Chinook - Hit Back Here
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TO ALL AND SUNDRY
Now that Lord Chalfont has gained approval for a Select Commitee of the House of Lords to enquire into the finding of "negligence to a gross degree" against the 2 Pilots, I find it quite incredible that no-one who supports the view that there was a miscarriage of justice in the original findings has seen fit to pay tribute to some-one who has done considerably more than fulminate against the decision on this thread.
I refer, of course, to BRIAN DIXON - who has for years, and long before this thread opened, campaigned against that decision. I, at least, can recognise the amount of time and effort that he has put in, over the years: campaigning, cajoling, writing, and organising against what he perceives to be an injustice.
BRIAN, I know that that we differ in our views about this accident, but I for one salute you for your perseverence.
Now that Lord Chalfont has gained approval for a Select Commitee of the House of Lords to enquire into the finding of "negligence to a gross degree" against the 2 Pilots, I find it quite incredible that no-one who supports the view that there was a miscarriage of justice in the original findings has seen fit to pay tribute to some-one who has done considerably more than fulminate against the decision on this thread.
I refer, of course, to BRIAN DIXON - who has for years, and long before this thread opened, campaigned against that decision. I, at least, can recognise the amount of time and effort that he has put in, over the years: campaigning, cajoling, writing, and organising against what he perceives to be an injustice.
BRIAN, I know that that we differ in our views about this accident, but I for one salute you for your perseverence.
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Brian,
I know I've said it in private via email, but as has been pointed out it is remiss of me to let your efforts go unremarked in public. Knowing how busy you are in real life, and how useful you were to us in your former RAF existence, may I add my public thanks for all you've done? Cheers mate.
I know I've said it in private via email, but as has been pointed out it is remiss of me to let your efforts go unremarked in public. Knowing how busy you are in real life, and how useful you were to us in your former RAF existence, may I add my public thanks for all you've done? Cheers mate.
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Thank you all for your very kind comments. I am both flattered and humbled. 
There are many people who have campaigned as hard as I have, if not harder. I suppose that I have been fortunate in the fact that I choose to spout off over the internet, whereas others opted for the quiet route.
Everyone's contribution is valuable, irrespective of which side of the debate and I thank everyone for making this thread the success it is.
Finally, a tribute to the families of the pilots. They have conducted themselves with absolute dignity throughout this terrible injustice. It has been a great pleasure to know them and I assure them of my continued support.
Now, where was I......"Dear Mr Hoon, any chance of a reply to my last letter...."
Regards all
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
There are many people who have campaigned as hard as I have, if not harder. I suppose that I have been fortunate in the fact that I choose to spout off over the internet, whereas others opted for the quiet route.
Everyone's contribution is valuable, irrespective of which side of the debate and I thank everyone for making this thread the success it is.
Finally, a tribute to the families of the pilots. They have conducted themselves with absolute dignity throughout this terrible injustice. It has been a great pleasure to know them and I assure them of my continued support.
Now, where was I......"Dear Mr Hoon, any chance of a reply to my last letter...."
Regards all
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Having carried out the hand over to to the rearcrew(4 days prior) that flew the ill fated sorted, into the Mull, and having being 'requested' 7 days later to recover a cab to ODI from BOSC, I would simply like to intimate that there was a major - 'probably a/c & accident related problem', that has not yet been fully defined.
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Ben Leice,
Thanks for that info re impact point. There is no problem with the aircraft being "a few hundred metres off track"; they were flying visually and it is quite possible that they deliberatly altered course slightly on sighting the yacht to avoid giving it the benefit of their downwash.
Ark Royal
No chance to put the abacus back together - Wife making sure I finish the decorating this weekend.
The "150 kts" is not my hypothosis - it is the finding of the BOI from the evidence of the AAIB and the trials done by Boeing and DRA Bedford. Taking into account the height and other data stored in the memory of the SuperTans at its final calculation 15-18 secs before impact and then comparing them with with the crash parameters established by AAIB produced a prerequisite IAS of 150kts and a rate of climb of 1000ft/min prior to the cyclic flare.
The finding of negligence was NOT because they crashed into the Mull. As I have said before; if they had forced landed and all had walked away then the finding would still have been negligence because of their total disregard of the rules of VFR flight and their failure to carry out an IMC abort which they were trained to do.
Has a handle
Is this just a "gut feeling" or do you have some specific information that neither the BOI or 1 Group Flight Safety staff were aware of?
Thanks for that info re impact point. There is no problem with the aircraft being "a few hundred metres off track"; they were flying visually and it is quite possible that they deliberatly altered course slightly on sighting the yacht to avoid giving it the benefit of their downwash.
Ark Royal
No chance to put the abacus back together - Wife making sure I finish the decorating this weekend.
The "150 kts" is not my hypothosis - it is the finding of the BOI from the evidence of the AAIB and the trials done by Boeing and DRA Bedford. Taking into account the height and other data stored in the memory of the SuperTans at its final calculation 15-18 secs before impact and then comparing them with with the crash parameters established by AAIB produced a prerequisite IAS of 150kts and a rate of climb of 1000ft/min prior to the cyclic flare.
The finding of negligence was NOT because they crashed into the Mull. As I have said before; if they had forced landed and all had walked away then the finding would still have been negligence because of their total disregard of the rules of VFR flight and their failure to carry out an IMC abort which they were trained to do.
Has a handle
Is this just a "gut feeling" or do you have some specific information that neither the BOI or 1 Group Flight Safety staff were aware of?
Guest
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Cheapseat,
YES
The ORIGINAL evidence of the Yachtsman was that he was 2-3nm from the Mull when he saw the aircraft and that there was approx 80% cloud cover and the visibility was 1 mile in haze. The evidence of ALL the people on the Mull was that it was in fog; backed up by video evidence taken approx 10 mins brfore the accident which,when assessed by the PRU experts at Wyton, showed a visibility of approx 400 metres. The fog stretched from below the lighthouse (300ft ASL) to the top of Beinn na lice (1400ft). "The visibility below the variable cloudbase close to the lighthouse was 400-500 metres" (BOI).
At the speed the BOI accepted they were travelling at the requirements were 5 km visibility, 1.5 km horizintally from cloud and 1000ft vertical clearance from cloud. 5km equates to just under 2.7nm, thus on the yachtsmans ORIGINAL evidence the were at that time, or were imminently about to become, IMC. The BOI's "most likely cause" was that, having become IMC, they selected an "inappropriate rate of climb". I do not understand how a BOI could reach such a conclusion in the full knowleedfe that the crew were trained, and practised, in the appropriate "IMC abort" procedure. In my opinion failure to take the appropriate action to either regain VMC or climb to SALT amounts to " negligence to a gross degree".
Finally, I have qouted the yachtsmans ORIGINAL evidens. That which he gave at the FAI is totally at variance with the evidence of all those who were actually on the Mull.
YES
The ORIGINAL evidence of the Yachtsman was that he was 2-3nm from the Mull when he saw the aircraft and that there was approx 80% cloud cover and the visibility was 1 mile in haze. The evidence of ALL the people on the Mull was that it was in fog; backed up by video evidence taken approx 10 mins brfore the accident which,when assessed by the PRU experts at Wyton, showed a visibility of approx 400 metres. The fog stretched from below the lighthouse (300ft ASL) to the top of Beinn na lice (1400ft). "The visibility below the variable cloudbase close to the lighthouse was 400-500 metres" (BOI).
At the speed the BOI accepted they were travelling at the requirements were 5 km visibility, 1.5 km horizintally from cloud and 1000ft vertical clearance from cloud. 5km equates to just under 2.7nm, thus on the yachtsmans ORIGINAL evidence the were at that time, or were imminently about to become, IMC. The BOI's "most likely cause" was that, having become IMC, they selected an "inappropriate rate of climb". I do not understand how a BOI could reach such a conclusion in the full knowleedfe that the crew were trained, and practised, in the appropriate "IMC abort" procedure. In my opinion failure to take the appropriate action to either regain VMC or climb to SALT amounts to " negligence to a gross degree".
Finally, I have qouted the yachtsmans ORIGINAL evidens. That which he gave at the FAI is totally at variance with the evidence of all those who were actually on the Mull.
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It's just amazing. All these pages. I do seriously doff my cap to all the pilots in the RAF, esp. the rotary ones, for your loyalty and ethos of 'benefit of doubt' to the dead who cannot defend themselves. As a layman, with lots of rotary experience in-Province and with experience of the precise same route that they flew, and in similar conditions (but without the benefit of 'reliable' navaids,) are we getting wrapped around the axle here? Could it just be a simple case of 'cumulo-granite'? I honestly do not mean any disrespect. We are all human, after all. There but for the grace etc.
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"The Board then considered the effect of the aircraft's speed on its climb performance, and the possibility that the crew did not recognise the implications of a cruise climb at 150 knots. The crew were unfamiliar with operating comfortably at high airspeeds, as the high vibration levels of the Chinook discouraged cruise flight above 135 knots. In the circumstances, an airspeed of 150 knots, coupled with a strong tailwind component, would have produced a high groundspeed and closure rate with the Mull of Kintyre. .. a level airspeed of 150 kt required a high power setting, leaving only a small power margin available for climbing.." .. Holland, 'Phoenix', p 240.
"As the noble Lord, Lord Jacobs, said, the aircraft crashed in cloud at a height of 812 feet at a ground speed of 151 knots, or 174 mph." .. Baroness Symons, House of Lords, 05.03.2001
At an airspeed of 150 kts would the pilots have seen anything considering the Chinook's vibration levels at that airspeed - a friend said that the eyeballs vibrate in their sockets at those vibration levels? Is it likely that the pilots would have voluntarily chosen to fly at such a high airspeed considering their knowledge of the location and the weather? Is it not much more likely that they were not in control?
When you look at the flightpath from Carnlough you would think that the Chinook may have veered to starboard after the change to port was made in the Way Point.
B52
If the pilots decided to deviate from their planned route because of the yacht they would not have opted for the side with the high cliffs. The Board speculated that, in the circumstances, even a minor navigational error could have been significant.
[This message has been edited by Ben Leice (edited 11 March 2001).]
[This message has been edited by Ben Leice (edited 11 March 2001).]
"As the noble Lord, Lord Jacobs, said, the aircraft crashed in cloud at a height of 812 feet at a ground speed of 151 knots, or 174 mph." .. Baroness Symons, House of Lords, 05.03.2001
At an airspeed of 150 kts would the pilots have seen anything considering the Chinook's vibration levels at that airspeed - a friend said that the eyeballs vibrate in their sockets at those vibration levels? Is it likely that the pilots would have voluntarily chosen to fly at such a high airspeed considering their knowledge of the location and the weather? Is it not much more likely that they were not in control?
When you look at the flightpath from Carnlough you would think that the Chinook may have veered to starboard after the change to port was made in the Way Point.
B52
If the pilots decided to deviate from their planned route because of the yacht they would not have opted for the side with the high cliffs. The Board speculated that, in the circumstances, even a minor navigational error could have been significant.
[This message has been edited by Ben Leice (edited 11 March 2001).]
[This message has been edited by Ben Leice (edited 11 March 2001).]
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K52
With reference to speed, the AAIB and Boeing did indeed carry out various simulations to try to discover the aircraft parameters just before the accident. Their simulation indicated that a climb rate of 1000ft/min coupled with an airspeed of 150kts gave the closest condition to match their estimate of the aircraft attitude, speed and control positions at impact. Note that the control positions are only those thought to have pertained, as the AAIB report states that they are not certain if these had been altered by impact. So the speed of 150 kts IAS is still only a hypothesis.
If the simulation is correct in its assumptions, then we would need to ask why the aircraft was accelerated to this speed from a much lower mean speed for the rest of the transit. As the AAIB point out, without CVR / ADR evidence, the only way to do this is by speculation, and here we are again, full circle. No firm, positive evidence.
I would still be interested to know what the crew understood to be the met conditions required for a VFR flight, as others have posted that in the NI theatre, a lower limit than that which you quote was in force. Indeed, nowhere in the BOI report is a limit mentioned, only that with the forecast conditions, (which were less than 5km/1.5km/1000ft) the crew were correct in planning a VFR transit.
The Yachtsman could see the Chinook, so the Chinook crew could see the surface. How are you so sure that they were IMC?
I would like further explanation of your claim: ‘If they had forced landed and all had walked away then the finding would still have been negligence.’ I think not, as the pilots would have been alive to explain their thought processes and actions, a defence sadly unavailable to them in the event.
Yes, Alligator, it could have just been a case of ‘cumulo-granite’. It could have been many things including negligence, but without evidence ‘beyond any doubt whatsoever’ the finding is unsafe, in common sense, natural justice; and more importantly, the RAF’s own rules.
With reference to speed, the AAIB and Boeing did indeed carry out various simulations to try to discover the aircraft parameters just before the accident. Their simulation indicated that a climb rate of 1000ft/min coupled with an airspeed of 150kts gave the closest condition to match their estimate of the aircraft attitude, speed and control positions at impact. Note that the control positions are only those thought to have pertained, as the AAIB report states that they are not certain if these had been altered by impact. So the speed of 150 kts IAS is still only a hypothesis.
If the simulation is correct in its assumptions, then we would need to ask why the aircraft was accelerated to this speed from a much lower mean speed for the rest of the transit. As the AAIB point out, without CVR / ADR evidence, the only way to do this is by speculation, and here we are again, full circle. No firm, positive evidence.
I would still be interested to know what the crew understood to be the met conditions required for a VFR flight, as others have posted that in the NI theatre, a lower limit than that which you quote was in force. Indeed, nowhere in the BOI report is a limit mentioned, only that with the forecast conditions, (which were less than 5km/1.5km/1000ft) the crew were correct in planning a VFR transit.
The Yachtsman could see the Chinook, so the Chinook crew could see the surface. How are you so sure that they were IMC?
I would like further explanation of your claim: ‘If they had forced landed and all had walked away then the finding would still have been negligence.’ I think not, as the pilots would have been alive to explain their thought processes and actions, a defence sadly unavailable to them in the event.
Yes, Alligator, it could have just been a case of ‘cumulo-granite’. It could have been many things including negligence, but without evidence ‘beyond any doubt whatsoever’ the finding is unsafe, in common sense, natural justice; and more importantly, the RAF’s own rules.
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AVWEB NEWSWIRE:
Army Finds Pilot at Fault in Fatal Chinook Crash
Lack of instrument and night currency, a lack of current weather forecast and IMC conditions contributed to the March [1996] crash of a U.S. Army Special Forces Chinook helicopter at Ft. Campbell that killed all five soldiers aboard. [...]
The Army report said the pilot in training may have been unfamiliar with the instrument display of the MH-47E Chinook and "became disoriented during a turn and inadvertently placed the aircraft into an unusual attitude that neither he nor the (instructor pilot) could recover from."
The Chinook crash killed four members of the elite 160th Special Operations Air Regiment. A fifth crew member was assigned to a student detachment at Fort Jackson, S.C.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Was there a reference to an unusual attitude in the 1994 crash too?
[This message has been edited by Ben Leice (edited 11 March 2001).]
Army Finds Pilot at Fault in Fatal Chinook Crash
Lack of instrument and night currency, a lack of current weather forecast and IMC conditions contributed to the March [1996] crash of a U.S. Army Special Forces Chinook helicopter at Ft. Campbell that killed all five soldiers aboard. [...]
The Army report said the pilot in training may have been unfamiliar with the instrument display of the MH-47E Chinook and "became disoriented during a turn and inadvertently placed the aircraft into an unusual attitude that neither he nor the (instructor pilot) could recover from."
The Chinook crash killed four members of the elite 160th Special Operations Air Regiment. A fifth crew member was assigned to a student detachment at Fort Jackson, S.C.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Was there a reference to an unusual attitude in the 1994 crash too?
[This message has been edited by Ben Leice (edited 11 March 2001).]
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Arkroyal
The weather limits for Strike Command helis were then the same as they are now. That is, UKLFS 250' cloudbase 100m viz, Ex or Op area (incl NI) 100' cloudbase 1000m viz. SF exercises or Ops could/can operate to COCISS.
K52
All of the above is regardless of airspeed, although those promulgating it have obviously taken into account the ability of helicopters to slow down. The reason the crew in this instance did not do so is, to me, the most significant of many unknown facts.
The weather limits for Strike Command helis were then the same as they are now. That is, UKLFS 250' cloudbase 100m viz, Ex or Op area (incl NI) 100' cloudbase 1000m viz. SF exercises or Ops could/can operate to COCISS.
K52
All of the above is regardless of airspeed, although those promulgating it have obviously taken into account the ability of helicopters to slow down. The reason the crew in this instance did not do so is, to me, the most significant of many unknown facts.
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In order to clarify the point, can anyone tell me what the rules were at the time of the accident. It would be those rules that Jon and Rick would have been flying to. What they changed to might very well prevent a similar tragedy, but it doesn't offer help to the campaign. (if that sounds offensive, I don't mean it to be).
Thanks
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Thanks
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Ben Leice,
The book on "Phoenix" is NOT an authoritative source. What you quoted is a reproduction of a passage of the BOI report with a significant Typo. It has missed out "HC1" after Chinook thus completely changing the context of the piece which discussed the Crew's relative inexperience in operating at such speeds in relative comfort.
If the Chinook had made a small deviation around the yacht then they would have done so on the downwind side.
PS. Speaking of Typo's - I am not a USAF Bomber.
Ark Royal, Pub User et al
Brian is, of course, correct; so could someone with a Service phone ask AIDU what limits they were promulgating in the FIH at that time. Theatre limits did not apply as they were out of Theatre in the UKLFS. The BOI did not appear to have any doubts as they stated: " The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."
The BOI state that the "AAIB investigations were particulaly comprehensive and detailed" and " The AAIB Technical Investigation revealed convincing information on the aircraft's attitude and groundspeed, and determined precise values for the DASH actuator and LCT settings at impact."
I am still a little confused by Ark's statement about the aircraft having to accelerate "from a much lower mean ground speed for the rest of the transit." We have a satellite generated time for "power down" and we have ATC times for airborne and approaching the CTR boundary.
If we add and subtract 1 minute each way from those times to allow for rounding up/down; then the aircraft travelled the 43nm from LIFT OFF to impact in between 16 - 18 minutes and the 33nm between CTR and impact in 11 - 13 minutes (recorded times being 17 & 12 minutes)
This means that ZD 576 had a mean goundspeed between lift off and impact in the range 143 - 161kts and a mean groundspeed between the CTR and impact in the range 152 - 180kts.The only evidence that the aircraft was travelling at a slower groundspeed comes from the yachtsman, in his evidence to the FAI, when he gave an estimate of "60 - 90kts" which was considerably lower than the estimate he gave the BOI.
The BOI concluded that it was likely that the overwater transit took place at 200 - 400 ft ASL until such time as the aircraft started to climb at 150kts. The wind at lighthouse level(300ft)on the Mull was described as "almost calm" but the wind further up the hill as "strong and blustery"
The book on "Phoenix" is NOT an authoritative source. What you quoted is a reproduction of a passage of the BOI report with a significant Typo. It has missed out "HC1" after Chinook thus completely changing the context of the piece which discussed the Crew's relative inexperience in operating at such speeds in relative comfort.
If the Chinook had made a small deviation around the yacht then they would have done so on the downwind side.
PS. Speaking of Typo's - I am not a USAF Bomber.
Ark Royal, Pub User et al
Brian is, of course, correct; so could someone with a Service phone ask AIDU what limits they were promulgating in the FIH at that time. Theatre limits did not apply as they were out of Theatre in the UKLFS. The BOI did not appear to have any doubts as they stated: " The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."
The BOI state that the "AAIB investigations were particulaly comprehensive and detailed" and " The AAIB Technical Investigation revealed convincing information on the aircraft's attitude and groundspeed, and determined precise values for the DASH actuator and LCT settings at impact."
I am still a little confused by Ark's statement about the aircraft having to accelerate "from a much lower mean ground speed for the rest of the transit." We have a satellite generated time for "power down" and we have ATC times for airborne and approaching the CTR boundary.
If we add and subtract 1 minute each way from those times to allow for rounding up/down; then the aircraft travelled the 43nm from LIFT OFF to impact in between 16 - 18 minutes and the 33nm between CTR and impact in 11 - 13 minutes (recorded times being 17 & 12 minutes)
This means that ZD 576 had a mean goundspeed between lift off and impact in the range 143 - 161kts and a mean groundspeed between the CTR and impact in the range 152 - 180kts.The only evidence that the aircraft was travelling at a slower groundspeed comes from the yachtsman, in his evidence to the FAI, when he gave an estimate of "60 - 90kts" which was considerably lower than the estimate he gave the BOI.
The BOI concluded that it was likely that the overwater transit took place at 200 - 400 ft ASL until such time as the aircraft started to climb at 150kts. The wind at lighthouse level(300ft)on the Mull was described as "almost calm" but the wind further up the hill as "strong and blustery"