Chinook - Hit Back Here
Guest
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Pulse1
The President of the Board does not need to review anything, that is partly what this case is all about. The boards findings were:
"insufficient evidence to support a finding of negligence on his (captain's) part"
and
"no human failings could be attributed to the co-pilot"
It was the reviewing officers who made up the final verdict.
The President of the Board does not need to review anything, that is partly what this case is all about. The boards findings were:
"insufficient evidence to support a finding of negligence on his (captain's) part"
and
"no human failings could be attributed to the co-pilot"
It was the reviewing officers who made up the final verdict.
Guest
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The available eye-witness evidence was that they DID slow down approaching the Mull. All that is known from evidence is that subsequently the aircraft hit the ground at very high speed, which suggests that something possibly went wrong with the aircraft.
What happened in between is the uncertain part. Uncertainty and lack of evidence is the key to this whole debate. If there was sufficient evidence to prove without doubt the crew were the only factor (not theory or supposition based on a lack of real understanding of SH, K52) none of us would have any real problem with this.
In my OPINION, this was a management accident if ever there was one. Those involved could and should have prevented it -because this aircraft should not have been operational or even in use for crew training, let alone used for such an important mission. The hierarchy elected not to do so and subsequently developed sloping and Teflon coated shoulders when the accident proved their ill-founded over- confidence to be flawed. The Mk2 had bypassed the RAF's own requirements for acceptance into service because the test pilots refused to continue with the test programme because of uncertainties over the FADEC problems previously experienced. The true responsibility surely lies between MOD and Squadron.
What happened in between is the uncertain part. Uncertainty and lack of evidence is the key to this whole debate. If there was sufficient evidence to prove without doubt the crew were the only factor (not theory or supposition based on a lack of real understanding of SH, K52) none of us would have any real problem with this.
In my OPINION, this was a management accident if ever there was one. Those involved could and should have prevented it -because this aircraft should not have been operational or even in use for crew training, let alone used for such an important mission. The hierarchy elected not to do so and subsequently developed sloping and Teflon coated shoulders when the accident proved their ill-founded over- confidence to be flawed. The Mk2 had bypassed the RAF's own requirements for acceptance into service because the test pilots refused to continue with the test programme because of uncertainties over the FADEC problems previously experienced. The true responsibility surely lies between MOD and Squadron.
Guest
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I can't believe this. I haven't checked on this thread for yonks and now am amazed to see that its reached 55 pages. Haven't you blokes got anything better to do? Look, it's the old old story. Flying low level to impress the Pongos in the back (done it myself many times) press on in sea fog...low level...forget that the lumpy bits are coming up..and we all know the end. So lets just let it drop shall we?
Guest
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Hi Percy,
I've always said that all views are welcome. However, if visiting here upsets you so much, it's quite simple.......don't.
Regards
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
[This message has been edited by Brian Dixon (edited 29 March 2001).]
I've always said that all views are welcome. However, if visiting here upsets you so much, it's quite simple.......don't.
Regards
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
[This message has been edited by Brian Dixon (edited 29 March 2001).]
Guest
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To retain the thread before it is lost; There is no way that Jon Tapper or Rick Cook flew this CH 47c into the Mull without having a damn good engineering reason not to do so: ie they had no choice. Graeme Forbes and Kev Hardie would have done (and I'm sure did do)everything in their power to keep this a/c flying. One can only surmise that whatevever happened was outwith the ability of the(extremely able) crew to deal with. Regardless of whoevere had hands on at the time of impact, regardless of whoever was designated Captain, an injustice remains...
Guest
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I was reading "Fly Navy" over the weekend ( bear with me, there is some relevance ) and came across a description of the resuce of the SAS troops stuck on Fortuna Glacier in mid 1982. One of the Wessex pilots was named as Flt Lt Pulford ( no first name ).
Two questions. First, might this be the same Andy Pulford who was the investigating officer on the BOI ? Secondly, I seem to remember that Wratten recently said in an interview that the person running the BOI was inexperienced. If the two Pulfords are one and the same, how did Wratten come to that conclusion, given that this one experience alone would be bound to imbue some understanding of SH ops ?
Two questions. First, might this be the same Andy Pulford who was the investigating officer on the BOI ? Secondly, I seem to remember that Wratten recently said in an interview that the person running the BOI was inexperienced. If the two Pulfords are one and the same, how did Wratten come to that conclusion, given that this one experience alone would be bound to imbue some understanding of SH ops ?
Guest
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Nr Fairy
Indeed one and the same. Andy was with porky pies (845) for a couple of years and was a very experienced SH man by the time of the Mull.
His examination of the evidence would have been most thorough and his conclusions sound.
Wratten's SH experience can be summed up on the back of a postage stamp written with felt tip marker!
Indeed one and the same. Andy was with porky pies (845) for a couple of years and was a very experienced SH man by the time of the Mull.
His examination of the evidence would have been most thorough and his conclusions sound.
Wratten's SH experience can be summed up on the back of a postage stamp written with felt tip marker!
Guest
Posts: n/a
Nr Fairy,
Assuming you are thinking of the Newsnight interview, how do you know that he was referring to their flying experience? He could have been referring to their political inexperience which made them put integrity and justice before the convenience of their masters.
Yes, I know that is unthinkable, almost as unthinkable as……..um…, I know, .... two very experienced SH pilots flying straight into a hill they knew was there.
------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
Assuming you are thinking of the Newsnight interview, how do you know that he was referring to their flying experience? He could have been referring to their political inexperience which made them put integrity and justice before the convenience of their masters.
Yes, I know that is unthinkable, almost as unthinkable as……..um…, I know, .... two very experienced SH pilots flying straight into a hill they knew was there.
------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
Guest
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Percy Dragon – have you not realized that anyone who invades this thread without being a true believer in the cause is automatically a numbskull/without any relevant experience/ unable to think for themselves or willfully pushing the party line.
First, a thank-you to those who have contacted me deprecating the personal abuse. I also see no need for it; but I suppose that they think that, as it disposed of (in a particularly vicious form) Pilgarlic, then it will work on me.
I was surprised, to say the least, to learn that the SH branch of the RAF would NEVER adjust the way they fly to suit the task in hand. I had always understood that the RAF became, and continues to be, a very effective Fighting Force PRECISELY because it adapted to changing conditions. I equally always understood that SH supported the forces IN THE FIELD. When tasked to do something completely different (such as a daytime passenger transit flight - as AOC 1 Gp put it); I see no reason why, once clear of the operating constraints of the Theatre, they could not adjust the mode of operation instead of continuing at low level “ for training purposes”: as evidence given at the FAI informs us. Incidentally, Lord Rathcavan, in his speech of 01/11/99, said “Most of us in Northern Ireland are used to the familiar throb of the double rotor Chinooks as they cruise across the countryside, usually at a height of 5000ft.”
I also am informed that I know little, or nothing, of low level flying (being a “Truckie”). I do seem to remember from the 60’s that the drop height for SEAC packs was 60ft and I certainly remember self authorizing my VIP aircraft, during an Operation, with a MSD of not ABOVE 100ft. Nor do 4 years as an Instructor on SORF seem to count (for those under 45 that was when the RAF was big enough to require a specialist FTS occupying 2 airfields just to carry out Refresher Training – with a Course every fortnight!).
The person who informed me of this is also of the opinion that his 1800 hours as First Officer on an Airline equates to my 19 years on the Transport Fleet. I realize that Civilianisation and Contractorisation have made deep inroads into the RAF but I didn’t realise that such activities as Para drops/ Halo/ 1ton drops/ ULLA/ STOL/ Aeromed etc had been parceled out to the Airlines. Of course, I do not know which Airline that person flies for. I wish I did, as any Airline which allows its Flight Deck crew to read The Times at 35000ft over the North Sea is one I would wish to steer clear of.
However, let us turn to the “refusal of the Test Pilots to fly the Chinook”. For some unaccountable reason we at HQ 1 Gp never got to hear about that. The story that WE got was that, as Boscombe were awaiting further data from the manufacturer on icing characteristics, an Engineering Management decision was taken to bring forward some pre-planned maintenance so that when the data became available the icing trials could proceed without interruption.
Likewise, the allegation that there were NO check lists. If that were the case then could someone please explain how the BOI could observe “ The Chinook HC2 FRC’s valid at the time of the accident were confusing”.
One other point. As the responsible Flight Safety Officer at HQ 1 GP may I ask what became of all the incident reports regarding FADEC failure resulting in UFCM’s? I do not recollect ever seeing one. Nor am I aware of any accidents involving RAF Chinooks following a FADEC failure. There may have been some since I left the Service but no-one on this thread has referred to them.
Now, I KNOW I shouldn’t – but I feel the need for a few ripostes:
Shy Torque
(1) The aircraft WAS cleared to fly IFR. The limitation was no flight in POTENTIAL icing conditions at an OAT below +4 C True. If they had routed clear of the Mull then they could quite easily have flown IFR at medium level to Fort George.
(2) “Responsibility lies between MOD and the Squadron.” Well, MOD had cleared the aircraft for service use and had laid down the limitations for its use. The interpretation of this clearance for Squadron use was down to that Officer who was in charge of Flying Operations on that Unit. In this case it was a Detatchment and, as such, supervisory functions were vested in the Detatchment Commander. The Captain of ZD 576 was the outgoing Detatchment Commander and the Co-Pilot was the incoming Detatchment Commander.
(3) Nearly forgot – SH QFI long before my first tour? Was that Whirlwind 10’s or the Bristol 2 rotor masterpiece? I joined, was Commissioned and started my Flying Training Course at 18 and my pension becomes index linked in 4 months.
Ark Royal
“ Low level in marginal weather, no comms due to altitude, flying manually”. Yes, it sounds just like the Gulf in the 60’s - particularly when you are looking for an airstrip and the maps have a dotted line 12 nm inland from the coast and the legend “ End of Reliable Relief Information”.
Or perhaps you would have preferred (from the perspective of your current employment) landing at the airstrip at Saiq – 1200ft long/ 80ft wide and 5500ft up a mountain (OAT +35C). The real problem was that the rest of the 9000ft mountain was right at the end of the strip!!! To take off again you had to do a 3-point turn (yes, we did have reverse) – but then you could just taxi off. You had 5500ft to gain flying speed! At the bottom of the mountain was another strip called Firq – yes you guessed, we had a tie made with the motto 4 Firq-Saiq.
Pulse 1
I agree. The AOC did agree that the sortie was properly planned. HE, however, was under the impression (as were the BOI in view of the evidence given to them on oath) that the Captain of ZD576 had planned the sortie. At the FAI it appears that the person who gave that evidence to the BOI changed his story and stated that HE HIMSELF had done the planning. So, we do not know whether the Captain of ZD576 would have chosen that routing himself and, as we don’t even know when he was given the chart, we don’t know whether he had enough time to make any changes given the crew duty constraints he had placed on himself.
-------------------------------
Pub User
I put the demarcation line in because you have always been very polite.
AOC 1 Gp was the Convening Officer of the BOI and issued its Terms Of Reference. Those TOR’s required the BOI to give their OPINION regarding Human Failings. As the AOC makes quite clear in his Remarks he considered these but then goes on to say “ The crew of ZD576 neither maintained Visual Flight Rules nor made a safe transition to Instrument Flight Rules. ----- In my judgement, none of the possible factors and scenarios are so strong that they would have been likely to prevent such an experienced crew from maintaining safe flight.”
First, a thank-you to those who have contacted me deprecating the personal abuse. I also see no need for it; but I suppose that they think that, as it disposed of (in a particularly vicious form) Pilgarlic, then it will work on me.
I was surprised, to say the least, to learn that the SH branch of the RAF would NEVER adjust the way they fly to suit the task in hand. I had always understood that the RAF became, and continues to be, a very effective Fighting Force PRECISELY because it adapted to changing conditions. I equally always understood that SH supported the forces IN THE FIELD. When tasked to do something completely different (such as a daytime passenger transit flight - as AOC 1 Gp put it); I see no reason why, once clear of the operating constraints of the Theatre, they could not adjust the mode of operation instead of continuing at low level “ for training purposes”: as evidence given at the FAI informs us. Incidentally, Lord Rathcavan, in his speech of 01/11/99, said “Most of us in Northern Ireland are used to the familiar throb of the double rotor Chinooks as they cruise across the countryside, usually at a height of 5000ft.”
I also am informed that I know little, or nothing, of low level flying (being a “Truckie”). I do seem to remember from the 60’s that the drop height for SEAC packs was 60ft and I certainly remember self authorizing my VIP aircraft, during an Operation, with a MSD of not ABOVE 100ft. Nor do 4 years as an Instructor on SORF seem to count (for those under 45 that was when the RAF was big enough to require a specialist FTS occupying 2 airfields just to carry out Refresher Training – with a Course every fortnight!).
The person who informed me of this is also of the opinion that his 1800 hours as First Officer on an Airline equates to my 19 years on the Transport Fleet. I realize that Civilianisation and Contractorisation have made deep inroads into the RAF but I didn’t realise that such activities as Para drops/ Halo/ 1ton drops/ ULLA/ STOL/ Aeromed etc had been parceled out to the Airlines. Of course, I do not know which Airline that person flies for. I wish I did, as any Airline which allows its Flight Deck crew to read The Times at 35000ft over the North Sea is one I would wish to steer clear of.
However, let us turn to the “refusal of the Test Pilots to fly the Chinook”. For some unaccountable reason we at HQ 1 Gp never got to hear about that. The story that WE got was that, as Boscombe were awaiting further data from the manufacturer on icing characteristics, an Engineering Management decision was taken to bring forward some pre-planned maintenance so that when the data became available the icing trials could proceed without interruption.
Likewise, the allegation that there were NO check lists. If that were the case then could someone please explain how the BOI could observe “ The Chinook HC2 FRC’s valid at the time of the accident were confusing”.
One other point. As the responsible Flight Safety Officer at HQ 1 GP may I ask what became of all the incident reports regarding FADEC failure resulting in UFCM’s? I do not recollect ever seeing one. Nor am I aware of any accidents involving RAF Chinooks following a FADEC failure. There may have been some since I left the Service but no-one on this thread has referred to them.
Now, I KNOW I shouldn’t – but I feel the need for a few ripostes:
Shy Torque
(1) The aircraft WAS cleared to fly IFR. The limitation was no flight in POTENTIAL icing conditions at an OAT below +4 C True. If they had routed clear of the Mull then they could quite easily have flown IFR at medium level to Fort George.
(2) “Responsibility lies between MOD and the Squadron.” Well, MOD had cleared the aircraft for service use and had laid down the limitations for its use. The interpretation of this clearance for Squadron use was down to that Officer who was in charge of Flying Operations on that Unit. In this case it was a Detatchment and, as such, supervisory functions were vested in the Detatchment Commander. The Captain of ZD 576 was the outgoing Detatchment Commander and the Co-Pilot was the incoming Detatchment Commander.
(3) Nearly forgot – SH QFI long before my first tour? Was that Whirlwind 10’s or the Bristol 2 rotor masterpiece? I joined, was Commissioned and started my Flying Training Course at 18 and my pension becomes index linked in 4 months.
Ark Royal
“ Low level in marginal weather, no comms due to altitude, flying manually”. Yes, it sounds just like the Gulf in the 60’s - particularly when you are looking for an airstrip and the maps have a dotted line 12 nm inland from the coast and the legend “ End of Reliable Relief Information”.
Or perhaps you would have preferred (from the perspective of your current employment) landing at the airstrip at Saiq – 1200ft long/ 80ft wide and 5500ft up a mountain (OAT +35C). The real problem was that the rest of the 9000ft mountain was right at the end of the strip!!! To take off again you had to do a 3-point turn (yes, we did have reverse) – but then you could just taxi off. You had 5500ft to gain flying speed! At the bottom of the mountain was another strip called Firq – yes you guessed, we had a tie made with the motto 4 Firq-Saiq.
Pulse 1
I agree. The AOC did agree that the sortie was properly planned. HE, however, was under the impression (as were the BOI in view of the evidence given to them on oath) that the Captain of ZD576 had planned the sortie. At the FAI it appears that the person who gave that evidence to the BOI changed his story and stated that HE HIMSELF had done the planning. So, we do not know whether the Captain of ZD576 would have chosen that routing himself and, as we don’t even know when he was given the chart, we don’t know whether he had enough time to make any changes given the crew duty constraints he had placed on himself.
-------------------------------
Pub User
I put the demarcation line in because you have always been very polite.
AOC 1 Gp was the Convening Officer of the BOI and issued its Terms Of Reference. Those TOR’s required the BOI to give their OPINION regarding Human Failings. As the AOC makes quite clear in his Remarks he considered these but then goes on to say “ The crew of ZD576 neither maintained Visual Flight Rules nor made a safe transition to Instrument Flight Rules. ----- In my judgement, none of the possible factors and scenarios are so strong that they would have been likely to prevent such an experienced crew from maintaining safe flight.”
Guest
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K52
Those who 'invade this thread' (your words) are not automatically considered 'numbskulls'. Some have earned that discription. You are not one of them.
I enjoy our sparring, as your views are as valid as any, and you have raised many good points and many which betray a lack of knowledge of things SH. I have obviously incurred your displeasure because I do not agree with much of your reasoning. I have not been diliberately rude to you, and if my passionate feelings about this case have led to the odd intemperate reposte, I apologise.
Granted, my 1800 hours of airline flying do not make me an expert in your field of aviation. I have never asserted that this experience equates to your impressive past. That is why you will not find me using that inexperience to judge my colleagues.
I equally ask that you respect my 16 year SH career as allowing me to speak of that genre with more authority than yourself.
Now, tell me with a straight face that you NEVER whipped out some non-relevant reading material during a long and boring cruise.
To your response to Shytorque's assertion that the blame lies with the MOD, it was not possible for Jon and Rick to fefuse to fly the Mk2. They had voiced their misgivings and been overruled. Like the loyal Officers they were, they accepted the task. Had they known the support they were to posthumously receive from the RAF, they may have chosen a different course of action.
Those who 'invade this thread' (your words) are not automatically considered 'numbskulls'. Some have earned that discription. You are not one of them.
I enjoy our sparring, as your views are as valid as any, and you have raised many good points and many which betray a lack of knowledge of things SH. I have obviously incurred your displeasure because I do not agree with much of your reasoning. I have not been diliberately rude to you, and if my passionate feelings about this case have led to the odd intemperate reposte, I apologise.
Granted, my 1800 hours of airline flying do not make me an expert in your field of aviation. I have never asserted that this experience equates to your impressive past. That is why you will not find me using that inexperience to judge my colleagues.
I equally ask that you respect my 16 year SH career as allowing me to speak of that genre with more authority than yourself.
Now, tell me with a straight face that you NEVER whipped out some non-relevant reading material during a long and boring cruise.
To your response to Shytorque's assertion that the blame lies with the MOD, it was not possible for Jon and Rick to fefuse to fly the Mk2. They had voiced their misgivings and been overruled. Like the loyal Officers they were, they accepted the task. Had they known the support they were to posthumously receive from the RAF, they may have chosen a different course of action.
Guest
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Since the beginning of time, aircrew have flown in to the side of hills. Indeed, the recent events concerning 2 x F15 in Scotland seems to bear this fact out. On how many of these occassions has an aircrew mate been found guilty of gross negligence?
Guest
Posts: n/a
Ark Royal,
Thank you for the kind words. I have never considered myself as an “invader” as I was involved before the BOI was published – albeit as the junior member of the Flight Safety team at 1Gp.
Now, with my very best straight face, the answer is NO – not on the Flight Deck. Perhaps the reason was that I have never had a boring flight. Exhilarating, wondrous, exciting and even, on the odd occasion, frightening – but never boring. If someone wanted a break on a long flight they went down the back.
If the Pilots of ZD576 felt that the aircraft was unsafe for the planned task then they not only had a right to refuse that task – they had a positive duty to do so. They were the experts on the spot and the executive officers of the Detachment. Moreover, why were no incident reports raised or the matter raised with their Sqn chain of command?
Yes, I remember the newspaper article about a “memo” that appeared 6 years after the crash. No one had heard of that “memo” before that article appeared: it was certainly never mentioned to the BOI. There does, however, appear to be at least one reporter on the Scottish Herald who sources his articles from this thread and then adds a few embellishments quoting “sources”. With me I.B.?
I totally acknowledge your expertise gathered during your years of RN SH flying. You will, I trust, allow me to lean towards the view of an Officer whose period of service on SH was far longer than yours (and in an RAF environment); and covered a far broader spectrum of aircraft and responsibilities than yours – including service on the Chinook.
Smooth Approach
That is a difficult question. My memory is good – but not that encyclopedic. You limited it to people who have flown into hills. However for starters (and not limiting it to hills) - how about the Captain of Argosy XR 133 who crashed at Got-El-Afrag on 7th May 1968. It wasn’t really his fault, the groundcrew hadn’t issued a NOTAM regarding the 18ft high improvised shower that they had constructed during the Exercise and it was that which his wing clipped during the unauthorized beat-up at the end of the Exercise. The crew were all killed – as were all the Army Pax.
Then there was, at about the same time, the period when we lost 3 Shackleton’s in 6 weeks. Perhaps the one that was last seen doing a wingover during its “beat up” of a Frigate would fit the bill. The next thing the Frigate crew saw was the splash as it hit the sea.
As a Flight Safety man I asked the statisticians at IFS how many accidents there had been during my time in the RAF. The answer worked out at slightly greater than one for every 15 days – and I served for 11.371 days.
Thank you for the kind words. I have never considered myself as an “invader” as I was involved before the BOI was published – albeit as the junior member of the Flight Safety team at 1Gp.
Now, with my very best straight face, the answer is NO – not on the Flight Deck. Perhaps the reason was that I have never had a boring flight. Exhilarating, wondrous, exciting and even, on the odd occasion, frightening – but never boring. If someone wanted a break on a long flight they went down the back.
If the Pilots of ZD576 felt that the aircraft was unsafe for the planned task then they not only had a right to refuse that task – they had a positive duty to do so. They were the experts on the spot and the executive officers of the Detachment. Moreover, why were no incident reports raised or the matter raised with their Sqn chain of command?
Yes, I remember the newspaper article about a “memo” that appeared 6 years after the crash. No one had heard of that “memo” before that article appeared: it was certainly never mentioned to the BOI. There does, however, appear to be at least one reporter on the Scottish Herald who sources his articles from this thread and then adds a few embellishments quoting “sources”. With me I.B.?
I totally acknowledge your expertise gathered during your years of RN SH flying. You will, I trust, allow me to lean towards the view of an Officer whose period of service on SH was far longer than yours (and in an RAF environment); and covered a far broader spectrum of aircraft and responsibilities than yours – including service on the Chinook.
Smooth Approach
That is a difficult question. My memory is good – but not that encyclopedic. You limited it to people who have flown into hills. However for starters (and not limiting it to hills) - how about the Captain of Argosy XR 133 who crashed at Got-El-Afrag on 7th May 1968. It wasn’t really his fault, the groundcrew hadn’t issued a NOTAM regarding the 18ft high improvised shower that they had constructed during the Exercise and it was that which his wing clipped during the unauthorized beat-up at the end of the Exercise. The crew were all killed – as were all the Army Pax.
Then there was, at about the same time, the period when we lost 3 Shackleton’s in 6 weeks. Perhaps the one that was last seen doing a wingover during its “beat up” of a Frigate would fit the bill. The next thing the Frigate crew saw was the splash as it hit the sea.
As a Flight Safety man I asked the statisticians at IFS how many accidents there had been during my time in the RAF. The answer worked out at slightly greater than one for every 15 days – and I served for 11.371 days.
Guest
Posts: n/a
"If the Pilots of ZD576 felt that the aircraft was unsafe for the planned task then they not only had a right to refuse that task – they had a positive duty to do so. They were the experts on the spot and the executive officers of the Detachment."
Might they not have been acting under orders, B52? Perhaps they had limited choices.
Might they not have been acting under orders, B52? Perhaps they had limited choices.
Guest
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earswentpop
You have such an elegant turn of phrase.
When last seen (by the yachtsman) the Chinook was 2-3nm from the Mull at 200-400ft in straight and level flight. At that point in time they either were, or were imminently about to become, IMC. Depending on the accuracy of the position given by the yachtsman they had between 40-70 seconds to go to impact. IF they had a major emergency at that time, which prevented them from turning away from the high ground or climbing to SALT, then they had ample time to get the Pax and Rear Crew strapped in (and in the crash landing posture) – Squawk EMERGENCY – and yell MAYDAY on some of the radios (not all because the VHF was switched OFF).
If they did NOT have a major emergency at that time which prevented them from turning away or climbing to SALT then they should have taken positive steps to maintain VMC. The first rule in any emergency is FLY THE AIRCRAFT.
THEY DID NONE OF THESE THINGS
The most depressing thing about being a Flight Safety Officer is that people keep making the same mistakes. I mentioned in my last post about the time we lost 3 Shackletons in 6 weeks. Having checked on the Shackleton Association web site I find I exaggerated by 4 days. WL786 ditched 120nm W of Sumatra on 5/11/67 after an engine failure/fire. WR 976 was next on 19/11/67 180nm from Lands End beating up the Frigate and that was followed on 21/12/67 by XF 702, which crashed in Invernesshire after experiencing severe icing.
There was then a (very) short break before WB 833 crashed on 19/4/68. The cause – continuing to fly at low level in poor visibility until they hit the Mull of Kintyre.
If we move on to accidents within the memory of most of those still serving then we find Shackleton WR 966 hitting high ground on South Harris while flying IMC at low level on 30/4/90. They had mis-identified the inlet that they were flying up. There were lots of findings of negligence on that one – the navigator was not even current on type.
You have such an elegant turn of phrase.
When last seen (by the yachtsman) the Chinook was 2-3nm from the Mull at 200-400ft in straight and level flight. At that point in time they either were, or were imminently about to become, IMC. Depending on the accuracy of the position given by the yachtsman they had between 40-70 seconds to go to impact. IF they had a major emergency at that time, which prevented them from turning away from the high ground or climbing to SALT, then they had ample time to get the Pax and Rear Crew strapped in (and in the crash landing posture) – Squawk EMERGENCY – and yell MAYDAY on some of the radios (not all because the VHF was switched OFF).
If they did NOT have a major emergency at that time which prevented them from turning away or climbing to SALT then they should have taken positive steps to maintain VMC. The first rule in any emergency is FLY THE AIRCRAFT.
THEY DID NONE OF THESE THINGS
The most depressing thing about being a Flight Safety Officer is that people keep making the same mistakes. I mentioned in my last post about the time we lost 3 Shackletons in 6 weeks. Having checked on the Shackleton Association web site I find I exaggerated by 4 days. WL786 ditched 120nm W of Sumatra on 5/11/67 after an engine failure/fire. WR 976 was next on 19/11/67 180nm from Lands End beating up the Frigate and that was followed on 21/12/67 by XF 702, which crashed in Invernesshire after experiencing severe icing.
There was then a (very) short break before WB 833 crashed on 19/4/68. The cause – continuing to fly at low level in poor visibility until they hit the Mull of Kintyre.
If we move on to accidents within the memory of most of those still serving then we find Shackleton WR 966 hitting high ground on South Harris while flying IMC at low level on 30/4/90. They had mis-identified the inlet that they were flying up. There were lots of findings of negligence on that one – the navigator was not even current on type.
Guest
Posts: n/a
K52,
Thank you for responding to my comment on the flight planning. I am sorry if you were offended by my criticism but I do think that any implied allegations should be supported by facts or, at least, good argument. In most cases this is what you have done very well.
As you say yourself “we don’t know” how much effort was put in to checking this plan. If it had been thoroughly checked by Fl Lt Tapper, it must be completely irrelevant who prepared it in the first place. As such it does not seem reasonable to imply, without solid evidence, that the planning had been anything less than careful.
The important factor to me is that the BOI and everyone else, except Wratten who did not refer to it at all, believed that the flight had been planned as a low level, VFR flight. More importantly, they all agreed that it was acceptable to plan a passenger flight on this basis and, in doing this, they presumably took into account the forecast and actual weather at Machrihanish (30% probability that VFR flight would be impossible in the vicinity of the Mull).
Now, like you, I find it a bit surprising that a passenger flight should be planned on these terms, particularly when you consider additional limitations on icing for the Mk 2 Chinook (only 400’ between MSA and FORECAST icing limit - BOI says that “Tapper decided that IFR flight was unwise” How did they know that?). Now, if the SH lobby condemn you for commenting on their operating procedures, they will probably vilify or ignore someone like me for daring to support this sort of question. Incidentally I have privately aired this with several SH contacts and retired people like yourself who have immense RAF experience, mostly in fast jets. To a man, the SH pilots said they would have done the same thing. A friend of mine who has credentials at least as good as yours tells me that there is no such thing as a passenger flight – it is classed as either training or operational. If this is true, and you would know this better than I, it reveals a mind set which would tend to question your belief that the RAF has always depended on flexibility and possibly suggests that it depends too much on rules. It also raises the question as to whether the passengers had signed an indemnity form, especially as some of them were civilians.
Having thought long and hard about this, I have come to the conclusion that, the fact that there were passengers in the back has no relevance in fact to the cause of the accident. However, if you are suggesting that they were negligent because they were carrying passengers on such a flight, this raises two questions (I know you told me to stop asking them but I can’t help it):
1. Would they have been found negligent if they had not been carrying passengers? (I guess that this is the same question raised previously about other CFIT accidents leading to a finding of gross negligence)
2. IF it was unwise to carry out a passenger flight under these conditions in this aircraft, absence of any hint of criticism from the BOI and reviewing officers tell me that high risk passenger flying is considered to be acceptable for SH, and Fl Lt’s Tapper and Cook should not have to carry the can for that. They, like all other SH pilots appear to have been trained to believe that it’s OK to take such risks with passengers. Surely, the officers responsible for the whole SH operation should take responsibility for that?
Whatever, I am more than ever convinced by your dependence on speculation, in defending your own opinion, that the names of the pilots of ZD 576 should be cleared, and I hope that this will result from the efforts of the House of Lords select committee. If the committee investigates the whole question of passenger flying under these conditions, I hope they will place the responsibility where it belongs, recognising that, although the pilots were theoretically free to refuse the task, the well known contributory factors in many accidents, management and peer group pressure, were probably abundant in this case.
Incidentally, why did you initially give examples of CFIT which followed unauthorised beat ups? I see no similarity with the Chinook crash unless you are indulging in a little mischievous spin.
Referring to your accident statistics, I am sure that they have improved in recent years (nothing to do with you having left I suppose?) but I am constantly amazed by the low accident rate of the modern RAF, considering the amount of low level flying carried out. This must be a testimony to the excellent training and skills of the aircrews. However, practice and training reduces risk to an acceptable level, it does not remove it. Low flying will always be risky and, in this case, Fl Lt Tapper considered that medium level IFR was also risky under the prevailing circumstances. In my view, unless the cause can be positively attributed to pilot error, as in some of your examples, the present finding of negligence is, in my view, an abrogation of responsibility of those in command.
Now, if you think you have been condemned, just wait to see what happens to me.
------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
Thank you for responding to my comment on the flight planning. I am sorry if you were offended by my criticism but I do think that any implied allegations should be supported by facts or, at least, good argument. In most cases this is what you have done very well.
As you say yourself “we don’t know” how much effort was put in to checking this plan. If it had been thoroughly checked by Fl Lt Tapper, it must be completely irrelevant who prepared it in the first place. As such it does not seem reasonable to imply, without solid evidence, that the planning had been anything less than careful.
The important factor to me is that the BOI and everyone else, except Wratten who did not refer to it at all, believed that the flight had been planned as a low level, VFR flight. More importantly, they all agreed that it was acceptable to plan a passenger flight on this basis and, in doing this, they presumably took into account the forecast and actual weather at Machrihanish (30% probability that VFR flight would be impossible in the vicinity of the Mull).
Now, like you, I find it a bit surprising that a passenger flight should be planned on these terms, particularly when you consider additional limitations on icing for the Mk 2 Chinook (only 400’ between MSA and FORECAST icing limit - BOI says that “Tapper decided that IFR flight was unwise” How did they know that?). Now, if the SH lobby condemn you for commenting on their operating procedures, they will probably vilify or ignore someone like me for daring to support this sort of question. Incidentally I have privately aired this with several SH contacts and retired people like yourself who have immense RAF experience, mostly in fast jets. To a man, the SH pilots said they would have done the same thing. A friend of mine who has credentials at least as good as yours tells me that there is no such thing as a passenger flight – it is classed as either training or operational. If this is true, and you would know this better than I, it reveals a mind set which would tend to question your belief that the RAF has always depended on flexibility and possibly suggests that it depends too much on rules. It also raises the question as to whether the passengers had signed an indemnity form, especially as some of them were civilians.
Having thought long and hard about this, I have come to the conclusion that, the fact that there were passengers in the back has no relevance in fact to the cause of the accident. However, if you are suggesting that they were negligent because they were carrying passengers on such a flight, this raises two questions (I know you told me to stop asking them but I can’t help it):
1. Would they have been found negligent if they had not been carrying passengers? (I guess that this is the same question raised previously about other CFIT accidents leading to a finding of gross negligence)
2. IF it was unwise to carry out a passenger flight under these conditions in this aircraft, absence of any hint of criticism from the BOI and reviewing officers tell me that high risk passenger flying is considered to be acceptable for SH, and Fl Lt’s Tapper and Cook should not have to carry the can for that. They, like all other SH pilots appear to have been trained to believe that it’s OK to take such risks with passengers. Surely, the officers responsible for the whole SH operation should take responsibility for that?
Whatever, I am more than ever convinced by your dependence on speculation, in defending your own opinion, that the names of the pilots of ZD 576 should be cleared, and I hope that this will result from the efforts of the House of Lords select committee. If the committee investigates the whole question of passenger flying under these conditions, I hope they will place the responsibility where it belongs, recognising that, although the pilots were theoretically free to refuse the task, the well known contributory factors in many accidents, management and peer group pressure, were probably abundant in this case.
Incidentally, why did you initially give examples of CFIT which followed unauthorised beat ups? I see no similarity with the Chinook crash unless you are indulging in a little mischievous spin.
Referring to your accident statistics, I am sure that they have improved in recent years (nothing to do with you having left I suppose?) but I am constantly amazed by the low accident rate of the modern RAF, considering the amount of low level flying carried out. This must be a testimony to the excellent training and skills of the aircrews. However, practice and training reduces risk to an acceptable level, it does not remove it. Low flying will always be risky and, in this case, Fl Lt Tapper considered that medium level IFR was also risky under the prevailing circumstances. In my view, unless the cause can be positively attributed to pilot error, as in some of your examples, the present finding of negligence is, in my view, an abrogation of responsibility of those in command.
Now, if you think you have been condemned, just wait to see what happens to me.
------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"