Chinook - Hit Back Here
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K52
“If the Pilots of ZD576 felt that the aircraft was unsafe for the planned task then they not only had a right to refuse that task – they had a positive duty to do so. They were the experts on the spot and the executive officers of the Detachment.”
Quite right. The very thought that fellow officers in the Royal Air Force would force such a detachment commander to ‘play on regardless’ is abhorrent.
In actual fact this is EXACTLY what happened. Not only that but John Tapper had to look his detachment aircrew in the eye and say he had tried and failed to prevent the Mk2 Chinook being introduced into NI.
You’re going to ask why this sort of information was never put before the BoI. The sad fact is that EVERYONE involved with the Chinook force during this period had NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER that ZD576 killed John, Rick, Graham, Kevin and their passengers. There was no need to volunteer information to the Board as this would just make the individual a whistle blower in an open and shut case.
This simple fact is probably the final tragedy of this whole sorry mess. Just about every RAF Chinook operator of the period could have offered statements explaining flaws, minor and major, involved in the introduction to service of the Mk2 to the BoI but no one did, there was no need.
“If the Pilots of ZD576 felt that the aircraft was unsafe for the planned task then they not only had a right to refuse that task – they had a positive duty to do so. They were the experts on the spot and the executive officers of the Detachment.”
Quite right. The very thought that fellow officers in the Royal Air Force would force such a detachment commander to ‘play on regardless’ is abhorrent.
In actual fact this is EXACTLY what happened. Not only that but John Tapper had to look his detachment aircrew in the eye and say he had tried and failed to prevent the Mk2 Chinook being introduced into NI.
You’re going to ask why this sort of information was never put before the BoI. The sad fact is that EVERYONE involved with the Chinook force during this period had NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER that ZD576 killed John, Rick, Graham, Kevin and their passengers. There was no need to volunteer information to the Board as this would just make the individual a whistle blower in an open and shut case.
This simple fact is probably the final tragedy of this whole sorry mess. Just about every RAF Chinook operator of the period could have offered statements explaining flaws, minor and major, involved in the introduction to service of the Mk2 to the BoI but no one did, there was no need.
Guest
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At the time in question, everyone felt that the a/c should not be operated. Every person in question was prepared to fly, but not one person, front or rear wanted to get airborne...resulting in a percentage of 1 in 100 actually achieving it, which grew rapidlly with peer pressure...
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Excellent post Pulse.
I too find it almost incredible that the task was allowed to go ahead as planned. There was no IFR option due to the limitations of the Mk2 in icing, so the trip was decidedly iffy.
Having been put in a similar position with VIPs, the pressure to complete the mission is almost intolerable. I turned back and was castigated for taking the safe option.
The trip went ahead and the responsible people blmed the crew. The crew may have been negligent, and no one in this thread has denied this as a possibility. We simply state that it cannot be proven beyond any doubt whatsoever, no matter how much spin and dodgy calculation is performed.
K52
Your comments regarding other accidents, and a wish to prevent recurrence would suggest that you support the finding of negligence 'pour encorager les autres'. That is not one of the parameters for such a finding in the RAFs own rules.
I would also suggest that monitoring the flight deck from behind a newspaper is safer than not being on the flight deck!
I too find it almost incredible that the task was allowed to go ahead as planned. There was no IFR option due to the limitations of the Mk2 in icing, so the trip was decidedly iffy.
Having been put in a similar position with VIPs, the pressure to complete the mission is almost intolerable. I turned back and was castigated for taking the safe option.
The trip went ahead and the responsible people blmed the crew. The crew may have been negligent, and no one in this thread has denied this as a possibility. We simply state that it cannot be proven beyond any doubt whatsoever, no matter how much spin and dodgy calculation is performed.
K52
Your comments regarding other accidents, and a wish to prevent recurrence would suggest that you support the finding of negligence 'pour encorager les autres'. That is not one of the parameters for such a finding in the RAFs own rules.
I would also suggest that monitoring the flight deck from behind a newspaper is safer than not being on the flight deck!
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Arkroyal
You are amazed that the flight was able to go ahead as planned. But what exactly was planned? An earlier poster in a private message said that he recommended on May 31 that two Pumas from the Aldergrove 7-strong fleet be used to transport the top security personnel. He also said that one of the people who died on the crash had requested the use of a Chinook on June 1 so that the passengers could be together for pre-conference discussions on the flight.
The Mk2 arrived at Aldergrove on May 31, the first time a Mk2 had been to Northern Ireland. Had the decision to fly the passengers in a Mk2 been taken before May 31?
In the light of what was known about the Mk2 it seems absolutely crazy that such a craft should have been used to ferry passengers who had to play such a key role in Northern Ireland's security.
You are amazed that the flight was able to go ahead as planned. But what exactly was planned? An earlier poster in a private message said that he recommended on May 31 that two Pumas from the Aldergrove 7-strong fleet be used to transport the top security personnel. He also said that one of the people who died on the crash had requested the use of a Chinook on June 1 so that the passengers could be together for pre-conference discussions on the flight.
The Mk2 arrived at Aldergrove on May 31, the first time a Mk2 had been to Northern Ireland. Had the decision to fly the passengers in a Mk2 been taken before May 31?
In the light of what was known about the Mk2 it seems absolutely crazy that such a craft should have been used to ferry passengers who had to play such a key role in Northern Ireland's security.
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cheapseat,
You obviously feel deeply aggrieved and bitter about your perception of events. The BOI could not comment on what you feel so deeply about PRECISELY because no one gave evidence to that effect. Equally you are incorrect in stating that ALL involved with the Chinook were aware of these feelings. We in the Flight Safety Team at 1 Gp were not aware; nor were the Flight Safety Team at STC.
If I had been made aware of your concerns then, I assure you, they would have been pursued all the way to the top. I, after all, had nothing to lose – a Spec Aircrew Flt Lt in a ground post and already accepted for Redundancy. I may not have agreed with you, but I would have ensured that your concerns were heard – that is how I saw my Job.
It is not, however, too late in the day for you to voice your concerns at the highest level. Submit a CONDOR!! That will go, unopened, directly to the Inspector of Flight Safety who has direct access to CAS. I can guarantee that what you write will remain “In Confidence” between you and the Inspector. Some 15+ years ago, whilst at Boscombe, I was doing some research and wanted more information regarding a CONDOR that had been submitted. The then Inspector agreed that it would be useful for me to obtain more information on the incident but flatly refused to break the rule of anonymity. What he did do was write privately to the individual with my request and invited him, IF HE SO WISHED, to telephone me without revealing his identity. I am glad to say he did phone me and our conversation was very useful – but, to this day, I have NO idea who that person was.
Ark Royal
A cheap shot would be to point out that it was YOUR Service that shot Admiral Byng and engendered Voltaire’s saying ”Dans ce pays-ci il est bon de tuer de temps en temps un amiral pour encourager les autres.”
I would never do that. Oh damn – SORRY!!!!
The only reason for quoting previous accidents was to show that Aircrew are not very innovative when it comes to killing themselves. Someone, unfortunately usually more than one, has always done it before.
Regarding the Flight Deck – we always ensured that if a Pilot left then someone else was on headset and observing. On the Andover it would be the Nav; on the 146 the Ground Eng and on the 125 the Steward(ess). We didn’t have “Trolley Dollies”- they were part of the crew (and they helped to refuel and do AF/BF’s). They also did a walkaround check after take off to see if they could spot anything unusual. I remember one Cabin Crew member spotting a massive oil leak from an engine.
Smooth Approach
Sorry about your friend, there was no way that any finding of negligence devolved onto him. I knew the Captain from training – he was on the Course above me. Did you know that he had to eject on one of his first trips (legend had it that it was his first trip)? The sortie was combined with a Wx check and they got to Break Off Height (that dates me) and commenced an overshoot having seen nothing when the FIRE WARNING went off. The Captain was reprimanded by the BOI for not transmitting a MAYDAY – 400ft, full flap and gear and no power!!!!!!
There is no way I can answer your point about Political Influence. All I can say is that I was never aware of any. After my initial reading of the BOI the GFSO asked me what I thought and my reply was “what were they doing there at that height and speed”? I would add that with a different BOI, when asked the same question, my reply was “It’s a stitch up.” In that particular case we got the BOI reconvened and the BOI’s findings of negligence were overruled.
Pulse 1
Sorry to leave you till last – but I join Ark Royal in his appreciation of your post. None of your posts have offended me – your points are well made and you keep me on my toes.
The planning and the execution of a flight (as you well know) are two totally different things. I agree that the planning of the flight as a VFR low level flight was correctly done (with some reservations about planned SALT’s). However, as the BOI pointed out (having used the same Met information as the crew in their calculations), the weather forecast for the Mull PRECLUDED flight in VFR conditions. My question, therefore, is “why did they attempt it”?
I agree that they could have “had a look” and then adjusted their flight so that they passed well clear of the bad weather BUT THEY DID NOT DO SO. As the AOC 1 Gp put it they “must have become aware of the actual bad weather near the Mull”.
Regarding icing – I have NO reason to doubt the information I was given by the GFSO that the return flight was planned at medium level. An independent source, who has many thousands of hours on RAF Chinook’s, has confirmed to me that a medium level transit was feasible in those conditions even with the icing limitations pertaining at the time.
You quoted “Tapper decided that IFR flight was unwise” Your question was “How did they know that?” I cannot answer that question; I do not have the annexes that contain the witness statements. I am not a betting man – but, if I were, then I would probably bet that those sentiments were conveyed to the BOI by the same people who informed them that Tapper spent the night before the accident preparing charts for the flight to Fort George. You will recall that at the FAI a different story emerged.
I think you have a point in that some SH pilots have a mindset of “this is the way we have always done it – therefore this is the way it will always be done.” That is unfair, of course, to a lot of SH pilots who are only too willing to embrace new ideas and procedures. That is as it should be because in the (hopefully unlikely) event of hostilities then their tasking will be very short notice and based on refueling options.
I remember a request we had on 32 Sqn which was quite simple. A London Hospital had a cancer patient who required a specific isotope for his/her treatment. The problem was that the isotope had a half life of 2 hours and the nearest source was in Southern Germany. The simple answer was NO. A few hours on the telephone to various agencies allowed us to position a 125 (on a “training flight”) at Heidleburg where it received the isotope from a Canadian Helicopter (on a “training flight”), which had picked the isotope up from the German Hospital, and then the 125 flew in a straight line at max speed direct to Northolt and the isotope was transferred to a Gazelle (on a “training flight”) which flew it directly to the Hospital. 58 minutes from Hospital to Hospital. The patient recovered. (Training hours were used because of the time lag required to get formal tasking - and financial approval from the NHS- and because both the Canadians and ourselves agreed that this was a useful training scenario).
Regarding the Pax. Yes, I firmly believe that the finding would have been the same regardless. My point was that the fact they had Pax should have concentrated their minds. With regard to the CFIT accidents I quoted following “unauthorised beat ups”: may I draw your attention to the speech of Lord Rathcavan in the House of Lords regarding the “antics” of the Chinook that fateful evening.
Regarding my contribution to the accident statistics – I own up to 2. One was an Air Cadet Glider in 1963, which doesn’t show in the statistics as they weren’t counted then (and I was exonerated from blame), and the other was a Cat 3 birdstrike in 1967. Cat 3’s don’t show any more. So, officially, I never had an accident!
You obviously feel deeply aggrieved and bitter about your perception of events. The BOI could not comment on what you feel so deeply about PRECISELY because no one gave evidence to that effect. Equally you are incorrect in stating that ALL involved with the Chinook were aware of these feelings. We in the Flight Safety Team at 1 Gp were not aware; nor were the Flight Safety Team at STC.
If I had been made aware of your concerns then, I assure you, they would have been pursued all the way to the top. I, after all, had nothing to lose – a Spec Aircrew Flt Lt in a ground post and already accepted for Redundancy. I may not have agreed with you, but I would have ensured that your concerns were heard – that is how I saw my Job.
It is not, however, too late in the day for you to voice your concerns at the highest level. Submit a CONDOR!! That will go, unopened, directly to the Inspector of Flight Safety who has direct access to CAS. I can guarantee that what you write will remain “In Confidence” between you and the Inspector. Some 15+ years ago, whilst at Boscombe, I was doing some research and wanted more information regarding a CONDOR that had been submitted. The then Inspector agreed that it would be useful for me to obtain more information on the incident but flatly refused to break the rule of anonymity. What he did do was write privately to the individual with my request and invited him, IF HE SO WISHED, to telephone me without revealing his identity. I am glad to say he did phone me and our conversation was very useful – but, to this day, I have NO idea who that person was.
Ark Royal
A cheap shot would be to point out that it was YOUR Service that shot Admiral Byng and engendered Voltaire’s saying ”Dans ce pays-ci il est bon de tuer de temps en temps un amiral pour encourager les autres.”
I would never do that. Oh damn – SORRY!!!!
The only reason for quoting previous accidents was to show that Aircrew are not very innovative when it comes to killing themselves. Someone, unfortunately usually more than one, has always done it before.
Regarding the Flight Deck – we always ensured that if a Pilot left then someone else was on headset and observing. On the Andover it would be the Nav; on the 146 the Ground Eng and on the 125 the Steward(ess). We didn’t have “Trolley Dollies”- they were part of the crew (and they helped to refuel and do AF/BF’s). They also did a walkaround check after take off to see if they could spot anything unusual. I remember one Cabin Crew member spotting a massive oil leak from an engine.
Smooth Approach
Sorry about your friend, there was no way that any finding of negligence devolved onto him. I knew the Captain from training – he was on the Course above me. Did you know that he had to eject on one of his first trips (legend had it that it was his first trip)? The sortie was combined with a Wx check and they got to Break Off Height (that dates me) and commenced an overshoot having seen nothing when the FIRE WARNING went off. The Captain was reprimanded by the BOI for not transmitting a MAYDAY – 400ft, full flap and gear and no power!!!!!!
There is no way I can answer your point about Political Influence. All I can say is that I was never aware of any. After my initial reading of the BOI the GFSO asked me what I thought and my reply was “what were they doing there at that height and speed”? I would add that with a different BOI, when asked the same question, my reply was “It’s a stitch up.” In that particular case we got the BOI reconvened and the BOI’s findings of negligence were overruled.
Pulse 1
Sorry to leave you till last – but I join Ark Royal in his appreciation of your post. None of your posts have offended me – your points are well made and you keep me on my toes.
The planning and the execution of a flight (as you well know) are two totally different things. I agree that the planning of the flight as a VFR low level flight was correctly done (with some reservations about planned SALT’s). However, as the BOI pointed out (having used the same Met information as the crew in their calculations), the weather forecast for the Mull PRECLUDED flight in VFR conditions. My question, therefore, is “why did they attempt it”?
I agree that they could have “had a look” and then adjusted their flight so that they passed well clear of the bad weather BUT THEY DID NOT DO SO. As the AOC 1 Gp put it they “must have become aware of the actual bad weather near the Mull”.
Regarding icing – I have NO reason to doubt the information I was given by the GFSO that the return flight was planned at medium level. An independent source, who has many thousands of hours on RAF Chinook’s, has confirmed to me that a medium level transit was feasible in those conditions even with the icing limitations pertaining at the time.
You quoted “Tapper decided that IFR flight was unwise” Your question was “How did they know that?” I cannot answer that question; I do not have the annexes that contain the witness statements. I am not a betting man – but, if I were, then I would probably bet that those sentiments were conveyed to the BOI by the same people who informed them that Tapper spent the night before the accident preparing charts for the flight to Fort George. You will recall that at the FAI a different story emerged.
I think you have a point in that some SH pilots have a mindset of “this is the way we have always done it – therefore this is the way it will always be done.” That is unfair, of course, to a lot of SH pilots who are only too willing to embrace new ideas and procedures. That is as it should be because in the (hopefully unlikely) event of hostilities then their tasking will be very short notice and based on refueling options.
I remember a request we had on 32 Sqn which was quite simple. A London Hospital had a cancer patient who required a specific isotope for his/her treatment. The problem was that the isotope had a half life of 2 hours and the nearest source was in Southern Germany. The simple answer was NO. A few hours on the telephone to various agencies allowed us to position a 125 (on a “training flight”) at Heidleburg where it received the isotope from a Canadian Helicopter (on a “training flight”), which had picked the isotope up from the German Hospital, and then the 125 flew in a straight line at max speed direct to Northolt and the isotope was transferred to a Gazelle (on a “training flight”) which flew it directly to the Hospital. 58 minutes from Hospital to Hospital. The patient recovered. (Training hours were used because of the time lag required to get formal tasking - and financial approval from the NHS- and because both the Canadians and ourselves agreed that this was a useful training scenario).
Regarding the Pax. Yes, I firmly believe that the finding would have been the same regardless. My point was that the fact they had Pax should have concentrated their minds. With regard to the CFIT accidents I quoted following “unauthorised beat ups”: may I draw your attention to the speech of Lord Rathcavan in the House of Lords regarding the “antics” of the Chinook that fateful evening.
Regarding my contribution to the accident statistics – I own up to 2. One was an Air Cadet Glider in 1963, which doesn’t show in the statistics as they weren’t counted then (and I was exonerated from blame), and the other was a Cat 3 birdstrike in 1967. Cat 3’s don’t show any more. So, officially, I never had an accident!
Guest
Posts: n/a
K52,
Thank you for your kind remarks (thanks also to ArkRoyal). Thank you also for a detailed response to some of the issues I have raised. Unfortunately you appear to have missed some of the most important points. This is probably because I have been insufficiently clear but could it be because you may also inevitably suffer from a RAF “mind set” which prevents a more objective view?
Of course I know that the planning and execution of a flight are two different things. My point is that all planning (and every subsequent decision) should include a risk assessment and cost benefit analysis. Although I am unqualified to make a total risk assessment for flights of this kind, I suspect that a proper assessment of this operation would demand that the flight should have been rejected at the planning stage. I repeat my main argument for that, which is that the IFR option was too risky because of the icing limitations.
My point is that none of the reviewing officers questioned this aspect of the planning which tells me that the “mind set” EXTENDS TO THE VERY HIGHEST LEVEL, not just to some of the SH pilots. In those circumstances it is unreasonable to place the responsibility onto individual pilots. Others more qualified than me have given testimony to the pressures placed on aircrew to conform.
You refer to the feasibility of flying IFR at medium level and I am really unqualified to do more than ask awkward questions. You quote your source as a well qualified SH pilot and we should not forget that he too may suffer from the “mind set”. However, on a more scientific basis, a risk assessment would raise three questions:
1. What is the probability of an accident occurring? This would have to be based on the skills and training of the crew (obviously very high), something going wrong with the aircraft, and the probability of the forecast 4 degree level being lower than forecast. (I am sure that there are many other factors but these will do for now).
There have been many questions raised about the reliability of this relatively untried aircraft and this should have been included in a risk assessment. What was safe in the Mk1 may not have been safe in the Mk2. Just as you can fly ETOPS across the oceans in some aircraft and not others.
I would not be able to comment on the likely accuracy of the forecast but, when you have only got 400’ tolerance, it seems to me that this factor alone should have made the risk too high, and we have seen that Tapper may have thought so also.
2. What is the extent of likely injury or damage. This question should show the obvious difference between a training flight and a passenger flight. This also may explain why it is thought to be feasible to have returned medium level IFR without the passengers.
3. How often is this activity carried out? Probably not meaningful in this case, but it might explain why single engine BBMF Spitfires can fly at low level over London, when I am not allowed to in my Cessna 172.
At least we have one thing in common. The only accident I have had was in an ATC glider when, as a gliding instructor, I was doing the hangar landing with the CO and “we” broke the skid trying to avoid going into the hedge. A classic example of the dangers of two instructors flying together. This was not many years after your own accident.
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"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
Thank you for your kind remarks (thanks also to ArkRoyal). Thank you also for a detailed response to some of the issues I have raised. Unfortunately you appear to have missed some of the most important points. This is probably because I have been insufficiently clear but could it be because you may also inevitably suffer from a RAF “mind set” which prevents a more objective view?
Of course I know that the planning and execution of a flight are two different things. My point is that all planning (and every subsequent decision) should include a risk assessment and cost benefit analysis. Although I am unqualified to make a total risk assessment for flights of this kind, I suspect that a proper assessment of this operation would demand that the flight should have been rejected at the planning stage. I repeat my main argument for that, which is that the IFR option was too risky because of the icing limitations.
My point is that none of the reviewing officers questioned this aspect of the planning which tells me that the “mind set” EXTENDS TO THE VERY HIGHEST LEVEL, not just to some of the SH pilots. In those circumstances it is unreasonable to place the responsibility onto individual pilots. Others more qualified than me have given testimony to the pressures placed on aircrew to conform.
You refer to the feasibility of flying IFR at medium level and I am really unqualified to do more than ask awkward questions. You quote your source as a well qualified SH pilot and we should not forget that he too may suffer from the “mind set”. However, on a more scientific basis, a risk assessment would raise three questions:
1. What is the probability of an accident occurring? This would have to be based on the skills and training of the crew (obviously very high), something going wrong with the aircraft, and the probability of the forecast 4 degree level being lower than forecast. (I am sure that there are many other factors but these will do for now).
There have been many questions raised about the reliability of this relatively untried aircraft and this should have been included in a risk assessment. What was safe in the Mk1 may not have been safe in the Mk2. Just as you can fly ETOPS across the oceans in some aircraft and not others.
I would not be able to comment on the likely accuracy of the forecast but, when you have only got 400’ tolerance, it seems to me that this factor alone should have made the risk too high, and we have seen that Tapper may have thought so also.
2. What is the extent of likely injury or damage. This question should show the obvious difference between a training flight and a passenger flight. This also may explain why it is thought to be feasible to have returned medium level IFR without the passengers.
3. How often is this activity carried out? Probably not meaningful in this case, but it might explain why single engine BBMF Spitfires can fly at low level over London, when I am not allowed to in my Cessna 172.
At least we have one thing in common. The only accident I have had was in an ATC glider when, as a gliding instructor, I was doing the hangar landing with the CO and “we” broke the skid trying to avoid going into the hedge. A classic example of the dangers of two instructors flying together. This was not many years after your own accident.
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"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
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I read all the theories with great interest. but please can we stick to the facts. The properly constituted Board of Inquiry, led by a very experienced operator, reached a perfectly logical conclusion. Wratten and Day in spite of their seniority, were not in the same league when it came to SH operations. If the Board were wrong with their assessment, then there must be evidence that was not made available to them. Just where is this evidence?
Guest
Posts: n/a
I have been a long time reader of PPRUNE but this is only the second time I have felt the need to post. This is obviousely an extremely emotive subject, several threads have appeared over the years and this one is on its 57th page. I just can't help wondering if it's time to stop.
As I understand it, the two Senior Officers who blamed the crew were not members of the board of enquiry and were, therefore, technically entitled to any opinion they cared to hold, however bizarre or upsetting it may be.
It will never be possible to change their minds on the issue and the only way to force the RAF to overturn them is through the courts.
Nothing said in this forum is going to help the crew in any way, we are just picking at the wound and keeping it fresh and painful. The only way to help is for those with concrete evidence to give it to the families solicitors.
Without wishing to cause offence to those who feel strongly about the subject, and I am one of them, perhaps it is time to close the thread.
As I understand it, the two Senior Officers who blamed the crew were not members of the board of enquiry and were, therefore, technically entitled to any opinion they cared to hold, however bizarre or upsetting it may be.
It will never be possible to change their minds on the issue and the only way to force the RAF to overturn them is through the courts.
Nothing said in this forum is going to help the crew in any way, we are just picking at the wound and keeping it fresh and painful. The only way to help is for those with concrete evidence to give it to the families solicitors.
Without wishing to cause offence to those who feel strongly about the subject, and I am one of them, perhaps it is time to close the thread.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Per O - What you say about trying to change the Day/Wratten mindset is probably correct; I doubt that they will ever accept that their finding was wrong. However, at some time in the future, there is a chance that the RAF might be instructed to overtrurn their verdict. To that end, the arguments being rehearsed here are the ones that will be presented to the Lord's inquiry. Amongst a few others.
And to all but a tiny minority, it can be seen that Day & wratten were wrong.
There were people advising the families to "let it lie" 5 years ago. Thank heavens they didn't!
And to all but a tiny minority, it can be seen that Day & wratten were wrong.
There were people advising the families to "let it lie" 5 years ago. Thank heavens they didn't!
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Per O A Asti,
welcome to the thread. Is it testimony to this thread that you feel that in all your visits, on this occasion you feel compelled to post.
I have to disagree with your pondering about whether this thread should stop. It clearly shows the level of dissatisfaction in the (in your words) opinion of the two senior officers, although I will agree that they were, and still are, entitled to their opinions. I just choose to disagree with them. Their role was to review the findings of the properly constituted Board of Inquiry, who had listened to all available evidence before reaching their conclusions (which were that it was unable to attribute human failings from either pilot as a cause of the crash). The reviewing officers, despite having no further evidence, and basing their findings on reading the report of the Board, chose to override those original findings.
Again, I agree that nothing said here will help the crew. It may help their families though. It may also help restore the confidence of some serving aircrew with regard to the procedure should they (Heaven forbid), find themselves in a similar situation.
With regard to further evidence, I would urge anyone that has 'concrete' evidence - either for or against the argument, to come forward and make themselves known. That way, the families will be able to resolve the matter once and for all. As it stands at the moment, the evidence presented does not support the verdict of gross negligence, and it is this that I am campaigning against. I respectfully remind you that in order to find deceased aircrew negligent, there has to be absoultely no doubt whatsoever. If you have any doubt, no matter how small, you must agree that the verdict is unsafe. I must say though, that I don't believe that anyone is deliberately witholding any evidence.
I'm grateful that you say that you have not intended to cause offence, and I trust my reply is accepted in the same manner. I do, however, feel that if this were allowed to slip from public view, the MoD would allow it to fade from memory. I for one, will not allow that to happen.
Regards
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
welcome to the thread. Is it testimony to this thread that you feel that in all your visits, on this occasion you feel compelled to post.
I have to disagree with your pondering about whether this thread should stop. It clearly shows the level of dissatisfaction in the (in your words) opinion of the two senior officers, although I will agree that they were, and still are, entitled to their opinions. I just choose to disagree with them. Their role was to review the findings of the properly constituted Board of Inquiry, who had listened to all available evidence before reaching their conclusions (which were that it was unable to attribute human failings from either pilot as a cause of the crash). The reviewing officers, despite having no further evidence, and basing their findings on reading the report of the Board, chose to override those original findings.
Again, I agree that nothing said here will help the crew. It may help their families though. It may also help restore the confidence of some serving aircrew with regard to the procedure should they (Heaven forbid), find themselves in a similar situation.
With regard to further evidence, I would urge anyone that has 'concrete' evidence - either for or against the argument, to come forward and make themselves known. That way, the families will be able to resolve the matter once and for all. As it stands at the moment, the evidence presented does not support the verdict of gross negligence, and it is this that I am campaigning against. I respectfully remind you that in order to find deceased aircrew negligent, there has to be absoultely no doubt whatsoever. If you have any doubt, no matter how small, you must agree that the verdict is unsafe. I must say though, that I don't believe that anyone is deliberately witholding any evidence.
I'm grateful that you say that you have not intended to cause offence, and I trust my reply is accepted in the same manner. I do, however, feel that if this were allowed to slip from public view, the MoD would allow it to fade from memory. I for one, will not allow that to happen.
Regards
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Posts: n/a
K52
My point was that anyone OPERATING the Chinook felt that there was no doubt about the fact that the BoI would, in TIME, find a reason, any reason, for the tragic events of 2 Jun 94. The same BoI that did not even hint at GROSS NEGLIGENCE. I apologise for my apparent scattergun and its inclusion of yourself, especially, considering you had nothing to do with helicopters in your RAF career.
On the subject of you, K52, did you, in any way, advise the BoI. Be it from advice to ‘The Board’ to advice enroute Day/Wratton.
For the record I am biased in all my posts through my friendship of John, Rick, Kev and Graham.
[This message has been edited by cheapseat (edited 09 April 2001).]
My point was that anyone OPERATING the Chinook felt that there was no doubt about the fact that the BoI would, in TIME, find a reason, any reason, for the tragic events of 2 Jun 94. The same BoI that did not even hint at GROSS NEGLIGENCE. I apologise for my apparent scattergun and its inclusion of yourself, especially, considering you had nothing to do with helicopters in your RAF career.
On the subject of you, K52, did you, in any way, advise the BoI. Be it from advice to ‘The Board’ to advice enroute Day/Wratton.
For the record I am biased in all my posts through my friendship of John, Rick, Kev and Graham.
[This message has been edited by cheapseat (edited 09 April 2001).]
Guest
Posts: n/a
cheapseat,
The Board did find the reason for the accident; the crew attempted a cruise climb at 150kts/1000fpm when IMC approaching high ground. The AOC accepted the Board’s FINDINGS but did not accept their ASSESSMENT of Human Failings. The CinC concurred with the AOC’s view, as did CAS.
I did not arrive at I Gp until 2 weeks before the AOC "signed off" the BOI on 20 March 1995. I assisted GFSO in co-ordinating all the staff responses so that the AOC could formulate his Remarks. I do not have any recollection of being specifically asked for my advice by the AOC or CinC.
Basing
According to the BOI the first response to the 999 call was by a Police Landrover of Campletown Police. This was followed by Civilian Fire and Ambulance crews, together with a Civilian Doctor, and were followed by a Crash tender from RAF Machrihanish. RAF helicopters subsequently arrived carrying an RAF MRT to act as crash guard.
Ark Royal
Bravo a vous pour la riposte
Pulse 1
Apologies for missing your points; not “mind set”- just trying to catch up with some of the jobs I should have been doing around the House and Garden while it has temporarily stopped raining!!
Regarding risk assessment. Ideally this task should have been carried out by a fixed wing Comms Fleet aircraft – but there were none available that day. I do not even know if that option was the subject of a request. The option of Civil air flights was probably rejected on grounds of cost and security. The flight was tasked “in house” using the medium lift capacity afforded by the Chinook Detachment. I do not know what priority was placed on this task by those responsible for such matters.
We are told that the initial planning was carried out by a member of the other crew and we don’t know when the crew involved in the accident were given the chart or if the routing was discussed with them. We don’t know because that was not the evidence given to the BOI who were told on oath that Flt Lt Tapper did the planning on the night of 1 June 1994. Consequently such questions were never asked. We don’t know, therefore, what risk assessment was carried out at the planning stage.
As I have said before, it is my opinion that a re-routing around the forecast poor weather at the Mull would have been a sensible option but, as we don’t know when the crew received the chart, we don’t know if they had the time to replan the sortie because of their self imposed crew duty problem. Certainly the copy of the chart left behind showed no evidence of any alterations. I am informed that a medium level transit avoiding the poor weather at the Mull was an option available to them. The aircraft was not precluded from flying in IFR, it was precluded from flying in potential icing conditions below +4C. If, as you conjecture, Tapper may have thought the risk too high to transit IMC then why did the crew proceed to fly a routing that took them directly towards the forecast bad weather? The BOI, with the same forecast, decided that the conditions precluded VFR flight in the vicinity of the Mull.
Regarding “ the reliability of this relatively untried aircraft.” This was tasked as an operational flight in support of the security forces in the Province. The aircraft was cleared by the appropriate authorities to undertake such flights. As such the crew correctly complied with operational procedures whist flying over the Province. Once clear of any threat there was no reason for them to continue at low level. At the FAI it was stated that they did so for “training purposes”. Having said that, this was classed as an operational flight in a military aircraft. Military aircraft are not subject to the same restrictions as civil aircraft operating under the ANO. (Hence Spitfires over London – and me crossing the Atlantic in an Andover with a gravity feed ferry tank).
Your comment at the end was interesting – “A classic example of the dangers of two instructors flying together.” What of the dangers of the outgoing and incoming Detachment Commanders flying together?
The Board did find the reason for the accident; the crew attempted a cruise climb at 150kts/1000fpm when IMC approaching high ground. The AOC accepted the Board’s FINDINGS but did not accept their ASSESSMENT of Human Failings. The CinC concurred with the AOC’s view, as did CAS.
I did not arrive at I Gp until 2 weeks before the AOC "signed off" the BOI on 20 March 1995. I assisted GFSO in co-ordinating all the staff responses so that the AOC could formulate his Remarks. I do not have any recollection of being specifically asked for my advice by the AOC or CinC.
Basing
According to the BOI the first response to the 999 call was by a Police Landrover of Campletown Police. This was followed by Civilian Fire and Ambulance crews, together with a Civilian Doctor, and were followed by a Crash tender from RAF Machrihanish. RAF helicopters subsequently arrived carrying an RAF MRT to act as crash guard.
Ark Royal
Bravo a vous pour la riposte
Pulse 1
Apologies for missing your points; not “mind set”- just trying to catch up with some of the jobs I should have been doing around the House and Garden while it has temporarily stopped raining!!
Regarding risk assessment. Ideally this task should have been carried out by a fixed wing Comms Fleet aircraft – but there were none available that day. I do not even know if that option was the subject of a request. The option of Civil air flights was probably rejected on grounds of cost and security. The flight was tasked “in house” using the medium lift capacity afforded by the Chinook Detachment. I do not know what priority was placed on this task by those responsible for such matters.
We are told that the initial planning was carried out by a member of the other crew and we don’t know when the crew involved in the accident were given the chart or if the routing was discussed with them. We don’t know because that was not the evidence given to the BOI who were told on oath that Flt Lt Tapper did the planning on the night of 1 June 1994. Consequently such questions were never asked. We don’t know, therefore, what risk assessment was carried out at the planning stage.
As I have said before, it is my opinion that a re-routing around the forecast poor weather at the Mull would have been a sensible option but, as we don’t know when the crew received the chart, we don’t know if they had the time to replan the sortie because of their self imposed crew duty problem. Certainly the copy of the chart left behind showed no evidence of any alterations. I am informed that a medium level transit avoiding the poor weather at the Mull was an option available to them. The aircraft was not precluded from flying in IFR, it was precluded from flying in potential icing conditions below +4C. If, as you conjecture, Tapper may have thought the risk too high to transit IMC then why did the crew proceed to fly a routing that took them directly towards the forecast bad weather? The BOI, with the same forecast, decided that the conditions precluded VFR flight in the vicinity of the Mull.
Regarding “ the reliability of this relatively untried aircraft.” This was tasked as an operational flight in support of the security forces in the Province. The aircraft was cleared by the appropriate authorities to undertake such flights. As such the crew correctly complied with operational procedures whist flying over the Province. Once clear of any threat there was no reason for them to continue at low level. At the FAI it was stated that they did so for “training purposes”. Having said that, this was classed as an operational flight in a military aircraft. Military aircraft are not subject to the same restrictions as civil aircraft operating under the ANO. (Hence Spitfires over London – and me crossing the Atlantic in an Andover with a gravity feed ferry tank).
Your comment at the end was interesting – “A classic example of the dangers of two instructors flying together.” What of the dangers of the outgoing and incoming Detachment Commanders flying together?
Guest
Posts: n/a
Whilst not wishing to appear to be acting in the role of a moderator; may I suggest that, in view of the tragic news emanating from Kosovo regarding a fatal Puma crash, we suspend comments on this thread for 48 hours.
I appreciate that it is not my role to suggest this, but I feel that it would be an appropriate mark of respect for those who have lost their lives on Active Service if we did so.
I suggest we resume discussion on this thread WEF 1800 BST 11 April.
My condolences to those who have lost loved ones.
I appreciate that it is not my role to suggest this, but I feel that it would be an appropriate mark of respect for those who have lost their lives on Active Service if we did so.
I suggest we resume discussion on this thread WEF 1800 BST 11 April.
My condolences to those who have lost loved ones.
Guest
Posts: n/a
K52
I really don’t want to get all excited and see this degenerate into a tacky argument so please humour me as I try a new tack.
AP3207 – RAF Manual of Flight Safety, Chapter 8, Appendix G, page 9 at the time of this BoI:
ONLY IN CASES IN WHICH THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER SHOULD DECEASED AIRCREW BE FOUND NEGLIGENT
The BoI said:
SUMMARY OF CAUSES AND FACTORS
14. Cause. With no ADR or CVR, survivors or eyewitnesses, the Board based its findings on logical argument derived from the limited evidence available to it. There were many potential causes of the accident and despite detailed and in depth analysis, the Board was unable to determine a definite cause. However the most potential causes could be dismissed or considered unlikely, and the Board concluded that there were only 3 likely scenarios that could be considered fully consistent with the evidence. In deciding which one of these three was the most probable cause, the Board could not avoid a degree of speculation. However, after careful consideration, the Board concluded that the most probable cause of the accident was that the crew selected an inappropriate ROC to safely overfly the Mull of Kintyre.
And for you this becomes:
“The Board did find the reason for the accident; the crew attempted a cruise climb at 150kts/1000fpm when IMC approaching high ground”
Now I don’t mind what you THINK happened, however, I take exception to people who claim, publicly, to KNOW what happened, because of AP3207. Now please, please answer the question; where does the BoI state with ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER what caused this tragedy.
I honestly don’t mind what you think happened. I have been involved with flying for long enough to realise that it is from the crewroom discussion of accidents and incidents that I have learnt so much (for my humble brain anyway), however this thread is about removing the uncorroborated charge of gross negligence from John and Rick.
Your points and arguments have all been well founded and, I am sure, well intended, most probably posted for the reasons above; that we all may learn. Some points did not stand up to scrutiny but some made me sit back and look at areas of my own ‘norms’. I stand by my earlier comment that the RAF has lost out through the loss of the ‘senior spec aircrew Flt Lt’, this loss, combined with the reduction in numbers of aircrew and an obsession for trivial paperwork has led to the crewroom being a quite place!!!!!! However it is in that setting, the ‘old’ crewroom, that our former sparring should remain, as Joe Public, and the more capable politicians, would at best misunderstand and worst ‘cherry pick’ this thread.
So, once again, where is the ‘absolute’ in the findings of the BoI?
[This message has been edited by cheapseat (edited 11 April 2001).]
I really don’t want to get all excited and see this degenerate into a tacky argument so please humour me as I try a new tack.
AP3207 – RAF Manual of Flight Safety, Chapter 8, Appendix G, page 9 at the time of this BoI:
ONLY IN CASES IN WHICH THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER SHOULD DECEASED AIRCREW BE FOUND NEGLIGENT
The BoI said:
SUMMARY OF CAUSES AND FACTORS
14. Cause. With no ADR or CVR, survivors or eyewitnesses, the Board based its findings on logical argument derived from the limited evidence available to it. There were many potential causes of the accident and despite detailed and in depth analysis, the Board was unable to determine a definite cause. However the most potential causes could be dismissed or considered unlikely, and the Board concluded that there were only 3 likely scenarios that could be considered fully consistent with the evidence. In deciding which one of these three was the most probable cause, the Board could not avoid a degree of speculation. However, after careful consideration, the Board concluded that the most probable cause of the accident was that the crew selected an inappropriate ROC to safely overfly the Mull of Kintyre.
And for you this becomes:
“The Board did find the reason for the accident; the crew attempted a cruise climb at 150kts/1000fpm when IMC approaching high ground”
Now I don’t mind what you THINK happened, however, I take exception to people who claim, publicly, to KNOW what happened, because of AP3207. Now please, please answer the question; where does the BoI state with ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER what caused this tragedy.
I honestly don’t mind what you think happened. I have been involved with flying for long enough to realise that it is from the crewroom discussion of accidents and incidents that I have learnt so much (for my humble brain anyway), however this thread is about removing the uncorroborated charge of gross negligence from John and Rick.
Your points and arguments have all been well founded and, I am sure, well intended, most probably posted for the reasons above; that we all may learn. Some points did not stand up to scrutiny but some made me sit back and look at areas of my own ‘norms’. I stand by my earlier comment that the RAF has lost out through the loss of the ‘senior spec aircrew Flt Lt’, this loss, combined with the reduction in numbers of aircrew and an obsession for trivial paperwork has led to the crewroom being a quite place!!!!!! However it is in that setting, the ‘old’ crewroom, that our former sparring should remain, as Joe Public, and the more capable politicians, would at best misunderstand and worst ‘cherry pick’ this thread.
So, once again, where is the ‘absolute’ in the findings of the BoI?
[This message has been edited by cheapseat (edited 11 April 2001).]
Guest
Posts: n/a
cheapseat,
The Board did indeed decide that there were only 3 likely scenarios regarding the probable cause of the accident ONCE THE AIRCRAFT WAS IN A POSITION WHERE IT WAS UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH THE RULES OF VFR FLIGHT.
The 3 scenarios considered by the Board regarding the crews intentions were:
1. Appropriate ROC Determined but not flown.
2. No decision made on how to avoid the Mull.
3. Inappropriate ROC selected.
As OC RAF Odiham put it "The decision to be made was relatively simple and the courses of action available when approaching high ground in poor weather would have been ingrained in this crew, and indeed in all helicopter crews, since basic training. Those alternatives are: to slow down and if necessaty stop; turn away from high ground and if necessary turn back and, if a climb is required, to do so on a safe heading at full power at the maximum rate of climb speed to at least Safety Altitude."
AOC 1 Gp decided that the failure of this crew to carry out the actions required to "maintain safe flight" was the direct cause of this crash.
Which of the possible scenarios postulated by the Board is correct is irrelevant. They are just that - postulations as to the crews decision making and the execution of that decision.
What there is absolutely NO DOUBT ABOUT is that the crew should have avoided the Mull by carrying out one of the actions described by OC RAF Odiham and reiterated by the AOC in his remarks. This was also the opinion of the Board when it stated that "a suitable bad weather contingency plan would be required" at para 42 when discussing the weather forecast.
The Board did indeed decide that there were only 3 likely scenarios regarding the probable cause of the accident ONCE THE AIRCRAFT WAS IN A POSITION WHERE IT WAS UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH THE RULES OF VFR FLIGHT.
The 3 scenarios considered by the Board regarding the crews intentions were:
1. Appropriate ROC Determined but not flown.
2. No decision made on how to avoid the Mull.
3. Inappropriate ROC selected.
As OC RAF Odiham put it "The decision to be made was relatively simple and the courses of action available when approaching high ground in poor weather would have been ingrained in this crew, and indeed in all helicopter crews, since basic training. Those alternatives are: to slow down and if necessaty stop; turn away from high ground and if necessary turn back and, if a climb is required, to do so on a safe heading at full power at the maximum rate of climb speed to at least Safety Altitude."
AOC 1 Gp decided that the failure of this crew to carry out the actions required to "maintain safe flight" was the direct cause of this crash.
Which of the possible scenarios postulated by the Board is correct is irrelevant. They are just that - postulations as to the crews decision making and the execution of that decision.
What there is absolutely NO DOUBT ABOUT is that the crew should have avoided the Mull by carrying out one of the actions described by OC RAF Odiham and reiterated by the AOC in his remarks. This was also the opinion of the Board when it stated that "a suitable bad weather contingency plan would be required" at para 42 when discussing the weather forecast.