Chinook - Hit Back Here
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MoD rejects MPs' call to overturn air crash verdict
Stuart Millar, technology correspondent
Saturday March 17, 2001
The Guardian http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/st...458189,00.html
The Ministry of Defence has brushed aside a damning indictment by MPs of its refusal to overturn the verdict of gross negligence against the pilots involved in the RAF's worst peacetime accident.
In its belated response to the Commons public accounts committee, which in November accused ministers and officials of "unwarrantable arrogance" in blaming the pilots, the MoD yesterday insisted that negligence was the only possible explanation for the loss of a Chinook helicopter on the Mull of Kintyre in 1994.
Flight Lieutenants Jonathan Tapper and Rick Cook died with two other aircrew and 25 senior members of the Northern Ireland intelligence community when Chinook ZD576 crashed into the cloud-covered Mull.
RAF rules stated that deceased aircrew could be blamed for crashes only in cases where there was absolutely no doubt. The air force's board of inquiry said a major technical malfunction could not be ruled out, but two air marshals overruled the board and blamed the pilots - effectively a verdict of manslaughter.
In its unanimous report, the public accounts committee found that technical problems, especially with the Chinook's computerised engine control system, meant there were clear grounds to doubt the pilots had been negligent.
It concluded: "We simply cannot understand why the [MoD] continues to defend the unsustainable finding of gross negligence and recommend it should be set aside."
In its five-page response, which should have been delivered a month ago, the MoD said: "The department does not agree that sustaining a properly reached judgment of a board of inquiry constitutes unwarrantable arrogance. Neither in the absence of new evidence, does it consider that the board's conclusions should be set aside."
Flt Lt Tapper's father Mike, said: "This pathetic response on an issue of such importance is indicative of the government's contempt for parliament and the views of ordinary people."
David Davies, chairman of the public accounts committee,said: "This is more of an ignoral than a rebuttal. The prime minister should correct this because it is clear that the MoD is unable to make a dispassionate judgment."
He said members of the committee would be furious and would now consider calling more witnesses.
Stuart Millar, technology correspondent
Saturday March 17, 2001
The Guardian http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/st...458189,00.html
The Ministry of Defence has brushed aside a damning indictment by MPs of its refusal to overturn the verdict of gross negligence against the pilots involved in the RAF's worst peacetime accident.
In its belated response to the Commons public accounts committee, which in November accused ministers and officials of "unwarrantable arrogance" in blaming the pilots, the MoD yesterday insisted that negligence was the only possible explanation for the loss of a Chinook helicopter on the Mull of Kintyre in 1994.
Flight Lieutenants Jonathan Tapper and Rick Cook died with two other aircrew and 25 senior members of the Northern Ireland intelligence community when Chinook ZD576 crashed into the cloud-covered Mull.
RAF rules stated that deceased aircrew could be blamed for crashes only in cases where there was absolutely no doubt. The air force's board of inquiry said a major technical malfunction could not be ruled out, but two air marshals overruled the board and blamed the pilots - effectively a verdict of manslaughter.
In its unanimous report, the public accounts committee found that technical problems, especially with the Chinook's computerised engine control system, meant there were clear grounds to doubt the pilots had been negligent.
It concluded: "We simply cannot understand why the [MoD] continues to defend the unsustainable finding of gross negligence and recommend it should be set aside."
In its five-page response, which should have been delivered a month ago, the MoD said: "The department does not agree that sustaining a properly reached judgment of a board of inquiry constitutes unwarrantable arrogance. Neither in the absence of new evidence, does it consider that the board's conclusions should be set aside."
Flt Lt Tapper's father Mike, said: "This pathetic response on an issue of such importance is indicative of the government's contempt for parliament and the views of ordinary people."
David Davies, chairman of the public accounts committee,said: "This is more of an ignoral than a rebuttal. The prime minister should correct this because it is clear that the MoD is unable to make a dispassionate judgment."
He said members of the committee would be furious and would now consider calling more witnesses.
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K52
My wind speed is not that calculated by the AAIB to explain the last manoeuvre, but from the AAIB report in which conditions are described as ‘Surface Wind 180/30 (approx) as part of a general after cast of the weather.
The Chinook is a powerful machine, which would accelerate to cruise in something under a minute. To humour you, let’s allow an average of a very conservative 60kts for the first minute and fly the next 42 miles in 17 minutes. Still gives an average cruise groundspeed of only 148 kts. With my ‘wizz-wheel’ this equates to an IAS of about 120 to 122 Kts. This still leaves us wondering why the aircraft would have accelerated to 150 Kts IAS prior to impact. Any calculation based on an estimate for the CTR boundary is worthless.
To your statement that rules for VFR flight are to be found in the FIH, I direct you once again to JSP 318 and local orders. As for my criticisms of those involved, I do indeed find the reviewing officers’ overturning of the BOI’s finding of no known cause bizarre. I am not aware that I have criticised the AAIB, whose painstaking report puts forward a few theories and ideas, but reaches no conclusion as to the cause of this tragedy.
My wind speed is not that calculated by the AAIB to explain the last manoeuvre, but from the AAIB report in which conditions are described as ‘Surface Wind 180/30 (approx) as part of a general after cast of the weather.
The Chinook is a powerful machine, which would accelerate to cruise in something under a minute. To humour you, let’s allow an average of a very conservative 60kts for the first minute and fly the next 42 miles in 17 minutes. Still gives an average cruise groundspeed of only 148 kts. With my ‘wizz-wheel’ this equates to an IAS of about 120 to 122 Kts. This still leaves us wondering why the aircraft would have accelerated to 150 Kts IAS prior to impact. Any calculation based on an estimate for the CTR boundary is worthless.
To your statement that rules for VFR flight are to be found in the FIH, I direct you once again to JSP 318 and local orders. As for my criticisms of those involved, I do indeed find the reviewing officers’ overturning of the BOI’s finding of no known cause bizarre. I am not aware that I have criticised the AAIB, whose painstaking report puts forward a few theories and ideas, but reaches no conclusion as to the cause of this tragedy.
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K52 & Arkroyal
To humour both of you, if they had flown for 40 miles at the normal IAS, calculated by OC Odiham of 135 kts, they could have slowed down to 60 - 80 kts for 2 miles before the Mull. (Witness, the yachtsman)
"Everything is possible to those who speculate". (Bill's Letter to the Chinookians Ch 3 vs 6, apologies to Private Eye)
To humour both of you, if they had flown for 40 miles at the normal IAS, calculated by OC Odiham of 135 kts, they could have slowed down to 60 - 80 kts for 2 miles before the Mull. (Witness, the yachtsman)
"Everything is possible to those who speculate". (Bill's Letter to the Chinookians Ch 3 vs 6, apologies to Private Eye)
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Pulse 1
Absolutely true - but that would mean that they then accelerated as quickly as possible, on a direct track for the Mull (the yachtsmans evidence,)and then hit it.
Would that not be negligence?
In addition; how did they know the yacht was there? Is there any other reason for them to slow down and then accelerate?
Perhaps some enquiries amongst the eye - witnesses (none of whom were interviewed by the BOI) on the behaviour of the Chinook, during its transit to the NI coast, that Lord Rathcavan quoted in a House of Lords debate would shed some light. He spoke of the Chinook following a meandering flightpath and suddenly stopping "as if looking to land". If true, it would render all time and distance calculations totally invalid.
A pity that John Nichol has not replied to my query as to HOW he knows that the two extractions from the SuperTans memory ptior to impact relate to different positions.
Absolutely true - but that would mean that they then accelerated as quickly as possible, on a direct track for the Mull (the yachtsmans evidence,)and then hit it.
Would that not be negligence?
In addition; how did they know the yacht was there? Is there any other reason for them to slow down and then accelerate?
Perhaps some enquiries amongst the eye - witnesses (none of whom were interviewed by the BOI) on the behaviour of the Chinook, during its transit to the NI coast, that Lord Rathcavan quoted in a House of Lords debate would shed some light. He spoke of the Chinook following a meandering flightpath and suddenly stopping "as if looking to land". If true, it would render all time and distance calculations totally invalid.
A pity that John Nichol has not replied to my query as to HOW he knows that the two extractions from the SuperTans memory ptior to impact relate to different positions.
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K52,
Very briefly (it's 0550 here and I'm flying in 1 hour) in your first paragraph you state positively that the crew MIGHT have accelerated as quickly as possible into the Mull - implying a degree of choice on their part. Without bogging myself down in your increasingly pointless and tedious semantics, a simple reassessment of the very same situation you describe COULD be that the aircraft accelerated faster than the crew could control into the Mull. All supposition of course, just like your meanderings - all of which reinforces the weakness of the findings of negligence.
Very briefly (it's 0550 here and I'm flying in 1 hour) in your first paragraph you state positively that the crew MIGHT have accelerated as quickly as possible into the Mull - implying a degree of choice on their part. Without bogging myself down in your increasingly pointless and tedious semantics, a simple reassessment of the very same situation you describe COULD be that the aircraft accelerated faster than the crew could control into the Mull. All supposition of course, just like your meanderings - all of which reinforces the weakness of the findings of negligence.
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Thud_and_Blunder
I never said "might" and, if the aircraft had accelerated without any input from the pilots, then they would have had over 1 minute to issue a Distress call, Squawk Emergency and get the Pax and Rear Crew strapped in!!!
You are also suggesting that, apart from having no control over the acceleration of the aircraft, they were unable to turn away from the Mull.
Yet NO EVIDENCE AT ALL was found that this was the case.
Runaway engines that leave no evidence I could possibly live with. Runaway engines and total loss of flying controls I have a great deal of difficulty with. Runaway engines, total loss of flying controls and a pitch up corresponding to transition to a cyclic climb at a distance to the Mull that corresponds with the known visibility stretches my incredulity too far.
I never said "might" and, if the aircraft had accelerated without any input from the pilots, then they would have had over 1 minute to issue a Distress call, Squawk Emergency and get the Pax and Rear Crew strapped in!!!
You are also suggesting that, apart from having no control over the acceleration of the aircraft, they were unable to turn away from the Mull.
Yet NO EVIDENCE AT ALL was found that this was the case.
Runaway engines that leave no evidence I could possibly live with. Runaway engines and total loss of flying controls I have a great deal of difficulty with. Runaway engines, total loss of flying controls and a pitch up corresponding to transition to a cyclic climb at a distance to the Mull that corresponds with the known visibility stretches my incredulity too far.
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Just back from flying - this particular island nation's OEI occupants can rest easy in their bunks knowing that they are once again safe from baddies. K52 - you are correct about not saying 'might' - I assumed (error..) that you weren't claiming that the crew under these circumstances would have chosen deliberately to accelerate into the Mull. So, you now appear to me to be stating that the crew had at least one minute in which to carry out all the appropriate emergency drills. Such precision, such certainty... Perhaps you have not read the account of the US Army CH47D that flew a rapid-onset, no-warning uncommanded inverted manoeuvre after collection from a maintenance base? I don't have the article to hand, but I do remember the crew commenting that it took all their attention to try to overcome the unusual, undemanded extreme attitude changes and avoid hitting the ground. That they did not stoof-in was largely due to the aircraft altitude at the start of the incident. They had no time or spare capacity to carry out any other actions, including radio calls. After flight and complete examination of the AFCS and flight control system, no evidence of existing or previous fault was found. Your incredulity is in for a decent spot of stretching exercise; get hold of the aforementioned write-up and then see if you can come back to this forum encased in your current impregnable carapace of certainty. Anyone out there in the Chinook world able to post the details for K52s enlightenment?
Back to semantics: you write "NO EVIDENCE AT ALL was found that this was the case". I submit that, equally, NO EVIDENCE AT ALL was found that this was NOT the case. This implies doubt, which is (and was) unacceptable in a finding of gross negligence.
Back to semantics: you write "NO EVIDENCE AT ALL was found that this was the case". I submit that, equally, NO EVIDENCE AT ALL was found that this was NOT the case. This implies doubt, which is (and was) unacceptable in a finding of gross negligence.
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K52,
Calm Down, Calm Down - some of us have to work as well as fight for justice!
I say that the two TANS computations were at different points because that is the presumption the BOI seems to make - they do not link the two points together. Depending on which of the many estimated approach speeds you use (60-80kts yachtsman, 135 'ish Crawford, 150kts AAIB) of course you can get the two TANS points to link up. But you really are getting into the guessing game now K52.
I have to say again, the BOI state of their reconstruction of the final seconds of flight -
"it was possible to determine A MOST LIKELY position for the WP change"
"and to subsequently ESTIMATE a MOST LIKELY track"
"it could not be PROVEN that the aircraft flew in a sraight line"
Regarding the final ROC of between 550ft/min to 1250ft/min:
"Whilst total reliance COULD NOT be placed on these figures...it was MOST LIKELY that whilst coasting in etc."
K52, I can not find a single case in the BOI when they state, about any crucial factor you keep bringing up, something along the lines of, "such and such occured, definately, 100%, without any doubt" or some form words even close to that.
All of your presumptions are based on the "POSSIBLE/PROBABLE" situations found by the BOI - which is why the President, a Chinook pilot, a man who had examined the evidence for 8 months and despite considerable pressure from above, refused to come to the conclusion that you, Day & Wratten have come to.
Re. the IFF - it was found with a mode 3A code of 7760 - 2 clicks away from the emergency squawk. Were they trying to send a distress code? Who can say? The BOI simply states "whilst the crew may have been in the process of changing the code, it may have been moved during impact". Though the AAIB thought the possibility of impact movement unlikely.
All guesses, all theories, all supposition -still doubt.
Calm Down, Calm Down - some of us have to work as well as fight for justice!
I say that the two TANS computations were at different points because that is the presumption the BOI seems to make - they do not link the two points together. Depending on which of the many estimated approach speeds you use (60-80kts yachtsman, 135 'ish Crawford, 150kts AAIB) of course you can get the two TANS points to link up. But you really are getting into the guessing game now K52.
I have to say again, the BOI state of their reconstruction of the final seconds of flight -
"it was possible to determine A MOST LIKELY position for the WP change"
"and to subsequently ESTIMATE a MOST LIKELY track"
"it could not be PROVEN that the aircraft flew in a sraight line"
Regarding the final ROC of between 550ft/min to 1250ft/min:
"Whilst total reliance COULD NOT be placed on these figures...it was MOST LIKELY that whilst coasting in etc."
K52, I can not find a single case in the BOI when they state, about any crucial factor you keep bringing up, something along the lines of, "such and such occured, definately, 100%, without any doubt" or some form words even close to that.
All of your presumptions are based on the "POSSIBLE/PROBABLE" situations found by the BOI - which is why the President, a Chinook pilot, a man who had examined the evidence for 8 months and despite considerable pressure from above, refused to come to the conclusion that you, Day & Wratten have come to.
Re. the IFF - it was found with a mode 3A code of 7760 - 2 clicks away from the emergency squawk. Were they trying to send a distress code? Who can say? The BOI simply states "whilst the crew may have been in the process of changing the code, it may have been moved during impact". Though the AAIB thought the possibility of impact movement unlikely.
All guesses, all theories, all supposition -still doubt.
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Thud,
I think the US Army CH47D you refer to was in the Computer Weekly report by Tony Collins. Chapter 1 p 12-1.
www.computerweekly.com/chinook/rafjust.pdf
I'm not at all suggesting that the same thing happened to Rick and Jon. I simply just don't know.
Regards all
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
[This message has been edited by Brian Dixon (edited 21 March 2001).]
I think the US Army CH47D you refer to was in the Computer Weekly report by Tony Collins. Chapter 1 p 12-1.
www.computerweekly.com/chinook/rafjust.pdf
I'm not at all suggesting that the same thing happened to Rick and Jon. I simply just don't know.
Regards all
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
[This message has been edited by Brian Dixon (edited 21 March 2001).]
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K52
One of the most curious comments by Lord Rathcavan is:
"Higher up the glens it had hedgehopped over farmlands, terrifying animals. Horses at Glenravel belonging to a dentist, Hugh McCann, panicked and had to be taken in."
Glenravel is about eight miles north of the flightpath from Aldergrove down Glencloy to Carnlough and on to the Mull. There is a range of hills in between the two glens.
One of the most curious comments by Lord Rathcavan is:
"Higher up the glens it had hedgehopped over farmlands, terrifying animals. Horses at Glenravel belonging to a dentist, Hugh McCann, panicked and had to be taken in."
Glenravel is about eight miles north of the flightpath from Aldergrove down Glencloy to Carnlough and on to the Mull. There is a range of hills in between the two glens.
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John Nichol
My apologies. I forgot about the IFF.
Of course I accept that the crew COULD have been trying to select 7700 and ended up with 7760. That is a possibility. I would question, however, why a crew on a low level sortie, and not in receipt of a radar service, would try to select 7700 on the IFF as the sole means of indicating an emergency.
The UHF was tuned to 300.8MHz, the UK Low Flying Flight Safety Frequency - would that not have been a better bet? Perhaps Guard would have been better - at least it would have registered on SARSAT.
I would suggest that; as the crew had an incorrect setting on one of the barometric altimeters and incorrect settings on BOTH Rad Alt bugs (not to mention a commercial radio station selected on the ADF),it is also quite possible that they overlooked setting the usual code of 7000 on the IFF.
This is, of course, SPECULATION. That,
however, is what this thread is all about. The BOI reached their conclusions and submitted their Report. This was accepted, albeit with some reservations on the Part of OC RAF Odiham, by the chain of Command.
What was NOT accepted was the ASSESSMENT of Human Failings. AOC 1 Gp found that the Pilots were "negligent to a gross degree." Subsequently AOC in C STC and CAS concurred with that decision.
Since then there has been SPECULATION that there COULD have been an UNSPECIFIED emergency which prevented the crew from making any form of Distress Call but was purely transient so that it did not show up in the AAIB investigation.
What nobody promoting these THEORIES has even attempted to explain is how the aircraft came to crash in an attitude that would be expected following a 30 degree nose up cyclic flare, on track, and with no indication of excess stress on either the airframe or the occupants other than the trauma associated with the crash.
In my opinion SPECULATION about possible causes is irrelevant. The finding of negligence was because the crew did not adhere to the rules for VFR flight. There is NO EVIDENCE that there was anything wrong with the aircraft. SPECULATION is not EVIDENCE.
If it has ever seemed that I have tried to present my own thoughts on this tragic accident as EVIDENCE then I unreservedly apologise. What I have presented are MY thoughts alone.
As Brian Dixon continues to say " All views are valid".
My apologies. I forgot about the IFF.
Of course I accept that the crew COULD have been trying to select 7700 and ended up with 7760. That is a possibility. I would question, however, why a crew on a low level sortie, and not in receipt of a radar service, would try to select 7700 on the IFF as the sole means of indicating an emergency.
The UHF was tuned to 300.8MHz, the UK Low Flying Flight Safety Frequency - would that not have been a better bet? Perhaps Guard would have been better - at least it would have registered on SARSAT.
I would suggest that; as the crew had an incorrect setting on one of the barometric altimeters and incorrect settings on BOTH Rad Alt bugs (not to mention a commercial radio station selected on the ADF),it is also quite possible that they overlooked setting the usual code of 7000 on the IFF.
This is, of course, SPECULATION. That,
however, is what this thread is all about. The BOI reached their conclusions and submitted their Report. This was accepted, albeit with some reservations on the Part of OC RAF Odiham, by the chain of Command.
What was NOT accepted was the ASSESSMENT of Human Failings. AOC 1 Gp found that the Pilots were "negligent to a gross degree." Subsequently AOC in C STC and CAS concurred with that decision.
Since then there has been SPECULATION that there COULD have been an UNSPECIFIED emergency which prevented the crew from making any form of Distress Call but was purely transient so that it did not show up in the AAIB investigation.
What nobody promoting these THEORIES has even attempted to explain is how the aircraft came to crash in an attitude that would be expected following a 30 degree nose up cyclic flare, on track, and with no indication of excess stress on either the airframe or the occupants other than the trauma associated with the crash.
In my opinion SPECULATION about possible causes is irrelevant. The finding of negligence was because the crew did not adhere to the rules for VFR flight. There is NO EVIDENCE that there was anything wrong with the aircraft. SPECULATION is not EVIDENCE.
If it has ever seemed that I have tried to present my own thoughts on this tragic accident as EVIDENCE then I unreservedly apologise. What I have presented are MY thoughts alone.
As Brian Dixon continues to say " All views are valid".
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K52,
There was evidence that there may have been a radio fault. 7700 or 7600 would have been relevant in this case. The same evidence may suggest that there was an intercom fault. Although the crew had flown the aircraft that day, there is no doubt whatsoever that that they were much less familiar with the cockpit layout than that of the Mk1. It is of course possible that the aircraft went into a UP, as other Chinooks have done before following engine malfunctions. In that scenario, it is entirely plausible that someone may make an attempt to select a transponder code but didn't quite manage it.
I too fly a twin engined rotary wing aircraft fitted with FADECs. More often than not, if there is a fault (thankfully far more rare than was the case with the Chinook at that time), often it is transient and leaves no evidence or fault code for the engineers to see once battery power is turned off.
Your thoughts are perhaps in many ways more relevant to the theatre you have experience in?
There was evidence that there may have been a radio fault. 7700 or 7600 would have been relevant in this case. The same evidence may suggest that there was an intercom fault. Although the crew had flown the aircraft that day, there is no doubt whatsoever that that they were much less familiar with the cockpit layout than that of the Mk1. It is of course possible that the aircraft went into a UP, as other Chinooks have done before following engine malfunctions. In that scenario, it is entirely plausible that someone may make an attempt to select a transponder code but didn't quite manage it.
I too fly a twin engined rotary wing aircraft fitted with FADECs. More often than not, if there is a fault (thankfully far more rare than was the case with the Chinook at that time), often it is transient and leaves no evidence or fault code for the engineers to see once battery power is turned off.
Your thoughts are perhaps in many ways more relevant to the theatre you have experience in?
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VERY DISSAPOINTED about the MoD's decision.
But not totally surprised........
The arrogance of this Govt is beyond belief!!!!!!!!
I wonder how many people are put off joining the services because of this???????
PS Congrats to John Nicol for starting what must be the longest PPRuNe thread ever!!!!
But not totally surprised........
The arrogance of this Govt is beyond belief!!!!!!!!
I wonder how many people are put off joining the services because of this???????
PS Congrats to John Nicol for starting what must be the longest PPRuNe thread ever!!!!
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K52 - we could go down this road for ever!
You say "Why would the crew use 7700 as the sole means of indicating an emergency". How do you know they weren't making a mayday call that was not received? - You dont.
You say "the crew had a commercial station set on the ADF". How do you know it wasn't a previous setting from another crew? I flew with an HF set for 10 years and never once used it or checked the frequency dialled in.
The whole point is that you are trying to make absolute judgement on actions or events that may or may not have occured. May, or may not have been intended.
Eg. "why did the crew not broadcast a mayday call on UKLFS or Guard, is that not a better bet?" Probably, but again, how do you know they did not? And even if they did not what does that tell us? I have had quite a few dire emergencies at low level (one crash & witnessing one crash to name but 2). They are terrifying and instill a monumental amount of fear bordering on panic. Every action can be analysed for its perfection at a later date but I don't think I was grossly negligent. Not a perfect sim ride perhaps, but not negligent.
Eg. Transient faults - the US Chinook is the classic example of an aircraft going out of control, back under control and landed, and leaving no evidence of any fault. I can't find the exact figures at the moment but the rotary force reported many hundreds of UCFMs over the last 6 years - many which left no evidence & could not be explained.
You say the crew were negligent "for not adhering to the rules of VFR flight". Could a transient fault have caused the aircraft to accelerate to 150kts and "porpoise" towards the Mull? Perhaps it could; chinook pilots offered a number of scenarios along those lines. Did it happen - I dont know.
As you say, your "views" are valid - of course they are. But even you seem to be accepting that they are views.
Pete o'H - I had a great time in the RAF for most of my 15 years service - not sure this is really the place to talk about it though. Somewhere in the pprune archives is a thread (started by someone else I might say!) asking me all sorts of questions about it.
Swashplate - Thanks, but although I've been involved for 6 years there are loads of other people involved in this campaign - many are contibutors here. All deserve recognition.
You say "Why would the crew use 7700 as the sole means of indicating an emergency". How do you know they weren't making a mayday call that was not received? - You dont.
You say "the crew had a commercial station set on the ADF". How do you know it wasn't a previous setting from another crew? I flew with an HF set for 10 years and never once used it or checked the frequency dialled in.
The whole point is that you are trying to make absolute judgement on actions or events that may or may not have occured. May, or may not have been intended.
Eg. "why did the crew not broadcast a mayday call on UKLFS or Guard, is that not a better bet?" Probably, but again, how do you know they did not? And even if they did not what does that tell us? I have had quite a few dire emergencies at low level (one crash & witnessing one crash to name but 2). They are terrifying and instill a monumental amount of fear bordering on panic. Every action can be analysed for its perfection at a later date but I don't think I was grossly negligent. Not a perfect sim ride perhaps, but not negligent.
Eg. Transient faults - the US Chinook is the classic example of an aircraft going out of control, back under control and landed, and leaving no evidence of any fault. I can't find the exact figures at the moment but the rotary force reported many hundreds of UCFMs over the last 6 years - many which left no evidence & could not be explained.
You say the crew were negligent "for not adhering to the rules of VFR flight". Could a transient fault have caused the aircraft to accelerate to 150kts and "porpoise" towards the Mull? Perhaps it could; chinook pilots offered a number of scenarios along those lines. Did it happen - I dont know.
As you say, your "views" are valid - of course they are. But even you seem to be accepting that they are views.
Pete o'H - I had a great time in the RAF for most of my 15 years service - not sure this is really the place to talk about it though. Somewhere in the pprune archives is a thread (started by someone else I might say!) asking me all sorts of questions about it.
Swashplate - Thanks, but although I've been involved for 6 years there are loads of other people involved in this campaign - many are contibutors here. All deserve recognition.
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John Nichol,
I transmitted my reply to Shy Torque before seeing your latest post.
As you say, the ADF setting could have been left by another crew - so could the altimeter settings. I thought we had check lists to ensure that things were set correctly prior to getting airborne. The Route Planning having been done by another Pilot - are you saying that it is possible that they just took that on trust and didn't check it?
I confess that I was sorely tempted to comment on your revelation about the HF - but I will leave that to fellow members of SODCAT. It was very useful for getting weather colour states twice an hour.
You are postulating not one but two major emergencies. Control problems and total radio failure. When last seen by an eyewitness at 2-3nm from the Mull the aircraft was in straight and level flight - and either already was, or was imminently about to become, IMC. At that time it should have been climbing to SALT or turning away to maintain VFR.
I transmitted my reply to Shy Torque before seeing your latest post.
As you say, the ADF setting could have been left by another crew - so could the altimeter settings. I thought we had check lists to ensure that things were set correctly prior to getting airborne. The Route Planning having been done by another Pilot - are you saying that it is possible that they just took that on trust and didn't check it?
I confess that I was sorely tempted to comment on your revelation about the HF - but I will leave that to fellow members of SODCAT. It was very useful for getting weather colour states twice an hour.
You are postulating not one but two major emergencies. Control problems and total radio failure. When last seen by an eyewitness at 2-3nm from the Mull the aircraft was in straight and level flight - and either already was, or was imminently about to become, IMC. At that time it should have been climbing to SALT or turning away to maintain VFR.
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K52
I can only admire your ability to respond to so many excellent points with equally considered replies. However, and I mean no insult, you are now showing a lack of experience in low level operations around the UK.
There are huge holes in radio coverage around these green lands. Fact. Before you head for your study to reference thousands of books and reports, which will prove that any number of frequencies are available 24 hours a day at ground level, let me assure you, from many years experience, lack of comms is common, bordering on the norm.
As I’ve said, the work you put in for this thread is impressive. The trouble is that if you spent five minutes on the phone to an SH operator before writing each post I’m sure you would lose the urge to comment. Again no insult intended. I must also make it clear that I do not, in any way, resent your comments. The beauty of this forum is the lack of censorship and, more importantly, fresh eyes may well spot the obviouse flaw which close in operators have missed.
I can only admire your ability to respond to so many excellent points with equally considered replies. However, and I mean no insult, you are now showing a lack of experience in low level operations around the UK.
There are huge holes in radio coverage around these green lands. Fact. Before you head for your study to reference thousands of books and reports, which will prove that any number of frequencies are available 24 hours a day at ground level, let me assure you, from many years experience, lack of comms is common, bordering on the norm.
As I’ve said, the work you put in for this thread is impressive. The trouble is that if you spent five minutes on the phone to an SH operator before writing each post I’m sure you would lose the urge to comment. Again no insult intended. I must also make it clear that I do not, in any way, resent your comments. The beauty of this forum is the lack of censorship and, more importantly, fresh eyes may well spot the obviouse flaw which close in operators have missed.
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Re - control inputs. Are pitch, roll, yaw and collective primary inputs not based through the control pallet? ie why find it hard to believe that a 'potential' restriction, is restricted to one input, when with the CH47, all inputs are grounded on the same pallet. (incident reports both prior to and post the accident state delamination of the pallet may have in flight led to...)
Re - one minute. Given(or maybe even if) your not familiar with the 'mod' type - even though you're a very experienced CH47 operator, start the clock next time you 'simulate' an airborne emergency. I have..The best case for a 'simple emergency' ie no contributing factors was 38 secs. With complications, ie one emergency leading into another, is 2mins 45secs...
Re - one minute. Given(or maybe even if) your not familiar with the 'mod' type - even though you're a very experienced CH47 operator, start the clock next time you 'simulate' an airborne emergency. I have..The best case for a 'simple emergency' ie no contributing factors was 38 secs. With complications, ie one emergency leading into another, is 2mins 45secs...
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cheapseat,
I think that's quite the nicest reply I have had so far (apart from Brian). I totally take your point - but I come from a different era. First tour in the Gulf (amazing how things don't change isn't it - I seem to recall that the reason for us being there was to deter Iraq from invading Kuwait). Every Airfield had one frequency - 118.1 - who answered when you called depended on the time of day and the height of the ionosphere. The only beacon in our normal operating area worked better at night because you could see the flame from a greater distance.
First time across the Atlantic - single ADF, a Doppler that didn't work over the sea and a "sun gun" (great at night but not if it was cloudy). We reached 11200ft in a climbing attitude after a max overload take-off. First task was to move every thing we could off the ramp and bring it to the flightdeck - that gave us another 7kts IAS. In an emergency - head for the nearest weather ship. They had radar,lifeboats, NDB and could lay a flarepath at night to assist ditching and oil if the sea was rough. (A real possibility - the ferry tank was purely gravity feed and fed at a greater rate than the engines could consume the fuel. We had to keep turning it off and hopeing it would feed properly when we turned it back on)
The point is that we knew the limitations of our comm's equipment and thought about it. We had a contingency plan in the event of emergency.
ZD576 had 2 way comms with STCICS on 4722 approx 13 minutes before impact. Any call on 243Mhz or 121.5Mhz would have registered on SARSAT (and with 121.5Mhz any aircraft coming in from Oceanic). The options were there if they had thought about it beforehand!! If they had kept Aldergrove Approach on the VHF it would have given them a 90%+ chance of somebody hearing them.
Perhaps I am being unfair, but there used to be a Flight Safety slogan that said "EXPECT THE UNEXPECTED"
TO ILLUSTRATE:
Fg Off Don Mcloud was an American serving on 121(Eagle)Sqn at RAF North Weald in early 1942. He was sitting in the Link Trainer practising IF when a flight of German fighters strafed the Airfield. A cannon shell went through the wooden wall of the Link Trainer building and exploded at the base of the Link Trainer which then fell off its podium onto the floor.
Fg Off Mcloud thus became the ONLY person in the annals of aviation to have been physically shot down whilst flying a flight simulator.
I think that's quite the nicest reply I have had so far (apart from Brian). I totally take your point - but I come from a different era. First tour in the Gulf (amazing how things don't change isn't it - I seem to recall that the reason for us being there was to deter Iraq from invading Kuwait). Every Airfield had one frequency - 118.1 - who answered when you called depended on the time of day and the height of the ionosphere. The only beacon in our normal operating area worked better at night because you could see the flame from a greater distance.
First time across the Atlantic - single ADF, a Doppler that didn't work over the sea and a "sun gun" (great at night but not if it was cloudy). We reached 11200ft in a climbing attitude after a max overload take-off. First task was to move every thing we could off the ramp and bring it to the flightdeck - that gave us another 7kts IAS. In an emergency - head for the nearest weather ship. They had radar,lifeboats, NDB and could lay a flarepath at night to assist ditching and oil if the sea was rough. (A real possibility - the ferry tank was purely gravity feed and fed at a greater rate than the engines could consume the fuel. We had to keep turning it off and hopeing it would feed properly when we turned it back on)
The point is that we knew the limitations of our comm's equipment and thought about it. We had a contingency plan in the event of emergency.
ZD576 had 2 way comms with STCICS on 4722 approx 13 minutes before impact. Any call on 243Mhz or 121.5Mhz would have registered on SARSAT (and with 121.5Mhz any aircraft coming in from Oceanic). The options were there if they had thought about it beforehand!! If they had kept Aldergrove Approach on the VHF it would have given them a 90%+ chance of somebody hearing them.
Perhaps I am being unfair, but there used to be a Flight Safety slogan that said "EXPECT THE UNEXPECTED"
TO ILLUSTRATE:
Fg Off Don Mcloud was an American serving on 121(Eagle)Sqn at RAF North Weald in early 1942. He was sitting in the Link Trainer practising IF when a flight of German fighters strafed the Airfield. A cannon shell went through the wooden wall of the Link Trainer building and exploded at the base of the Link Trainer which then fell off its podium onto the floor.
Fg Off Mcloud thus became the ONLY person in the annals of aviation to have been physically shot down whilst flying a flight simulator.
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To John Nicol:
Not having a go, mate!! Of course, I recognise that there are many more people involved in this campaign as well as yourself - congrats to 'em all!!
There are now nearly 800 replies to this thread on PPRuNe- should the campaign not use this as evidence of the strength of feeling on this issue????
Maybe I should have made that clearer.....
Not having a go, mate!! Of course, I recognise that there are many more people involved in this campaign as well as yourself - congrats to 'em all!!
There are now nearly 800 replies to this thread on PPRuNe- should the campaign not use this as evidence of the strength of feeling on this issue????
Maybe I should have made that clearer.....