Ukraine War Thread Part 2
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Russian naval promotion prospects are on the up. One can hope a lot of those vessels in harbour are now minus their senior officers.
Ukrainian Special Forces confirmed the death of Viktor Nikolayevich Sokolov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet. In total 34 officers were killed while another 105 Russians were injured.
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Numbers a racking up.
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Blimey, even the pope is saying stop playing games over the supply of arms to Ukraine!
https://kyivindependent.com/pope-tel...-military-aid/
https://kyivindependent.com/pope-tel...-military-aid/
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I don't want to join the army,
I don't want to go to war. [throws Molotov cocktail]
I'd rather hang around the local underground,
Living off the earnings of a prostitutka ............. [throws Molotov cocktail]
I don't want a bayonet up my ar$e hole, [throws Molotov cocktail]
I don't want my b%llocks shot away,
I'd rather live in Russia, rotten bloody Russia, [throws Molotov cocktail]
and fornicate my refusenik life away.
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Russia taking their burnt out, knocked out crap home to Russia, ohhh how I laughed when the blue truck passed going the opposite direction.
Russia taking their burnt out, knocked out crap home to Russia, ohhh how I laughed when the blue truck passed going the opposite direction.
https://twitter.com/ChallengerInUA/s...58543739129956
https://twitter.com/ChallengerInUA/s...58543739129956
Why ATACMS and not long-range Storm-Shadow ?
Why is Ukraine constantlty calling for ATACMS and not the 500 km *version of S-S?
I understand they are different types of missile, but from what I read the cruise-missile is more likely to beat the air-defence measures.
The only advantages I see for ATACMS is that it is 50% cheaper than S-S and being ground-launched means it is not dependent on fixed infrastructure (airfields ) and limited numbers of launch aircraft
Why is Ukraine constantlty calling for ATACMS and not the 500 km *version of S-S?
I understand they are different types of missile, but from what I read the cruise-missile is more likely to beat the air-defence measures.
The only advantages I see for ATACMS is that it is 50% cheaper than S-S and being ground-launched means it is not dependent on fixed infrastructure (airfields ) and limited numbers of launch aircraft
The bolded part is sufficient reason to be desirous of ATACMS, and I am not sure if the air defenses would be able to handle it all that well. It has some properties of a ballistic missile, but it is also able to maneuver.
Ukraine has wanted it since the American Government offered to ship weapons to help them defend their country ... s offered any help at all.
It also is mature weapons system with substantial track record of effectiveness (Desert Storm and OIF among two examples) - not taking anything away from S-S, it appears to be doing a bang up job.(Pun intended)
The bolded part is sufficient reason to be desirous of ATACMS, and I am not sure if the air defenses would be able to handle it all that well. It has some properties of a ballistic missile, but it is also able to maneuver.
Ukraine has wanted it since the American Government offered to ship weapons to help them defend their country ... s offered any help at all.
The bolded part is sufficient reason to be desirous of ATACMS, and I am not sure if the air defenses would be able to handle it all that well. It has some properties of a ballistic missile, but it is also able to maneuver.
Ukraine has wanted it since the American Government offered to ship weapons to help them defend their country ... s offered any help at all.
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Spot the dummy tanks, not a single track mark behind them.
Spot the dummy tanks, not a single track mark behind them.
https://twitter.com/Heroiam_Slava/st...41870601666840
https://twitter.com/Heroiam_Slava/st...41870601666840
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FWIW, ISW had an interesting assessment of the Russian efforts to launch counterattacks on the salient formed by the recent Ukrainian penetration.
The full article is worth a read, from which I'll pull out a tidbit....
The Russian sacrifice of combat power to hold every meter may alternatively be intended to support the Kremlin’s informational and hybrid warfare objectives.
Russian President Vladimir Putin first acknowledged the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive on June 9 by emphasizing two key and persistent narratives: that Ukrainian forces will not achieve significant successes due to well-prepared Russian defenses and that the Ukrainian forces are suffering heavy losses in personnel and Western military equipment.
Putin and the Kremlin have been framing Russian defensive operations as a major battlefield victory, and persistent Russian counterattacks allow the Kremlin to claim these operations as individual victories amidst the general lack of Russian battlefield advances elsewhere.
These efforts likely intend to erode support and trust in Ukrainian forces in Ukraine and the West. Putin may have ordered the Russian military command to hold all Russia’s initial defensive positions to create the illusion that Ukrainian counteroffensives have not achieved any tactical or operational effects despite substantial Western support.
This informational undertaking can only succeed in the long run if Russian forces can actually prevent Ukrainian forces from breaking through and liberating large areas, however.
The Russian resistance to ceding ground may also be tied to Russian military commanders’ and officials’ attempts to use the counteroffensive to achieve political goals, or it could result from Putin’s micromanagement.
Russian President Vladimir Putin first acknowledged the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive on June 9 by emphasizing two key and persistent narratives: that Ukrainian forces will not achieve significant successes due to well-prepared Russian defenses and that the Ukrainian forces are suffering heavy losses in personnel and Western military equipment.
Putin and the Kremlin have been framing Russian defensive operations as a major battlefield victory, and persistent Russian counterattacks allow the Kremlin to claim these operations as individual victories amidst the general lack of Russian battlefield advances elsewhere.
These efforts likely intend to erode support and trust in Ukrainian forces in Ukraine and the West. Putin may have ordered the Russian military command to hold all Russia’s initial defensive positions to create the illusion that Ukrainian counteroffensives have not achieved any tactical or operational effects despite substantial Western support.
This informational undertaking can only succeed in the long run if Russian forces can actually prevent Ukrainian forces from breaking through and liberating large areas, however.
The Russian resistance to ceding ground may also be tied to Russian military commanders’ and officials’ attempts to use the counteroffensive to achieve political goals, or it could result from Putin’s micromanagement.
With that said, situational details matter - METT-T - and the on-scene commander has to earn his pay at times like this... and of course piled on top of that challenge in decision making, the political considerations outlined above add another degree of difficulty.
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The one hiding in the shade of the trees may be more comfortable inside, and the one the Russians do not want targeting.
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