that a piece of equipment must go at a certain speed or something like that. We talk much more in terms of outcomes because it is outcomes that we are after.
**184. Do you feel that the equipment capability customer has enough influence—that is the important word—in steering equipment programmes to meet evolving requirements once they are under the control of the Integrated Project Teams?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) Yes, I do. I would just say that as we have to continue our progress in looking at equipment capability in the round and the interactions between different projects, that has to be mirrored with in the Defence Procurement Agency as well. So they face exactly the same challenge that we do. Integrated Project Teams are very focused on their own projects, but they cannot be delivered in isolation because everything connects to everybody else.
**185. What difference will the new Investment Appraisals Board make? What is the key difference?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) It will not make any difference to me. I am not really the right person to ask about the Investment Approvals Board. The purpose in moving from the old Equipment Approvals Committee was to address the fact that we are no longer just about buying systems and therefore approving the expenditure on those systems. We are actually about procuring systems and/or services in terms of equipment capability and of course there is a range of other very large investment decisions which are outside the equipment capability area that go in the Ministry of Defence. It is about drawing all those together in a systematic and coherent way.
**Chairman: When you leave in a few years' time, Air Marshal, we will ask you on how many occasions the advice of the Equipment Approvals Committee was ignored by higher authority. It is quite difficult to get that information out of anybody. We have given you 40 minutes of rather gentle questioning but now we are coming onto the really dirty stuff and there is no one better to deliver difficult questions than my colleague, Gerald Howarth.
Mr Howarth
**186. We have had the theory, Air Marshal, and now we turn to the practice. We would like to ask you a number of questions relating to the Sea Harrier, the JSF, Eurofighter so on. As you will know only too well, two months ago, the Ministry of Defence announced, rather unexpectedly, the withdrawal of the Sea Harrier force beginning in 2004 and ending in 2006, which of course is at least six years before the introduction of its proposed replacement, the Joint Strike Fighter. Can you tell us what role your organisation had in the decision to withdraw the Sea Harrier from service prior to the original planned date of withdrawal.
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) My organisation had a significant role, as you would expect since we are about future equipment capability. The issue was how we were going to continue to provide the necessary range of capabilities on board carriers until the new carrier and the Future Joint Combat Aircraft came into service. What was clear to us was that, to sustain the Sea Harrier, the FA2, beyond 2006 as a viable weapon system was going to require a very great deal of investment and would entail substantial technical risk. There were a number of other areas of the programme that required investment and, as ever, it was a question of balance of priorities and, given the need to balance the priorities, the decision was taken that it would not be sensible for that period of time and given the risk to make the degree of investment in the Sea Harrier that would have been necessary to keep it viable in service.
**187. Given that the Fleet will be unprotected in that time, I think it is only reasonable to ask you what that essential upgrade would entail and how much it would cost.
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) It is not the case that the Fleet will be unprotected; I must make that absolutely clear. First of all, the —
**188. Perhaps, making that rather bold assertion, Air Marshal, you could tell us how the Fleet will be protected.
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) Absolutely. First of all, what is it that we seek in terms of capability from our carriers? We seek the projection of offensive power. That was the purpose behind the decision to procure two new larger carriers in the defence review. The carriers are about the projection of offensive power in which the Sea Harrier plays a very small part and a reducing part as the technology, in terms of offensive power, moves on.
**189. Forgive me, Air Marshal, but we are not talking about carriers, we are talking about the fleet that we currently have.
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) No, but that is the rationale for our carriers. It is projection of offensive power. It is true of the carriers that we have now as it will be of the carriers that we will have in 2012. That is the primary role. We have, for a number of years now, embarked GR7s and we will be embarking GR9s on carriers to carry out that role. We embark them on the current carriers and we have done for a number of years.
**190. That is an offensive role.
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) That is the primary purpose of a carrier.
**191. That is not a Fleet Air Defence role?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) No.
**192. They are two completely different aircraft with completely different roles.
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) They are indeed, but I need to make clear, before moving on to some more detail about air defence, why we have carriers in the first place and it is not to provide air defence for the fleet, it is to provide projection of offensive power. Clearly, if you have a fleet at sea, you need to make sure that it is properly protected from the range of threats that it might face: sub-surface, surface and from the air as well. We are introducing, as you know, the Type-45 Destroyer which is going to have a substantial range of effective surface-to-air defences, a world beating radar, world beating missiles to go with it and a command and control system to go along with those. In the interim, we are making some substantial improvements of the Type-42 to make sure that its air defence capability remains at the level that we need. We have the Frigates providing point defence with missiles. We also of course, depending upon the scenario, envisage mostly operating with allies and partners in intensive combat operations. So, it may well be that we are being provided with air cover from other ships. We also may be able to provide air cover by aircraft operating from ashore. Again, all depending upon the circumstances. If you were to say to me, would I prefer to continue to have the kind of capability that the Sea Harrier produces up until 2012, my answer would be "of course", but not at any cost given the opportunities in other areas that we would have to forego if we were to make the necessary investment and that is the fundamental point.
**193. Would there not be greater savings that could be attributable to, for example, rationalising the Tornado F3, the GR4, GR7s and Jaguar?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) Those are areas that we continue to look at and that we are investigating at the moment. We have not chosen only to look at the balance of investment in the FA2, we are looking at the balance of investment across the whole range of capabilities. However, it remains the case that not only would the necessary improvements to the FA2 have been extremely expensive, but they would have been at extremely high technical risk and it may have turned out that we could not have done it.
**194. Can you spell out to us what that technical risk is.
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) For example, it needs upgraded engines. The Sea Harrier is not the same airframe, as you know, as the GR7/GR9. Putting the larger engines into the Sea Harrier was a formidable task. We have had some experience of putting new engines into aircraft unsuccessfully. So, we have a very clear idea of the risks involved and they would have been substantial in the case of the Sea Harrier.
**195. Is that because you need the upgraded Pegasus?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) Yes.
**196. It was suggested to me by John Farley last night, whom you will know is a most distinguished proponent of the VSTOL theory, that there are engines in America which would be perfectly suitable for the purpose of upgrading the FA2s.
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) I do not know to which engines he was referring, but certainly all the studies we carried out showed that to put an engine of sufficient power into the Sea Harrier while not obviously impossible was a substantial task involving a very high degree of technical risk.
**197. If the MoD concluded that it cannot afford to upgrade the Sea Harrier, why has it happened now? Why was the decision not made some time ago?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) The decision was made now on the basis of a great deal of work that was undertaken in terms of balance of investment. I cannot give you a specific answer as to why it was not taken two years ago, but the most likely conclusion one can draw is that the necessary material and evidence was not to hand. There has been an attempt at coming up with an affordable plan to continue with the Sea Harrier in service because nobody really wants to see it go before it is replaced. It is not, as I said earlier, something that I would have chosen to do were it not for the fact that we have to make some hard choices in terms of balance of investment.
**198. Why not make the savings now? Why not scrap it now? Why wait until 2004/06?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) We have to move the aircrew from the Sea Harrier across to the GR7/GR9 in order that they can perform the offensive power role flying those aircraft from the current carriers. We have to move the people, we have to put the training in place and we have to get sufficient numbers and that takes a bit of time.
**199. That takes two years and meanwhile all these costs that you are talking about are going to be incurred.
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) No; the costs that I referred to are the costs that would be entailed if we were to make the kind of improvements necessary in the Sea Harrier for it to remain viable post-2006."
An officer whose own flying career included service in the regional reinforcement and rapid deployment roles?
What would he have to say about SHar?
And for the benefit of the lazy.
"Examination of Witness (Questions 180 - 199)
WEDNESDAY 1 MAY 2002
AIR MARSHAL SIR JOCK STIRRUP
**180. Against that background, what would you say to the proposition, which some might say, that, under the procurement system as we have it at the minute, there is far too much emphasis on project deadlines, cost budgets and not enough on what they might term and, for all I know you might term, customer value?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) We have three key parameters when dealing with our projects: time, cost and performance and we consider them all. The performance is set by us in terms of key user requirements which are set after detailed consultation with those who are going to have to use the equipment. Obviously, we are always alive to the possibility of trade-offs between them. If somebody comes along to us and says, "Look, we cannot deliver this capability but we can deliver 80 per cent of it for half the cost", then we would take a very close look at it. If delivering 80 per cent of the capability meant that you could not win, we would not be interested. If it meant that you could, perhaps you might have to do something else with another system, perhaps you might have to change your processes a little but you could alter things and deliver the necessary outcome for 50 per cent of the cost, then of course that is what we would wish to do. We need to use the money as wisely as possible. We have a responsibility to the taxpayer, but also of course I have a much closer interest which is squeezing as much capability out of the resources available as I possibly can.
**181. Just so that I understand, is that a "yes" or a "no" to the proposition? In other words, did you agree with that proposition about customer value versus project deadlines and cost budgets or not?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) No, I did not agree because your proposition, as I understand it—and forgive me if I have it wrong—was that we did not really worry about customer value, we just worried about time and cost.
**182. Again, just so that I understand this, what is your definition of customer value?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) We set key user requirements for our capability and whatever system is delivered has to meet those key user requirements. That is then delivering the value, the outcome that the customer needs. As I said, if there were an opportunity to deliver slightly less than that for a significantly reduced cost or much, much quicker, then we would of course look at it. However, we would need to be sure that the capability required would produce the desired outcome. If it did not, there would be no point in it.
**183. Do you have any thoughts about how customer value might be better recognised or measured because of course measurement is always the key thing, is it not?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) I think that we have a good system with our key user requirements because we do not any longer, in my area, specify that a piece of equipment must go at a certain speed or something like that. We talk much more in terms of outcomes because it is outcomes that we are after.
**184. Do you feel that the equipment capability customer has enough influence—that is the important word—in steering equipment programmes to meet evolving requirements once they are under the control of the Integrated Project Teams?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) Yes, I do. I would just say that as we have to continue our progress in looking at equipment capability in the round and the interactions between different projects, that has to be mirrored with in the Defence Procurement Agency as well. So they face exactly the same challenge that we do. Integrated Project Teams are very focused on their own projects, but they cannot be delivered in isolation because everything connects to everybody else.
**185. What difference will the new Investment Appraisals Board make? What is the key difference?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) It will not make any difference to me. I am not really the right person to ask about the Investment Approvals Board. The purpose in moving from the old Equipment Approvals Committee was to address the fact that we are no longer just about buying systems and therefore approving the expenditure on those systems. We are actually about procuring systems and/or services in terms of equipment capability and of course there is a range of other very large investment decisions which are outside the equipment capability area that go in the Ministry of Defence. It is about drawing all those together in a systematic and coherent way.
**Chairman: When you leave in a few years' time, Air Marshal, we will ask you on how many occasions the advice of the Equipment Approvals Committee was ignored by higher authority. It is quite difficult to get that information out of anybody. We have given you 40 minutes of rather gentle questioning but now we are coming onto the really dirty stuff and there is no one better to deliver difficult questions than my colleague, Gerald Howarth.
Mr Howarth
**186. We have had the theory, Air Marshal, and now we turn to the practice. We would like to ask you a number of questions relating to the Sea Harrier, the JSF, Eurofighter so on. As you will know only too well, two months ago, the Ministry of Defence announced, rather unexpectedly, the withdrawal of the Sea Harrier force beginning in 2004 and ending in 2006, which of course is at least six years before the introduction of its proposed replacement, the Joint Strike Fighter. Can you tell us what role your organisation had in the decision to withdraw the Sea Harrier from service prior to the original planned date of withdrawal.
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) My organisation had a significant role, as you would expect since we are about future equipment capability. The issue was how we were going to continue to provide the necessary range of capabilities on board carriers until the new carrier and the Future Joint Combat Aircraft came into service. What was clear to us was that, to sustain the Sea Harrier, the FA2, beyond 2006 as a viable weapon system was going to require a very great deal of investment and would entail substantial technical risk. There were a number of other areas of the programme that required investment and, as ever, it was a question of balance of priorities and, given the need to balance the priorities, the decision was taken that it would not be sensible for that period of time and given the risk to make the degree of investment in the Sea Harrier that would have been necessary to keep it viable in service.
**187. Given that the Fleet will be unprotected in that time, I think it is only reasonable to ask you what that essential upgrade would entail and how much it would cost.
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) It is not the case that the Fleet will be unprotected; I must make that absolutely clear. First of all, the —
**188. Perhaps, making that rather bold assertion, Air Marshal, you could tell us how the Fleet will be protected.
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) Absolutely. First of all, what is it that we seek in terms of capability from our carriers? We seek the projection of offensive power. That was the purpose behind the decision to procure two new larger carriers in the defence review. The carriers are about the projection of offensive power in which the Sea Harrier plays a very small part and a reducing part as the technology, in terms of offensive power, moves on.
**189. Forgive me, Air Marshal, but we are not talking about carriers, we are talking about the fleet that we currently have.
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) No, but that is the rationale for our carriers. It is projection of offensive power. It is true of the carriers that we have now as it will be of the carriers that we will have in 2012. That is the primary role. We have, for a number of years now, embarked GR7s and we will be embarking GR9s on carriers to carry out that role. We embark them on the current carriers and we have done for a number of years.
**190. That is an offensive role.
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) That is the primary purpose of a carrier.
**191. That is not a Fleet Air Defence role?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) No.
**192. They are two completely different aircraft with completely different roles.
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) They are indeed, but I need to make clear, before moving on to some more detail about air defence, why we have carriers in the first place and it is not to provide air defence for the fleet, it is to provide projection of offensive power. Clearly, if you have a fleet at sea, you need to make sure that it is properly protected from the range of threats that it might face: sub-surface, surface and from the air as well. We are introducing, as you know, the Type-45 Destroyer which is going to have a substantial range of effective surface-to-air defences, a world beating radar, world beating missiles to go with it and a command and control system to go along with those. In the interim, we are making some substantial improvements of the Type-42 to make sure that its air defence capability remains at the level that we need. We have the Frigates providing point defence with missiles. We also of course, depending upon the scenario, envisage mostly operating with allies and partners in intensive combat operations. So, it may well be that we are being provided with air cover from other ships. We also may be able to provide air cover by aircraft operating from ashore. Again, all depending upon the circumstances. If you were to say to me, would I prefer to continue to have the kind of capability that the Sea Harrier produces up until 2012, my answer would be "of course", but not at any cost given the opportunities in other areas that we would have to forego if we were to make the necessary investment and that is the fundamental point.
**193. Would there not be greater savings that could be attributable to, for example, rationalising the Tornado F3, the GR4, GR7s and Jaguar?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) Those are areas that we continue to look at and that we are investigating at the moment. We have not chosen only to look at the balance of investment in the FA2, we are looking at the balance of investment across the whole range of capabilities. However, it remains the case that not only would the necessary improvements to the FA2 have been extremely expensive, but they would have been at extremely high technical risk and it may have turned out that we could not have done it.
**194. Can you spell out to us what that technical risk is.
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) For example, it needs upgraded engines. The Sea Harrier is not the same airframe, as you know, as the GR7/GR9. Putting the larger engines into the Sea Harrier was a formidable task. We have had some experience of putting new engines into aircraft unsuccessfully. So, we have a very clear idea of the risks involved and they would have been substantial in the case of the Sea Harrier.
**195. Is that because you need the upgraded Pegasus?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) Yes.
**196. It was suggested to me by John Farley last night, whom you will know is a most distinguished proponent of the VSTOL theory, that there are engines in America which would be perfectly suitable for the purpose of upgrading the FA2s.
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) I do not know to which engines he was referring, but certainly all the studies we carried out showed that to put an engine of sufficient power into the Sea Harrier while not obviously impossible was a substantial task involving a very high degree of technical risk.
**197. If the MoD concluded that it cannot afford to upgrade the Sea Harrier, why has it happened now? Why was the decision not made some time ago?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) The decision was made now on the basis of a great deal of work that was undertaken in terms of balance of investment. I cannot give you a specific answer as to why it was not taken two years ago, but the most likely conclusion one can draw is that the necessary material and evidence was not to hand. There has been an attempt at coming up with an affordable plan to continue with the Sea Harrier in service because nobody really wants to see it go before it is replaced. It is not, as I said earlier, something that I would have chosen to do were it not for the fact that we have to make some hard choices in terms of balance of investment.
**198. Why not make the savings now? Why not scrap it now? Why wait until 2004/06?
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) We have to move the aircrew from the Sea Harrier across to the GR7/GR9 in order that they can perform the offensive power role flying those aircraft from the current carriers. We have to move the people, we have to put the training in place and we have to get sufficient numbers and that takes a bit of time.
**199. That takes two years and meanwhile all these costs that you are talking about are going to be incurred.
**(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) No; the costs that I referred to are the costs that would be entailed if we were to make the kind of improvements necessary in the Sea Harrier for it to remain viable post-2006."
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Re: Sea Jet
Why he might not be a good person to ask?
Because the RAF has always claimed that it could protect the fleet at sea - without ever, as far as I can tell, explaining how.
As an RAF man he might not have a balanced view when it comes to spending money on defence - not that I blame him for that, mind. Add to that the possibility of hefty dose of intra-service back stabbing . . .
Ask an admiral for his opinion and I'm sure it would be different to Sir Jocks - espeicially where the question of using a carrier for fleet defence is concerned.
There must be more interviews about this subject available at the stationary office so it might be a good idea for me to go and find someone who was all for keeping the SHar.
Because the RAF has always claimed that it could protect the fleet at sea - without ever, as far as I can tell, explaining how.
As an RAF man he might not have a balanced view when it comes to spending money on defence - not that I blame him for that, mind. Add to that the possibility of hefty dose of intra-service back stabbing . . .
Ask an admiral for his opinion and I'm sure it would be different to Sir Jocks - espeicially where the question of using a carrier for fleet defence is concerned.
There must be more interviews about this subject available at the stationary office so it might be a good idea for me to go and find someone who was all for keeping the SHar.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Re: Sea Jet
It was suggested to me by John Farley last night, whom you will know is a most distinguished proponent of the VSTOL theory, that there are engines in America which would be perfectly suitable for the purpose of upgrading the FA2s.
Is this an accurate quote? If so could you elaborate ?
I take Jock Stirrup's comments in the same light as I take Geoff Hoon's comments about retiring assets that serve the Uk forces "less well" than their counterparts. Could someone explain to me how the three deleted Type 23s serve the fleet "less well" than their remaining counterparts? Just answer the question: In what way does the 8 yr old HMS Grafton serve the fleet "less well" than her 13yr old sisters? How "less well"?
Re: Sea Jet
At the end of the day, the Sea Harrier is going, and very soon. It's been said that it is a great display aircraft, so where can I buy a serviceable single- and two-seater and a range of spares? I am thinking of preservation initially, but I think that an example of this iconic aircraft deserves to be kept airworthy, if possible. Any info appreciated.
Re: Sea Jet
I found the following in the Executive Overview of Janes Fighting Ships 2005-2006, edited by Commodore Stephen Saunders:
The most serious operational risk is air defence, also identified as a major concern by the House of Commons Defence Committee in its report of 17 March 2005. The Sea Harrier fighter is to be withdrawn from service by 2006, and it is not until 2013, by when the first six Type 45 Destroyers (equipped with the PAAMS missile system) will have been commissioned and when the Joint Strike Fighter enters service, that the capability gap will be bridged. The Chief of Naval Staff has again been candid in his assessment that "we will be taking risks in certain types of operations and I would not be too happy in a very high air threat."
The current First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Alan West, has been candid about cuts time and time again.
It is interesting that several Navies that have recently acquired carriers see them first and foremost as an air defence asset. Do they know something we don't?
The most serious operational risk is air defence, also identified as a major concern by the House of Commons Defence Committee in its report of 17 March 2005. The Sea Harrier fighter is to be withdrawn from service by 2006, and it is not until 2013, by when the first six Type 45 Destroyers (equipped with the PAAMS missile system) will have been commissioned and when the Joint Strike Fighter enters service, that the capability gap will be bridged. The Chief of Naval Staff has again been candid in his assessment that "we will be taking risks in certain types of operations and I would not be too happy in a very high air threat."
The current First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Alan West, has been candid about cuts time and time again.
It is interesting that several Navies that have recently acquired carriers see them first and foremost as an air defence asset. Do they know something we don't?
Do a Hover - it avoids G
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Re: Sea Jet
Navaleye
Not really I am afraid!
As you will see my meeting with Gerald (I had gone along to keep him company at a RAFA do in Bognor) was several years ago. After his talk I was discussing the fact that the UK had lagged the US in buying the big donk for the GR5 Harrier force. What a shame that the Americans had got it and we had not etc etc.
Not surprisingly I did not say it could drop in a SHAR (because of the different nose and intake) but I probably did not say it could NOT either.
The last two occasions I have had discussions with Sir Jock (not Harrier related) he never raised the topic so the first I knew of Gerald's pitch was this thread.
JF
Not really I am afraid!
As you will see my meeting with Gerald (I had gone along to keep him company at a RAFA do in Bognor) was several years ago. After his talk I was discussing the fact that the UK had lagged the US in buying the big donk for the GR5 Harrier force. What a shame that the Americans had got it and we had not etc etc.
Not surprisingly I did not say it could drop in a SHAR (because of the different nose and intake) but I probably did not say it could NOT either.
The last two occasions I have had discussions with Sir Jock (not Harrier related) he never raised the topic so the first I knew of Gerald's pitch was this thread.
JF
Re: Sea Jet
Talking of the First Sea Lord being candid, see this piece from the Telegraph: Navy too small to defend us, warns First Sea Lord.
Funny that these articles seem to ignore amphibious ships and MCMVs.
"It takes a long time to build up a maritime force that can cope with both the expected and the unexpected. The UK's security depends on having the right range of maritime capabilities."
"Whenever the UK has got to the stage where it is spending too little on defence the nation has suffered, due to some unforeseen event not long afterwards."
Funny that these articles seem to ignore amphibious ships and MCMVs.
"It takes a long time to build up a maritime force that can cope with both the expected and the unexpected. The UK's security depends on having the right range of maritime capabilities."
"Whenever the UK has got to the stage where it is spending too little on defence the nation has suffered, due to some unforeseen event not long afterwards."
Re: Sea Jet
A service in crisis?
Two examples of what I mean. Firstly the vogue for changing things for changes sake.
You may remember that I once tried to join the RN as an Artificer. Well, from now on they'll be called Technicians instead. Suppose it doesn't matter as they might still be referred to a Tiffs, but it seems like a pointless change for change's sake. As if we didn't have enough problems...Some fool of a staff officer probably got a promotion out of that. "No, it isn't the continual cutbacks, delays to new equipment projects, overstretch etc etc that is the reason morale is low, its because some members of the public have trouble understanding some of our terminology. Let's get rid of more of our traditions and heritage, yes that'll cheer everyone up. Oh, why's recruiting getting even worse.?"
Secondly the amount of politics is defence related decisions, like where contracts are awarded (where will it help get Labour votes?) and basing (where will it help get Labour votes?).
Consider the basing of the JSF. Yeovilton has been discounted for some odd reasons (noise issues, although no issues at the moment with the very noisy aircraft that have been based there, runway too short, although it used to be long enough for the Phantom and we're buying the short take off version of the JSF, too far away from training areas - apart from the training areas over the South West and Bristol Channel). They will go to Lossiemouth, an RAF base.
Given the distance from Lossie to the English Channel, where the carriers they are likely to be it will make it harder for Navy pilots to get enough training for carrier ops, particularly with the RAF in charge. Being taken over by the RAF even more will only make morale and recruitment problems worse, and this and the distance will no doubt be used as an argument for scrapping the carriers, which would end the days of the RN and the UK being a global player.
As discussed here.
And the capability gaps/holidays keep adding up. As this story reports, we will soon lose the ability to launch Swimmer Delivery Vehicles from submerged submarines. Since SF type stuff is a major part of operations in the littoral, a SSN would have to surface (unlikely) or one of our dwindling numbers of surface warships would have to be used, losing the element of secrecy and being at greater risk. In the absence of proper air defence, a single ship approaching a hostile shore is going to be an inviting target.
Another key part of littoral operations is Mine Counter Measures. The Navy decided (in the 90s?) to phase out conventional minesweeping and replace it with a Remote Influence Minesweeping System (RIMS). RIMS was cancelled in 2002. A few months later, Telic was looming and a remotely controlled minesweeping system was needed. Hurriedly things were improvised - SWIMS!
SWIMS was discontinued after Telic, and we now have another capability gap. MCM operations may take longer thn necessary, exposing our forces to danger for longer.
Two examples of what I mean. Firstly the vogue for changing things for changes sake.
You may remember that I once tried to join the RN as an Artificer. Well, from now on they'll be called Technicians instead. Suppose it doesn't matter as they might still be referred to a Tiffs, but it seems like a pointless change for change's sake. As if we didn't have enough problems...Some fool of a staff officer probably got a promotion out of that. "No, it isn't the continual cutbacks, delays to new equipment projects, overstretch etc etc that is the reason morale is low, its because some members of the public have trouble understanding some of our terminology. Let's get rid of more of our traditions and heritage, yes that'll cheer everyone up. Oh, why's recruiting getting even worse.?"
Secondly the amount of politics is defence related decisions, like where contracts are awarded (where will it help get Labour votes?) and basing (where will it help get Labour votes?).
Consider the basing of the JSF. Yeovilton has been discounted for some odd reasons (noise issues, although no issues at the moment with the very noisy aircraft that have been based there, runway too short, although it used to be long enough for the Phantom and we're buying the short take off version of the JSF, too far away from training areas - apart from the training areas over the South West and Bristol Channel). They will go to Lossiemouth, an RAF base.
Given the distance from Lossie to the English Channel, where the carriers they are likely to be it will make it harder for Navy pilots to get enough training for carrier ops, particularly with the RAF in charge. Being taken over by the RAF even more will only make morale and recruitment problems worse, and this and the distance will no doubt be used as an argument for scrapping the carriers, which would end the days of the RN and the UK being a global player.
As discussed here.
And the capability gaps/holidays keep adding up. As this story reports, we will soon lose the ability to launch Swimmer Delivery Vehicles from submerged submarines. Since SF type stuff is a major part of operations in the littoral, a SSN would have to surface (unlikely) or one of our dwindling numbers of surface warships would have to be used, losing the element of secrecy and being at greater risk. In the absence of proper air defence, a single ship approaching a hostile shore is going to be an inviting target.
Another key part of littoral operations is Mine Counter Measures. The Navy decided (in the 90s?) to phase out conventional minesweeping and replace it with a Remote Influence Minesweeping System (RIMS). RIMS was cancelled in 2002. A few months later, Telic was looming and a remotely controlled minesweeping system was needed. Hurriedly things were improvised - SWIMS!
SWIMS was discontinued after Telic, and we now have another capability gap. MCM operations may take longer thn necessary, exposing our forces to danger for longer.
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Re: Sea Jet
Here we go again.......
Artificers = technicians.....given the current plan for RN fixed wing aviation, don't you think it makes some sort of sense for the RAF and RN aircraft engineers working on the same airframes to be called the same thing i.e. technicians? Accept it - the RAF has a degree of primacy where JFH is concerned.
To answer your second point - local/regional/national politics have always influenced defence contracts. Get over it.
"Being taken over by the RAF even more will only make morale and recruitment problems worse"
I have a few words for this outlook, but being an officer and a gentleman I will refrain from denigrating this thread with the expression that immediately springs to mind.
You can continue to whine as much as you like (heard the one about the difference between a SHAR pilot and his aircraft? Sorry, I digress....), but as was quoted earlier on this thread the RN have not taken the swinging cuts the RAF has had to face and continues to do so. So JSF takes up residence at Lossie rather than Yeovilton. Why is this such a big deal to you? In your RN-centric ravings have you forgotten RAF Lossiemouth was formerly an RN Air Station (HMS Fulmar)?
There is a finite amount of money. The RN wants new, big carriers (and some fancy new jets to fly from them). Something else has to give to pay for the capability. Attempting to further reinforce your points with references to cuts to the Swimmer Delivery System and SWIMS are frankly, laughable.
"Since SF type stuff is a major part of operations in the littoral" Really? Isn't this type of operation highly specialised and confined to a few platforms? Given the limited number of SF troops and even more limited potential areas for employment in the manner you describe, would you like to reconsider the emphasis of this point?
The RN's MCMs are correctly regarded as the best in the world at what they do. Yes, improved kit always helps but as always we will make the best of what we have.
I served for a couple of years on JFH and fortunately your anti-RAF views are not the norm for the dark blue personnel within this organisation. Regarding your point of where the carriers would be located for aircrew deck training, the annual two weeks on Lusty that took place during my tenure on IV(AC) Sqn was very much in the North, and far closer to Lossie than either Yeovilton or for that matter, Cottesmore!
Rant over.
SBG
Artificers = technicians.....given the current plan for RN fixed wing aviation, don't you think it makes some sort of sense for the RAF and RN aircraft engineers working on the same airframes to be called the same thing i.e. technicians? Accept it - the RAF has a degree of primacy where JFH is concerned.
To answer your second point - local/regional/national politics have always influenced defence contracts. Get over it.
"Being taken over by the RAF even more will only make morale and recruitment problems worse"
I have a few words for this outlook, but being an officer and a gentleman I will refrain from denigrating this thread with the expression that immediately springs to mind.
You can continue to whine as much as you like (heard the one about the difference between a SHAR pilot and his aircraft? Sorry, I digress....), but as was quoted earlier on this thread the RN have not taken the swinging cuts the RAF has had to face and continues to do so. So JSF takes up residence at Lossie rather than Yeovilton. Why is this such a big deal to you? In your RN-centric ravings have you forgotten RAF Lossiemouth was formerly an RN Air Station (HMS Fulmar)?
There is a finite amount of money. The RN wants new, big carriers (and some fancy new jets to fly from them). Something else has to give to pay for the capability. Attempting to further reinforce your points with references to cuts to the Swimmer Delivery System and SWIMS are frankly, laughable.
"Since SF type stuff is a major part of operations in the littoral" Really? Isn't this type of operation highly specialised and confined to a few platforms? Given the limited number of SF troops and even more limited potential areas for employment in the manner you describe, would you like to reconsider the emphasis of this point?
The RN's MCMs are correctly regarded as the best in the world at what they do. Yes, improved kit always helps but as always we will make the best of what we have.
I served for a couple of years on JFH and fortunately your anti-RAF views are not the norm for the dark blue personnel within this organisation. Regarding your point of where the carriers would be located for aircrew deck training, the annual two weeks on Lusty that took place during my tenure on IV(AC) Sqn was very much in the North, and far closer to Lossie than either Yeovilton or for that matter, Cottesmore!
Rant over.
SBG
Re: Sea Jet
Artificers = technicians.....given the current plan for RN fixed wing aviation, don't you think it makes some sort of sense for the RAF and RN aircraft engineers working on the same airframes to be called the same thing i.e. technicians? Accept it - the RAF has a degree of primacy where JFH is concerned.
Yes I do understand the logic of that. But what about the ME and WE ones?
Yes I do understand the logic of that. But what about the ME and WE ones?
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Artificers = technicians.....given the current plan for RN fixed wing aviation, don't you think it makes some sort of sense for the RAF and RN aircraft engineers working on the same airframes to be called the same thing i.e. technicians
... and I promised I wasn't going to drawn into this thread again!!!!
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No, something much more traditional would be more appropriate...."RAF Trenchard"....."RAF Dowding"......
SBG
Honest question: What do civilian companies i.e. VT et al call marine systems engineers? Do they call them technicians?
SBG
Honest question: What do civilian companies i.e. VT et al call marine systems engineers? Do they call them technicians?
WEBF
Sorry, I think you're either missing the point or trying to block out the facts in attempt to drum up some sympathy.
Firstly, training areas. Have you any knowledge of the UKLFS? I suspect not, as if you did you would understand that LFA 2 (around Yeovil) is inferior to LFAs 14/16 in terms of size, and is much more congested both with ATZs/MATZs, controlled airspace and other Dedicated User Areas. For JSF ops, the area around Lossie is far more suitable than the SW of England. There goes your argument about training areas.
Secondly, distance from Pompey. How many times do you think the boys from Yeovilton take off from Yeovs and land on the carrier in Portsmouth? Not many. As you are probably aware, the boat can move, and does so frequently. As Spotting Bad Guys has quite correctly pointed out, the carriers are more frequently based around the Northen UK waters during UK training ops - so what negative effect has that got on Harrier ops? Nil. Harriers, like the carriers, are also capable of moving
and don't need to be based in the SW. I say don't NEED to be based there, nor do they have to be based up North, but that is the decision that has been made. Distance from Portsmouth has NOTHING to do with it as there is no benefit on landing on a carrier that's tied up alongside. Another of your arguments quashed.
Thirdly, the RN are not being taken over by the RAF. Do you hate the crabs so much?
JOINT Force Harrier is, as the name suggests, made up of equal proportions of dark blue and light blue, or will be by the time 801 stands up at Cottesmore soon. So how, pray tell, will the RN be unable to get enough training for carrier ops with "the RAF in charge"?
As for the changing of Atrificer to Technician - it happens everywhere in every service. Remember Navigators? No such thing apparently...
Please don't take this as a personal dig, but your arguments are flawed and smack of a man in desperation to keep a thread alive.
Sorry, I think you're either missing the point or trying to block out the facts in attempt to drum up some sympathy.
Firstly, training areas. Have you any knowledge of the UKLFS? I suspect not, as if you did you would understand that LFA 2 (around Yeovil) is inferior to LFAs 14/16 in terms of size, and is much more congested both with ATZs/MATZs, controlled airspace and other Dedicated User Areas. For JSF ops, the area around Lossie is far more suitable than the SW of England. There goes your argument about training areas.
Secondly, distance from Pompey. How many times do you think the boys from Yeovilton take off from Yeovs and land on the carrier in Portsmouth? Not many. As you are probably aware, the boat can move, and does so frequently. As Spotting Bad Guys has quite correctly pointed out, the carriers are more frequently based around the Northen UK waters during UK training ops - so what negative effect has that got on Harrier ops? Nil. Harriers, like the carriers, are also capable of moving
and don't need to be based in the SW. I say don't NEED to be based there, nor do they have to be based up North, but that is the decision that has been made. Distance from Portsmouth has NOTHING to do with it as there is no benefit on landing on a carrier that's tied up alongside. Another of your arguments quashed. Thirdly, the RN are not being taken over by the RAF. Do you hate the crabs so much?
JOINT Force Harrier is, as the name suggests, made up of equal proportions of dark blue and light blue, or will be by the time 801 stands up at Cottesmore soon. So how, pray tell, will the RN be unable to get enough training for carrier ops with "the RAF in charge"? As for the changing of Atrificer to Technician - it happens everywhere in every service. Remember Navigators? No such thing apparently...
Please don't take this as a personal dig, but your arguments are flawed and smack of a man in desperation to keep a thread alive.
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Exhaustion sets in.
For those new to this thread I would like to say that WEBF's comments in no way represent the views of any dark blue personnel within Joint Force Harrier.
The views expressed are his and his alone.
For those new to this thread I would like to say that WEBF's comments in no way represent the views of any dark blue personnel within Joint Force Harrier.
The views expressed are his and his alone.
Indeed my views are entirely my own. The points raised in last night's post...
1. Artificers/Technicians. Said my piece already, but is this rebranding not a sign of crisis? I can't help thinking of the changes to the Army's structure, and the problems being caused. with recruitment - see here.
2. Basing. A rant for which I must apologise, but those are my concerns - valid or not.
3 and 4. The capability gaps that I mention are just additional areas of risk, and ones that might affect the conduct of future operations.
1. Artificers/Technicians. Said my piece already, but is this rebranding not a sign of crisis? I can't help thinking of the changes to the Army's structure, and the problems being caused. with recruitment - see here.
2. Basing. A rant for which I must apologise, but those are my concerns - valid or not.
3 and 4. The capability gaps that I mention are just additional areas of risk, and ones that might affect the conduct of future operations.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Valid points in all of the above posts and yes change does happen but not always for the better. Out of interest, I hear that when C de G was on exercise with the Indian Shar's off Viraat, the Rafale boys were claiming kills on the Shars as they took off the deck! I'd hate to see a similar situation with the RN.
Kill, schmill,
I remember some Turkish F5s claiming similar when attacking Invincible in the Eastern Med some years ago. Thing was, that they did not see the link transmitted "G" (missile) from the USS Virginia that shot them down 90 miles earlier!
Only an ACMI/RAIDS/Real Combat will ever sort the argument out!
I remember some Turkish F5s claiming similar when attacking Invincible in the Eastern Med some years ago. Thing was, that they did not see the link transmitted "G" (missile) from the USS Virginia that shot them down 90 miles earlier!
Only an ACMI/RAIDS/Real Combat will ever sort the argument out!
Caught on the deck? It happened to the Japs at Midway, but with AEW/ASaCs......shouldn't happen now. In fact, wasn't that why AEW was devloped - to prevent Kamikazes catching US carriers with their fighters on deck.
Going back to an previously made point, I thought most of Devon (and Cornwall?) was free for ACM training? At least that is what someone told me.
Going back to an previously made point, I thought most of Devon (and Cornwall?) was free for ACM training? At least that is what someone told me.