Sea Jet
Convoluted situations? So it wouldn't occur to however we find ourselves fighting that they could use aircraft to prevent our Merlins and Lynx from hunting and engaging their missile boats or submarines? No? No need for top cover then.
In 1991 allied forces were unable to move into the northern part of the Persian Gulf due to mines. Yet mine clearence operations could not start until the threat from Exocet armed Fast Attack Craft had been removed. What if some time in the future we had the same sort of situation, but the threat was from aircraft rather than surface craft?
Not even during the Cold War when the RN was expected to deal with the Sub Surge through the GIUK Gap, was there a requirement to to have air cover for the ASW forces. I mean even the Nimrod was expected to do its role with no defensive capabilites.
Perhaps this was because the GIUK gap was a long way from any Warsaw Pact bases, and therefore not that likely to see many Soviet aircraft there, apart from Bears. However, the operations of today and tommorow will mostly be in the littoral. Whites of the eyes.
In 1991 allied forces were unable to move into the northern part of the Persian Gulf due to mines. Yet mine clearence operations could not start until the threat from Exocet armed Fast Attack Craft had been removed. What if some time in the future we had the same sort of situation, but the threat was from aircraft rather than surface craft?
Not even during the Cold War when the RN was expected to deal with the Sub Surge through the GIUK Gap, was there a requirement to to have air cover for the ASW forces. I mean even the Nimrod was expected to do its role with no defensive capabilites.
Perhaps this was because the GIUK gap was a long way from any Warsaw Pact bases, and therefore not that likely to see many Soviet aircraft there, apart from Bears. However, the operations of today and tommorow will mostly be in the littoral. Whites of the eyes.
BHR
Shar no good against subs. Can easily spot subs below the surface from 5000' and then has a hoofin great Aden Cannon. Santa Fe (1982) was taken out with a combination of Depth Charges, GMPG and other ordnance. All by Airpower.
Shar no good against gunboats. Aden Cannon, Bombs and (Unfortunately no more) the venerable Sea Eagle.
Don't forget about the French!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Shar no good against subs. Can easily spot subs below the surface from 5000' and then has a hoofin great Aden Cannon. Santa Fe (1982) was taken out with a combination of Depth Charges, GMPG and other ordnance. All by Airpower.
Shar no good against gunboats. Aden Cannon, Bombs and (Unfortunately no more) the venerable Sea Eagle.
Don't forget about the French!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Shar no good against subs. Can easily spot subs below the surface from 5000' and then has a hoofin great Aden Cannon. Santa Fe (1982) was taken out with a combination of Depth Charges, GMPG and other ordnance.
Red On, Green On
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TT - correct
Navy News article
HMS Plymouth's Wasp was scrambled following the Wessex's sighting of the Santa Fe but was beaten to a firing position by one of Endurance's helicopters piloted by Lt Cdr Ellerbeck. The helicopter, armed with AS12 missiles, got off her two shots, the first exploding inside the submarine's large fin. The helicopter had returned to the Endurance, reloaded and returned to the Santa Fe before the Plymouth's Wasp had time to fire. Again one hit and one miss was recorded by the Endurance's Wasp. The Plymouth Wasp had time to fire only one missile, the return flight to HMS Plymouth being 50 miles.
Endurance's second helicopter, piloted by Lt T S Finding was on her way by 10:00 and after encountering machine-gun fire from King Edward Point scored another hit on Santa Fe's fin.
Lt Cdr Ellerbeck's third attack was more strongly opposed with anti-tank rockets, rifle-fire from the shore and at least one machine-gun in action on the Santa Fe. The Wasp escaped damage and scored its most damaging hit, striking the periscope standards.
Navy News article
HMS Plymouth's Wasp was scrambled following the Wessex's sighting of the Santa Fe but was beaten to a firing position by one of Endurance's helicopters piloted by Lt Cdr Ellerbeck. The helicopter, armed with AS12 missiles, got off her two shots, the first exploding inside the submarine's large fin. The helicopter had returned to the Endurance, reloaded and returned to the Santa Fe before the Plymouth's Wasp had time to fire. Again one hit and one miss was recorded by the Endurance's Wasp. The Plymouth Wasp had time to fire only one missile, the return flight to HMS Plymouth being 50 miles.
Endurance's second helicopter, piloted by Lt T S Finding was on her way by 10:00 and after encountering machine-gun fire from King Edward Point scored another hit on Santa Fe's fin.
Lt Cdr Ellerbeck's third attack was more strongly opposed with anti-tank rockets, rifle-fire from the shore and at least one machine-gun in action on the Santa Fe. The Wasp escaped damage and scored its most damaging hit, striking the periscope standards.
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On Sunday morning (25th) as "Santa Fe" heads out on the surface, she is spotted off Cumberland Bay by Lt Cmdr Stanley's Wessex. Near-missed by two Mk.11 depth charges and with some damage, the submarine limps back towards Grytviken. As she does, one of "Brilliant's" Lynx attacks with a Mk.46 torpedo, the two "Endurance" Wasps (Flight Commander, Lt Cmdr Ellerbeck) fire AS.12 missiles hitting her fin, "Plymouth's" Wasp fires another AS.12 and both of "Brilliant's" Wasps strafe with machine guns. The warships meanwhile head for the action at high speed. Although the attacks only slightly damage the "Santa Fe" and wound one crewman, by noon she is abandoned alongside the jetty at King Edward Point.
Point is,
unlike the "potential (future) capability" of the typhoon, the Shar does have a cannon, and bombs, (I know the Typhoon will have a cannon but they just won't be able to use it.) so it does have some capability against subs, especially of the diesel type that has to surface now and again as clearly demonstrated by the wobbleheads. Now what type of subs do most of the axis of evil have?
If we go up against the french...we are Bu@@ered!
unlike the "potential (future) capability" of the typhoon, the Shar does have a cannon, and bombs, (I know the Typhoon will have a cannon but they just won't be able to use it.) so it does have some capability against subs, especially of the diesel type that has to surface now and again as clearly demonstrated by the wobbleheads. Now what type of subs do most of the axis of evil have?
If we go up against the french...we are Bu@@ered!
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Widger
No mate, this is no where near a real slagging, you should hear Chief of Domestic Ops when I've popped into Happy Hour!!!! This is actually quite cuddly, what has happened to us all?
No mate, this is no where near a real slagging, you should hear Chief of Domestic Ops when I've popped into Happy Hour!!!! This is actually quite cuddly, what has happened to us all?
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Here’s My take on things (For what its worth)
Why is SHAR being deleted?
The main reason being cited by the MoD is that the engine upgrade is high risk right? That’s true, I believe the Airframe requires lengthened with a plug aft of the cockpit. Judging by the way that BAE have handled the upgrade of Nimrod would you trust them to get this one right 1st time – no I don’t think so. Without this we are told that SHAR cannot operate in hot climates – I personally think that is fudge. How do the Indian’s operate their aircraft if that is the case? (OK FRS51 is lighter than FA2 but I believe there have been interim engine upgrades to FA2 increasing thrust)
So I’m not convinced of the Risk or necessity factor.
The second reason is Money. The total saving of dropping SHAR from 2006 to 2012 (When JSF comes into service) is £128 Million. Which mean’s that to have operated 3 squadrons of aircraft (28 in total) would have cost an average of approx £7M/squadron/year – hardly a saving in terms of the defence budget and definitely no saving in terms of Govt spending as a whole.
Now let’s look at the Capability Gap.
WEBF and BHR have covered this in previously with asymmetric threats. Well, maybe I’m looking at this over-symplisticly but doesn’t just about every tin-pot country that we will probably have to deal with have Air forces? Was the major loss of shipping not due to air attack in the Falkland's? And was the munition of choice the (Very basic) Iron bomb? Most of the shipping was lost in the South Atlantic due to Fire control RADAR’s not being able to function effectively so near to the shore. (Mountains do shorten effective radar range – even I know that) I believe also the RADAR’s were only really efficient in a blue water environment. I believe the new RADAR’s on Type 45 do not have this problem. I think its fair to say that most of our future conflicts will be fought with either host nation support or with Carrier air defence from another Nation. However, there are wild cards I can think of where that might not be the case. Notably the Falkland’s. Remember the Argentinians haven’t given up their claim to it, despite giving a promise that they will only pursue a diplomatic solution to the problem. (Everyone on this forum know what a politicians promise is worth) And secondly … Well I would bet on a little adventure in Zimbabwe before the decade is out! So for protecting the TG in amphibious environment (At present) SHAR is well justified.
So to summarise we really have an upgrade that isn’t really all that necessary, A negligible saving from the early decommissioning, and one hell of a risk factor in hostile environment. So it begs the question. Why are we really getting rid of Sea Harrier?
I believe at this time there are about 20 airframes in the system somewhere. The Disposal date (not decommisioning date) is early-mid 2007. Given also that there are still Seakings in storage and we will have just had another election then the government will have a free hand in selling these on. But wait! These aircraft are no good without a ship to fly them from. I wonder where that would be coming from? Oh look the RN have got three and they cant afford to operate/man one of them so what the chances of a CVS with equipped carrier air group going up for sale in the next 18 months? Pretty high I think.
As for the possible interim solutions to the capability gap.
Retain SHAR in storage, with two airframes used for keeping pilots in date – Good one but unlikely, these are marketable airframes and the MoD is skint. Also think of the support costs ala BAE and the like.
Convert some GR7’s to AD platforms – I don’t believe it impossible (maybe some of engO’s and AEO’s could clarify) but the USMC fly with an AD Capability so it can’t be that risky. However we are now well down the line to ending the Shar’s career so would there be any gain in spending money on a capability that will probably not enter service until after the Type 45 is in service. Probably not.
Going to our Big brother and either leasing AV8’s or Swapping them for some of our GR7a’s/9’s –The USMC have a fair few in storage and would probably be the best solution to rapidly fill the capability gap should the MoD require to do so. Maybe a deal has already been struck – who know’s
Am I talking sh1t? – Absolutely!
Have I an over-active imagination? – Definitely!
Is there much going on at work today? – Nope;
Am I bored? – yep!
Why is SHAR being deleted?
The main reason being cited by the MoD is that the engine upgrade is high risk right? That’s true, I believe the Airframe requires lengthened with a plug aft of the cockpit. Judging by the way that BAE have handled the upgrade of Nimrod would you trust them to get this one right 1st time – no I don’t think so. Without this we are told that SHAR cannot operate in hot climates – I personally think that is fudge. How do the Indian’s operate their aircraft if that is the case? (OK FRS51 is lighter than FA2 but I believe there have been interim engine upgrades to FA2 increasing thrust)
So I’m not convinced of the Risk or necessity factor.
The second reason is Money. The total saving of dropping SHAR from 2006 to 2012 (When JSF comes into service) is £128 Million. Which mean’s that to have operated 3 squadrons of aircraft (28 in total) would have cost an average of approx £7M/squadron/year – hardly a saving in terms of the defence budget and definitely no saving in terms of Govt spending as a whole.
Now let’s look at the Capability Gap.
WEBF and BHR have covered this in previously with asymmetric threats. Well, maybe I’m looking at this over-symplisticly but doesn’t just about every tin-pot country that we will probably have to deal with have Air forces? Was the major loss of shipping not due to air attack in the Falkland's? And was the munition of choice the (Very basic) Iron bomb? Most of the shipping was lost in the South Atlantic due to Fire control RADAR’s not being able to function effectively so near to the shore. (Mountains do shorten effective radar range – even I know that) I believe also the RADAR’s were only really efficient in a blue water environment. I believe the new RADAR’s on Type 45 do not have this problem. I think its fair to say that most of our future conflicts will be fought with either host nation support or with Carrier air defence from another Nation. However, there are wild cards I can think of where that might not be the case. Notably the Falkland’s. Remember the Argentinians haven’t given up their claim to it, despite giving a promise that they will only pursue a diplomatic solution to the problem. (Everyone on this forum know what a politicians promise is worth) And secondly … Well I would bet on a little adventure in Zimbabwe before the decade is out! So for protecting the TG in amphibious environment (At present) SHAR is well justified.
So to summarise we really have an upgrade that isn’t really all that necessary, A negligible saving from the early decommissioning, and one hell of a risk factor in hostile environment. So it begs the question. Why are we really getting rid of Sea Harrier?
I believe at this time there are about 20 airframes in the system somewhere. The Disposal date (not decommisioning date) is early-mid 2007. Given also that there are still Seakings in storage and we will have just had another election then the government will have a free hand in selling these on. But wait! These aircraft are no good without a ship to fly them from. I wonder where that would be coming from? Oh look the RN have got three and they cant afford to operate/man one of them so what the chances of a CVS with equipped carrier air group going up for sale in the next 18 months? Pretty high I think.
As for the possible interim solutions to the capability gap.
Retain SHAR in storage, with two airframes used for keeping pilots in date – Good one but unlikely, these are marketable airframes and the MoD is skint. Also think of the support costs ala BAE and the like.
Convert some GR7’s to AD platforms – I don’t believe it impossible (maybe some of engO’s and AEO’s could clarify) but the USMC fly with an AD Capability so it can’t be that risky. However we are now well down the line to ending the Shar’s career so would there be any gain in spending money on a capability that will probably not enter service until after the Type 45 is in service. Probably not.
Going to our Big brother and either leasing AV8’s or Swapping them for some of our GR7a’s/9’s –The USMC have a fair few in storage and would probably be the best solution to rapidly fill the capability gap should the MoD require to do so. Maybe a deal has already been struck – who know’s
Am I talking sh1t? – Absolutely!
Have I an over-active imagination? – Definitely!
Is there much going on at work today? – Nope;
Am I bored? – yep!
More nations have attack aircraft than submarines. They will probably also disperse or hide their aircraft to prevent them all being taken out on day one. The SDR said we needed the Sea Harrier for protection from air threats. What changed between 1998 and 2002 to remove this threat?
If no air threat exists, then how come simulated air attacks form part of weekly FOST exercises, JMCs and NATO and multinational exercises?
If no air threat exists, then how come simulated air attacks form part of weekly FOST exercises, JMCs and NATO and multinational exercises?
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
If no air threat exists, then how come simulated air attacks form part of weekly FOST exercises, JMCs and NATO and multinational exercises?
Why did I exercise for 25 years against a low level threat that didn't exist? Russian tactics were a high level supersonic dash under heavy ECM, firing supersonic missiles at around 150 miles.
We normally train the way we do for 3 reasons:
1. Laziness. Its easier to pull out the file from the last exercise and just update it. Which is why the plans sometimes include disbanded units. (
).
2. Availability of assets. If you haven't got the type or the people trained in the right tactics it is hard to train against them. Which leads onto the 3rd reason.
3. Offensive training. The threat is simulated by people after their own training. They will only want to come if they can use their own tactics or if you pick up the entire bill - which no one will pay for. Which is why we always end up training against the tactics of our own forces/allies - which inevitably leads to how you equip and train your own side.
Incestuous really.
Why did I exercise for 25 years against a low level threat that didn't exist? Russian tactics were a high level supersonic dash under heavy ECM, firing supersonic missiles at around 150 miles.
We normally train the way we do for 3 reasons:
1. Laziness. Its easier to pull out the file from the last exercise and just update it. Which is why the plans sometimes include disbanded units. (
).2. Availability of assets. If you haven't got the type or the people trained in the right tactics it is hard to train against them. Which leads onto the 3rd reason.
3. Offensive training. The threat is simulated by people after their own training. They will only want to come if they can use their own tactics or if you pick up the entire bill - which no one will pay for. Which is why we always end up training against the tactics of our own forces/allies - which inevitably leads to how you equip and train your own side.
Incestuous really.
From the FOST website, particularly this page:
The coalition forces will come under attack from air, surface and sub-surface threats. Each Weekly War has a different setting and ships are exposed to a multitude of different platforms and weapon systems, to equip them with the skills necessary to combat the proliferation of conventional arms worldwide.
The threat is real, just about everywhere these days. A quick look at Janes will demonstrate this. The FOST and JMC scenarios may be quite daft, the NATO exercises unrealistics as they are in the NATO theatre. But the significant thing is the threats that are simulated. The fact FRADU simulates air attacks, and simulates air launched missile attacks (with Falcon aircraft operated by FRA simulating the EW signature of a an aircraft looking for targets - then firing) suggests that not everyone is convinced by the assertion that no such threat exists.
The coalition forces will come under attack from air, surface and sub-surface threats. Each Weekly War has a different setting and ships are exposed to a multitude of different platforms and weapon systems, to equip them with the skills necessary to combat the proliferation of conventional arms worldwide.
The threat is real, just about everywhere these days. A quick look at Janes will demonstrate this. The FOST and JMC scenarios may be quite daft, the NATO exercises unrealistics as they are in the NATO theatre. But the significant thing is the threats that are simulated. The fact FRADU simulates air attacks, and simulates air launched missile attacks (with Falcon aircraft operated by FRA simulating the EW signature of a an aircraft looking for targets - then firing) suggests that not everyone is convinced by the assertion that no such threat exists.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 11th Mar 2005 at 12:25.
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WEBF, we've been though this before.... We all exercise the assets we have, in a variety of scenarios - but that doesn't always mean that the exercise represents the actual events of the next conflict (or the next one after that, or any, for that matter.)
Take for example, Ex CLEAN HUNTER - a Cold War scenario involving NATO forces attacking targets in the Germany, the Baltic and so on. What resemblance does this bear to GWII?
In many cases the scenario is largely irrelevant (a point you you seem to miss) as it is the COMAO training i.e. how to plan and integrate into a mixed force , multi-national package that contributes most training value.
I'm not a naval tactician but I'm sure that this reads across to the RN too; you take these things far too litterally. A scenario is made up by someone with training aims in mind; they are not always "this is how we'll fight the next war".
SBG
Take for example, Ex CLEAN HUNTER - a Cold War scenario involving NATO forces attacking targets in the Germany, the Baltic and so on. What resemblance does this bear to GWII?
In many cases the scenario is largely irrelevant (a point you you seem to miss) as it is the COMAO training i.e. how to plan and integrate into a mixed force , multi-national package that contributes most training value.
I'm not a naval tactician but I'm sure that this reads across to the RN too; you take these things far too litterally. A scenario is made up by someone with training aims in mind; they are not always "this is how we'll fight the next war".
SBG
Just as well, as Hoon et al have decided that the next war will go to his nice little game plan, where we won't face conventional threats.
I myself said the scenerio does not matter (ok, not in those words) the fact that anti air skills are being exercised does. My point was that various weapons are being proliferated, so it seems prudent to be prepared to deal with them.
I myself said the scenerio does not matter (ok, not in those words) the fact that anti air skills are being exercised does. My point was that various weapons are being proliferated, so it seems prudent to be prepared to deal with them.
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Don't know how to insert links, but for those of you with access to the Evening Standard today, the centre pages of the Business Section don't look that encouraging. Robert Fox is essentially saying that because of the delays to JSF, it looks like the Government is now looking hungrily at its options for delaying the carriers still further. He also points out that because of the perceived increase in costs to build the carrier that we want/need, BAE are saying that the RN will just have to accept a smaller carrier.
The whole matter of fact tone of the article is not encouraging. An awful lot (in terms of ships, future aircraft programmes and people) has been sacrificed to try to ensure that the carriers are ordered this year. What shape will the RN be in if it doesn't happen?
FF
The whole matter of fact tone of the article is not encouraging. An awful lot (in terms of ships, future aircraft programmes and people) has been sacrificed to try to ensure that the carriers are ordered this year. What shape will the RN be in if it doesn't happen?
FF