Possible Nuclear Accident
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
4. There is a far greater threat of a nuclear accident in the official DISMANTLING of a nuke . . . in many other nuclear-weapons-owning countries - where nuke dismantling is being carried out - of which we have very little knowledge of their processes and safety regimes.
To remain viable it must be serviced regularly and ultimately dismantled and recycled in order to maintain a given arsenal. I don't believe that one track was referring solely to former Soviet states - there are others.
6. The journo who wrote the book about the NC incident would be better advised to write a book about the potential catastrophe that awaits from another Chernobyl-style incident occurring from a Russian nuke incident that is probably less than one cheap switch away from happening. 
But then again - he wouldn't have access to any de-classified info to feed on, would he? 
But then again - he wouldn't have access to any de-classified info to feed on, would he?
Sellafield UK 1953
Three Mile Island US 1979
Chernobyl Russia 1986
Fukushima Japan 2011
Number of incidents where people got lucky..................who knows but doubt its a low figure.
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Sounds like quite a safe weapon when compared to our early attempts
http://aviationtrivia.********.co.uk...bly-worst.html
ISTR the ball bearings fell out of one in the hangar and that created a problem disarming the weapon, the hole was underneath
The UKs early atomic weapon program was as poor as our aircraft industry, lucky for us the US stepped in with interim weapons and then warhead designs.
Plenty of incidents and accidents listed here
Key Issues: Nuclear Weapons: Issues: Accidents
http://aviationtrivia.********.co.uk...bly-worst.html
ISTR the ball bearings fell out of one in the hangar and that created a problem disarming the weapon, the hole was underneath
The UKs early atomic weapon program was as poor as our aircraft industry, lucky for us the US stepped in with interim weapons and then warhead designs.
Plenty of incidents and accidents listed here
Key Issues: Nuclear Weapons: Issues: Accidents
Last edited by Ivan Rogov; 22nd Sep 2013 at 20:22.
Link above doesn't seem to work - here it is cut and pasted.
Violet Club: Quite Possibly the Worst Nuclear Bomb Ever Fielded
The warhead, or physics package, of the Violet Club bomb
When taking a look at the development of British nuclear weapons following the Second World War, it has to be viewed in the context of a piece of legislation in the United States that was passed in 1946- the McMahon Act or the Atomic Energy Act. Sponsored by Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut who chaired the Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy, this legislation is better known for its creation of the Atomic Energy Commission and the placement of nuclear weapons development and nuclear applications under civilian rather than military control. However, one consequence of the McMahon Act was the stipulation that nuclear weapons development be restricted from US allies- this affect the United Kingdom and Canada who had provided scientists and support to the wartime Manhattan Project. As a result of being shut out of American nuclear weapons development, the British set about to create their own air-dropped weapon which would be fielded in 1953 at RAF Witttering- though somewhat amusingly the first aircraft that could carry the bomb, designated Blue Danube, the Vickers Valiant, didn't become operational until a year later. The purpose of this wasn't just a message to the Soviets, but also to the United States that Britain was more than capable of fielding its own nuclear deterrent despite the McMahon Act.
On 1 November 1952 the United States detonated its first fusion bomb (H-bomb) in the Ivy Mike test at Eniwetok Atoll in the Pacific. Given that the British were still shut out of US nuclear development by the McMahon Act, despite the fact that the Blue Danube fission bomb (A-bomb) was still a year out from being operational, strategic imperatives meant that Britain had to develop it's own H-bomb and the program was launched in 1954. In the UK, many military systems were assigned code names under the Ministry of Supply's "rainbow codes"- hence, "Blue Danube". In the development of an H-bomb, the casing had its own code name and the actual warhead, called the physics package, had another code name. The casing of the H-bomb was based on the Blue Danube casing and was designated Violet Club while the physics package was designated Green Grass.
But before the code names had been settled upon, the British H-bomb had a different name- "Interim Megaton Weapon"- implying that it was a high-yield weapon but not a true thermonuclear or H-bomb/fusion weapon. And this is really at the heart of the history of the Violet Club and its historical legacy. First, it indicates that Violet Club was intended to be a temporary weapon and secondly, it wasn't a fusion bomb as was commonly believed by *both* the Soviet Union and the United States.
The warhead or physics package of the bomb was based on earlier warhead designs that were named Orange Herald and Green Bamboo. Orange Herald was a lighter version of Green Bamboo and the designs were projected to be the new fusion warheads for the Royal Air Force's V-force, the Blue Steel stand-off missile, and the planned Blue Streak intermediate-range ballistic missile. Testing of Orange Herald showed that it had failed to boost the fission reaction to create a fusion reaction. The failure of the warhead designs left the British scrambling for a high-yield weapon and this became the Green Grass warhead of the Interim Megaton Weapon that was based on design elements of the earlier Green Bamboo and Orange Herald designs. As was the case in the United States, interservice rivalries in Great Britain meant that the Army wanted highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear landmines in Europe and the Royal Navy wanted HEU for the reactors for its planned nuclear-powered submarine fleet. The Royal Air Force was of the feeling that the HEU that had so far been produced in British reactors had to be used or it would be lost to rival services, so that was one of several motivations to rush the Interim Megaton Weapon into service as it would use a significant amount of HEU.
Schematic of the Green Grass warhead showing how the ball bearings were used.
It was the design of the Green Grass warhead that went into the Violet Club that made it for all practical purposes a useless weapon. A hollow sphere of HEU was surrounded by a system of 72 explosive lenses that compressed the HEU to critical mass and detonation. But here was the problem. In the Green Grass warhead, the mass of HEU was in *excess* of the critical mass once compressed by the explosive lenses. That meant if the warhead were crushed or damaged during handling, it could partially detonate. American designs avoided this by having an HEU core that was inserted into the physics package usually by the bombardier once the bomber was in flight, thereby "arming" the bomb once the core was inserted. Without the core inserted, the HEU mass in the American designs was below the critical mass. The solution by British designers was to fill the center of the HEU sphere with 20,000 steel ball bearings to prevent the sphere from being crushed and reaching critical mass. To arm the bomb, a plastic plug was removed from the bottom of the warhead (accessible via a hatch on the underside of the Violet Club casing) that allowed the bearings to flow out, thereby arming the bomb.
While it may sound like a creative solution, there were several issues:
The weight of the ball-bearings increased the bomb's weight to 11,250 lbs which was greater than the capacity of not only the bomb release mechanisms of the V-bombers but also the ground-transport equipment of the bomb.
The outflow of bearings took at least half an hour under ideal conditions- in cold weather, the bearings could freeze together, making arming the weapon near-impossible.
Once the bomb was armed by allowing the ball-bearings to flow out of the center of the warhead, there was on way of making the weapon safe again. In fact, engine running was prohibited even with Violet Club "safed" as it was feared vibration would cause the plastic plug to fall out and inadvertantly arm the weapon.
Because the bomb was armed irreversibly, airborne alerts were impossible because take off and landing were too hazardous to attempt with an armed Violet Club.
Dispersal of the V-force to outlying fields was impossible as the bomb couldn't be flown to the dispersal airfield and the bomb transport equipment couldn't handle the Violet Club when it had its ball-bearings in place.
The Blue Danube- the Violet Club looked similar externally.
While the Air Staff of the RAF ordered twelve Violet Club bombs, only five were made and as British author Chris Gibson put it in his book Vulcan's Hammer "From the RAF's point of view, that was five too many." With such an unwieldly weapon, why was it even fielded? First of all, remember that the British were classifying the Violet Club as megaton-class weapon by calling it the Interim Megaton Weapon. It definitely wasn't a megaton weapon, perhaps more 400 kilotons at best, but certainly the Operation Grapple tests at Christmas Island in 1957 did indicate to the Americans the British were succeeding at fielding their own H-bombs- even if those test detonations failed to created the desired thermonuclear reaction. So who was the target of the Violet Club? While serving notice to the Soviet Union that Britain was still a force to be reckoned with, it seems that perhaps the Americans were the target, so to speak- with a weapon in their inventory called Interim Megaton Weapon implying that newer designs forthcoming and the Grapple series of tests in 1957 making a good show of things despite failing to work as planned, in 1958 the United States repealed the McMahon Act and resumed full nuclear cooperation with the United Kingdom. The Green Grass warhead used in Violet Club would be the last all-British nuclear weapon as a new Mutual Defense Agreement signed as part of the repeal of the McMahon Act meant British designers now had access to more advanced and compact American designs. In fact, the successor to the much-despised Violet Club, the Yellow Sun Mk.2, used an Anglicized American Mk.28 thermonuclear warhead. But no other fission weapon ever fielded by any other nation approached the explosive yield of the Violet Club.
Source: Vulcan's Hammer: V-Force Projects and Weapons Since 1945 by Chris Gibson. Hikoki Publications, 2011, p47-51. nuclear-weapons.info, by Brian Burnell.
Violet Club: Quite Possibly the Worst Nuclear Bomb Ever Fielded
The warhead, or physics package, of the Violet Club bomb
When taking a look at the development of British nuclear weapons following the Second World War, it has to be viewed in the context of a piece of legislation in the United States that was passed in 1946- the McMahon Act or the Atomic Energy Act. Sponsored by Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut who chaired the Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy, this legislation is better known for its creation of the Atomic Energy Commission and the placement of nuclear weapons development and nuclear applications under civilian rather than military control. However, one consequence of the McMahon Act was the stipulation that nuclear weapons development be restricted from US allies- this affect the United Kingdom and Canada who had provided scientists and support to the wartime Manhattan Project. As a result of being shut out of American nuclear weapons development, the British set about to create their own air-dropped weapon which would be fielded in 1953 at RAF Witttering- though somewhat amusingly the first aircraft that could carry the bomb, designated Blue Danube, the Vickers Valiant, didn't become operational until a year later. The purpose of this wasn't just a message to the Soviets, but also to the United States that Britain was more than capable of fielding its own nuclear deterrent despite the McMahon Act.
On 1 November 1952 the United States detonated its first fusion bomb (H-bomb) in the Ivy Mike test at Eniwetok Atoll in the Pacific. Given that the British were still shut out of US nuclear development by the McMahon Act, despite the fact that the Blue Danube fission bomb (A-bomb) was still a year out from being operational, strategic imperatives meant that Britain had to develop it's own H-bomb and the program was launched in 1954. In the UK, many military systems were assigned code names under the Ministry of Supply's "rainbow codes"- hence, "Blue Danube". In the development of an H-bomb, the casing had its own code name and the actual warhead, called the physics package, had another code name. The casing of the H-bomb was based on the Blue Danube casing and was designated Violet Club while the physics package was designated Green Grass.
But before the code names had been settled upon, the British H-bomb had a different name- "Interim Megaton Weapon"- implying that it was a high-yield weapon but not a true thermonuclear or H-bomb/fusion weapon. And this is really at the heart of the history of the Violet Club and its historical legacy. First, it indicates that Violet Club was intended to be a temporary weapon and secondly, it wasn't a fusion bomb as was commonly believed by *both* the Soviet Union and the United States.
The warhead or physics package of the bomb was based on earlier warhead designs that were named Orange Herald and Green Bamboo. Orange Herald was a lighter version of Green Bamboo and the designs were projected to be the new fusion warheads for the Royal Air Force's V-force, the Blue Steel stand-off missile, and the planned Blue Streak intermediate-range ballistic missile. Testing of Orange Herald showed that it had failed to boost the fission reaction to create a fusion reaction. The failure of the warhead designs left the British scrambling for a high-yield weapon and this became the Green Grass warhead of the Interim Megaton Weapon that was based on design elements of the earlier Green Bamboo and Orange Herald designs. As was the case in the United States, interservice rivalries in Great Britain meant that the Army wanted highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear landmines in Europe and the Royal Navy wanted HEU for the reactors for its planned nuclear-powered submarine fleet. The Royal Air Force was of the feeling that the HEU that had so far been produced in British reactors had to be used or it would be lost to rival services, so that was one of several motivations to rush the Interim Megaton Weapon into service as it would use a significant amount of HEU.
Schematic of the Green Grass warhead showing how the ball bearings were used.
It was the design of the Green Grass warhead that went into the Violet Club that made it for all practical purposes a useless weapon. A hollow sphere of HEU was surrounded by a system of 72 explosive lenses that compressed the HEU to critical mass and detonation. But here was the problem. In the Green Grass warhead, the mass of HEU was in *excess* of the critical mass once compressed by the explosive lenses. That meant if the warhead were crushed or damaged during handling, it could partially detonate. American designs avoided this by having an HEU core that was inserted into the physics package usually by the bombardier once the bomber was in flight, thereby "arming" the bomb once the core was inserted. Without the core inserted, the HEU mass in the American designs was below the critical mass. The solution by British designers was to fill the center of the HEU sphere with 20,000 steel ball bearings to prevent the sphere from being crushed and reaching critical mass. To arm the bomb, a plastic plug was removed from the bottom of the warhead (accessible via a hatch on the underside of the Violet Club casing) that allowed the bearings to flow out, thereby arming the bomb.
While it may sound like a creative solution, there were several issues:
The weight of the ball-bearings increased the bomb's weight to 11,250 lbs which was greater than the capacity of not only the bomb release mechanisms of the V-bombers but also the ground-transport equipment of the bomb.
The outflow of bearings took at least half an hour under ideal conditions- in cold weather, the bearings could freeze together, making arming the weapon near-impossible.
Once the bomb was armed by allowing the ball-bearings to flow out of the center of the warhead, there was on way of making the weapon safe again. In fact, engine running was prohibited even with Violet Club "safed" as it was feared vibration would cause the plastic plug to fall out and inadvertantly arm the weapon.
Because the bomb was armed irreversibly, airborne alerts were impossible because take off and landing were too hazardous to attempt with an armed Violet Club.
Dispersal of the V-force to outlying fields was impossible as the bomb couldn't be flown to the dispersal airfield and the bomb transport equipment couldn't handle the Violet Club when it had its ball-bearings in place.
The Blue Danube- the Violet Club looked similar externally.
While the Air Staff of the RAF ordered twelve Violet Club bombs, only five were made and as British author Chris Gibson put it in his book Vulcan's Hammer "From the RAF's point of view, that was five too many." With such an unwieldly weapon, why was it even fielded? First of all, remember that the British were classifying the Violet Club as megaton-class weapon by calling it the Interim Megaton Weapon. It definitely wasn't a megaton weapon, perhaps more 400 kilotons at best, but certainly the Operation Grapple tests at Christmas Island in 1957 did indicate to the Americans the British were succeeding at fielding their own H-bombs- even if those test detonations failed to created the desired thermonuclear reaction. So who was the target of the Violet Club? While serving notice to the Soviet Union that Britain was still a force to be reckoned with, it seems that perhaps the Americans were the target, so to speak- with a weapon in their inventory called Interim Megaton Weapon implying that newer designs forthcoming and the Grapple series of tests in 1957 making a good show of things despite failing to work as planned, in 1958 the United States repealed the McMahon Act and resumed full nuclear cooperation with the United Kingdom. The Green Grass warhead used in Violet Club would be the last all-British nuclear weapon as a new Mutual Defense Agreement signed as part of the repeal of the McMahon Act meant British designers now had access to more advanced and compact American designs. In fact, the successor to the much-despised Violet Club, the Yellow Sun Mk.2, used an Anglicized American Mk.28 thermonuclear warhead. But no other fission weapon ever fielded by any other nation approached the explosive yield of the Violet Club.
Source: Vulcan's Hammer: V-Force Projects and Weapons Since 1945 by Chris Gibson. Hikoki Publications, 2011, p47-51. nuclear-weapons.info, by Brian Burnell.
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GreenKnight - Yes, I was aware of the U.S. assistance to Russia in the form of the Co-operative Threat Reduction program.
However, for the U.S., the CTR program been a pretty expensive and lengthy exercise that has resulted in the dismantling of a little over 9100 nukes, ICBM's and SLBM's, over 20 yrs - at a total cost to the U.S. of nearly $8.8B.
That's not exactly nuclear weapons reduction on a large scale, and it's only a small % of the number of U.S. nukes dismantled in the same time frame.
The CTR program has not only been troubled by a total lack of co-ordination amongst the major U.S. weapons and defence agencies - it has been largely stunted, by Russia's refusal to allow U.S. scientists and nuke technicians access to (nuclear) "operational sites".
Nukes of Hazard Blog
Russia inherited around 30,000 nukes as its share of the USSR nuke arsenal - and after the collapse of the USSR, it was revealed that the USSR at one time possessed 45,000 nuclear weapons (50% more than previously estimated by Western Intelligence), and 1,200 tonnes of fissile material - more than double the previous Western "guesstimate".
A large proportion of the CTR monies went into "scientist welfare" - as the U.S., by way of the CTR, funded the salaries of over 2200 Russian nuclear scientists and technicians after the collapse of the USSR - to largely prevent desperate, unpaid Russian nuclear scientists, from selling their skills to other, less-stable nations. Another 3000 skilled Russian scientists and technicians departed from Russia to areas unknown, in the period just after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Another large proportion of CTR funding went into Russian nuke transportation assistance - secure containers, armored blankets, specialized railcars, emergency response vehicles, support vehicles, and nuke transportation training.
Another very large proportion of the CTR funding went into costly security arrangements for Russian nukes and fissile material.
One Russian security adviser was reported as stating, that during the catastrophic period of instability right after the collapse of the Soviet Union; "We guard our potatoes better than our nuclear weapons!"
A sizeable sum from the CTR budget went into radiation-detecting devices at critical border crossings and ports in Eastern Europe and nearby States. The U.S. determined that this was the simplest and easiest way to detect any stolen nuclear items.
There was enormous waste in many of the CTR programs - such as the building of a $100M facility to hold discarded rocket propellant from ICBM's and SLBM's - but which fuel, Russia promptly used in its later space program rockets!
Thus, upon completion of the U.S.-funded, secure rocket fuel facility, the Russians promptly informed your guys, there wasn't any ICBM/SLBM fuel left to store in it!
Overall, if the CTR program had had a better-focused strategic aim and structure from day one - and unqualified support from the Russians - it may have been a whole lot more successful - and you guys might have had a lot better return for your money "invested" in threat reduction.
A critical analysis shows that the CTR has had limited effect at best, and in an economists terms, "a very poor ROI."
IMO, the CTR program can really be likened to the Police Chief of a large U.S. city, turning up to a fortified Hells Angels clubhouse with all his men, and politely asking the Sergeant-at-Arms of the Hells Angels, permission to enter their inner sanctum and check on their weapons storage and security - and to help them secure their weapons to prevent any nasty accidents, and to destroy any they don't really want or need.
Overall, the total number of current nukes held by Russia and the U.S. on the best figures available, appear to number around 20,000.
That's definitely a whole lot better than the figure of probably well over 100,000 nukes formerly in existence at the height of the Cold War.
Whether the CTR can take a lot of the credit for the "downsizing" of the number of nukes in the world - or whether the downsizing was purely driven by the goodwill of the various countries and States leaders agreeing to multilateral arms reductions, is a moot point.
Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union - http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31957.pdf
However, for the U.S., the CTR program been a pretty expensive and lengthy exercise that has resulted in the dismantling of a little over 9100 nukes, ICBM's and SLBM's, over 20 yrs - at a total cost to the U.S. of nearly $8.8B.
That's not exactly nuclear weapons reduction on a large scale, and it's only a small % of the number of U.S. nukes dismantled in the same time frame.
The CTR program has not only been troubled by a total lack of co-ordination amongst the major U.S. weapons and defence agencies - it has been largely stunted, by Russia's refusal to allow U.S. scientists and nuke technicians access to (nuclear) "operational sites".
From link below - "Back in 2006, in a feature for The Atlantic, William Langewiesche detailed how many National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) technicians, sent abroad to help their Russian counterparts enhance the security of Russian nuclear facilities, questioned Moscow’s commitment to nuclear security, and expressed concerns that the CTR-funded upgrades would “slip into disrepair” upon the termination of US funding."
Russia inherited around 30,000 nukes as its share of the USSR nuke arsenal - and after the collapse of the USSR, it was revealed that the USSR at one time possessed 45,000 nuclear weapons (50% more than previously estimated by Western Intelligence), and 1,200 tonnes of fissile material - more than double the previous Western "guesstimate".
A large proportion of the CTR monies went into "scientist welfare" - as the U.S., by way of the CTR, funded the salaries of over 2200 Russian nuclear scientists and technicians after the collapse of the USSR - to largely prevent desperate, unpaid Russian nuclear scientists, from selling their skills to other, less-stable nations. Another 3000 skilled Russian scientists and technicians departed from Russia to areas unknown, in the period just after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Another large proportion of CTR funding went into Russian nuke transportation assistance - secure containers, armored blankets, specialized railcars, emergency response vehicles, support vehicles, and nuke transportation training.
Another very large proportion of the CTR funding went into costly security arrangements for Russian nukes and fissile material.
One Russian security adviser was reported as stating, that during the catastrophic period of instability right after the collapse of the Soviet Union; "We guard our potatoes better than our nuclear weapons!"
A sizeable sum from the CTR budget went into radiation-detecting devices at critical border crossings and ports in Eastern Europe and nearby States. The U.S. determined that this was the simplest and easiest way to detect any stolen nuclear items.
There was enormous waste in many of the CTR programs - such as the building of a $100M facility to hold discarded rocket propellant from ICBM's and SLBM's - but which fuel, Russia promptly used in its later space program rockets!
Thus, upon completion of the U.S.-funded, secure rocket fuel facility, the Russians promptly informed your guys, there wasn't any ICBM/SLBM fuel left to store in it!
Overall, if the CTR program had had a better-focused strategic aim and structure from day one - and unqualified support from the Russians - it may have been a whole lot more successful - and you guys might have had a lot better return for your money "invested" in threat reduction.
A critical analysis shows that the CTR has had limited effect at best, and in an economists terms, "a very poor ROI."
IMO, the CTR program can really be likened to the Police Chief of a large U.S. city, turning up to a fortified Hells Angels clubhouse with all his men, and politely asking the Sergeant-at-Arms of the Hells Angels, permission to enter their inner sanctum and check on their weapons storage and security - and to help them secure their weapons to prevent any nasty accidents, and to destroy any they don't really want or need.
Overall, the total number of current nukes held by Russia and the U.S. on the best figures available, appear to number around 20,000.
That's definitely a whole lot better than the figure of probably well over 100,000 nukes formerly in existence at the height of the Cold War.
Whether the CTR can take a lot of the credit for the "downsizing" of the number of nukes in the world - or whether the downsizing was purely driven by the goodwill of the various countries and States leaders agreeing to multilateral arms reductions, is a moot point.
Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union - http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31957.pdf
Last edited by onetrack; 23rd Sep 2013 at 11:01. Reason: sp...
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Schematic of the Green Grass warhead showing how the ball bearings were used.
It was the design of the Green Grass warhead that went into the Violet Club that made it for all practical purposes a useless weapon. A hollow sphere of HEU was surrounded by a system of 72 explosive lenses that compressed the HEU to critical mass and detonation. But here was the problem. In the Green Grass warhead, the mass of HEU was in *excess* of the critical mass once compressed by the explosive lenses. That meant if the warhead were crushed or damaged during handling, it could partially detonate.
. . .
The solution by British designers was to fill the center of the HEU sphere with 20,000 steel ball bearings to prevent the sphere from being crushed and reaching critical mass. To arm the bomb, a plastic plug was removed from the bottom of the warhead (accessible via a hatch on the underside of the Violet Club casing) that allowed the bearings to flow out, thereby arming the bomb.
While it may sound like a creative solution, there were several issues:
. . .Once the bomb was armed by allowing the ball-bearings to flow out of the center of the warhead, there was on way of making the weapon safe again.
It was the design of the Green Grass warhead that went into the Violet Club that made it for all practical purposes a useless weapon. A hollow sphere of HEU was surrounded by a system of 72 explosive lenses that compressed the HEU to critical mass and detonation. But here was the problem. In the Green Grass warhead, the mass of HEU was in *excess* of the critical mass once compressed by the explosive lenses. That meant if the warhead were crushed or damaged during handling, it could partially detonate.
. . .
The solution by British designers was to fill the center of the HEU sphere with 20,000 steel ball bearings to prevent the sphere from being crushed and reaching critical mass. To arm the bomb, a plastic plug was removed from the bottom of the warhead (accessible via a hatch on the underside of the Violet Club casing) that allowed the bearings to flow out, thereby arming the bomb.
While it may sound like a creative solution, there were several issues:
. . .Once the bomb was armed by allowing the ball-bearings to flow out of the center of the warhead, there was on way of making the weapon safe again.
Whilst it was not possible to safe the weapons in situ it could, with extreme care be safed by putting the ball bearings back. I am not sure it the arming mentioned took place in the hangar or on a dispersal but it was apparently quite interesting collecting 20,000 ball bearings. Also I don't know whether it was a drill weapon or the real thing.
As mentioned, you could no put the ball bearings back in from the bottom, nor could you invert the weapon and drop them in from the top. It was feared that the ball bearings dropping on to the bottom of the sphere could dislodge some of the HEU plates at the bottom which of course would be the top when the bomb was right way up. They could then drop as soon as the ball bearings were removed.
The ball bearings had to be reinserted with the hole as low as possible to minimise movement and impact and the weapon rotated as more and more were inserted.
Steady hand required?
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
American designs avoided this by having an HEU core that was inserted into the physics package usually by the bombardier once the bomber was in flight, thereby "arming" the bomb once the core was inserted. Without the core inserted, the HEU mass in the American designs was below the critical mass.
Similarly on the Canberra and V-bombers there was no way to insert the gauntlet in flight.
Interestingly, although Red Beard employed the gauntlet system we never had approved documentation for that system. Only with approved documentation could the live weapon be loaded, armed and carried. Therefore while RB was probably* deployed operationally special emergency clearance would probably* have been issued.
*usual caveats - it is not HMGs policy to confirm or deny . . . "
Thread Starter
Dear Pontius,
Thank you for your private message – sorry I have not answered earlier but I have been busy with other things!
The problem is that, when anything nuclear is mentioned, journos and the public tend get all hyped up. As I said, when I started this thread, my background is entirely commercial flying, although during the latter part of my time I also dealt with aviation security issues. Thus, while I am ignorant re most military matters, I do have some insight into the way government departments deal with these matters, hence my request when starting this thread to get some reasoned responses from those of you who were in the know.
May I thank you, Pontius, and all also tartare, onetrack and racedo for your inputs – I will follow up with much interest some of your reference.
Thank you for your private message – sorry I have not answered earlier but I have been busy with other things!
The problem is that, when anything nuclear is mentioned, journos and the public tend get all hyped up. As I said, when I started this thread, my background is entirely commercial flying, although during the latter part of my time I also dealt with aviation security issues. Thus, while I am ignorant re most military matters, I do have some insight into the way government departments deal with these matters, hence my request when starting this thread to get some reasoned responses from those of you who were in the know.
May I thank you, Pontius, and all also tartare, onetrack and racedo for your inputs – I will follow up with much interest some of your reference.
Last edited by Bergerie1; 23rd Sep 2013 at 10:56.
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Op,
As others have dealt in commendable depth on the various technical issues, I'll change tack and bring in the human perspective. Accidental, unintended or even unfortunate nuclear detonations are perhaps more likely (leastwise thesedays) from human error. There is well documented case of the fairly low-ranking half of a Soviet subs two-man team refusing to follow his commanders orders and release a nuke during the Cuban Missile Crisis. If the account is accurate (who knows) and the dude had lacked the cojones to do what he did we wouldn't be typing this or reading it now, because that really would have changed history.
Scary stuff is it not? Oh, BTW, for those that think this is all just Cold War nostalgia, you might consider all the nuclear hardware parked on the Indian Sub-continent, ten minutes flying time apart.
As others have dealt in commendable depth on the various technical issues, I'll change tack and bring in the human perspective. Accidental, unintended or even unfortunate nuclear detonations are perhaps more likely (leastwise thesedays) from human error. There is well documented case of the fairly low-ranking half of a Soviet subs two-man team refusing to follow his commanders orders and release a nuke during the Cuban Missile Crisis. If the account is accurate (who knows) and the dude had lacked the cojones to do what he did we wouldn't be typing this or reading it now, because that really would have changed history.
Scary stuff is it not? Oh, BTW, for those that think this is all just Cold War nostalgia, you might consider all the nuclear hardware parked on the Indian Sub-continent, ten minutes flying time apart.
Last edited by The Old Fat One; 23rd Sep 2013 at 11:31.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
TOFO, it is also interesting that our cousins took nuclear weapons security to commendable lengths. In contrast we had no reliability programme and point guarding of the QRA aircraft was for a long time a single RAF Police acting corporal (unpaid). On a two aircraft main base that would be just 2 men armed with pistols.
There was no marked exclusion zone, backup police could be a couple of miles away and the aircraft, hard by a low wooden perimeter fence were 'secured' with a cheap car door lock - FA501 on the Vulcan (available from Halfords).
That there were so few incidents was due entirely to British sang froid, fair play and LUCK.
There was no marked exclusion zone, backup police could be a couple of miles away and the aircraft, hard by a low wooden perimeter fence were 'secured' with a cheap car door lock - FA501 on the Vulcan (available from Halfords).
That there were so few incidents was due entirely to British sang froid, fair play and LUCK.
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Thanks for the pointer to "Project Dominic", ORAC. I hadn't been aware that the US were using the facilities at Christmas Island to carry out their tests.
Apart from having my "Electronic Block" duties & QRA duties, a group of us were also on standby, whenever a Nuclear Weapon was transported by road or rail. If there was a crash, we would be bused in or flown in to the crash site.
If the HE was triggered on the device, it would NOT trigger a Nuclear Explosion, but would probably crack the physics package casing, allowing Plutonium to spill. Our job was to go in, down wind of the accident site with protective clothing & Geiger counters & cordon off the area that was "Hot".
Although we were put on standby on a very regular basis, thank goodness we were never called out. The USAF would regularly fly in Nuclear Weapons as cargo , so I presume that they had a similar team as ourselves.
Apart from having my "Electronic Block" duties & QRA duties, a group of us were also on standby, whenever a Nuclear Weapon was transported by road or rail. If there was a crash, we would be bused in or flown in to the crash site.
If the HE was triggered on the device, it would NOT trigger a Nuclear Explosion, but would probably crack the physics package casing, allowing Plutonium to spill. Our job was to go in, down wind of the accident site with protective clothing & Geiger counters & cordon off the area that was "Hot".
Although we were put on standby on a very regular basis, thank goodness we were never called out. The USAF would regularly fly in Nuclear Weapons as cargo , so I presume that they had a similar team as ourselves.
PN: Picking up your point about USAF nuclear security, during my time on the C-141 in the early 1970s, "Nuclear Loading" was a required part of annual refresher training, albeit that I was excused on NOFORN grounds. It appeared to be taken very seriously indeed and the training was certainly carried out in an exclusion area.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
VIProds, yes, it was the first time we came across the term EOD Teams.
There was a question in the House, 1957 IIRC, when a question was asked as to the response by the Royal Air Force as to actions that would be taken in the event of a nuclear incident (it was probably as a result of Sellafield). The appropriate minster rose to his feet and announced to the House that in the event of a nuclear incident to Royal Air Force would attend the incident with Special Safety Teams and thus the SST organisation was born.
At the time he stood up there was no such organisation but there was the following day.
The initial kit, modelled on suits and procedures used during the nuclear tests was still in use almost 20 years later but by then the white suits we in short supply, the wellie boots were frequently perished and the stirrup pumps were a joke delivering a mere trickle of water through perished rubber hoses.
In the 1980s things improved with more modern kit, NBC suits replacing the white fabric ones.
There was a question in the House, 1957 IIRC, when a question was asked as to the response by the Royal Air Force as to actions that would be taken in the event of a nuclear incident (it was probably as a result of Sellafield). The appropriate minster rose to his feet and announced to the House that in the event of a nuclear incident to Royal Air Force would attend the incident with Special Safety Teams and thus the SST organisation was born.
At the time he stood up there was no such organisation but there was the following day
.The initial kit, modelled on suits and procedures used during the nuclear tests was still in use almost 20 years later but by then the white suits we in short supply, the wellie boots were frequently perished and the stirrup pumps were a joke delivering a mere trickle of water through perished rubber hoses.
In the 1980s things improved with more modern kit, NBC suits replacing the white fabric ones.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Sush HH, accidents to NW convoys would be a whole new book.
At one time the convoys were so hush hush that they would lay up in a public layby rather than use an adjacent military facility where their true purpose could be guessed at.
On one particular convoy we were free running from the main convoy and coming down one road we were held at a T-junction as our convoy came in from a T-junction on the right. While waiting there came a loud bang and tinkle tinkle as the right front wheel bearing blew up. Fortunately we were outside a large RAF station that had a very large MT setup but now has a well known shopping outlet nearby.
We called them up and they sent a recovery vehicle. We had to provide our 658 to get them to release a replacement. All it said was from Wittering to Secret thence Secret then return to Wittering.
While this was going on we noticed that one of the convoy tractors was on the back of a flat be trailer having come off the road a short while before.
Eventually we all returned to Wittering where it seemed we had had a 50% attrition in serviceable tractors, trailers, and escort bikes.
At one time the convoys were so hush hush that they would lay up in a public layby rather than use an adjacent military facility where their true purpose could be guessed at.
On one particular convoy we were free running from the main convoy and coming down one road we were held at a T-junction as our convoy came in from a T-junction on the right. While waiting there came a loud bang and tinkle tinkle as the right front wheel bearing blew up. Fortunately we were outside a large RAF station that had a very large MT setup but now has a well known shopping outlet nearby.
We called them up and they sent a recovery vehicle. We had to provide our 658 to get them to release a replacement. All it said was from Wittering to Secret thence Secret then return to Wittering.
While this was going on we noticed that one of the convoy tractors was on the back of a flat be trailer having come off the road a short while before.
Eventually we all returned to Wittering where it seemed we had had a 50% attrition in serviceable tractors, trailers, and escort bikes.
Last edited by Pontius Navigator; 23rd Sep 2013 at 17:34.
BGG - me too when OC Admin at Wyton early 90s. Had this "mobile" phone - filled a large suitcase.
Last edited by Wander00; 23rd Sep 2013 at 18:45. Reason: finger trouble - nothing new
Originally Posted by PN
At one time the convoys were so hush hush that they would lay up in a public layby rather than use an adjacent military facility where their true purpose could be guessed at.
"Come, Ladies and Gents. H-Bomds, H-Bombs. Only two left. Sold as a lot or for spares. Three million a pound. Make me an offer for a quick sale."