Chinook - Hit Back Here
Guest
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K52, Still very confused by your line of arguement. Of course the crew should have made the early decision to make the appropriaite rate of climb and avoid the Mull. Why didn't they? With an ADR and a CVR we may have known, but we don,t. Open verdict? Any other planet on the galaxy would agree. Just what is your problem?
Guest
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Perfect timing by the Government in their attempt to stop the debate in the House of Lords. Announced on the afternoon preceeding a Bank Holiday weekend and a recess, leaving no time for reply.
Cynic...me? Absolutely!
Couple of points for those attempting to avoid the debate:
1. We will still be here after Easter.
2. We will not go away.
3. We are not scared to debate the issue.
Finally: Dear MoD, any chance of a reply to my letter? You said you hoped to reply shortly - and that was on 7 March!!
Regards all and Happy Easter.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Ed for spelling (again!!)
[This message has been edited by Brian Dixon (edited 14 April 2001).]
Cynic...me? Absolutely!
Couple of points for those attempting to avoid the debate:
1. We will still be here after Easter.
2. We will not go away.
3. We are not scared to debate the issue.
Finally: Dear MoD, any chance of a reply to my letter? You said you hoped to reply shortly - and that was on 7 March!!
Regards all and Happy Easter.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Ed for spelling (again!!)
[This message has been edited by Brian Dixon (edited 14 April 2001).]
Guest
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oldgit 47,
"Why didn't they" make the early decision to avoid the Mull? I would suggest that the answer to that would be what has, historically, proved to be the greatest killer in aviation - COMPLACENCY. There was no need to do so because that had done this hundreds of times before without a problem.
AN ANALOGY
In the early 70's (1972?) an Andover C Mk 1 crashed in Italy carrying members of the Falcons Display Team. The cine film taken at the time, and shown on TV News, seemed to show quite conclusively that the starboard engine had failed just after take-off and the aircraft had veered, and rolled, right before crashing. There were, unfortunately, several fatalities.
The investigation showed a totally different scenario. The Captain had decided to perform a STOL take-off. There was no requirement to do so but there was, equally, no reason why he should not do so for Training Purposes. A STOL take-off required the use of 27 degrees of flap. The flap was a modified Fowler Flap and thus the tab travelled to a far greater angle than the nominal flap position. If my memory serves me correctly this actually gave a flap angle of 64 degrees.
The investigation showed that the flap selected for take-off was not that required for a STOL take-off but that required for a STOL landing (ie 30 degrees) which gave an actual flap angle of 106 degrees. Neither Pilot spotted this error during the "challenge and response" pre take-off checks. The Navigator who read the checks was not to blame as there was a passenger in the "jump seat" between the Pilots and he was unable to see the lever position selected without unstrapping and standing up to look.
With that flap setting there was no way that the aircraft could accelerate to a safe flying speed to accomodate an engine failure. However, it transpired that there was NO EVIDENCE of an engine failure and the most likely cause of the power reduction on the starboard side was that the starboard side had run out of water methanol (used to boost engine power output on take-off) before the port side. NB The starboard tank held 27 Galls and the port tank held 31 Galls of water methanol.
Following the crash the Pax had extreme difficulty exiting the aircraft because the locking pins for the emergency escape door had not been removed before take-off. The ALM was, unfortunately, unable to help because he had neglected to strap himself in before take-off and had suffered fatal injuries in the crash.
This was a well thought of, and experienced, crew who had been selected to carry the RAF Parachute Display Team on an Overseas Tour.
"Why didn't they" make the early decision to avoid the Mull? I would suggest that the answer to that would be what has, historically, proved to be the greatest killer in aviation - COMPLACENCY. There was no need to do so because that had done this hundreds of times before without a problem.
AN ANALOGY
In the early 70's (1972?) an Andover C Mk 1 crashed in Italy carrying members of the Falcons Display Team. The cine film taken at the time, and shown on TV News, seemed to show quite conclusively that the starboard engine had failed just after take-off and the aircraft had veered, and rolled, right before crashing. There were, unfortunately, several fatalities.
The investigation showed a totally different scenario. The Captain had decided to perform a STOL take-off. There was no requirement to do so but there was, equally, no reason why he should not do so for Training Purposes. A STOL take-off required the use of 27 degrees of flap. The flap was a modified Fowler Flap and thus the tab travelled to a far greater angle than the nominal flap position. If my memory serves me correctly this actually gave a flap angle of 64 degrees.
The investigation showed that the flap selected for take-off was not that required for a STOL take-off but that required for a STOL landing (ie 30 degrees) which gave an actual flap angle of 106 degrees. Neither Pilot spotted this error during the "challenge and response" pre take-off checks. The Navigator who read the checks was not to blame as there was a passenger in the "jump seat" between the Pilots and he was unable to see the lever position selected without unstrapping and standing up to look.
With that flap setting there was no way that the aircraft could accelerate to a safe flying speed to accomodate an engine failure. However, it transpired that there was NO EVIDENCE of an engine failure and the most likely cause of the power reduction on the starboard side was that the starboard side had run out of water methanol (used to boost engine power output on take-off) before the port side. NB The starboard tank held 27 Galls and the port tank held 31 Galls of water methanol.
Following the crash the Pax had extreme difficulty exiting the aircraft because the locking pins for the emergency escape door had not been removed before take-off. The ALM was, unfortunately, unable to help because he had neglected to strap himself in before take-off and had suffered fatal injuries in the crash.
This was a well thought of, and experienced, crew who had been selected to carry the RAF Parachute Display Team on an Overseas Tour.
Guest
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K52
The major difference between the Chinook accident and your allegedly analogous accident would appear to be conclusive technical evidence and survivor testimony: Neither of which are available to support an insubstantiated finding of gross negligence in the Chinook case.
The major difference between the Chinook accident and your allegedly analogous accident would appear to be conclusive technical evidence and survivor testimony: Neither of which are available to support an insubstantiated finding of gross negligence in the Chinook case.
Guest
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K52, I was on 46 Sqn at the time of the Andover accident. In fact I was airborne at the time and learned of the accident on landing. There are two major differences to the Chinook accident.
1. Both pilots survived in the Andover and gave evidence to the Board.
2. Their was also photographic evidence.
All we have in the case of the Chinook, is opinion, supposition and a distinct lack of hard evidence.
How on earth can you decide on complacency? I don't recall the word being used by the BOI.
1. Both pilots survived in the Andover and gave evidence to the Board.
2. Their was also photographic evidence.
All we have in the case of the Chinook, is opinion, supposition and a distinct lack of hard evidence.
How on earth can you decide on complacency? I don't recall the word being used by the BOI.
Guest
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K52,
How can you possibly expect to use evidence from one accident to reinforce your argument for your verdict / opinion on another where there was no conclusive evidence? How can you possibly say this crew were complacent?
Your words indicate prejudiced reasoning and verge on libel, were that possible for persons deceased.
I note that you elected to answer my previous point but chose not to disclose your motive for your crusade against these two deceased pilots.
The question must be asked again. What axe are you grinding?
How can you possibly expect to use evidence from one accident to reinforce your argument for your verdict / opinion on another where there was no conclusive evidence? How can you possibly say this crew were complacent?
Your words indicate prejudiced reasoning and verge on libel, were that possible for persons deceased.
I note that you elected to answer my previous point but chose not to disclose your motive for your crusade against these two deceased pilots.
The question must be asked again. What axe are you grinding?
Guest
Posts: n/a
“Did you, in any way, advise the BoI. Be it from advice to ‘The Board’ to advice enroute Day/Wratton?”
K52 you answer:
“I do not have any recollection of being specifically asked for my advice by the AOC or CinC.”
Come on, answer the whole question; did you give advice, to anyone, involved in the final copy of the BoI?
You also say:
“The Board did indeed decide that there were only 3 likely scenarios regarding the probable cause of the accident ONCE THE AIRCRAFT WAS IN A POSITION WHERE IT WAS UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH THE RULES OF VFR FLIGHT."
Please explain to me, with out doubt, using only evidence either in, or offered to, the BoI, how ZD576 got into a position where it was unable to comply with the rules of VFR flight. Oh, and while you’re at it please explain how you completely overlook the essence of the BoI’s paragraph concerning cause.
K52 you answer:
“I do not have any recollection of being specifically asked for my advice by the AOC or CinC.”
Come on, answer the whole question; did you give advice, to anyone, involved in the final copy of the BoI?
You also say:
“The Board did indeed decide that there were only 3 likely scenarios regarding the probable cause of the accident ONCE THE AIRCRAFT WAS IN A POSITION WHERE IT WAS UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH THE RULES OF VFR FLIGHT."
Please explain to me, with out doubt, using only evidence either in, or offered to, the BoI, how ZD576 got into a position where it was unable to comply with the rules of VFR flight. Oh, and while you’re at it please explain how you completely overlook the essence of the BoI’s paragraph concerning cause.
Guest
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Shy Torque,
I really must buy another Dictionary, and another Thesaurus, as my current ones seem to really get you angry.
I fail to see how suggesting that the reason the crew of ZD576 failed to make the decision to climb or turn away in time was “COMPLACENCY” could possibly be construed as Libel. The word means “CONTENTMENT” or “SATISFACTION”. Hence the analogy of the Andover where the crew, having carried out all the preflight checks using the “challenge and response” system, were content (or satisfied) that it was correctly set for take-off.
As you will be aware; the Board, whilst discussing the “Crew’s Decision Making Process”, stated that “it was impossible for the Board to decide, with any degree of confidence, whether mutual crew complacency had delayed the crew in their decision making as they approached the Mull”. You will also be aware that OC RAF Odiham stated “I do not agree that the decision making process was a complicated one” and then went on to outline what the crew should have done. The Reviewing Officers agreed with OC RAF Odiham.
Or are you are suggesting that the crew were not “content” with the way things were going but carried on regardless?
I, unlike most contributors to this thread, have NO axe to grind. I am satisfied that the conclusion reached by the Reviewing Officers was correct. The lack of ADR and CVR did not prevent attribution of blame before these items were fitted to Military aircraft. I, incidentally, only flew one type of aircraft in my Service career which boasted both ADR and CVR, and most types in the 60’s and 70’s did not have either.
If you are saying that it is impossible to attribute blame without the evidence of BOTH ADR AND CVR then you are implying that ALL BOI’s where blame was apportioned prior to circa 1975 will have to be reviewed.
There has been NO evidence whatsoever brought forward of any technical malfunction affecting ZD576 which would have caused this accident. The PREDOMINENT theme, it appears, has been that the crew would not have flown the aircraft in IMC below SALT “therefore” there MUST have been something wrong which did not show up in the AAIB investigation.
Accidents such as the Andover in Italy, the Shackleton which crashed on Harris and the Hercules which crashed in the Scottish Glens all show that even one error is one too many – and these were all experienced crews. In the cases of the Shackleton and the Hercules (and I knew both of the Captains from Acklington days) many thousands of hours on type did not prevent the accidents. I hasten to add that in the case of the Hercules it was adjudged to have been an error of judgment.
If you provide the EVIDENCE, rather than supposition or speculation, you may then be able to change my mind.
cheapseat,
Fascinating to read that Jon Tapper and yourself were discussing this very task WEEKS before the accident. If that is the case then why was the planning left till the night before and why did neither of the 2 Pilots involved do the initial planning? May one ask what routing was decided on and why?
As I have said before; it was part of our job in FS to co-ordinate the various responses from relevant Staffs into one document and “flag up” the pertinent responses and provide a response from the Flight Safety aspect. Once complete the document was passed through SASO to the AOC. So the answer would be yes – comment from myself would have been included in the document that went out under GFSO’s signature. All responses from the various Staffs were “In Confidence” and I have no intention of divulging what was said or who commented. The same process would have been repeated at HQSTC by the CFSO and his Staff.
Regarding the Boards paragraph on “Cause”. At the speed that the aircraft was traveling, as determined by the Board, of 150kts IAS (giving a groundspeed of 170-180kts); the requirement for VFR flight was 5km visibility, 1000ft vertically from cloud and 1.5km horizontally from cloud. The Board themselves concluded at para 16e “The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre.” The evidence accumulated by the Board showed that in the vicinity of the lighthouse the weather “was very poor with cloud and hill fog extending from below lighthouse level(300ft) to at least the summit of Beinn na Lice(1400ft), the highest point on the southern tip of the Mull. The visibility below the variable cloudbase close to the lighthouse was 400-500metres”.
The Board also states at para 56, when discussing why the crew had not been alerted to their proximity to the ground by visual sighting, “The lack of visual warning appears to indicate that the crew had lost all external references and were in IMC during this phase of the flight.”
The evidence is that they continued to fly towards the Mull at high speed and with “an inappropriate rate of climb” until a visual sighting of the Mull at approx 400metres range prompted the cyclic flare. They did not do what they had been trained to do since basic training – what OC RAF Odiham stated “would have been ingrained in this crew, indeed all helicopter crews” – climb on a safe heading at full power at the maximum rate of climb speed to at least Safety Altitude. That is what gave rise to the finding of “Negligence to a Gross Degree”.
I really must buy another Dictionary, and another Thesaurus, as my current ones seem to really get you angry.
I fail to see how suggesting that the reason the crew of ZD576 failed to make the decision to climb or turn away in time was “COMPLACENCY” could possibly be construed as Libel. The word means “CONTENTMENT” or “SATISFACTION”. Hence the analogy of the Andover where the crew, having carried out all the preflight checks using the “challenge and response” system, were content (or satisfied) that it was correctly set for take-off.
As you will be aware; the Board, whilst discussing the “Crew’s Decision Making Process”, stated that “it was impossible for the Board to decide, with any degree of confidence, whether mutual crew complacency had delayed the crew in their decision making as they approached the Mull”. You will also be aware that OC RAF Odiham stated “I do not agree that the decision making process was a complicated one” and then went on to outline what the crew should have done. The Reviewing Officers agreed with OC RAF Odiham.
Or are you are suggesting that the crew were not “content” with the way things were going but carried on regardless?
I, unlike most contributors to this thread, have NO axe to grind. I am satisfied that the conclusion reached by the Reviewing Officers was correct. The lack of ADR and CVR did not prevent attribution of blame before these items were fitted to Military aircraft. I, incidentally, only flew one type of aircraft in my Service career which boasted both ADR and CVR, and most types in the 60’s and 70’s did not have either.
If you are saying that it is impossible to attribute blame without the evidence of BOTH ADR AND CVR then you are implying that ALL BOI’s where blame was apportioned prior to circa 1975 will have to be reviewed.
There has been NO evidence whatsoever brought forward of any technical malfunction affecting ZD576 which would have caused this accident. The PREDOMINENT theme, it appears, has been that the crew would not have flown the aircraft in IMC below SALT “therefore” there MUST have been something wrong which did not show up in the AAIB investigation.
Accidents such as the Andover in Italy, the Shackleton which crashed on Harris and the Hercules which crashed in the Scottish Glens all show that even one error is one too many – and these were all experienced crews. In the cases of the Shackleton and the Hercules (and I knew both of the Captains from Acklington days) many thousands of hours on type did not prevent the accidents. I hasten to add that in the case of the Hercules it was adjudged to have been an error of judgment.
If you provide the EVIDENCE, rather than supposition or speculation, you may then be able to change my mind.
cheapseat,
Fascinating to read that Jon Tapper and yourself were discussing this very task WEEKS before the accident. If that is the case then why was the planning left till the night before and why did neither of the 2 Pilots involved do the initial planning? May one ask what routing was decided on and why?
As I have said before; it was part of our job in FS to co-ordinate the various responses from relevant Staffs into one document and “flag up” the pertinent responses and provide a response from the Flight Safety aspect. Once complete the document was passed through SASO to the AOC. So the answer would be yes – comment from myself would have been included in the document that went out under GFSO’s signature. All responses from the various Staffs were “In Confidence” and I have no intention of divulging what was said or who commented. The same process would have been repeated at HQSTC by the CFSO and his Staff.
Regarding the Boards paragraph on “Cause”. At the speed that the aircraft was traveling, as determined by the Board, of 150kts IAS (giving a groundspeed of 170-180kts); the requirement for VFR flight was 5km visibility, 1000ft vertically from cloud and 1.5km horizontally from cloud. The Board themselves concluded at para 16e “The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre.” The evidence accumulated by the Board showed that in the vicinity of the lighthouse the weather “was very poor with cloud and hill fog extending from below lighthouse level(300ft) to at least the summit of Beinn na Lice(1400ft), the highest point on the southern tip of the Mull. The visibility below the variable cloudbase close to the lighthouse was 400-500metres”.
The Board also states at para 56, when discussing why the crew had not been alerted to their proximity to the ground by visual sighting, “The lack of visual warning appears to indicate that the crew had lost all external references and were in IMC during this phase of the flight.”
The evidence is that they continued to fly towards the Mull at high speed and with “an inappropriate rate of climb” until a visual sighting of the Mull at approx 400metres range prompted the cyclic flare. They did not do what they had been trained to do since basic training – what OC RAF Odiham stated “would have been ingrained in this crew, indeed all helicopter crews” – climb on a safe heading at full power at the maximum rate of climb speed to at least Safety Altitude. That is what gave rise to the finding of “Negligence to a Gross Degree”.
Guest
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K52
You are now being disingenuous in the extreme. You say:
"I fail to see how suggesting that the reason the crew of ZD576 failed to make the decision to climb or turn away in time was “COMPLACENCY” could possibly be construed as Libel. The word means “CONTENTMENT” or “SATISFACTION”."
The word "complacency" carries a far more pejorative meaning than just "contentment" or "satisfaction". My dictionary (Collins Concise) gives "extreme self-satisfaction" or "smugness", both terms which I feel would be far more appropriately applied to you than to Jon Tapper or Rick Cook.
You are now being disingenuous in the extreme. You say:
"I fail to see how suggesting that the reason the crew of ZD576 failed to make the decision to climb or turn away in time was “COMPLACENCY” could possibly be construed as Libel. The word means “CONTENTMENT” or “SATISFACTION”."
The word "complacency" carries a far more pejorative meaning than just "contentment" or "satisfaction". My dictionary (Collins Concise) gives "extreme self-satisfaction" or "smugness", both terms which I feel would be far more appropriately applied to you than to Jon Tapper or Rick Cook.
Guest
Posts: n/a
K52,
Again you confuse your opinion with evidence.
It is not your dictionary that irritates me but your self satisfied arrogance and your eager willingness to jump on your ex-colleagues graves. Your time in the military appears to have left you with little understanding of esprit de corps (devotion to and pride in one's group, to save you looking it up).
Again you are not willing to state your motive in all this. If you have nil motive then why do you persist in publically smearing the names of these dead men who cannot have their say?
Finally, I can only remark that if you were to find yourself in the same highly regrettable situation as Flt Lts Tapper and Cook then it is to be hoped that your family would obtain more support than you are prepared to give.
Again you confuse your opinion with evidence.
It is not your dictionary that irritates me but your self satisfied arrogance and your eager willingness to jump on your ex-colleagues graves. Your time in the military appears to have left you with little understanding of esprit de corps (devotion to and pride in one's group, to save you looking it up).
Again you are not willing to state your motive in all this. If you have nil motive then why do you persist in publically smearing the names of these dead men who cannot have their say?
Finally, I can only remark that if you were to find yourself in the same highly regrettable situation as Flt Lts Tapper and Cook then it is to be hoped that your family would obtain more support than you are prepared to give.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Apologies for being the self-appointed busybody again, but I don't think anything is being gained by arguing amongst each other (and I include myself in that statement).
K52 is entitled to his opinion as we are ours. We need to focus on the element of doubt as opposed to speculation (unlike the senior reviewing officer who admits as much in the opening paragraph of his statement). Only 80% of the aircraft survived for examination, and not all of that was. The AAIB examiner had areas of doubt, as did the three members of the Board. Therefore, an element of doubt exists with regard the final verdict, therefore it is unsustainable (I could go on with more but I'll spare you all). That is where we must concentrate our efforts and not venting our spleens on people who post here. By all means argue the point, but I feel this subject is above personal insults.
Please please don't think I'm telling anyone what to do (after all how could I stop you!), I just feel we need to keep to the task in hand. If you disagree please feel free to send hate mail to my e-mail address!!
Just for the record - K52, I disagree with you. There I said it!
Regards all
Cheekily,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
K52 is entitled to his opinion as we are ours. We need to focus on the element of doubt as opposed to speculation (unlike the senior reviewing officer who admits as much in the opening paragraph of his statement). Only 80% of the aircraft survived for examination, and not all of that was. The AAIB examiner had areas of doubt, as did the three members of the Board. Therefore, an element of doubt exists with regard the final verdict, therefore it is unsustainable (I could go on with more but I'll spare you all). That is where we must concentrate our efforts and not venting our spleens on people who post here. By all means argue the point, but I feel this subject is above personal insults.
Please please don't think I'm telling anyone what to do (after all how could I stop you!), I just feel we need to keep to the task in hand. If you disagree please feel free to send hate mail to my e-mail address!!
Just for the record - K52, I disagree with you. There I said it!
Regards all
Cheekily,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Guest
Posts: n/a
Brian,
I agree, we should concentrate on the uncertainties, so I will state the obvious and repeat both myself and others. It's time we had a recap anyway. No offence to your good self but the title of this thread is "Chinook - Hit back here".
It is about two good men being blamed for an RAF aircraft accident. One causing a large loss of life when is there IS doubt about the cause, in an aircraft that had been made to bypass the normal safety procedures and requirements for introduction into service. (It should be borne in mind that the Mk2 Chinook is quite different to the Mk1).
The RAF's own Handling Squadron (test pilots) had elected not to continue flying the aircraft, even for the purposes of further aircraft tests towards issue of a Release to Service, because of doubts over the safety of the computerised engine control systems (FADEC). Some similar MK2 aircraft had suffered loss of engine control during trials in the USA and there had been some less serious but unexplained occurrences with the RAF trial aircraft.
Some time after this accident it came to light that MOD were actually suing the aircraft manufacturer over the problems with the FADEC software at that time but had not publicised the fact.
[A loss of engine control in a helicopter, especially a runaway up, can be disastrous in that the rotor may overspeed causing rapid and terminal failure. Immediate action is required, in that the aircraft must be flown at a much higher collective pitch setting than normal. This results in a climb, an increase in speed, or a combination of both. There was no published evidence to indicate that this had happened but it is NOT uncommon for FADEC faults to clear once electrical power is removed from the aircraft so it cannot be completely ruled out as a causal factor].
There were no proper Pilot Manuals or Flight reference cards available because they had yet to be published. I understand that some Engineering manuals were also not available at that time.
Despite this, pressure was brought from on high to bear to introduce the aircraft into squadron service and even to use it for passengers of extreme importance. The crew flying this Mk2 aircraft (in fact all crews)had only a small amount of operational experience on it.
This particular airframe had suffered recent unexplained inaccuracies in the GPS navigation system, which could have been of great significance. There was EVIDENCE in the wreckage that it may have suffered an intercom fault during the last flight.
The weather was not good, but RAF SH has always been required to operate VFR in conditions well below what would be considered normal VMC for fixed-wing aircraft because of the ability to slow down or stop. There has been much speculation over the actual cloud and visibility at the time of the accident because there was conflicting evidence. Although the BOI did their job of collecting and collating the available evidence, the President of the Board and his team were unable to reach a conclusion on the cause of the accident.
As we all know, this was swept aside by two more senior officers directly involved in the chain of command responsible for, and obviously supporting, the Mk2 Chinook in service.
The more senior officer of these two had no SH experience to speak of at all, and only experience of the rules and operation of fixed wing aircraft which operate to more stringent weather and height limits. Strangely, he later publically dimissed the experience of the President of the Board of Inquiry, a Wing Commander who was a highly experienced and current Chinook operator.
Any loss of confidence in, or a grounding of the Mk2 aircraft could have meant that there was no medium SH available to the RAF due to the lack of Mk1 airframes. (Mk1s were being removed from service to be rebuilt into Mk2s) and the remainder were suffering from poor servicability.
In my opinion, this resulted in the reputations of two dead pilots being seen at the time as of lesser importance to the RAF than for MOD to admit there may have been other, aircraft and organisational factors involved in this appalling accident.
====================================
I find that unacceptable. Others apparently do not. That is why there is discussion, argument, call it what you will.
Those in agreement please say "AYE".
I agree, we should concentrate on the uncertainties, so I will state the obvious and repeat both myself and others. It's time we had a recap anyway. No offence to your good self but the title of this thread is "Chinook - Hit back here".
It is about two good men being blamed for an RAF aircraft accident. One causing a large loss of life when is there IS doubt about the cause, in an aircraft that had been made to bypass the normal safety procedures and requirements for introduction into service. (It should be borne in mind that the Mk2 Chinook is quite different to the Mk1).
The RAF's own Handling Squadron (test pilots) had elected not to continue flying the aircraft, even for the purposes of further aircraft tests towards issue of a Release to Service, because of doubts over the safety of the computerised engine control systems (FADEC). Some similar MK2 aircraft had suffered loss of engine control during trials in the USA and there had been some less serious but unexplained occurrences with the RAF trial aircraft.
Some time after this accident it came to light that MOD were actually suing the aircraft manufacturer over the problems with the FADEC software at that time but had not publicised the fact.
[A loss of engine control in a helicopter, especially a runaway up, can be disastrous in that the rotor may overspeed causing rapid and terminal failure. Immediate action is required, in that the aircraft must be flown at a much higher collective pitch setting than normal. This results in a climb, an increase in speed, or a combination of both. There was no published evidence to indicate that this had happened but it is NOT uncommon for FADEC faults to clear once electrical power is removed from the aircraft so it cannot be completely ruled out as a causal factor].
There were no proper Pilot Manuals or Flight reference cards available because they had yet to be published. I understand that some Engineering manuals were also not available at that time.
Despite this, pressure was brought from on high to bear to introduce the aircraft into squadron service and even to use it for passengers of extreme importance. The crew flying this Mk2 aircraft (in fact all crews)had only a small amount of operational experience on it.
This particular airframe had suffered recent unexplained inaccuracies in the GPS navigation system, which could have been of great significance. There was EVIDENCE in the wreckage that it may have suffered an intercom fault during the last flight.
The weather was not good, but RAF SH has always been required to operate VFR in conditions well below what would be considered normal VMC for fixed-wing aircraft because of the ability to slow down or stop. There has been much speculation over the actual cloud and visibility at the time of the accident because there was conflicting evidence. Although the BOI did their job of collecting and collating the available evidence, the President of the Board and his team were unable to reach a conclusion on the cause of the accident.
As we all know, this was swept aside by two more senior officers directly involved in the chain of command responsible for, and obviously supporting, the Mk2 Chinook in service.
The more senior officer of these two had no SH experience to speak of at all, and only experience of the rules and operation of fixed wing aircraft which operate to more stringent weather and height limits. Strangely, he later publically dimissed the experience of the President of the Board of Inquiry, a Wing Commander who was a highly experienced and current Chinook operator.
Any loss of confidence in, or a grounding of the Mk2 aircraft could have meant that there was no medium SH available to the RAF due to the lack of Mk1 airframes. (Mk1s were being removed from service to be rebuilt into Mk2s) and the remainder were suffering from poor servicability.
In my opinion, this resulted in the reputations of two dead pilots being seen at the time as of lesser importance to the RAF than for MOD to admit there may have been other, aircraft and organisational factors involved in this appalling accident.
====================================
I find that unacceptable. Others apparently do not. That is why there is discussion, argument, call it what you will.
Those in agreement please say "AYE".
Guest
Posts: n/a
AYE
Shy,
an excellent reply, and I hope that I didn't cause offence (none taken by me). I accept everything you have written, and I share all your concerns. I just didn't want the issue to go off at a tangent. Selfish I know, but that is how I am with regard this issue.
I will also repeat that those at the heart of the campaign are grateful for the support shown by those on this site. I will also repeat that I never intend to cause offence on any post I submit.
Shy - Would you be willing to drop me an e-mail?
Regards all
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Shy,
an excellent reply, and I hope that I didn't cause offence (none taken by me). I accept everything you have written, and I share all your concerns. I just didn't want the issue to go off at a tangent. Selfish I know, but that is how I am with regard this issue.
I will also repeat that those at the heart of the campaign are grateful for the support shown by those on this site. I will also repeat that I never intend to cause offence on any post I submit.
Shy - Would you be willing to drop me an e-mail?
Regards all
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Guest
Posts: n/a
K52,
I had decided not to continue our debate as, although I have enjoyed it, it did not seem to be leading to any kind of resolution. However, I cannot let you get away with your suggestion that complacency played any part in this accident, whatever understanding of the word you want to use. As I understand it, this is the first time anyone has made this suggestion in public, and I can only wonder about your motivation in suggesting it, without a shred of evidence.
We all know that lack of evidence is the main problem in this whole sad story but I would have thought that we had enough evidence which suggests to me that the very opposite of complacency was more likely to be the problem here.
1. Fl Lt Tapper had expressed considerable concern about the reliability of the Mk2 Chinook to his father.
2. Cheapseat and Tapper had previously discussed ways of not having this machine in NI.
3. Many other SH pilots have witnessed to the concern about this aircraft. Did they know that Boscombe Down had grounded their aircraft the day before?
It would therefore seem to me that a high degree of nervousness about the flight was more likely to lead to distraction by any indication of problems, false or otherwise.
To ShyTorque therefore, I also say AYE.
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"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
I had decided not to continue our debate as, although I have enjoyed it, it did not seem to be leading to any kind of resolution. However, I cannot let you get away with your suggestion that complacency played any part in this accident, whatever understanding of the word you want to use. As I understand it, this is the first time anyone has made this suggestion in public, and I can only wonder about your motivation in suggesting it, without a shred of evidence.
We all know that lack of evidence is the main problem in this whole sad story but I would have thought that we had enough evidence which suggests to me that the very opposite of complacency was more likely to be the problem here.
1. Fl Lt Tapper had expressed considerable concern about the reliability of the Mk2 Chinook to his father.
2. Cheapseat and Tapper had previously discussed ways of not having this machine in NI.
3. Many other SH pilots have witnessed to the concern about this aircraft. Did they know that Boscombe Down had grounded their aircraft the day before?
It would therefore seem to me that a high degree of nervousness about the flight was more likely to lead to distraction by any indication of problems, false or otherwise.
To ShyTorque therefore, I also say AYE.
------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
Guest
Posts: n/a
Shytorque.....AYE
I too have tired recently of the circular arguments with K52, who refuses to answer the pointed questions, but instead raises more supposition and half-baked theory.
K52, I could not let your asking for EVIDENCE to prove our point pass without comment. It is not for us to do so. Can't you see that by all that is fair, and in line with the RAFs own rules, that it is for those who brought in the finding of negligence to prove it beyond any doubt whatsoever. No-one else is required to prove anything.
In the other cases raised by yourself, crews found negligent have been so found on strong and irefutable evidence. In this case there is none.
Your latest speed calculation cannot go unchallenged. The only evidence is that the GSDI showed a speed at impact of 147 knots groundspeed. From this, and making many assumptions, Boeing produced a likely scenario which was very theoretical, that an airspeed of about 150 kts was required to reproduce the accident in the simulator with a fully servicable aircraft.
With no hard evidence that the aircraft was fully servicable, or that the airspeed was actually 150 kts you have no proof. With no proof, you cannot be sure beyond any doubt whatsoever, and without that certainty the benefit of the doubt must rest with the crew.
Any other reading of the events suggests a very large axe to grind. What, pray, was your full involvement in this investigation?
[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 18 April 2001).]
I too have tired recently of the circular arguments with K52, who refuses to answer the pointed questions, but instead raises more supposition and half-baked theory.
K52, I could not let your asking for EVIDENCE to prove our point pass without comment. It is not for us to do so. Can't you see that by all that is fair, and in line with the RAFs own rules, that it is for those who brought in the finding of negligence to prove it beyond any doubt whatsoever. No-one else is required to prove anything.
In the other cases raised by yourself, crews found negligent have been so found on strong and irefutable evidence. In this case there is none.
Your latest speed calculation cannot go unchallenged. The only evidence is that the GSDI showed a speed at impact of 147 knots groundspeed. From this, and making many assumptions, Boeing produced a likely scenario which was very theoretical, that an airspeed of about 150 kts was required to reproduce the accident in the simulator with a fully servicable aircraft.
With no hard evidence that the aircraft was fully servicable, or that the airspeed was actually 150 kts you have no proof. With no proof, you cannot be sure beyond any doubt whatsoever, and without that certainty the benefit of the doubt must rest with the crew.
Any other reading of the events suggests a very large axe to grind. What, pray, was your full involvement in this investigation?
[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 18 April 2001).]