Chinook - Hit Back Here
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In view of the news today, this post, which was a reply to K52 is irrelevant and I have deleted it.
My sincere thanks to Lord Chalfont and all who have tried long and hard to achieve this.
Excellent news. Lets hope this time a correct and fair verdict is reached.
[This message has been edited by ShyTorque (edited 06 March 2001).]
My sincere thanks to Lord Chalfont and all who have tried long and hard to achieve this.
Excellent news. Lets hope this time a correct and fair verdict is reached.
[This message has been edited by ShyTorque (edited 06 March 2001).]
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All :
The Today programme carried about 3 or 4 minutes of reporting today on the House of Lords discussion related to the Chinook crash. Overall the emphasis was on the side of those wishing to have another inquiry, although both a former CDS and Lady Symonds ( sp? ) were opposed to the idea.
I've emailed the Today programme asking if the clip can be made available to listen to via the Internet, but there's no guarantee of that. The email address is "[email protected]", should you wish to make a request yourself.
The Today programme carried about 3 or 4 minutes of reporting today on the House of Lords discussion related to the Chinook crash. Overall the emphasis was on the side of those wishing to have another inquiry, although both a former CDS and Lady Symonds ( sp? ) were opposed to the idea.
I've emailed the Today programme asking if the clip can be made available to listen to via the Internet, but there's no guarantee of that. The email address is "[email protected]", should you wish to make a request yourself.
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I knew I should have waited !! At about 7:15, Lord Chalfont was on the Today programme.
The good news is that there's going to be a select committee looking again at the verdict of gross negligence. The bad news, well I didn't detect any but if you're cynical you could say it's not over till it's over.
Lord Chalfont also reinforced the points that 1) the original BOI didn't bring in the verdict of gross negligence, it was the Air Marshals and 2) that all the evidence is known and it's purely the verdict which is disputed.
Hopefully this is the beginning of the end.
The good news is that there's going to be a select committee looking again at the verdict of gross negligence. The bad news, well I didn't detect any but if you're cynical you could say it's not over till it's over.
Lord Chalfont also reinforced the points that 1) the original BOI didn't bring in the verdict of gross negligence, it was the Air Marshals and 2) that all the evidence is known and it's purely the verdict which is disputed.
Hopefully this is the beginning of the end.
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Nr Fairy, I hope you are right about "the beginning of the end", but let's wait and see what happens. I may be cynical, but I suspect there is a reason for the Govt not opposing last night's motion. It will be interesting to see who is on the committee, but don't forget that Hoon et al simply dismissed the PAC report without a second glance using the well worn phrase "no new evidence".
There is no doubt that this time, Wratten/Day will give evidence. Make no mistake; they are very convincing, I know from experience as Day gave me his brief before I got involved in the CH4 programme about the accident. He is very, very good.
I'm not sure who else the committee will call to give evidence but they will be crucial in dicounting the RAF's argument.
Let's all hope that the outcome is the one we want.
There is no doubt that this time, Wratten/Day will give evidence. Make no mistake; they are very convincing, I know from experience as Day gave me his brief before I got involved in the CH4 programme about the accident. He is very, very good.
I'm not sure who else the committee will call to give evidence but they will be crucial in dicounting the RAF's argument.
Let's all hope that the outcome is the one we want.
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K52,
Thank you for taking the time to answer my question. I will now take considerable time to work out what it all means. I am still puzzled about them flying direct to a WP(A) which they would have known they could not reach at the altitude at which they were flying, and then set a WP(B) which they also could not reach for the same reason. They must have known that they had to climb and/or turn. We know that they were climbing at the point of impact but we don't know if anything distracted them or prevented them from turning.
However, the basis of your argument is that they were being negligent BEFORE the event and, presumably, this will be the key point of debate for the new select committee as it is also the key point of Wratten’s argument for his position, as expressed in his “Pilot” article.
I do hope that those involved in this new enquiry will read your contributions and realise what they are up against. As JN correctly says, it will be crucial who they call to give evidence.
Hopefully we will now see this case being argued in public by people far better qualified than me, as we have already seen in this forum. My interest in seeing justice being given another chance to prevail has been satisfied, thanks to Lord Chalfont and those who have supported him.
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"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
Thank you for taking the time to answer my question. I will now take considerable time to work out what it all means. I am still puzzled about them flying direct to a WP(A) which they would have known they could not reach at the altitude at which they were flying, and then set a WP(B) which they also could not reach for the same reason. They must have known that they had to climb and/or turn. We know that they were climbing at the point of impact but we don't know if anything distracted them or prevented them from turning.
However, the basis of your argument is that they were being negligent BEFORE the event and, presumably, this will be the key point of debate for the new select committee as it is also the key point of Wratten’s argument for his position, as expressed in his “Pilot” article.
I do hope that those involved in this new enquiry will read your contributions and realise what they are up against. As JN correctly says, it will be crucial who they call to give evidence.
Hopefully we will now see this case being argued in public by people far better qualified than me, as we have already seen in this forum. My interest in seeing justice being given another chance to prevail has been satisfied, thanks to Lord Chalfont and those who have supported him.
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"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
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K52,
Sorry I could not resist a quick further question. If a constant track of 027º took them directly from Aldergrove to the impact point, why was the Mull bearing 045º when they changed waypoints? Would not that have involved a change in heading, the wrong way? Unfortunately, as I only fly in the south I do not have a ½ mil of the area but, according to my nav computer, a direct track which put them 1.75Km SW of the Mull might have ended very differently.
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"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
Sorry I could not resist a quick further question. If a constant track of 027º took them directly from Aldergrove to the impact point, why was the Mull bearing 045º when they changed waypoints? Would not that have involved a change in heading, the wrong way? Unfortunately, as I only fly in the south I do not have a ½ mil of the area but, according to my nav computer, a direct track which put them 1.75Km SW of the Mull might have ended very differently.
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"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
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Just to let everybody know, this is my first post, I have read all the mail and will do anything within reason to get some justice done.I have arranged with Brian to talk to Andrew Hunter MP on this Saturday to try to get him on board, either myself or Brian will let you know the outcome. I can not make any comments because I am a ex- yomper,so I used all your machines as taxis
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John Nichol,
Sorry for the delayed response to your comments posted 26 Feb 15.00.
I did not actually say that 'flying low-level in cloud was negligent' - implied it maybe but did not say it. Your assertion that there is not one 'jot of evidence' to say the crew were IMC below SALT is rather disingenuous. They hit the ground which is pretty complelling really.
At the risk of being castigated again for "offering no new evidence", I would suggest there is nothing new to offer. The SALT issue is fundamental. If the ac had been VFR when it hit the ground and the Board had reached the same conclusion then I agree all the speculation or hypothesis discussed in this forum may be relevant. But given the actual at the time, sorry.
As one who spent the best part of 25 years flying VFR underneath SALT remains the key to survival. If anything went wrong - emergency, dropped map, felt sick, got lost -the list is never ending the first rule, climb to gain VFR or to SALT then sort things out. If that is impractical then turn round and go back and/or stay VFR.
Nothing I have read or heard convinces me (nor evidently the BOI)that in the case of this accident such a basic principle of airmanship was being addressed.
So, what price 'Pressonitis'?
Sorry for the delayed response to your comments posted 26 Feb 15.00.
I did not actually say that 'flying low-level in cloud was negligent' - implied it maybe but did not say it. Your assertion that there is not one 'jot of evidence' to say the crew were IMC below SALT is rather disingenuous. They hit the ground which is pretty complelling really.
At the risk of being castigated again for "offering no new evidence", I would suggest there is nothing new to offer. The SALT issue is fundamental. If the ac had been VFR when it hit the ground and the Board had reached the same conclusion then I agree all the speculation or hypothesis discussed in this forum may be relevant. But given the actual at the time, sorry.
As one who spent the best part of 25 years flying VFR underneath SALT remains the key to survival. If anything went wrong - emergency, dropped map, felt sick, got lost -the list is never ending the first rule, climb to gain VFR or to SALT then sort things out. If that is impractical then turn round and go back and/or stay VFR.
Nothing I have read or heard convinces me (nor evidently the BOI)that in the case of this accident such a basic principle of airmanship was being addressed.
So, what price 'Pressonitis'?
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As Lord Chalfont pointed out, the committe requirs no real technical expertise, merely legal expertise. Therefore K52's 'nibbling ducks' needn't come into play.
As a non-pilot am I missing something? The fact that the a/c hit the ground to my mind proves only that it hit the ground, to say that therefore the crew were flying IMC below SALT makes (to my mind) the major assumption that they had full control of the a/c. Can there be no doubt whatsoever that they did?
As all the facts that are knowable are known, the HoL Select Committee has only to answer the question: "Do these facts prove beyond any doubt whatsoever that either, both or neither of the pilots were grossly negligent?"
There is no need for any new evidence.
As a non-pilot am I missing something? The fact that the a/c hit the ground to my mind proves only that it hit the ground, to say that therefore the crew were flying IMC below SALT makes (to my mind) the major assumption that they had full control of the a/c. Can there be no doubt whatsoever that they did?
As all the facts that are knowable are known, the HoL Select Committee has only to answer the question: "Do these facts prove beyond any doubt whatsoever that either, both or neither of the pilots were grossly negligent?"
There is no need for any new evidence.
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Coincidences?
I posted queries about Chinook flights in Northern Ireland on June 2, 1994, at the beginning of December and tasking information for 1991-94 is destroyed. [Tasking forms recording helicopter flights in Northern Ireland are retained for six years ... Spellar, HoC, Written Answers, 15.02.2001]
I persuade a Northern Ireland MP to raise a series of questions about Chinooks in parliament [see William Ross, 14.02.2001] and the Government are prepared to let the Lords carry out an investigation - 'without new evidence'.
I've been told that Colonel C Biles, an army intelligence officer who died in the crash, requested the use of the Chinook. Is this likely? Apparently the advice on May 31 was to use two Pumas. This was also the day that Chinook Mk2 arrived at Aldergrove, the first Mk2 to be used in Northern Ireland. There was a Mk1 already there but I don't know if it was available to fly to Inverness. Presumably Tapper and Cook would have preferred to use the Mk1.
Are we beginning to see the light at the end of the tunnel? Let's hope so.
I posted queries about Chinook flights in Northern Ireland on June 2, 1994, at the beginning of December and tasking information for 1991-94 is destroyed. [Tasking forms recording helicopter flights in Northern Ireland are retained for six years ... Spellar, HoC, Written Answers, 15.02.2001]
I persuade a Northern Ireland MP to raise a series of questions about Chinooks in parliament [see William Ross, 14.02.2001] and the Government are prepared to let the Lords carry out an investigation - 'without new evidence'.
I've been told that Colonel C Biles, an army intelligence officer who died in the crash, requested the use of the Chinook. Is this likely? Apparently the advice on May 31 was to use two Pumas. This was also the day that Chinook Mk2 arrived at Aldergrove, the first Mk2 to be used in Northern Ireland. There was a Mk1 already there but I don't know if it was available to fly to Inverness. Presumably Tapper and Cook would have preferred to use the Mk1.
Are we beginning to see the light at the end of the tunnel? Let's hope so.
Guest
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Thank you very much to everyone who has been so supportive so far.
This is just a small step forward in the process. What everyone could do at the moment is to get their MPs to pledge support to Lord Chalfont. It may have a bearing when we know who is appointed to the Committee. Once the HoL Committee members are known, it may be worthwhile getting our MPs to canvass them. That said, keep the questions going into the MoD. They are soooo keen to reply, and nothing seems too much trouble for them. (Any chance of a reply to my letter by the way?)
Basing,
Nice to see you have finally managed to get a post on!! Thanks for arranging the meeting. I'm looking forward to it.
Remember, the light may be on at the end of the tunnel, but the end of the tunnel is still quite a way off. Lets keep the momentum and direction going, and not get complacent. We will then get the verdict that is right and just.
I cannot begin to thank everybody enough.
Regards
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
This is just a small step forward in the process. What everyone could do at the moment is to get their MPs to pledge support to Lord Chalfont. It may have a bearing when we know who is appointed to the Committee. Once the HoL Committee members are known, it may be worthwhile getting our MPs to canvass them. That said, keep the questions going into the MoD. They are soooo keen to reply, and nothing seems too much trouble for them. (Any chance of a reply to my letter by the way?)
Basing,
Nice to see you have finally managed to get a post on!! Thanks for arranging the meeting. I'm looking forward to it.
Remember, the light may be on at the end of the tunnel, but the end of the tunnel is still quite a way off. Lets keep the momentum and direction going, and not get complacent. We will then get the verdict that is right and just.
I cannot begin to thank everybody enough.
Regards
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Lords debate information can be found on
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld19990 0/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds01/text/10305-22.htm#10305-22_head0
[This message has been edited by rivets (edited 06 March 2001).]
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld19990 0/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds01/text/10305-22.htm#10305-22_head0
[This message has been edited by rivets (edited 06 March 2001).]
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FYI there was a very sympathetically presented feature on the re-opening of the case on Meridian last night (6 Mar), including an interview with Lord C and John Cook. Nothing from the 'Establishment' - one presumes that they would have to have been offered the right to reply?
Let's hope that some good comes out of this.
Let's hope that some good comes out of this.
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Pulse1,
Now that is a very good question. I knew I shouldn’t have dismantled the abacus!! I will have to try and answer with a bit of mental arithmetic - and this early in the morning.
The problem with dealing with just the Summary of the BOI’s deliberations is that you cannot check the statements against the detailed evidence in the annexes. So when the BOI state “ a WP change was recorded at a point very close to a direct track from RAF Aldergrove to the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse, 1.75 km south west of the impact point” one does not know exactly what they meant. Did they mean “south west” or “in a southwesterly direction” or even “south and west”? Nor do we know whether they mean the actual position of the lighthouse or whether they meant the mis-plotted position. If they meant the latter then all we know is that it was mis-plotted by 280m, they did not specify in which direction!!!
With those caveats in mind then all I can do is TRY to offer min and max deviation from ideal track on the assumption that the BOI are referring to the true position of the lighthouse. If the true position was on a bearing of 117 degrees from the plotted position then at 1.75 km that, using the 1 in 60 rule, equates to 9.6 degrees leaving us to find another 8.4 degrees (045 degrees minus 027 degrees = 18 degrees). As 8.4 is 7/8ths of 9.6 then 7/8ths of 280m is 245m. Ergo, the aircraft was at a minimum 245m left of ideal track. If, on the other hand, the true position bore 297 degrees frm the plotted position then the calclation would be 280+280+245 = 805m left of ideal track. The truth would be somewhere within those parameters.
Hope no Navigators are reading this.
Now that is a very good question. I knew I shouldn’t have dismantled the abacus!! I will have to try and answer with a bit of mental arithmetic - and this early in the morning.
The problem with dealing with just the Summary of the BOI’s deliberations is that you cannot check the statements against the detailed evidence in the annexes. So when the BOI state “ a WP change was recorded at a point very close to a direct track from RAF Aldergrove to the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse, 1.75 km south west of the impact point” one does not know exactly what they meant. Did they mean “south west” or “in a southwesterly direction” or even “south and west”? Nor do we know whether they mean the actual position of the lighthouse or whether they meant the mis-plotted position. If they meant the latter then all we know is that it was mis-plotted by 280m, they did not specify in which direction!!!
With those caveats in mind then all I can do is TRY to offer min and max deviation from ideal track on the assumption that the BOI are referring to the true position of the lighthouse. If the true position was on a bearing of 117 degrees from the plotted position then at 1.75 km that, using the 1 in 60 rule, equates to 9.6 degrees leaving us to find another 8.4 degrees (045 degrees minus 027 degrees = 18 degrees). As 8.4 is 7/8ths of 9.6 then 7/8ths of 280m is 245m. Ergo, the aircraft was at a minimum 245m left of ideal track. If, on the other hand, the true position bore 297 degrees frm the plotted position then the calclation would be 280+280+245 = 805m left of ideal track. The truth would be somewhere within those parameters.
Hope no Navigators are reading this.
Guest
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K52,
Thanks again for that. With my maths I shall take even longer to work that one out.
I am still puzzled about why every one, including the BoI accepts that the Mull was a reasonable waypoint for a low level VFR flight in marginal weather. Wouldn't it make more sense to have routed direct to Corran in the first place? Still, I guess it might all now become clearer when, hopefully, we can all see the outcome of the new enquiry.
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"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
Thanks again for that. With my maths I shall take even longer to work that one out.
I am still puzzled about why every one, including the BoI accepts that the Mull was a reasonable waypoint for a low level VFR flight in marginal weather. Wouldn't it make more sense to have routed direct to Corran in the first place? Still, I guess it might all now become clearer when, hopefully, we can all see the outcome of the new enquiry.
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"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
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Pulse 1,
Firstly an apology, the southwest bearing was from the impact point not the lighthouse; regretably the only map I have which shows the OS grid doesn't show the lighthouse. The impact point was, I think, north and slightly west of the lighthouse. My own view is the "southwest" reference was a generalisation.
Secondly : will you please stop asking very relevant questions!! The routing is a key element now that it appears that there will be further investigation into the accident. Let me explain.
The BOI based their assessment on the photocopied map left behind by the captain. The evidence given to the BOI was that the Captain had planned the sortie the night before. We now learn that the sortie was in fact planned by the other Chinook Captain on the detatchment the night before the final sortie; although he appears, if he was witness 19, to have corroborated the evidence given to the BOI that Ft Lt Tapper did the planning.
If the other Captain did do the planning, as he swore at the FAI, then this brings to mind some very relevant questions:
1. Did he discuss the routing with Flt Lt Tapper or was it his own idea?
2. What meteorological information did he use to formulate the route?
3. When did he give the prepared map to Flt Lt Tapper?
At the very least any new inquiry will be able to learn definintively why that route was chosen.
Firstly an apology, the southwest bearing was from the impact point not the lighthouse; regretably the only map I have which shows the OS grid doesn't show the lighthouse. The impact point was, I think, north and slightly west of the lighthouse. My own view is the "southwest" reference was a generalisation.
Secondly : will you please stop asking very relevant questions!! The routing is a key element now that it appears that there will be further investigation into the accident. Let me explain.
The BOI based their assessment on the photocopied map left behind by the captain. The evidence given to the BOI was that the Captain had planned the sortie the night before. We now learn that the sortie was in fact planned by the other Chinook Captain on the detatchment the night before the final sortie; although he appears, if he was witness 19, to have corroborated the evidence given to the BOI that Ft Lt Tapper did the planning.
If the other Captain did do the planning, as he swore at the FAI, then this brings to mind some very relevant questions:
1. Did he discuss the routing with Flt Lt Tapper or was it his own idea?
2. What meteorological information did he use to formulate the route?
3. When did he give the prepared map to Flt Lt Tapper?
At the very least any new inquiry will be able to learn definintively why that route was chosen.
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Received notice from Basing that our proposed meeting with Andrew Hunter MP has had to be cancelled for the moment, due to ill health by Mr Hunter.
Firstly, thanks for letting me know Basing, and secondly, get well soon Mr Hunter. I do know that he has sent a very supportive letter to Basing.
Once he feels up to it, we will go and see him. Post-meeting report will be posted here.
Regards
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Firstly, thanks for letting me know Basing, and secondly, get well soon Mr Hunter. I do know that he has sent a very supportive letter to Basing.
Once he feels up to it, we will go and see him. Post-meeting report will be posted here.
Regards
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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"If your Lordships so decide, perhaps I may suggest that all these matters are ones that a Select Committee might look at. But I make one point. The air marshals will then be able to explain properly, in their own words, to the Select Committee why they reached the conclusions that they did, something they have not been able to do properly before.
It would be wrong to re-run the board of inquiry. It is important that all the views are carefully listened to and very carefully balanced. I must say that that has not always been what has happened in the past, although I know that the House today has been very balanced in the way that it has approached the issue.
Yes, the Government have reservations about the noble Lord's proposal, not least because of the thorough way in which the accident has already been investigated. I believe that successive Ministers have been fully and honestly briefed on all aspects of this case. I believe that Ministers of both parties have been honest in their dealings with this House and with another place. Nothing has been or is being hidden. That is because we believe that there is nothing to hide. It follows that we will, of course, co-operate fully with any committee that your Lordships may decide to establish." .. Baroness Symons, Minister of State, 05.03.01
Does this represent progress or another opportunity for prevarication?
It would be wrong to re-run the board of inquiry. It is important that all the views are carefully listened to and very carefully balanced. I must say that that has not always been what has happened in the past, although I know that the House today has been very balanced in the way that it has approached the issue.
Yes, the Government have reservations about the noble Lord's proposal, not least because of the thorough way in which the accident has already been investigated. I believe that successive Ministers have been fully and honestly briefed on all aspects of this case. I believe that Ministers of both parties have been honest in their dealings with this House and with another place. Nothing has been or is being hidden. That is because we believe that there is nothing to hide. It follows that we will, of course, co-operate fully with any committee that your Lordships may decide to establish." .. Baroness Symons, Minister of State, 05.03.01
Does this represent progress or another opportunity for prevarication?
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B52
The first point of impact was close to the road that runs east from the lighthouse and the second a few hundred metres north and east of the first impact. In other words, the actual flightpath was a few hundred metres to the east of the lighthouse whereas the planned one was to the west of it and almost tangential to the coastline, with the sea beneath.
Apparently, the computers showed that there had been small lateral displacements to the right of their expected track but I haven't found any explanation for this. Earlier that day Flight Lieutenant Tapper had asked for one of the SuperTANS navigation computers to be checked because it was giving unusual GPS satellite tracking data. The check was completed but no fault was found.
[This message has been edited by Ben Leice (edited 08 March 2001).]
The first point of impact was close to the road that runs east from the lighthouse and the second a few hundred metres north and east of the first impact. In other words, the actual flightpath was a few hundred metres to the east of the lighthouse whereas the planned one was to the west of it and almost tangential to the coastline, with the sea beneath.
Apparently, the computers showed that there had been small lateral displacements to the right of their expected track but I haven't found any explanation for this. Earlier that day Flight Lieutenant Tapper had asked for one of the SuperTANS navigation computers to be checked because it was giving unusual GPS satellite tracking data. The check was completed but no fault was found.
[This message has been edited by Ben Leice (edited 08 March 2001).]
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3 days away and two more pages to read!
This is excellent news indeed. Well done Lord Chalfont.
To reply to K52, with respect to speed. The AAIB wind of 180/30 (which I believe is from an after cast) applied to the known impact groundspeed of 147 Kts gives an IAS of about 115 to 120, quite reasonable but not as useful to your case as the 150 kts you insist on hypothesising. Please adjust your abacus!
With respect to the choice of a low level VFR transit, the crew had no choice. An IFR plan would have fallen foul of a SALT well above the icing clearance of the aircraft.
Pulse 1. I hate speculation on this accident, as that is what led to the bizarre findings by the Air Marshals. All I would say about the route, had I been planning the trip, is that W/P 1 would have been the Lighthouse at the Mull. It would have been my intention to become visual with it, change Tans to W/P 2, which would be Corran, and visually follow the coast around to it. There is no implication that the aircraft would be flown exactly on the track between waypoints. That is why Tans was in Tactical Steer, so that at any time, a direct track to the next W/P is available.
Why the aircraft flew into the Mull cannot be 'ascertained ' i.e. 'found out for certain' (to quote K52) from the evidence gleaned. Therefore the finding of negligence is unsafe.
I will refrain from asking K52 my usual question, as he obviously cannot answer it.
This is excellent news indeed. Well done Lord Chalfont.
To reply to K52, with respect to speed. The AAIB wind of 180/30 (which I believe is from an after cast) applied to the known impact groundspeed of 147 Kts gives an IAS of about 115 to 120, quite reasonable but not as useful to your case as the 150 kts you insist on hypothesising. Please adjust your abacus!
With respect to the choice of a low level VFR transit, the crew had no choice. An IFR plan would have fallen foul of a SALT well above the icing clearance of the aircraft.
Pulse 1. I hate speculation on this accident, as that is what led to the bizarre findings by the Air Marshals. All I would say about the route, had I been planning the trip, is that W/P 1 would have been the Lighthouse at the Mull. It would have been my intention to become visual with it, change Tans to W/P 2, which would be Corran, and visually follow the coast around to it. There is no implication that the aircraft would be flown exactly on the track between waypoints. That is why Tans was in Tactical Steer, so that at any time, a direct track to the next W/P is available.
Why the aircraft flew into the Mull cannot be 'ascertained ' i.e. 'found out for certain' (to quote K52) from the evidence gleaned. Therefore the finding of negligence is unsafe.
I will refrain from asking K52 my usual question, as he obviously cannot answer it.