Chinook - Hit Back Here
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Swash,
absolutely right!
This is a good indicator of the feelings surrounding this injustice. I make sure I refer to the thread in each of my letters to Ministers, MoD etc. Hopefully someone will take notice. You may also remember that the thread was mentioned on Newsnight after the PAC Report was published.
Lord Chalfont is well aware too.
Thanks for the support
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
absolutely right!
This is a good indicator of the feelings surrounding this injustice. I make sure I refer to the thread in each of my letters to Ministers, MoD etc. Hopefully someone will take notice. You may also remember that the thread was mentioned on Newsnight after the PAC Report was published.
Lord Chalfont is well aware too.
Thanks for the support
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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K52
I can relate to your single frequency over the Iraqi border. If it weren’t for BEagle et al (I assume) I too would have had many a lonely evening trying to keep Iraq/Kuwait in their O Level positions.
How about a little story. You stoophed in (not in my speil chocker, sorry) over The Pond for no reason other than you hit the bridge wing on a vessel no more than 150 feet asl. Lets say all the wreckage (less 20% to make it a fair fight) was found. There’s much gnashing of teeth but it just looks like you flew, flat out, at that ship. Worse, the ship was under tow and the Skipper of the Tug Bulstrode said he was in cloud, not 200 yds away. Well, I guess that’s gross negligence then.
Oh, and by the way, I’m on SAR and not every call on 243 is heard. FACT.
This comes across all negative (hence the edit). Sorry. I really, really like the dit about the sim. Guess this is why we need to keep the experience levels up: Good times when the tilly’s swinging!!!!
[This message has been edited by cheapseat (edited 24 March 2001).]
I can relate to your single frequency over the Iraqi border. If it weren’t for BEagle et al (I assume) I too would have had many a lonely evening trying to keep Iraq/Kuwait in their O Level positions.
How about a little story. You stoophed in (not in my speil chocker, sorry) over The Pond for no reason other than you hit the bridge wing on a vessel no more than 150 feet asl. Lets say all the wreckage (less 20% to make it a fair fight) was found. There’s much gnashing of teeth but it just looks like you flew, flat out, at that ship. Worse, the ship was under tow and the Skipper of the Tug Bulstrode said he was in cloud, not 200 yds away. Well, I guess that’s gross negligence then.
Oh, and by the way, I’m on SAR and not every call on 243 is heard. FACT.
This comes across all negative (hence the edit). Sorry. I really, really like the dit about the sim. Guess this is why we need to keep the experience levels up: Good times when the tilly’s swinging!!!!
[This message has been edited by cheapseat (edited 24 March 2001).]
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Pete - Although you say we flew together I obviously don't know who you are as you remain annonymous.
I think "crusade" is a strong word for my involvement. Yes, I feel a great deal of pride & loyalty about my time in the RAF. which is why I, amongst many others as I said to Swashplate (no offence taken at all SW) have fought for 5 years or so to clear the names of two men who could not defend themselves.
To be honest, I'm not really sure what point you are trying to make.
K52 - I am not postulating, as I'm sure you know. To give a verdict of "Gross Negligence" there has to be no doubt whatsoever. That means that if there is just one, tiny, miniscule area of doubt about the cause of the crash then the crew remain innocent. The onus is on the MOD to explain away every single area of doubt raised by the families. It is not for the families to offer any theories or explanations about the cause of the accident. I am saying, and have said more than once, that you are postulating. You are guessing about what may or may not have happened to ZD576. As has been said before, you have not one jot of evidence to support your theory.
I am pointing out that your version of events is a theory. I make no claim to know what did or did not happen. I'm simply saying that neither do you.
I think "crusade" is a strong word for my involvement. Yes, I feel a great deal of pride & loyalty about my time in the RAF. which is why I, amongst many others as I said to Swashplate (no offence taken at all SW) have fought for 5 years or so to clear the names of two men who could not defend themselves.
To be honest, I'm not really sure what point you are trying to make.
K52 - I am not postulating, as I'm sure you know. To give a verdict of "Gross Negligence" there has to be no doubt whatsoever. That means that if there is just one, tiny, miniscule area of doubt about the cause of the crash then the crew remain innocent. The onus is on the MOD to explain away every single area of doubt raised by the families. It is not for the families to offer any theories or explanations about the cause of the accident. I am saying, and have said more than once, that you are postulating. You are guessing about what may or may not have happened to ZD576. As has been said before, you have not one jot of evidence to support your theory.
I am pointing out that your version of events is a theory. I make no claim to know what did or did not happen. I'm simply saying that neither do you.
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K52
HF use on SH, as I recall, is very limited. The HF was sometimes checked for serviceability by way of an 'Ops normal' call early in the sortie, with a later call if sortie length dictated. Rarely would we receive a reply.
I once recall in southern Germany, in unforecast IMC (all en route airfields green or better), with 2 pilots and a full ferry tank, spending 30 minutes trying to inform our destination that we were likely to be very late by virtue of the fact that we were transitting in sight of the ground at about 10kts/10' instead of 120kts/500'. When we finally arrived, having parked in a field for an hour and subsequently drained the ferry, very late with 50kg or less per side (not much in a Puma) the destination airfield confirmed that they had never received my blind transmissions nor a message I had tried to relay through Architect.
The 30 minute check of colour states presumes a number of things. Firstly that the information is of any use when you only have 90 minutes of fuel and can't go far. In emergency the nearest div is the flattest bit of open ground you can see out of the window! Secondly that the sortie is planned for more than an hour - 750+ of my 1000 Puma hours were achieved on sorties of less than an hour and doing things that didn't involve proximity to an airfield other than the home base/landing site. Thirdly, that there is someone with the capacity to ignore everything happening around them whilst they write down what is superfluous information. Unless there are rapidly changing conditions the forecast at destination tends to be pretty much the same as at the out brief. I've flown with plenty of pilots who never once spoke on HF in an entire sortie. I only once used the ADF - we tried to fly an NDB hold, but after 3 attempts decided that it wasn't going to work and landed!
Pete
Loyalty involves having the courage to tell it like it is. A loyal officer should be able to tell his seniors that he believes them to be wrong, without fear of losing his career, and explain why, with reference to facts where possible. Doing what is right is far more important than burying your head in the sand for fear of offending those in authority.
[This message has been edited by Paul Wesson (edited 25 March 2001).]
HF use on SH, as I recall, is very limited. The HF was sometimes checked for serviceability by way of an 'Ops normal' call early in the sortie, with a later call if sortie length dictated. Rarely would we receive a reply.
I once recall in southern Germany, in unforecast IMC (all en route airfields green or better), with 2 pilots and a full ferry tank, spending 30 minutes trying to inform our destination that we were likely to be very late by virtue of the fact that we were transitting in sight of the ground at about 10kts/10' instead of 120kts/500'. When we finally arrived, having parked in a field for an hour and subsequently drained the ferry, very late with 50kg or less per side (not much in a Puma) the destination airfield confirmed that they had never received my blind transmissions nor a message I had tried to relay through Architect.
The 30 minute check of colour states presumes a number of things. Firstly that the information is of any use when you only have 90 minutes of fuel and can't go far. In emergency the nearest div is the flattest bit of open ground you can see out of the window! Secondly that the sortie is planned for more than an hour - 750+ of my 1000 Puma hours were achieved on sorties of less than an hour and doing things that didn't involve proximity to an airfield other than the home base/landing site. Thirdly, that there is someone with the capacity to ignore everything happening around them whilst they write down what is superfluous information. Unless there are rapidly changing conditions the forecast at destination tends to be pretty much the same as at the out brief. I've flown with plenty of pilots who never once spoke on HF in an entire sortie. I only once used the ADF - we tried to fly an NDB hold, but after 3 attempts decided that it wasn't going to work and landed!
Pete
Loyalty involves having the courage to tell it like it is. A loyal officer should be able to tell his seniors that he believes them to be wrong, without fear of losing his career, and explain why, with reference to facts where possible. Doing what is right is far more important than burying your head in the sand for fear of offending those in authority.
[This message has been edited by Paul Wesson (edited 25 March 2001).]
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K52
Your story of those old trips across the pond is excellent and quite thought-provoking.
It is, however, an unfortunate fact (the reason for which escapes me) but comms from a helicopter at low level are absolutely dreadful. I personally have lost comms entirely whilst transitting from Aldergrove to West Freugh! No radio failure involved, just low-level-heli-typical comms!
As for your faith in Guard transmissions, a friend of mine once suffered rather badly from hypothermia on an exercise on Salisbury Plain and (before mobiles & hand-held GPS) used the emergency procedure and set off a PLB. It later transpired that it had not registered on SARSAT for over 3 hours, and once it did, he was picked up 40 mins later - by Landrover.
Your story of those old trips across the pond is excellent and quite thought-provoking.
It is, however, an unfortunate fact (the reason for which escapes me) but comms from a helicopter at low level are absolutely dreadful. I personally have lost comms entirely whilst transitting from Aldergrove to West Freugh! No radio failure involved, just low-level-heli-typical comms!
As for your faith in Guard transmissions, a friend of mine once suffered rather badly from hypothermia on an exercise on Salisbury Plain and (before mobiles & hand-held GPS) used the emergency procedure and set off a PLB. It later transpired that it had not registered on SARSAT for over 3 hours, and once it did, he was picked up 40 mins later - by Landrover.
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Back from another 5 days at the coalface.
K52, what becomes more and more evident with each post you make, is that you really have no idea how helicopters are operated at low level.
I have about 5000 SH hours and about 1800 airline hours, and as the latter would equate fairly closely to your truckying, I think I have a good handle on your perceptions of aviation.
Please accept that the two genres are chalk and cheese, and that judging one with the experience of the other is a dangerous road to pursue.
The checklist in my SH types did not include setting up kit I had no intention of using. If the item was relevant, it was dialled up, otherwise it was forgotten.
In extremis, we all AVIATE, NAVIGATE, COMMUNICATE. In my airliner the first bit is done by the autopilot, leaving me a liesurely time to sort out the rest, hell, even in free-fall with no wings I've STILL got minutes to sort out a last prayer.
Low level, in marginal weather, no comms due to altitude, flying manually..... THINK about it. It is a very different problem.
As John Nichol says, there is a requirement for the MOD to prove its case beyond any doubt whatsoever.
They simply cannot do this, and all your theories will not change that one bit.
K52, what becomes more and more evident with each post you make, is that you really have no idea how helicopters are operated at low level.
I have about 5000 SH hours and about 1800 airline hours, and as the latter would equate fairly closely to your truckying, I think I have a good handle on your perceptions of aviation.
Please accept that the two genres are chalk and cheese, and that judging one with the experience of the other is a dangerous road to pursue.
The checklist in my SH types did not include setting up kit I had no intention of using. If the item was relevant, it was dialled up, otherwise it was forgotten.
In extremis, we all AVIATE, NAVIGATE, COMMUNICATE. In my airliner the first bit is done by the autopilot, leaving me a liesurely time to sort out the rest, hell, even in free-fall with no wings I've STILL got minutes to sort out a last prayer.
Low level, in marginal weather, no comms due to altitude, flying manually..... THINK about it. It is a very different problem.
As John Nichol says, there is a requirement for the MOD to prove its case beyond any doubt whatsoever.
They simply cannot do this, and all your theories will not change that one bit.
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The Crew of ZD576 were tasked to fly 25 Pax from Aldergrove to Fort George. THe sortie was planned as a low level VFR sortie via the Mull, Corran and the Great Glen. The BOI stated in its findings that "The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre." Yet when last seen the aircraft was 2-3nm from the Mull at 200-400ft in straight and level flight heading directly at high speed towards the cloud enshrouded Mull.
What is postulation is the idea that a trained SF Crew could not have failed to take the correct action to avoid disaster THEREFORE there must have been an emergency of some kind which the subsequent investigation failed to discover.
Regretably, trained aircrew have been flying into cloud enshrouded high ground for many, many years - the only member of the Royal Family (The Duke of Kent) to be killed on Active Service during either World War died when the Sunderland he was flying did just that.
Despite the evidence as recorded by the BOI, we learn from these pages that the route was planned by a member of the other crew the night before. I also understand that was the evidence given to the FAI; where it was also stated the the route was planned at low level "for training purposes". What the BOI does not include is the chart for the return sorie. I never personally saw that chart but I was informed by those who had seen it that it was planned "at MEDIUM level".
If the crew wanted to fly at low level "for training purposes" why do it with 25 Pax( some of whom were Civilians) on board? Why not do it on the way back to Aldergrove and replan a more direct route clear of the poor weather which was localised in the vicinity of the Mull. Perhaps, as Pulse 1 suggested, routing via the isle of Gigha. We do not, however know when the Pilots received the pre-planned chart for the outbound journey and whether they had time to replan it before their intended departure.
Paul Wesson
I did not mean to imply that this crew should have listened to the Colour States on HF. I was having a dig at JN for not turning his HF on in 10 years.
[This message has been edited by K52 (edited 26 March 2001).]
What is postulation is the idea that a trained SF Crew could not have failed to take the correct action to avoid disaster THEREFORE there must have been an emergency of some kind which the subsequent investigation failed to discover.
Regretably, trained aircrew have been flying into cloud enshrouded high ground for many, many years - the only member of the Royal Family (The Duke of Kent) to be killed on Active Service during either World War died when the Sunderland he was flying did just that.
Despite the evidence as recorded by the BOI, we learn from these pages that the route was planned by a member of the other crew the night before. I also understand that was the evidence given to the FAI; where it was also stated the the route was planned at low level "for training purposes". What the BOI does not include is the chart for the return sorie. I never personally saw that chart but I was informed by those who had seen it that it was planned "at MEDIUM level".
If the crew wanted to fly at low level "for training purposes" why do it with 25 Pax( some of whom were Civilians) on board? Why not do it on the way back to Aldergrove and replan a more direct route clear of the poor weather which was localised in the vicinity of the Mull. Perhaps, as Pulse 1 suggested, routing via the isle of Gigha. We do not, however know when the Pilots received the pre-planned chart for the outbound journey and whether they had time to replan it before their intended departure.
Paul Wesson
I did not mean to imply that this crew should have listened to the Colour States on HF. I was having a dig at JN for not turning his HF on in 10 years.
[This message has been edited by K52 (edited 26 March 2001).]
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K52
I have bitten my tongue for long enough but i'm afraid that I now feel the need to reply. As an ex truckie it is quite clear to me and also to a number of other SH people who have contributed to this thread that you have absolutely no idea what SH flying is or was about! SH pilots NEVER plan just a medium level sortie; medium level to us is 500 ft or above and on the likelihood of probabilities we would have to fly low level anyway. Low level or 1000ft is just the same in the planning stages. perhaps you would find this difficult to believe since your MSD was probably 2000ft as a transport pilot. We appreciate the terrific interest that this thread has caused, but when faced with the overwhelming SH experience that has made comment on this thread, I suggest that you retire gracefully and leave this matter to those a little more appropriately qualified to comment. I would not dream of commenting on an AT matter of a similar nature.
Your comments on rad alt settings, could highlight a possible lazyness within the crew, however it could be counter argued that a rad alt set at 50ft would not have prevented this accident. Your emphasis on the reliance of the GPS further demonstrates your lack of low-level VFR experience. Do you think that the crew slavishly follow the steer bar? Do you know how difficult it is to do this in a Chinook? Has your boss ever told you that the Test Pilots have refused to fly the aircraft type that you are currently flying and will carry on flying regardless? Have you ever been at 50ft over water with poor weather ahead, no IFR option, pressures of the task, an aircraft that wasn't cleared for full use, a hierarchy that didn't give a fu(k?
K52, I plead with you to let dogs lie. Your counter bickering detracts from the real argument that there IS doubt about the negligence of the crew.
Leave it alone. A response will merely show your ignorance regarding SH ops.
HPT
I have bitten my tongue for long enough but i'm afraid that I now feel the need to reply. As an ex truckie it is quite clear to me and also to a number of other SH people who have contributed to this thread that you have absolutely no idea what SH flying is or was about! SH pilots NEVER plan just a medium level sortie; medium level to us is 500 ft or above and on the likelihood of probabilities we would have to fly low level anyway. Low level or 1000ft is just the same in the planning stages. perhaps you would find this difficult to believe since your MSD was probably 2000ft as a transport pilot. We appreciate the terrific interest that this thread has caused, but when faced with the overwhelming SH experience that has made comment on this thread, I suggest that you retire gracefully and leave this matter to those a little more appropriately qualified to comment. I would not dream of commenting on an AT matter of a similar nature.
Your comments on rad alt settings, could highlight a possible lazyness within the crew, however it could be counter argued that a rad alt set at 50ft would not have prevented this accident. Your emphasis on the reliance of the GPS further demonstrates your lack of low-level VFR experience. Do you think that the crew slavishly follow the steer bar? Do you know how difficult it is to do this in a Chinook? Has your boss ever told you that the Test Pilots have refused to fly the aircraft type that you are currently flying and will carry on flying regardless? Have you ever been at 50ft over water with poor weather ahead, no IFR option, pressures of the task, an aircraft that wasn't cleared for full use, a hierarchy that didn't give a fu(k?
K52, I plead with you to let dogs lie. Your counter bickering detracts from the real argument that there IS doubt about the negligence of the crew.
Leave it alone. A response will merely show your ignorance regarding SH ops.
HPT
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HPT,
I agree with all you say. K52 is very ignorant of the way SH has always been required to operate. He persists in his efforts to apply maxims from his own experience of medium level and IFR fixed wing operations. Sound familiar? The more senior of the two air officers had NO support helicopter operational experience.
K52,
You announced your verdict very early on and ever since have been trying to find evidence to fit. You have gone as far as 3 decimal places to "prove" your theories. Why?
As an SH QHI (from long before your first tour from what you have said) I continue to despise your efforts to belittle and besmirch the names of a crew who were trying to do their job despite the pressures of flying an aircraft that was brought into service without checklists, Flight Manual,or the necessary clearance to fly under IFR.
Your motive?
I agree with all you say. K52 is very ignorant of the way SH has always been required to operate. He persists in his efforts to apply maxims from his own experience of medium level and IFR fixed wing operations. Sound familiar? The more senior of the two air officers had NO support helicopter operational experience.
K52,
You announced your verdict very early on and ever since have been trying to find evidence to fit. You have gone as far as 3 decimal places to "prove" your theories. Why?
As an SH QHI (from long before your first tour from what you have said) I continue to despise your efforts to belittle and besmirch the names of a crew who were trying to do their job despite the pressures of flying an aircraft that was brought into service without checklists, Flight Manual,or the necessary clearance to fly under IFR.
Your motive?
Guest
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K52, in one of your previous posts, you talk about speculation and evidence. there is NO evidence that the crew were negligent. Many of the points here revolve around an aircraft that should not have been flying (no FRCs etc). That is evidence. Therefore, if one is going to speculate that the crew were negligent, one must also be willing to speculate that the crew may have been caught in an unusual situation without the ability or information required to resolve what may have been a major/minor problem.
John Cook has never categorically said that his son was "not guilty"; he is unconvinced by the argument that says he was "guilty".
John Cook has never categorically said that his son was "not guilty"; he is unconvinced by the argument that says he was "guilty".
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K52,
Even the AOC supported the Board by accepted that the flight was carefully planned. I think it is disgraceful that you should suggest that it was anything less without quoting the authority for your statement. These pages are not an authority, especially as you do not quote the reference.
I wonder if the BOI could have the last word on this argument.
“With no ADR or CVR, survivors or witnesses, the Board based its findings on logical argument derived from the limited evidence available to it” (Ch 61 Cause).
There has been much logical argument in this bulletin, some of it scientific, but most of it based on credibility or, in K52’s case, incredulity. It can never be resolved without new evidence and the only logical outcome, therefore, must be that there is considerable doubt.
With respect to Human Failings “the Board was unable to positively determine the sequence of events leading to the accident………..it would be incorrect to criticise him (Flt Lt Tapper) for human failings based on available evidence” (Ch67c).
As a civilian I have a little experience of involvement in a RAF BOI (naughty Chipmunk pilot flew into glider launch cable) and I would be very surprised indeed if the President of this Board did not come under immense pressure to change some of the findings, particularly when one considers the high profile of this case (even pre pprune).
The Board’s diligence and integrity in upholding this position should be respected, at least by accepting that there is too much doubt to maintain the subsequent finding of negligence.
------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
Even the AOC supported the Board by accepted that the flight was carefully planned. I think it is disgraceful that you should suggest that it was anything less without quoting the authority for your statement. These pages are not an authority, especially as you do not quote the reference.
I wonder if the BOI could have the last word on this argument.
“With no ADR or CVR, survivors or witnesses, the Board based its findings on logical argument derived from the limited evidence available to it” (Ch 61 Cause).
There has been much logical argument in this bulletin, some of it scientific, but most of it based on credibility or, in K52’s case, incredulity. It can never be resolved without new evidence and the only logical outcome, therefore, must be that there is considerable doubt.
With respect to Human Failings “the Board was unable to positively determine the sequence of events leading to the accident………..it would be incorrect to criticise him (Flt Lt Tapper) for human failings based on available evidence” (Ch67c).
As a civilian I have a little experience of involvement in a RAF BOI (naughty Chipmunk pilot flew into glider launch cable) and I would be very surprised indeed if the President of this Board did not come under immense pressure to change some of the findings, particularly when one considers the high profile of this case (even pre pprune).
The Board’s diligence and integrity in upholding this position should be respected, at least by accepting that there is too much doubt to maintain the subsequent finding of negligence.
------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
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HPT, Shy and smooth.
I too had spotted the similar willingness to pontificate upon matters of which they have no knowledge by both K52 and Sir Billy W. I have been told off by K52 for not showing the latter respect, so I have laid off him of late!
Just a further note to K52 as insight into SH ops.
Would it horrify you to realise that an average NI trip would carry no more knowledge at the outset than the Grid Reference of the start point? After that you are tasked by the unit. Planning is done on the hoof.
I too had spotted the similar willingness to pontificate upon matters of which they have no knowledge by both K52 and Sir Billy W. I have been told off by K52 for not showing the latter respect, so I have laid off him of late!
Just a further note to K52 as insight into SH ops.
Would it horrify you to realise that an average NI trip would carry no more knowledge at the outset than the Grid Reference of the start point? After that you are tasked by the unit. Planning is done on the hoof.
Guest
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Keep with the thread. There are serious issuses pending here. If U cannot offer anything to progress the thread (K52) then butt out. The engineerinig implications as to the state of the aircraft are to my mind pretty paramount here. Is it not possible to get a CH47 qualified person to comment....
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If there was a problem with the aircraft then why were they still going so quickly? Is it not common practise to slow down(and climb if you can)when you've got a problem. I personally think that this was just a bad day....HOWEVER, the point is that you cannot POSITIVLEY say that there was not a problem with the aircraft, and therefore cannot blame the crew.