Decision to axe Harrier is "bonkers".
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FPlod,
Nope, never too hot just f
g bored to death by it all!
Foldie
If it's too hot for you, just keep out of the kitchen. You don't have to click on the thread. Is it that difficult to resist?
g bored to death by it all!Foldie
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Foldie
Remind me how many years ago the TSR2 was cancelled?
The fact that people still bemoan the loss of it on Pprune suggests that you will be bored for a while longer.
Remind me how many years ago the TSR2 was cancelled?
The fact that people still bemoan the loss of it on Pprune suggests that you will be bored for a while longer.
Perhaps we could try getting back on thread? Looking at the recent analysis by RUSI may be useful (the actual report PDF is here):
The Maritime Contribution
Throughout the Libyan campaign, various navies have conducted tasks across a wide spectrum of operations in ways not necessarily obvious from media reports. This has ranged from maritime security and blockade enforcement to the use – even if on a small scale – of traditional high end capabilities such as mine counter measures, naval fire missions and carrier strike. Even before the commencement of combat operations in March, warships and other maritime assets were deployed to conduct non-combatant evacuation operations. The United States Navy’s Joint Force Commander Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III stated that Libya demonstrated not only the agility and flexibility of sea power, but also that the coalition’s ability to assist ashore would have been reduced without it.
The Royal Navy’s initial contributions to the campaign, however, required it to drop some other on-going naval tasks. For example:
• HMS Cumberland had been conducting counter-piracy and other maritime security operations in the Indian Ocean before being redeployed to Libya. Her relief, HMS Liverpool, was sent to Libya;
• HMS York was en route to the South Atlantic, for her second deployment there in 12 months, when she was re-tasked to head to Libya;
• HMS Westminster had been operating in UK waters.
The UK had to choose for the duration of this crisis, however long that would turn out to be, between four critical national tasks – counter-piracy operations, deterrent presence in the South Atlantic, domestic maritime tasking, or supporting a UN-mandated operation in Libya. This choice was made on the back of the February 2011 decision to drop counter-narcotics and disaster relief warship patrols in the Caribbean.
Unique UK Maritime Contributions
Apache at Sea
Following the recent Defence Review’s decision to withdraw from service the UK’s current aircraft carriers, the UK was not able to contribute a carrier to the operation. Nevertheless, in an unprecedented operational deployment delivering what some described as a ‘game-changing’ capability, British Army Apache helicopters were embarked in the Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) ship HMS Ocean. Indeed, the very public demonstration of this new capability, off the coast of Cyprus a few weeks previously, could have been intended to have a deterrent or coercive effect on regime forces.
Tomahawk Land Attack
Tomahawk land attack is one of the Royal Navy’s four core strategic contributions to British defence and security policy. The UK holds an inventory of sixty-five Tomahawks, deployed across its flotilla of seven nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). Given this force level and the range of global commitments these submarines must support, it is challenging to maintain in theatre even one boat equipped with a Tomahawk load sufficient to make more than a modest numerical contribution.
In Libya, press sources suggest around seven UK Tomahawks were fired, compared to the 221 fired by the US Navy. Indeed, when compared to the United States – the only other Tomahawk-capable navy – the UK’s use of the weapon since it entered into service in 1998 has always been significantly lower. Alongside participation in the opening strikes, firing the first UK ordnance in the operation, HMS Triumph fired a mix of Block III and – in a first for the UK – Block IV Tomahawks, including conducting the first UK-only Tomahawk strike.
The strategic value of Tomahawks is to reach deep into hostile territory and in this case to target air defence, command and control centres that were intrinsic to Qadhafi’s forces as a pre-requisite to operating a no-fly zone. The use of Tomahawks are also designed to have some coercive effect on an adversary.
The presence in theatre of the American guided missile submarine USS Florida (SSGN-728 ) – which at one stage fired ninety-three of its maximum potential load of 154 Tomahawk rounds – enabled the US Navy to retain the ability to fire large numbers of Tomahawks even with fewer platforms available. This was also the first conventional or nuclear launch mission of any of the US Navy’s Ohio-class submarines.
Command, Control and Situational Awareness
The presence of new partners within the coalition presented challenges in integrating other navies into the command and control network. The network was brought together by established naval traditions of operating together, longstanding NATO procedures and the role of key assets like the command ship USS Mount Whitney (LCC/JCC 20) and the UK maritime command and Cruise Missile Support Activity (CMSA) operations at its Northwood Headquarters. Moreover, the role of established professional and personal relationships brought by individual naval personnel should not be underestimated. The habitual ease with which naval forces routinely work together was demonstrated in the ‘fairly easy and straightforward’ maritime hand-over from the US-led to NATO-led phases of the operation. One notable development from the UK’s perspective was the contribution of the newly-established, multi-agency National Maritime Information Centre at Northwood in providing maritime situational awareness.
Surveillance capability was critical throughout the campaign. From the maritime perspective, while the Nimrod MR2 maritime patrol aircraft had already been withdrawn from service, Libya showed that the decision to scrap the Nimrod MRA4 upgrade programme would raise renewed questions about the UK’s future maritime surveillance contribution.
The Strategic Significance of an Aircraft Carrier Contribution
In the UK, the polarity of the aircraft carrier debate has only been exacerbated by the Libyan conflict. The operation served to highlight a range of questions relating not only to the Defence Review’s decision to withdraw the carriers but also to the wider use of air power based at sea on aircraft carriers.
Arguments persist that the UK can still contribute prominently to such operations without sending a carrier. Yet the fact is that three coalition carriers were employed, which added some capability and reduced the risks to aircraft operating from land bases. These were: the French strike carrier Charles de Gaulle; the Italian carrier Giuseppe di Garibaldi; and a US amphibious assault ships – initially USS Kearsarge (LHD-3), relieved by USS Bataan (LHD-5).
At an operational level, the carriers provided some unique advantages. The faster repeatability of carrier-borne air missions, due to proximity to Libya relative to land air bases, saw AV-8B Harriers flying from Kearsarge play a critical role in halting early regime offensives. The carriers also provided the only Combat Search and Rescue Capability (CSAR) in theatre. While the French and Italian navies argued that carrier-based air power improved their operational flexibility and cost-effectiveness, the return home of their carriers underscored the risks of operating without them.
Perhaps most notably, for the first time in recent history, a major coalition combat operation was conducted without the presence of a large-deck US aircraft carrier. The USS Enterprise (CVN-65) did transit the region, but was en route to other regions and other priorities. This suggests that even the United States Navy may be struggling to meet commitments. In such circumstances, allied support is likely to assume greater relevance in the future.
Another key argument in the carrier debate is over the assumption that friendly and allied nations can provide sufficient basing options to deploy land-based air power to fill any gaps opened up by the lack of a carrier. Interestingly, however, even within the NATO context, the availability of Gioia del Colle, the Italian air base used for UK aircraft, could not initially be taken for granted and created some political turbulence. Some analysis suggests Italy had to tear up its non-aggression pact with Libya and required NATO to assume operational command, on 31 March, before it could permit use of the base. Other recent examples demonstrate that the assumption of available shore-basing always involves a balance of risks.
New Partnerships, New Players
The campaign provided the first operational and political test of the new UK-France bilateral defence co-operation arrangement. With the US endeavouring to take a reduced profile in Libya, this arrangement took on a more prominent role in the coalition operation.
Some emerging navies also played a significant role. Deploying a carrier and eight other ships, Italy took a leading role in the NATO operation (especially with French, UK and US assets operating under national taskings). Turkey, which had traditionally close links with Libya, sent five ships and a submarine.
Perhaps most notable, given its growing global presence, was the involvement of China and its navy, led by the frigate Xuzhou - itself diverted from counter-piracy operations to conduct the first Chinese non-combatant evacuation operation in a combat zone. Chinese involvement in global crises is something which should now assumed to be more likely.
The Role of the United States
The conflict also raised the significant question of the risk of US overstretch. Despite its established history of leading ‘coalitions of the willing’, with commitments elsewhere and resource challenges of its own, the Libya campaign was a clear example of the US seeking to play a different role. Then US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that ‘our goal right now [in Libya] is actually very limited ... It is basically a support role’.
Alongside the absence of major capabilities, the US attempted to scale back its commitments as early as it could. In a press briefing on 25 March, when asked how quickly the US would reduce its number of ships in theatre, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Director Vice Admiral William Gortney stated that this would be ‘a function of how quickly the coalition ramps up and becomes effective.’
The Maritime Contribution
Throughout the Libyan campaign, various navies have conducted tasks across a wide spectrum of operations in ways not necessarily obvious from media reports. This has ranged from maritime security and blockade enforcement to the use – even if on a small scale – of traditional high end capabilities such as mine counter measures, naval fire missions and carrier strike. Even before the commencement of combat operations in March, warships and other maritime assets were deployed to conduct non-combatant evacuation operations. The United States Navy’s Joint Force Commander Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III stated that Libya demonstrated not only the agility and flexibility of sea power, but also that the coalition’s ability to assist ashore would have been reduced without it.
The Royal Navy’s initial contributions to the campaign, however, required it to drop some other on-going naval tasks. For example:
• HMS Cumberland had been conducting counter-piracy and other maritime security operations in the Indian Ocean before being redeployed to Libya. Her relief, HMS Liverpool, was sent to Libya;
• HMS York was en route to the South Atlantic, for her second deployment there in 12 months, when she was re-tasked to head to Libya;
• HMS Westminster had been operating in UK waters.
The UK had to choose for the duration of this crisis, however long that would turn out to be, between four critical national tasks – counter-piracy operations, deterrent presence in the South Atlantic, domestic maritime tasking, or supporting a UN-mandated operation in Libya. This choice was made on the back of the February 2011 decision to drop counter-narcotics and disaster relief warship patrols in the Caribbean.
Unique UK Maritime Contributions
Apache at Sea
Following the recent Defence Review’s decision to withdraw from service the UK’s current aircraft carriers, the UK was not able to contribute a carrier to the operation. Nevertheless, in an unprecedented operational deployment delivering what some described as a ‘game-changing’ capability, British Army Apache helicopters were embarked in the Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) ship HMS Ocean. Indeed, the very public demonstration of this new capability, off the coast of Cyprus a few weeks previously, could have been intended to have a deterrent or coercive effect on regime forces.
Tomahawk Land Attack
Tomahawk land attack is one of the Royal Navy’s four core strategic contributions to British defence and security policy. The UK holds an inventory of sixty-five Tomahawks, deployed across its flotilla of seven nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). Given this force level and the range of global commitments these submarines must support, it is challenging to maintain in theatre even one boat equipped with a Tomahawk load sufficient to make more than a modest numerical contribution.
In Libya, press sources suggest around seven UK Tomahawks were fired, compared to the 221 fired by the US Navy. Indeed, when compared to the United States – the only other Tomahawk-capable navy – the UK’s use of the weapon since it entered into service in 1998 has always been significantly lower. Alongside participation in the opening strikes, firing the first UK ordnance in the operation, HMS Triumph fired a mix of Block III and – in a first for the UK – Block IV Tomahawks, including conducting the first UK-only Tomahawk strike.
The strategic value of Tomahawks is to reach deep into hostile territory and in this case to target air defence, command and control centres that were intrinsic to Qadhafi’s forces as a pre-requisite to operating a no-fly zone. The use of Tomahawks are also designed to have some coercive effect on an adversary.
The presence in theatre of the American guided missile submarine USS Florida (SSGN-728 ) – which at one stage fired ninety-three of its maximum potential load of 154 Tomahawk rounds – enabled the US Navy to retain the ability to fire large numbers of Tomahawks even with fewer platforms available. This was also the first conventional or nuclear launch mission of any of the US Navy’s Ohio-class submarines.
Command, Control and Situational Awareness
The presence of new partners within the coalition presented challenges in integrating other navies into the command and control network. The network was brought together by established naval traditions of operating together, longstanding NATO procedures and the role of key assets like the command ship USS Mount Whitney (LCC/JCC 20) and the UK maritime command and Cruise Missile Support Activity (CMSA) operations at its Northwood Headquarters. Moreover, the role of established professional and personal relationships brought by individual naval personnel should not be underestimated. The habitual ease with which naval forces routinely work together was demonstrated in the ‘fairly easy and straightforward’ maritime hand-over from the US-led to NATO-led phases of the operation. One notable development from the UK’s perspective was the contribution of the newly-established, multi-agency National Maritime Information Centre at Northwood in providing maritime situational awareness.
Surveillance capability was critical throughout the campaign. From the maritime perspective, while the Nimrod MR2 maritime patrol aircraft had already been withdrawn from service, Libya showed that the decision to scrap the Nimrod MRA4 upgrade programme would raise renewed questions about the UK’s future maritime surveillance contribution.
The Strategic Significance of an Aircraft Carrier Contribution
In the UK, the polarity of the aircraft carrier debate has only been exacerbated by the Libyan conflict. The operation served to highlight a range of questions relating not only to the Defence Review’s decision to withdraw the carriers but also to the wider use of air power based at sea on aircraft carriers.
Arguments persist that the UK can still contribute prominently to such operations without sending a carrier. Yet the fact is that three coalition carriers were employed, which added some capability and reduced the risks to aircraft operating from land bases. These were: the French strike carrier Charles de Gaulle; the Italian carrier Giuseppe di Garibaldi; and a US amphibious assault ships – initially USS Kearsarge (LHD-3), relieved by USS Bataan (LHD-5).
At an operational level, the carriers provided some unique advantages. The faster repeatability of carrier-borne air missions, due to proximity to Libya relative to land air bases, saw AV-8B Harriers flying from Kearsarge play a critical role in halting early regime offensives. The carriers also provided the only Combat Search and Rescue Capability (CSAR) in theatre. While the French and Italian navies argued that carrier-based air power improved their operational flexibility and cost-effectiveness, the return home of their carriers underscored the risks of operating without them.
Perhaps most notably, for the first time in recent history, a major coalition combat operation was conducted without the presence of a large-deck US aircraft carrier. The USS Enterprise (CVN-65) did transit the region, but was en route to other regions and other priorities. This suggests that even the United States Navy may be struggling to meet commitments. In such circumstances, allied support is likely to assume greater relevance in the future.
Another key argument in the carrier debate is over the assumption that friendly and allied nations can provide sufficient basing options to deploy land-based air power to fill any gaps opened up by the lack of a carrier. Interestingly, however, even within the NATO context, the availability of Gioia del Colle, the Italian air base used for UK aircraft, could not initially be taken for granted and created some political turbulence. Some analysis suggests Italy had to tear up its non-aggression pact with Libya and required NATO to assume operational command, on 31 March, before it could permit use of the base. Other recent examples demonstrate that the assumption of available shore-basing always involves a balance of risks.
New Partnerships, New Players
The campaign provided the first operational and political test of the new UK-France bilateral defence co-operation arrangement. With the US endeavouring to take a reduced profile in Libya, this arrangement took on a more prominent role in the coalition operation.
Some emerging navies also played a significant role. Deploying a carrier and eight other ships, Italy took a leading role in the NATO operation (especially with French, UK and US assets operating under national taskings). Turkey, which had traditionally close links with Libya, sent five ships and a submarine.
Perhaps most notable, given its growing global presence, was the involvement of China and its navy, led by the frigate Xuzhou - itself diverted from counter-piracy operations to conduct the first Chinese non-combatant evacuation operation in a combat zone. Chinese involvement in global crises is something which should now assumed to be more likely.
The Role of the United States
The conflict also raised the significant question of the risk of US overstretch. Despite its established history of leading ‘coalitions of the willing’, with commitments elsewhere and resource challenges of its own, the Libya campaign was a clear example of the US seeking to play a different role. Then US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that ‘our goal right now [in Libya] is actually very limited ... It is basically a support role’.
Alongside the absence of major capabilities, the US attempted to scale back its commitments as early as it could. In a press briefing on 25 March, when asked how quickly the US would reduce its number of ships in theatre, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Director Vice Admiral William Gortney stated that this would be ‘a function of how quickly the coalition ramps up and becomes effective.’
Most of the above post appears to be off thread i.e. nothing to do with the decision to axe Harriers being bonkers.
Not unsurprisingly though it also doesn't quote this from the conclusions (my bold)
So, coalitions work. Not everyone needs to have every capability available all the time. Hoorah.
Not unsurprisingly though it also doesn't quote this from the conclusions (my bold)
The ‘carrier debate’ in Britain will almost certainly be re-ignited by this operation. The fact is that the operation was successfully conducted without a British aircraft carrier being available. But it is equally a fact that the operation involved four major ships that were capable of launching aircraft – the French and Italian carriers, the US assault ship, and Britain’s HMS Ocean acting as a helicopter carrier.
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WEBF
We cannot "get back on thread" because the thread title is now outdated. The Harriers have been scrapped and are now in the same state as Humpty Dumpty.
We cannot "get back on thread" because the thread title is now outdated. The Harriers have been scrapped and are now in the same state as Humpty Dumpty.
The strategic value of Tomahawks is to reach deep into hostile territory and in this case to target air defence, command and control centres that were intrinsic to Qadhafi’s forces as a pre-requisite to operating a no-fly zone. The use of Tomahawks are also designed to have some coercive effect on an adversary.
The faster repeatability of carrier-borne air missions, due to proximity to Libya relative to land air bases, saw AV-8B Harriers flying from Kearsarge play a critical role in halting early regime offensives.
However, when working to the rigidity of an ATO, and not doing any planned GCAS activities, does it matter? 16 GR4s at Gioia seem to do the task absolutely fine. You may argue that a Harrier unit nearby on a carrier is more efficient, but it isn't when you take into account the carrier's running costs!
The only thing I could think of that works as a USP for the carrier option is GCAS, but if you have enough assets in the air to retask then that's less of an issue.
WEBF
The Royal Navy’s initial contributions to the campaign, however, required it to drop some other on-going naval tasks.
Isn't that one of the pre-eminent tasks for the RN??
Who appointed WEBF "thread monitor"?
Pprune has a long history of threads drifting off track (who defines what is "off track"?). While this can at times be very frustrating, it is as often fascinating and rewarding in opening up new areas/topics for discussion.
Pprune has a long history of threads drifting off track (who defines what is "off track"?). While this can at times be very frustrating, it is as often fascinating and rewarding in opening up new areas/topics for discussion.
In the previous post I simply thought that the recent analysis by RUSI may be of interest (the actual report PDF is here), and very much related to the issues discussed on these pages.
Wrathmonk
We can all pick bits to support pretty much any view! The also said:
Nevertheless, in an unprecedented operational deployment delivering what some described as a ‘game-changing’ capability, British Army Apache helicopters were embarked in the Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) ship HMS Ocean. Indeed, the very public demonstration of this new capability, off the coast of Cyprus a few weeks previously, could have been intended to have a deterrent or coercive effect on regime forces.
Surely that sounds a lot like "Carrier Strike"?
At an operational level, the carriers provided some unique advantages. The faster repeatability of carrier-borne air missions, due to proximity to Libya relative to land air bases, saw AV-8B Harriers flying from Kearsarge play a critical role in halting early regime offensives. The carriers also provided the only Combat Search and Rescue Capability (CSAR) in theatre. While the French and Italian navies argued that carrier-based air power improved their operational flexibility and cost-effectiveness, the return home of their carriers underscored the risks of operating without them.
So the carrier provides more than fast jets, and you need the other capabilities even without fixed wing flying - hence the LPH deployments in lieu of a carrier.
Perhaps most notably, for the first time in recent history, a major coalition combat operation was conducted without the presence of a large-deck US aircraft carrier. The USS Enterprise (CVN-65) did transit the region, but was en route to other regions and other priorities. This suggests that even the United States Navy may be struggling to meet commitments. In such circumstances, allied support is likely to assume greater relevance in the future.
Perhaps relying the the US may not be such a sound policy after all?
Another key argument in the carrier debate is over the assumption that friendly and allied nations can provide sufficient basing options to deploy land-based air power to fill any gaps opened up by the lack of a carrier. Interestingly, however, even within the NATO context, the availability of Gioia del Colle, the Italian air base used for UK aircraft, could not initially be taken for granted and created some political turbulence. Some analysis suggests Italy had to tear up its non-aggression pact with Libya and required NATO to assume operational command, on 31 March, before it could permit use of the base. Other recent examples demonstrate that the assumption of available shore-basing always involves a balance of risks.
Coalitions..... tricky....
5F6B
We ended up sending a carrier of sorts (HMS Ocean) to support Apache/Sea King ASaCs/Jungly Lynx, so the cost argument is less than black and white.
Wrathmonk
We can all pick bits to support pretty much any view! The also said:
Nevertheless, in an unprecedented operational deployment delivering what some described as a ‘game-changing’ capability, British Army Apache helicopters were embarked in the Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) ship HMS Ocean. Indeed, the very public demonstration of this new capability, off the coast of Cyprus a few weeks previously, could have been intended to have a deterrent or coercive effect on regime forces.
Surely that sounds a lot like "Carrier Strike"?
At an operational level, the carriers provided some unique advantages. The faster repeatability of carrier-borne air missions, due to proximity to Libya relative to land air bases, saw AV-8B Harriers flying from Kearsarge play a critical role in halting early regime offensives. The carriers also provided the only Combat Search and Rescue Capability (CSAR) in theatre. While the French and Italian navies argued that carrier-based air power improved their operational flexibility and cost-effectiveness, the return home of their carriers underscored the risks of operating without them.
So the carrier provides more than fast jets, and you need the other capabilities even without fixed wing flying - hence the LPH deployments in lieu of a carrier.
Perhaps most notably, for the first time in recent history, a major coalition combat operation was conducted without the presence of a large-deck US aircraft carrier. The USS Enterprise (CVN-65) did transit the region, but was en route to other regions and other priorities. This suggests that even the United States Navy may be struggling to meet commitments. In such circumstances, allied support is likely to assume greater relevance in the future.
Perhaps relying the the US may not be such a sound policy after all?
Another key argument in the carrier debate is over the assumption that friendly and allied nations can provide sufficient basing options to deploy land-based air power to fill any gaps opened up by the lack of a carrier. Interestingly, however, even within the NATO context, the availability of Gioia del Colle, the Italian air base used for UK aircraft, could not initially be taken for granted and created some political turbulence. Some analysis suggests Italy had to tear up its non-aggression pact with Libya and required NATO to assume operational command, on 31 March, before it could permit use of the base. Other recent examples demonstrate that the assumption of available shore-basing always involves a balance of risks.
Coalitions..... tricky....
5F6B
We ended up sending a carrier of sorts (HMS Ocean) to support Apache/Sea King ASaCs/Jungly Lynx, so the cost argument is less than black and white.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 24th Sep 2011 at 16:29.
WEBF - you are quite right. Pretty much any statement can be turned to support any particular argument.
For example, Joe Public will see that we have successfully engaged in Libya without a full size carrier. You say that Apaches on OCEAN sounds very similar to Carrier Strike. Perhaps. So the beancounters could argue (for it is they that have the real control over our future capabilities) that do we really need up to 2 huge carriers or shoukd we build them, sell them and reinvest part of the income in two smaller OCEAN size vessels and pocket the difference.
Now don't get me wrong. I am looking forward to seeing F35s flying off the QE class. But for that to happen in the future we had to make savings now. And of the choices availabe i believe the right one was made. Therefore, right back on thread, I do not believe the decision to axe the Harrier was bonkers. Yes, getting the deck launched capability back up to speed will not be easy but from what I can see the RN are doing the best they can to smooth the pain with the little cash available.
Any chance we can now park the whole carrier/Harrier discussion or at least continue it in the historical forum And, IMHO, any talk of the non-aviation RN support to ops should be in Rum Ration. By the way do you post as Yokel over on the Army site?
For example, Joe Public will see that we have successfully engaged in Libya without a full size carrier. You say that Apaches on OCEAN sounds very similar to Carrier Strike. Perhaps. So the beancounters could argue (for it is they that have the real control over our future capabilities) that do we really need up to 2 huge carriers or shoukd we build them, sell them and reinvest part of the income in two smaller OCEAN size vessels and pocket the difference.
Now don't get me wrong. I am looking forward to seeing F35s flying off the QE class. But for that to happen in the future we had to make savings now. And of the choices availabe i believe the right one was made. Therefore, right back on thread, I do not believe the decision to axe the Harrier was bonkers. Yes, getting the deck launched capability back up to speed will not be easy but from what I can see the RN are doing the best they can to smooth the pain with the little cash available.
Any chance we can now park the whole carrier/Harrier discussion or at least continue it in the historical forum
And, IMHO, any talk of the non-aviation RN support to ops should be in Rum Ration. By the way do you post as Yokel over on the Army site?
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I'm with you Wrathmonk!
Recently published in the Sunday Telegraph:
I am not quite sure upon what facts Andrew Dow might be basing his statement that the "Tornado is not a dedicated ground attack aircraft but the Harrier is" (Sunday Telegraph Letters: Scrapping the Harrier was a strategic error - 31 July 2011). I can assure him, as a one-time Tornado GR1 navigator and weapons instructor, that the Tornado GR4 is most definitely a ground attack aircraft and one that is, given its more potent air-to-surface weapon inventory, a much more capable and effective ground attack aircraft than the erstwhile Harrier ever was or could be when operating from an aircraft carrier. The Invincible-class carriers' magazines were not explosive licenced to carry many of the modern weapons available to the Harrier when it was in Service. Moreover, Mr Dow's attempts to blame Sir Jock Stirrup, when CDS, for the demise of the RAF-owned Harriers is misguided. The Navy Board, with Prime Minister Brown's encouragement, took the decision alone to scrap the Sea Harrier early thereby accepting a 'capability holiday' in providing air defence of the Fleet until the Future Carriers came into service. That decision heralded the death knell for the Harrier Force and, when push came to shove under the Conservative mandated SDSR, the RAF Harriers, with their expensive, extensive and complex logistic chain, were quite rightly identified as the RAF aircraft that would release the greatest savings.
Is it not now the time for those Tornado knockers to stop harping on about the loss of the Harrier, which we all regret no matter the colour of our uniform, and start focusing on the future in order to ensure that we do regain a Power Projection capability in the future with JSF and an aircraft carrier to fly them from!
And:
In response to some nonsense published the week before that quoted Army and Navy officers on board Ocean:
It beggars belief that some Army and RN officers are prepared to make unsubstantiated statements to the press (Page 2 The Sunday Telegraph June 5 2011) in an attempt to 'big up' their role in the operations against the Gaddafi Regime! Fact: "helicopters, generally, fly slower and lower than fast jets". Fiction: "helicopter weapons are smaller and more precise". Rockets and cannon, as deployed on Apache, suffer from greater ballistic dispersion and are, therefore, more likely to cause collateral damage than the highly accurate Storm Shadow missile and Paveway guided bombs currently deployed on Tornado GR4 and/or Typhoon aircraft operating from Gioia del Colle in Southern Italy. Hellfire, launched from Apache, is exactly the same missile as Brimstone, launched from the deployed fast jets. However, unlike the US-built Hellfire, Brimstone has a British manufactured, more versatile, seeker on its Hellfire missile body thereby providing not only greater accuracy against a raft of different targets but also making it more flexible! I know, I was involved in the procurement of all of these weapons, including those on Apache, during a 4-year stint working in MOD.
Now lets put a stop to this (and any other) thread that is a self-licking lollipop sustained by those who just don't get it or are not prepared to accept it!
Foldie
Recently published in the Sunday Telegraph:
I am not quite sure upon what facts Andrew Dow might be basing his statement that the "Tornado is not a dedicated ground attack aircraft but the Harrier is" (Sunday Telegraph Letters: Scrapping the Harrier was a strategic error - 31 July 2011). I can assure him, as a one-time Tornado GR1 navigator and weapons instructor, that the Tornado GR4 is most definitely a ground attack aircraft and one that is, given its more potent air-to-surface weapon inventory, a much more capable and effective ground attack aircraft than the erstwhile Harrier ever was or could be when operating from an aircraft carrier. The Invincible-class carriers' magazines were not explosive licenced to carry many of the modern weapons available to the Harrier when it was in Service. Moreover, Mr Dow's attempts to blame Sir Jock Stirrup, when CDS, for the demise of the RAF-owned Harriers is misguided. The Navy Board, with Prime Minister Brown's encouragement, took the decision alone to scrap the Sea Harrier early thereby accepting a 'capability holiday' in providing air defence of the Fleet until the Future Carriers came into service. That decision heralded the death knell for the Harrier Force and, when push came to shove under the Conservative mandated SDSR, the RAF Harriers, with their expensive, extensive and complex logistic chain, were quite rightly identified as the RAF aircraft that would release the greatest savings.
Is it not now the time for those Tornado knockers to stop harping on about the loss of the Harrier, which we all regret no matter the colour of our uniform, and start focusing on the future in order to ensure that we do regain a Power Projection capability in the future with JSF and an aircraft carrier to fly them from!
And:
In response to some nonsense published the week before that quoted Army and Navy officers on board Ocean:
It beggars belief that some Army and RN officers are prepared to make unsubstantiated statements to the press (Page 2 The Sunday Telegraph June 5 2011) in an attempt to 'big up' their role in the operations against the Gaddafi Regime! Fact: "helicopters, generally, fly slower and lower than fast jets". Fiction: "helicopter weapons are smaller and more precise". Rockets and cannon, as deployed on Apache, suffer from greater ballistic dispersion and are, therefore, more likely to cause collateral damage than the highly accurate Storm Shadow missile and Paveway guided bombs currently deployed on Tornado GR4 and/or Typhoon aircraft operating from Gioia del Colle in Southern Italy. Hellfire, launched from Apache, is exactly the same missile as Brimstone, launched from the deployed fast jets. However, unlike the US-built Hellfire, Brimstone has a British manufactured, more versatile, seeker on its Hellfire missile body thereby providing not only greater accuracy against a raft of different targets but also making it more flexible! I know, I was involved in the procurement of all of these weapons, including those on Apache, during a 4-year stint working in MOD.
Now lets put a stop to this (and any other) thread that is a self-licking lollipop sustained by those who just don't get it or are not prepared to accept it!
Foldie