Chinook - Hit Back Here
Guest
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Smoothy - CFIT would be the cause of an accident. In a BOI it would come at "Summary of Causes and Factors"
"Gross negligence" is the subsequent judgement passed on the crew's actions that may have resulted in CFIT. In the BOI it comes under the section "Consideration of Human Failings".
K52 - Yet again, you offer very reasoned and well presented opinion. But you continue to avoid the question that has been put time and time again.
Can you say that your reasoned and well thought out theory about the cause of the crash is correct "without any doubt whatsoever"?
"Gross negligence" is the subsequent judgement passed on the crew's actions that may have resulted in CFIT. In the BOI it comes under the section "Consideration of Human Failings".
K52 - Yet again, you offer very reasoned and well presented opinion. But you continue to avoid the question that has been put time and time again.
Can you say that your reasoned and well thought out theory about the cause of the crash is correct "without any doubt whatsoever"?
Guest
Posts: n/a
Do you ever feel that we are constantly going around in a circular arguement.
As we have seen in the preceeding 40 odd pages that all of us who have contributed to this discussion do not know beyond reasonable doubt what happened on the day. I am all in favour of continuing the campaign to get the verdict of the chimps at the top overturned. But I feel that this thread is now just going around in circles with a little personal abuse thrown in.
The thread has been useful if nothing else for flight safety, as I have heard more and more come out about the build up to the flight I have taken a look at the way I operate and I hope that it has given others food for thought. However, I feel that this thread has used up it's usefulness in terms of the campaign. Perhaps it is time to give the thread a rest and concentrate on whats important. Maybe a new thread with campaign updates and what people who wish to help can do.
edited for spullin. That ISS curse wuz werth it.
[This message has been edited by Seat Stick Interface (edited 03 March 2001).]
As we have seen in the preceeding 40 odd pages that all of us who have contributed to this discussion do not know beyond reasonable doubt what happened on the day. I am all in favour of continuing the campaign to get the verdict of the chimps at the top overturned. But I feel that this thread is now just going around in circles with a little personal abuse thrown in.
The thread has been useful if nothing else for flight safety, as I have heard more and more come out about the build up to the flight I have taken a look at the way I operate and I hope that it has given others food for thought. However, I feel that this thread has used up it's usefulness in terms of the campaign. Perhaps it is time to give the thread a rest and concentrate on whats important. Maybe a new thread with campaign updates and what people who wish to help can do.
edited for spullin. That ISS curse wuz werth it.
[This message has been edited by Seat Stick Interface (edited 03 March 2001).]
Guest
Posts: n/a
Time For Action:
First of all let me post two articles from the (Glasgow) Herald on Friday 2nd March:
New hope for fresh Chinook inquiry
MICHAEL SETTLE
CAMPAIGNERS are confident that a new inquiry into the 1994 Chinook helicopter
crash on the Mull of Kintyre will be triggered next week.
Lord Chalfont, chairman of the Mull of Kintyre group that has been campaigning for a
new investigation, has succeeded in securing a debate in the House of Lords on the
subject for Monday evening.
The purpose is to set up a Lords select committee to look into all the circumstances
when Chinook ZD576 plunged into the fogbound hillside on June 2, 1994.
It was the RAF's worst peacetime accident. All 29 people on board, including some of
the country's leading anti-terrorism experts, perished.
Politicians from all parties - including Sir Malcolm Rifkind, who was defence secretary
at the time - as well as victims' relatives, hope an inquiry will be established and
exonerate the pilots, Flight Lieutenants Richard Cook and Jonathan Tapper.
The Lords debate will be led by Lord Chalfont, with Baroness Symons of Vernham
Dean, the defence minister, replying for the government.
If the government were to reject the call for a committee to be set up to launch a new
inquiry, then peers would vote on whether one should be established.
Last night Lord Chalfont, a former Labour foreign office minister, who recently met
with Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, said his "guess and gut feeling" was that the
government would agree to a new inquiry.
"In all the circumstances, it would be in the government's interest to accept this select
com mittee. The result of that would be to draw a line under the whole thing," he
explained.
Lord Chalfont insisted he would abide by the Lords committee's verdict and hoped the
government would do so too.
If the Lords committee concludes the air marshals' verdict was unsafe, then it will be
up to the Ministry of Defence to set aside the verdict or, a more unlikely outcome, set
up yet another inquiry.
The saga of Chinook ZD576 has been long and fraught. The original RAF board of
inquiry found there was not enough evidence to find the pilots responsible but this was
overruled by two air marshals, who found there was "no doubt whatsoever" they were
to blame. A year later, a Scottish court conducting a fatal accident inquiry again found
too little evidence against the pilots.
Subsequently, reports emerged of major problems with the helicopter's computer
software.
It also later transpired that the MoD was suing Textron Lycoming, the US maker of
the computer software, a fact neither disclosed to the RAF board of inquiry nor to the
fatal accident inquiry.
Last December, a damning report by the powerful Commons public accounts
committee (PAC) into the crash accused the MoD of "unwarrantable arrogance" and
said defence chiefs were guilty of "a major miscarriage of natural justice" when they
blamed the pilots.
Ministry fails to ground Chinook campaigners
Ian Bruce
THE Ministry of Defence has fought a dogged, six-year rearguard action to block any
public inquiry into the tragic crash of Chinook helicopter ZD576 on a fog-shrouded
hillside on the Mull of Kintyre.
It has stonewalled behind the unproven finding of "gross negligence" by two young
pilots who cannot defend themselves because they died along with two other crewmen
and 25 police and intelligence service passengers in the RAF's worst peacetime
disaster.
In November last year, the influential all-party Commons public accounts committee
accused the ministry of "unwarrantable arrogance" for its persistent refusal to reopen
the case.
It also branded senior RAF officers as being "guilty of a major miscarriage of natural
justice" in overturning the finding of a fatal accident inquiry which concluded that there
was insufficient evidence to blame the pilots.
Instead, the RAF hierarchy convened its own "very unsatisfactory" board of inquiry
and pinned responsibility squarely on Flight Lieutenants Jonathan Tapper and Rick
Cook, ignoring what the committee described as "the superior standing of the Scottish
courts".
The 1995 service board was headed by Air Chief Marshal Sir William Wratten and Air
Marshal Sir John Day, an unusually high-powered duo for such a task.
Since then, the parents of the special forces pilots have conducted a persistent
campaign to have their sons' names cleared in the light of a growing weight of evidence
that the Mark 2 Chinook model flown that day had serious software flaws in its
computer system.
The Fadec system controlled fuel flow to the aircraft's twin engines. At the time of the
crash, the RAF was experiencing "repeated and unexplained technical difficulties" with
its entire fleet of Mark 2 aircraft.
In 1997, the MoD admitted that the helicopters had not been fully tested before the
accident. It also emerged that the ministry was suing Textron Lycoming, the US
manufacturer of the software, a fact disclosed neither to the fatal accident inquiry nor
the RAF investigation.
The families' bid to force the ministry out of its intransigence has been boosted by the
intervention of Lord Chalfont, the support of veteran Lib-Dem MP and defence
specialist Menzies Campbell, and the about-turn of Sir Malcolom Rifkind, who was
Tory defence secretary at the time of the crash.
Sir Malcolm originally pushed the MoD line in the Commons, but then became
involved in a behind-the-scenes dispute with his own ministerial officials over the
circumstances of the incident and has now thrown his weight behind the campaign for
a public inquiry.
Ironically, Dr John Reid, now Labour's Northern Ireland secretary, steadfastly
supported the MoD's refusal to contemplate any change in its stance when he was
armed forces minister.
Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, has until now simply repeated the mantra of "no
inquiry without new hard evidence".
The hardline refusal has angered many RAF helicopter pilots who feel a sense of
betrayal by their own service chiefs and harbour the suspicion that blaming dead pilots
for no-survivor crashes may be the MoD's cynical method of avoiding expensive
compensation claims.
The pilots, both military and civilian, have set up a website to keep the controversy
alive. Most serving personnel who contribute do so under pseudonyms.
The key objective of an inquiry is to try to clear Jonathan Tapper and Richard Cook's
names, given full disclosure of the relevant technical facts and the absence of evidence
of their culpability.
Among other issues to be explained are why so many top intelligence officers were put
at risk in a single aircraft and why the MoD persists in the lie that the flight was en
route for Fort George. As revealed exclusively by The Herald, the helicopter was
heading for a security conference at Machrihanish.
-March 2nd
The Herald has fought a long campaign to clear the pilots name and I know that their reporter Ian Bruce regularly reads Pprune.
Can I suggest that all day Monday the following are inundated with telephone calls, faxes, emails etc to ensure the debate on Monday evening gets the maximum attention:
Lord Chalfont
Baroness Symons
Sir Malcolm Rifkind
Geooff Hoon
Menzies Campbell
John Reid
The peers can be contacted via 020 72193000
and the MP's via 020 72194000
No doubt you will all know direct phone no's for your MP's , email addresses and fax no's.
First of all let me post two articles from the (Glasgow) Herald on Friday 2nd March:
New hope for fresh Chinook inquiry
MICHAEL SETTLE
CAMPAIGNERS are confident that a new inquiry into the 1994 Chinook helicopter
crash on the Mull of Kintyre will be triggered next week.
Lord Chalfont, chairman of the Mull of Kintyre group that has been campaigning for a
new investigation, has succeeded in securing a debate in the House of Lords on the
subject for Monday evening.
The purpose is to set up a Lords select committee to look into all the circumstances
when Chinook ZD576 plunged into the fogbound hillside on June 2, 1994.
It was the RAF's worst peacetime accident. All 29 people on board, including some of
the country's leading anti-terrorism experts, perished.
Politicians from all parties - including Sir Malcolm Rifkind, who was defence secretary
at the time - as well as victims' relatives, hope an inquiry will be established and
exonerate the pilots, Flight Lieutenants Richard Cook and Jonathan Tapper.
The Lords debate will be led by Lord Chalfont, with Baroness Symons of Vernham
Dean, the defence minister, replying for the government.
If the government were to reject the call for a committee to be set up to launch a new
inquiry, then peers would vote on whether one should be established.
Last night Lord Chalfont, a former Labour foreign office minister, who recently met
with Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, said his "guess and gut feeling" was that the
government would agree to a new inquiry.
"In all the circumstances, it would be in the government's interest to accept this select
com mittee. The result of that would be to draw a line under the whole thing," he
explained.
Lord Chalfont insisted he would abide by the Lords committee's verdict and hoped the
government would do so too.
If the Lords committee concludes the air marshals' verdict was unsafe, then it will be
up to the Ministry of Defence to set aside the verdict or, a more unlikely outcome, set
up yet another inquiry.
The saga of Chinook ZD576 has been long and fraught. The original RAF board of
inquiry found there was not enough evidence to find the pilots responsible but this was
overruled by two air marshals, who found there was "no doubt whatsoever" they were
to blame. A year later, a Scottish court conducting a fatal accident inquiry again found
too little evidence against the pilots.
Subsequently, reports emerged of major problems with the helicopter's computer
software.
It also later transpired that the MoD was suing Textron Lycoming, the US maker of
the computer software, a fact neither disclosed to the RAF board of inquiry nor to the
fatal accident inquiry.
Last December, a damning report by the powerful Commons public accounts
committee (PAC) into the crash accused the MoD of "unwarrantable arrogance" and
said defence chiefs were guilty of "a major miscarriage of natural justice" when they
blamed the pilots.
Ministry fails to ground Chinook campaigners
Ian Bruce
THE Ministry of Defence has fought a dogged, six-year rearguard action to block any
public inquiry into the tragic crash of Chinook helicopter ZD576 on a fog-shrouded
hillside on the Mull of Kintyre.
It has stonewalled behind the unproven finding of "gross negligence" by two young
pilots who cannot defend themselves because they died along with two other crewmen
and 25 police and intelligence service passengers in the RAF's worst peacetime
disaster.
In November last year, the influential all-party Commons public accounts committee
accused the ministry of "unwarrantable arrogance" for its persistent refusal to reopen
the case.
It also branded senior RAF officers as being "guilty of a major miscarriage of natural
justice" in overturning the finding of a fatal accident inquiry which concluded that there
was insufficient evidence to blame the pilots.
Instead, the RAF hierarchy convened its own "very unsatisfactory" board of inquiry
and pinned responsibility squarely on Flight Lieutenants Jonathan Tapper and Rick
Cook, ignoring what the committee described as "the superior standing of the Scottish
courts".
The 1995 service board was headed by Air Chief Marshal Sir William Wratten and Air
Marshal Sir John Day, an unusually high-powered duo for such a task.
Since then, the parents of the special forces pilots have conducted a persistent
campaign to have their sons' names cleared in the light of a growing weight of evidence
that the Mark 2 Chinook model flown that day had serious software flaws in its
computer system.
The Fadec system controlled fuel flow to the aircraft's twin engines. At the time of the
crash, the RAF was experiencing "repeated and unexplained technical difficulties" with
its entire fleet of Mark 2 aircraft.
In 1997, the MoD admitted that the helicopters had not been fully tested before the
accident. It also emerged that the ministry was suing Textron Lycoming, the US
manufacturer of the software, a fact disclosed neither to the fatal accident inquiry nor
the RAF investigation.
The families' bid to force the ministry out of its intransigence has been boosted by the
intervention of Lord Chalfont, the support of veteran Lib-Dem MP and defence
specialist Menzies Campbell, and the about-turn of Sir Malcolom Rifkind, who was
Tory defence secretary at the time of the crash.
Sir Malcolm originally pushed the MoD line in the Commons, but then became
involved in a behind-the-scenes dispute with his own ministerial officials over the
circumstances of the incident and has now thrown his weight behind the campaign for
a public inquiry.
Ironically, Dr John Reid, now Labour's Northern Ireland secretary, steadfastly
supported the MoD's refusal to contemplate any change in its stance when he was
armed forces minister.
Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, has until now simply repeated the mantra of "no
inquiry without new hard evidence".
The hardline refusal has angered many RAF helicopter pilots who feel a sense of
betrayal by their own service chiefs and harbour the suspicion that blaming dead pilots
for no-survivor crashes may be the MoD's cynical method of avoiding expensive
compensation claims.
The pilots, both military and civilian, have set up a website to keep the controversy
alive. Most serving personnel who contribute do so under pseudonyms.
The key objective of an inquiry is to try to clear Jonathan Tapper and Richard Cook's
names, given full disclosure of the relevant technical facts and the absence of evidence
of their culpability.
Among other issues to be explained are why so many top intelligence officers were put
at risk in a single aircraft and why the MoD persists in the lie that the flight was en
route for Fort George. As revealed exclusively by The Herald, the helicopter was
heading for a security conference at Machrihanish.
-March 2nd
The Herald has fought a long campaign to clear the pilots name and I know that their reporter Ian Bruce regularly reads Pprune.
Can I suggest that all day Monday the following are inundated with telephone calls, faxes, emails etc to ensure the debate on Monday evening gets the maximum attention:
Lord Chalfont
Baroness Symons
Sir Malcolm Rifkind
Geooff Hoon
Menzies Campbell
John Reid
The peers can be contacted via 020 72193000
and the MP's via 020 72194000
No doubt you will all know direct phone no's for your MP's , email addresses and fax no's.
Guest
Posts: n/a
K52
Your *speculations* show an attention to detail and little more. I put it to you that we can argue over how many angels can dance on the head of a pin (or nibbling ducks may occupy this pond to use your analogy) until hell freezes over.
You still refuse to answer the basic question. Bearing in mind that absence of evidence is *not* evidence of absence: What *evidence* is there that gross negligence was, with *absolutely* no doubt whatsoever, the cause of this accident?
JM
Great news, let's hope their Lordships (who seem to be the only people able to hold the executive to account in this parliament) manage to pull the cat out of the bag. One thing, though: I'd suggest not pestering the enlightened ones but firing off e-mails to the press, BBC's PM programme etc to try and drum up interest from opposition peers to attend the debate. Hopefully the NuLabour Flockmasters would not try to pack out the Upper House on the night with placemen to kill Lord Chalfont's motion, but nothing would surprise me with this lot.
Your *speculations* show an attention to detail and little more. I put it to you that we can argue over how many angels can dance on the head of a pin (or nibbling ducks may occupy this pond to use your analogy) until hell freezes over.
You still refuse to answer the basic question. Bearing in mind that absence of evidence is *not* evidence of absence: What *evidence* is there that gross negligence was, with *absolutely* no doubt whatsoever, the cause of this accident?
JM
Great news, let's hope their Lordships (who seem to be the only people able to hold the executive to account in this parliament) manage to pull the cat out of the bag. One thing, though: I'd suggest not pestering the enlightened ones but firing off e-mails to the press, BBC's PM programme etc to try and drum up interest from opposition peers to attend the debate. Hopefully the NuLabour Flockmasters would not try to pack out the Upper House on the night with placemen to kill Lord Chalfont's motion, but nothing would surprise me with this lot.
Guest
Posts: n/a
K52
In reply to your most recent posts, (Part 1 & 2), I'd just like to make a couple of points in relation to SH ops.
The BOI state at Pt 2 para 5 that this was a "passenger flight" rather than an SH flight. AOC 1 Gp concurs and describes it as planned to be "a low level, daytime, passenger carrying transit flight flown clear of cloud under Visual Flight Rules"
As a current SH operator (same a/c type as ArkRoyal's past), I spend the majority of my operational tasking flying passengers. Yes, we also carry cargo either internally or underslung, but in the main I carry people. These operational tasking flights are normally conducted clear of cloud under VFR and will involve low level flight either if the tasking requires it or if we encounter poor weather en route. If neither you or AOC 1 Gp think this was an SH flight, I'd be interested to know exactly what you think we do as SH.
Only one attempt to contact Scottish Military ( and we will all have experienced failure to obtain a reply from a ground station first go - did you give up?).
I'm sorry to have to answer your question by saying 'Yes'. (Ok, so I may have tried two or three times before giving up for a while). Having flown around the west coast of Scotland at low level, there are an awful lot of places where you simply cannot get through to Scottish Mil due to the terrain. Admittedly, if you are in company with another aircraft and therefore have mutual SAR, there's more of a warm fuzzy feeling that you're not on your own if the guano hits the fan, but if you are alone with no IFR option you may just have to press on until you do get comms. HF may offer some assistance in these situations but you can't always get through, so yes, I have continued without talking to anyone. It wasn't comfortable and our threshold for going into a field in the event of anything going pear-shaped probably rose a few notches.
Do I consider myself negligent for doing so? No, we were clear of cloud and in sight of the surface with at least 5 km vis. Did I feel like we were suffering from 'Press-on-itis'? No - in a mountainous terrain with no IFR option and poor comms at low level it is just a characteristic of SH ops. Not particularly nice but not entirely unfamiliar.
In reply to your most recent posts, (Part 1 & 2), I'd just like to make a couple of points in relation to SH ops.
The BOI state at Pt 2 para 5 that this was a "passenger flight" rather than an SH flight. AOC 1 Gp concurs and describes it as planned to be "a low level, daytime, passenger carrying transit flight flown clear of cloud under Visual Flight Rules"
As a current SH operator (same a/c type as ArkRoyal's past), I spend the majority of my operational tasking flying passengers. Yes, we also carry cargo either internally or underslung, but in the main I carry people. These operational tasking flights are normally conducted clear of cloud under VFR and will involve low level flight either if the tasking requires it or if we encounter poor weather en route. If neither you or AOC 1 Gp think this was an SH flight, I'd be interested to know exactly what you think we do as SH.
Only one attempt to contact Scottish Military ( and we will all have experienced failure to obtain a reply from a ground station first go - did you give up?).
I'm sorry to have to answer your question by saying 'Yes'. (Ok, so I may have tried two or three times before giving up for a while). Having flown around the west coast of Scotland at low level, there are an awful lot of places where you simply cannot get through to Scottish Mil due to the terrain. Admittedly, if you are in company with another aircraft and therefore have mutual SAR, there's more of a warm fuzzy feeling that you're not on your own if the guano hits the fan, but if you are alone with no IFR option you may just have to press on until you do get comms. HF may offer some assistance in these situations but you can't always get through, so yes, I have continued without talking to anyone. It wasn't comfortable and our threshold for going into a field in the event of anything going pear-shaped probably rose a few notches.
Do I consider myself negligent for doing so? No, we were clear of cloud and in sight of the surface with at least 5 km vis. Did I feel like we were suffering from 'Press-on-itis'? No - in a mountainous terrain with no IFR option and poor comms at low level it is just a characteristic of SH ops. Not particularly nice but not entirely unfamiliar.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Thanks again for everyone's contribution. Excellent articles from the Herald. Thanks for posting them Jim.
To answer Seat Stick Interface, (welcome, by the way), I have been campaigning for over 6 years now and have, on occasion, felt as though I was going around in circles. That is because Ministers and senior Officers refuse to even look at anything that may cast doubt on their summation of events. I do genuinely believe this thread is important, as it shows those with cotton wool in their ears that the issue will not go away. If a new thread were started, not only would we lose the contributions of everyone here, but the Ministers could say, "There's only the odd posting on the subject so it can't be that important anymore." It IS important and should remain as a testimony to those who have a belief in justice and as a sign that some of us respect those who serve in the Armed Forces.
What people can do to help is get on to their own MPs and ask that they lend support to Lord Chalfont, and not contact him direct. I have a feeling he will be quite busy over the next few days!
I'll keep everyone informed of the progress as and when I can.
Regards as always.
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
To answer Seat Stick Interface, (welcome, by the way), I have been campaigning for over 6 years now and have, on occasion, felt as though I was going around in circles. That is because Ministers and senior Officers refuse to even look at anything that may cast doubt on their summation of events. I do genuinely believe this thread is important, as it shows those with cotton wool in their ears that the issue will not go away. If a new thread were started, not only would we lose the contributions of everyone here, but the Ministers could say, "There's only the odd posting on the subject so it can't be that important anymore." It IS important and should remain as a testimony to those who have a belief in justice and as a sign that some of us respect those who serve in the Armed Forces.
What people can do to help is get on to their own MPs and ask that they lend support to Lord Chalfont, and not contact him direct. I have a feeling he will be quite busy over the next few days!
I'll keep everyone informed of the progress as and when I can.
Regards as always.
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Guest
Posts: n/a
Ark Royal, Pulse 1, John Nichol et al
(Shy Torque - I'll reply to you at the end)
Thank you for your comments. I have been trying to explain the events leading up to the accident - not the cause. I am in no doubt whatsoever that the cause of this appalling accident was the the crew continued to fly an undeviating track directly at the mist enshrouded Mull and when they transitted from flight in VMC to IMC failed to take appropriate action to maintain safe separation with the ground. Even though they failed to take the correct action and adopted what OC RAF Odiham called " unrecognisable as a Chinook technique" it is likely that they could have averted disaster if the Rad Alt bugs had been set in accordance with SOP's. You will note from the BOI at para 56 that " it would have been possible for the aircraft to have avoided the ground, whilst remaining on track, from any point beyond the poosition of the WP change until some 4 seconds prior to impact, if the crew had initiated a cyclic climb". The crew did initiate a cyclic climb - but fractionally too late, with tragic results. The cyclic climb was initiated at a distance from the Mull that co-incided with the reported visibility.
I have no doubt whatsoever that the Determination by AOC 1 Gp was correct.
Before you reach for your keyboards please read the reply to Shy Torque. But first I will share with you the reply from Belfast ATC on how they keep their clocks accurate:-
" The clocks are always kept up to date. How? I'm not sure I'll have to ask an engineer, they must be calibrated and checked all the time (I think)."
Shy Torque
Thank you, despite the unwarranted disparagement, for your reply to my post. Oddly enough I have never, as far as I am aware, met Sir William Wratten. I do, of course, know Sir John Day - we first met when I was instructing at The School of Refresher Flying RAF Manby in the early 1970's (Manby closed in 1973). From that time, until I arrived at HQ 1 Gp, I do not recollect our paths crossing again.
I was surprised to note from your post that the Engineer Officer on the BOI was "highly experienced in Support Helicopter Operations", I was not aware of that. I am, of course, aware that Sir John Day is highly experienced in Support Helicopter Operations (including Chinook) so perhaps it was him that you had in mind. It was, of course, his BOI as Convening Officer.
I am not really sure which of your bizarre accusations to answer first, however:-
" The crew did NOT order the flight. They were ordered to make it against their better judgement and against their will. The authorising officer and those above him did not stop the flight from taking place despite the fact that they were aware of the weather, the crew's duty hours, the state of the aircraft and the implications of making the flight"
HQNI tasked the flight and JATOC tasked the Chinook.
If it was against their better judgement and will then why did the volunteer to do all the tasking that day?
"The authorising officer etc". Flt Lt Tapper WAS the authorising offficer; he was also the Detatchment Commander and HE allocated the crews to tasks. The crew's duty hours were solely his responsibility as HE had decided on the dual tasking and as Aircraft Captain it was HIS DUTY to take into account all the implications of making the flight.
"This unfortunate crew were ordered to make a VFR over-water flight in an untried, potentially insafe and unservicable aircraft, with no proper IFR option and unreliable nav kit, in marginal weather."
Who ordered them to make a VFR flight. The BOI make it quite clear that this was the OPTION chosen by Flt Lt Tapper. Untried - the crew had been flyimng that airframe all day. All man made mechanical objects, includng machines that fly, are POTENTIALLY unsafe. The aircraft was declared servicable for the task and was also deemed to be by the BOI.
I'm not sure which bit of the nav kit you deem to be unreliable but this was planned as a low level VFR flight. The marginal weather was localised in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre and it was the CAPTAINS decision to take that routing. The IFR climb to safety altitude was deemed feasible by the BOI.
"should have taken place in one of your shiny 32 squadron jets". Well, I doubt it would of got airborne but it would almost certainly have made the Guinness Book of Records! 25 Pax in an HS125!! To transport that number of people would have required 5 HS 125's or a lot of work to re-role an Andover into a 28 seat fit which would have left precious little room for luggage. ( There would not have been any room for luggage in the 125's).
" The disgraceful and vindictive over-ruling of the BOI removes the onus of responsibility from where it truly belongs."
I'll leave that for just a moment.
"OPINION has no real standing in legal matters."
Yes, I totally agree with you. I'll say it again - I agree with you. Let me explain.
A Board of Inquiry into an aircraft accident is normally convened By the AOC of the relevant Group; except in the case of a Directly Administered Unit (eg an OEU) when it will be convened by that Officer who, besides his normal duties, is also AOC DAU's.
The AOC assembles a panel of Officers of whom one will have been nomonated as President. The President may be a Flt Lt but is usually a Sqn Ldr. In the case of a fatal accident the Pesident MUST be of at least Wg Cdr rank. Having convened the BOI the AOC issues them with Terms of Reference and it is to these TOR's that I would draw everyones attention.
As not all contributors have a copy of the BOI I will reproduce the TOR's.
a. Investigate the circumstances of the accident to Chinook HC2 ZD576 at Mull of Kintyre on 2 June 1994.
b. Determine the cause or causes of the accident and examine related factors.
C. Ascertain degree of injury suffered by persons both service and civilian.
d. Ascertain if service personnel were on duty.
e. Ascertain if all relevant oreders and instructions were complied with.
f. Ascertain if aircrew escape and survival facilities were fully utilised and functioned correctly.
g. Ascertain extent of damage to aircraft, public property and civilian property.
h. Assess any human failings.
i. Investigate the loss of all classified material carried on or in the aircraft at the time of the accident.
j. Make appropriate recommendations.
These are standard TOR's for an aircraft accident.
Please look at the wording:
Sub para (a) says "Investigate" which means " to inquire into with care and accuracy".
Sub para (b) says " Determine" which means "to decide".
Sub paras (c) to (g) say "Ascertain" which means " to find out for certain".
Sub para (h), however, says "Assess" which means "to give an opinion".
The BOI did not establish a lack of human failings they gave their OPINION!!!
The BOI delivers its report to the AOC who can either accept it, reconvene it with expanded TOR's or, if he deems it necessary, reconvene the BOI under a new President. The finalised BOI is staffed at Group and , folowing that, the AOC makes his determination on the findings of the BOI.It is the AOC's duty and resposibility, and his alone, to make a finding on human failings.
THERE WAS NO " disgraceful and vindictive over-ruling of the BOI". The power to decide on human failings had not been delegated to the BOI. If the power to make a decision has not been delegated to you then you cannot be "over - ruled". All that happened was that their OPINION was considered, along with all the opinions provided during staffing, and the AOC made his DETERMINATION.
[This message has been edited by K52 (edited 05 March 2001).]
[This message has been edited by K52 (edited 05 March 2001).]
(Shy Torque - I'll reply to you at the end)
Thank you for your comments. I have been trying to explain the events leading up to the accident - not the cause. I am in no doubt whatsoever that the cause of this appalling accident was the the crew continued to fly an undeviating track directly at the mist enshrouded Mull and when they transitted from flight in VMC to IMC failed to take appropriate action to maintain safe separation with the ground. Even though they failed to take the correct action and adopted what OC RAF Odiham called " unrecognisable as a Chinook technique" it is likely that they could have averted disaster if the Rad Alt bugs had been set in accordance with SOP's. You will note from the BOI at para 56 that " it would have been possible for the aircraft to have avoided the ground, whilst remaining on track, from any point beyond the poosition of the WP change until some 4 seconds prior to impact, if the crew had initiated a cyclic climb". The crew did initiate a cyclic climb - but fractionally too late, with tragic results. The cyclic climb was initiated at a distance from the Mull that co-incided with the reported visibility.
I have no doubt whatsoever that the Determination by AOC 1 Gp was correct.
Before you reach for your keyboards please read the reply to Shy Torque. But first I will share with you the reply from Belfast ATC on how they keep their clocks accurate:-
" The clocks are always kept up to date. How? I'm not sure I'll have to ask an engineer, they must be calibrated and checked all the time (I think)."
Shy Torque
Thank you, despite the unwarranted disparagement, for your reply to my post. Oddly enough I have never, as far as I am aware, met Sir William Wratten. I do, of course, know Sir John Day - we first met when I was instructing at The School of Refresher Flying RAF Manby in the early 1970's (Manby closed in 1973). From that time, until I arrived at HQ 1 Gp, I do not recollect our paths crossing again.
I was surprised to note from your post that the Engineer Officer on the BOI was "highly experienced in Support Helicopter Operations", I was not aware of that. I am, of course, aware that Sir John Day is highly experienced in Support Helicopter Operations (including Chinook) so perhaps it was him that you had in mind. It was, of course, his BOI as Convening Officer.
I am not really sure which of your bizarre accusations to answer first, however:-
" The crew did NOT order the flight. They were ordered to make it against their better judgement and against their will. The authorising officer and those above him did not stop the flight from taking place despite the fact that they were aware of the weather, the crew's duty hours, the state of the aircraft and the implications of making the flight"
HQNI tasked the flight and JATOC tasked the Chinook.
If it was against their better judgement and will then why did the volunteer to do all the tasking that day?
"The authorising officer etc". Flt Lt Tapper WAS the authorising offficer; he was also the Detatchment Commander and HE allocated the crews to tasks. The crew's duty hours were solely his responsibility as HE had decided on the dual tasking and as Aircraft Captain it was HIS DUTY to take into account all the implications of making the flight.
"This unfortunate crew were ordered to make a VFR over-water flight in an untried, potentially insafe and unservicable aircraft, with no proper IFR option and unreliable nav kit, in marginal weather."
Who ordered them to make a VFR flight. The BOI make it quite clear that this was the OPTION chosen by Flt Lt Tapper. Untried - the crew had been flyimng that airframe all day. All man made mechanical objects, includng machines that fly, are POTENTIALLY unsafe. The aircraft was declared servicable for the task and was also deemed to be by the BOI.
I'm not sure which bit of the nav kit you deem to be unreliable but this was planned as a low level VFR flight. The marginal weather was localised in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre and it was the CAPTAINS decision to take that routing. The IFR climb to safety altitude was deemed feasible by the BOI.
"should have taken place in one of your shiny 32 squadron jets". Well, I doubt it would of got airborne but it would almost certainly have made the Guinness Book of Records! 25 Pax in an HS125!! To transport that number of people would have required 5 HS 125's or a lot of work to re-role an Andover into a 28 seat fit which would have left precious little room for luggage. ( There would not have been any room for luggage in the 125's).
" The disgraceful and vindictive over-ruling of the BOI removes the onus of responsibility from where it truly belongs."
I'll leave that for just a moment.
"OPINION has no real standing in legal matters."
Yes, I totally agree with you. I'll say it again - I agree with you. Let me explain.
A Board of Inquiry into an aircraft accident is normally convened By the AOC of the relevant Group; except in the case of a Directly Administered Unit (eg an OEU) when it will be convened by that Officer who, besides his normal duties, is also AOC DAU's.
The AOC assembles a panel of Officers of whom one will have been nomonated as President. The President may be a Flt Lt but is usually a Sqn Ldr. In the case of a fatal accident the Pesident MUST be of at least Wg Cdr rank. Having convened the BOI the AOC issues them with Terms of Reference and it is to these TOR's that I would draw everyones attention.
As not all contributors have a copy of the BOI I will reproduce the TOR's.
a. Investigate the circumstances of the accident to Chinook HC2 ZD576 at Mull of Kintyre on 2 June 1994.
b. Determine the cause or causes of the accident and examine related factors.
C. Ascertain degree of injury suffered by persons both service and civilian.
d. Ascertain if service personnel were on duty.
e. Ascertain if all relevant oreders and instructions were complied with.
f. Ascertain if aircrew escape and survival facilities were fully utilised and functioned correctly.
g. Ascertain extent of damage to aircraft, public property and civilian property.
h. Assess any human failings.
i. Investigate the loss of all classified material carried on or in the aircraft at the time of the accident.
j. Make appropriate recommendations.
These are standard TOR's for an aircraft accident.
Please look at the wording:
Sub para (a) says "Investigate" which means " to inquire into with care and accuracy".
Sub para (b) says " Determine" which means "to decide".
Sub paras (c) to (g) say "Ascertain" which means " to find out for certain".
Sub para (h), however, says "Assess" which means "to give an opinion".
The BOI did not establish a lack of human failings they gave their OPINION!!!
The BOI delivers its report to the AOC who can either accept it, reconvene it with expanded TOR's or, if he deems it necessary, reconvene the BOI under a new President. The finalised BOI is staffed at Group and , folowing that, the AOC makes his determination on the findings of the BOI.It is the AOC's duty and resposibility, and his alone, to make a finding on human failings.
THERE WAS NO " disgraceful and vindictive over-ruling of the BOI". The power to decide on human failings had not been delegated to the BOI. If the power to make a decision has not been delegated to you then you cannot be "over - ruled". All that happened was that their OPINION was considered, along with all the opinions provided during staffing, and the AOC made his DETERMINATION.
[This message has been edited by K52 (edited 05 March 2001).]
[This message has been edited by K52 (edited 05 March 2001).]
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We're missing the point here. No-one is arguing about the BOI findings prior to submission to higher authority. A lot of hot air has been expounded over the fitness of the ac and systems, and whether or not the pilot failed to avoid high ground, flying imc when he should not.
I reiterate a point I made some time ago, which I will repeat here:
NO-ONE KNOWS WHAT WENT ON IN THAT COCKPIT IN THE FINAL 20 SECONDS OF THAT FLIGHT.
Since no-one knows what went on, you can speculate until hell freezes over; there may have been a catastrophic failure, transitory or otherwise, which was so bad that it completely distracted them at a critical time. They may even NOT HAVE BEEN IN CONTROL. I don't know and neither does anybody else.
I draw your attention to the Lynx crash last year, where 1 survived and 3 did not. The cause was a massive hydraulic leak INTO THE COCKPIT which rendered the cockpit atmosphere untenable, which prevented the pilot from making a SUCCESSFUL forced landing. Had 1 crew member not survived to explain what happened, the true cause of the crash would probably never have been known.
I am not suggesting that that is what happened at the Mull of Kintyre, but it illustrates the point that because we do not know what happened at the latter stages before impact, NO FINDING OF NEGLIGENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE. You can talk about the balance of probabilities all you like, and theorise until the cows come home, but in the absense of positive evidence to the contrary, IT HAS BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO CATEGORICALLY STATE, WITH 100% ACCURACY, WHAT CAUSED THE CRASH.
Ergo, and the whole point of this thread, is that the findings of negigence should never have happened.
I reiterate a point I made some time ago, which I will repeat here:
NO-ONE KNOWS WHAT WENT ON IN THAT COCKPIT IN THE FINAL 20 SECONDS OF THAT FLIGHT.
Since no-one knows what went on, you can speculate until hell freezes over; there may have been a catastrophic failure, transitory or otherwise, which was so bad that it completely distracted them at a critical time. They may even NOT HAVE BEEN IN CONTROL. I don't know and neither does anybody else.
I draw your attention to the Lynx crash last year, where 1 survived and 3 did not. The cause was a massive hydraulic leak INTO THE COCKPIT which rendered the cockpit atmosphere untenable, which prevented the pilot from making a SUCCESSFUL forced landing. Had 1 crew member not survived to explain what happened, the true cause of the crash would probably never have been known.
I am not suggesting that that is what happened at the Mull of Kintyre, but it illustrates the point that because we do not know what happened at the latter stages before impact, NO FINDING OF NEGLIGENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE. You can talk about the balance of probabilities all you like, and theorise until the cows come home, but in the absense of positive evidence to the contrary, IT HAS BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO CATEGORICALLY STATE, WITH 100% ACCURACY, WHAT CAUSED THE CRASH.
Ergo, and the whole point of this thread, is that the findings of negigence should never have happened.
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FJJP,
I take your point but the issue here is that they were IMC below SALT approaching high ground which they knew was there. Irrespective of any emergency, for which there is no evidence, they had backed themselves into a hole. Even if as a result of their actions they had forced landed and everyone had walked away then the finding would still have been "Gross negligence">
I take your point but the issue here is that they were IMC below SALT approaching high ground which they knew was there. Irrespective of any emergency, for which there is no evidence, they had backed themselves into a hole. Even if as a result of their actions they had forced landed and everyone had walked away then the finding would still have been "Gross negligence">
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K52,
Thanks for another interesting contribution. I would be grateful if, with your access to the BOI report, you would be kind enough to explain your position with respect to the "undeviating track directly at the mist enshrouded Mull"
I have seen a lot of discussion about the height and speed of the Chinook when seen by the only witness. Presumably, his evidence was also used to estimate the position and heading at that time. Was this calculated to be on the direct track between their last known position and the Mull?
I understand that the flight was planned to be VFR low level. This means that in that area and in the forecast weather conditions, it had to be over water the whole time? Assuming that they were intending to track west of the Mull, a direct track to clear Gigha Island should have put them several miles west of the Mull. If they set the Mull as a waypoint, no-one is going to fly to the waypoint knowing they are a long way below it. Presumably they would have had a planned turning point before they reached the Mull.
It is reported that they had changed waypoints, is it not certain that they would have changed heading at the same time if the first wp was the Mull?
There still seem a lot of room for doubt to me.
------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
Thanks for another interesting contribution. I would be grateful if, with your access to the BOI report, you would be kind enough to explain your position with respect to the "undeviating track directly at the mist enshrouded Mull"
I have seen a lot of discussion about the height and speed of the Chinook when seen by the only witness. Presumably, his evidence was also used to estimate the position and heading at that time. Was this calculated to be on the direct track between their last known position and the Mull?
I understand that the flight was planned to be VFR low level. This means that in that area and in the forecast weather conditions, it had to be over water the whole time? Assuming that they were intending to track west of the Mull, a direct track to clear Gigha Island should have put them several miles west of the Mull. If they set the Mull as a waypoint, no-one is going to fly to the waypoint knowing they are a long way below it. Presumably they would have had a planned turning point before they reached the Mull.
It is reported that they had changed waypoints, is it not certain that they would have changed heading at the same time if the first wp was the Mull?
There still seem a lot of room for doubt to me.
------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
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Sorry to add to this circular argument, but may I ask two more questions?
Let us assume the existance of a CVR, with two hypothetical recordings from the Chinook.
1. Pilots chatting, interupted by one saying "look out!" or "Oh Sh*T", then no further signal.
2. Pilots in the midst of dealing with a 'runaway up' or similar, then no further signal.
Which of these exhonnerates them, and which dams them for negligence?
As niether exists, what can be a fair verdict?
Sorry to have to resort the cheap psycology guys, but how else do we clarify this?
Let us assume the existance of a CVR, with two hypothetical recordings from the Chinook.
1. Pilots chatting, interupted by one saying "look out!" or "Oh Sh*T", then no further signal.
2. Pilots in the midst of dealing with a 'runaway up' or similar, then no further signal.
Which of these exhonnerates them, and which dams them for negligence?
As niether exists, what can be a fair verdict?
Sorry to have to resort the cheap psycology guys, but how else do we clarify this?
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K52,
I'm sorry, I may not have expressed myself clearly. The point I am making is that there IS NOT DOUBT that they were IMC below SALT. QED. They hit the rock-filled cloud. The point I was trying to make was that they MAY HAVE HAD NO CONTROL over the ac at that time, and that they flew into the hillside BECAUSE THEY MAY HAVE HAD AN EMERGENCY SITUATION OVER WHICH THEY HAD NO PHYSICAL CONTROL. That is the whole point of this thread in a nutshell.
Because of this possibility, which the BOI could not prove or dis-prove, they, rightly, found no negligence. However, those up the chain made certain assumptions which WERE NOT BASED ON FACT, BUT SPECULATION.
A test pilot will fly an ac to the limits of control IN HIS OPINION. Then the flt envelope is curtailed to the point where the TEST PILOT CONSIDERS THE AVERAGE PILOT can cope.
It's all a matter of opinion. The test pilot can cope with much more than the average because he is trained to do so. The average pilot may or may not be able to cope - no-one can definitively say. Therefore, we fly to the limits that is dictated by the test pilot.
It is not for those above to say what happened or did not happen that fateful day - because it has been impossible to state categorically what happened in the cockpit, it was wrong to overrule the BOI.
LORD CHALFONT - I hope you read this - I suspect youwill, since you know of its existance. Sir, just ask the question - what happened in the final 20 seconds of that flight. If the answer is 'no-one knows' then the findings of negligence MUST be overturned.
It will take a big man to admit he was wrong; I hope that the Air Marshalls shown that they have real leadership - the ultimate test of such leadership is the ability to admit that they are human, and perhaps can make mistakes after all.
At the end of the day it is not the sensibilities of 2 Air Officers that counts, it is the comfort and peace of mind of the families of the crew that are the most important factors. How would you all feel if it was YOUR son that was involved?
I'm sorry, I may not have expressed myself clearly. The point I am making is that there IS NOT DOUBT that they were IMC below SALT. QED. They hit the rock-filled cloud. The point I was trying to make was that they MAY HAVE HAD NO CONTROL over the ac at that time, and that they flew into the hillside BECAUSE THEY MAY HAVE HAD AN EMERGENCY SITUATION OVER WHICH THEY HAD NO PHYSICAL CONTROL. That is the whole point of this thread in a nutshell.
Because of this possibility, which the BOI could not prove or dis-prove, they, rightly, found no negligence. However, those up the chain made certain assumptions which WERE NOT BASED ON FACT, BUT SPECULATION.
A test pilot will fly an ac to the limits of control IN HIS OPINION. Then the flt envelope is curtailed to the point where the TEST PILOT CONSIDERS THE AVERAGE PILOT can cope.
It's all a matter of opinion. The test pilot can cope with much more than the average because he is trained to do so. The average pilot may or may not be able to cope - no-one can definitively say. Therefore, we fly to the limits that is dictated by the test pilot.
It is not for those above to say what happened or did not happen that fateful day - because it has been impossible to state categorically what happened in the cockpit, it was wrong to overrule the BOI.
LORD CHALFONT - I hope you read this - I suspect youwill, since you know of its existance. Sir, just ask the question - what happened in the final 20 seconds of that flight. If the answer is 'no-one knows' then the findings of negligence MUST be overturned.
It will take a big man to admit he was wrong; I hope that the Air Marshalls shown that they have real leadership - the ultimate test of such leadership is the ability to admit that they are human, and perhaps can make mistakes after all.
At the end of the day it is not the sensibilities of 2 Air Officers that counts, it is the comfort and peace of mind of the families of the crew that are the most important factors. How would you all feel if it was YOUR son that was involved?
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Pulse1,
Thanks for the comment and the question. The BOI report is basically a precis of events, and the Boards deliberations, with margin reference to the appropriate annex or witness statement. As I have said I do not have these but I will do my best to answer the Question. Please remember also that I received this out of the ether and it is 5 years since I saw the original It LOOKS all right, apart from some obvious typo’s. The typo’s in words I can probably spot but ones in the figures are far more difficult’
Regarding the track - I will precis the Narrative of Events reproducing the parts referring to the aircraft's track:-
“ Chinook ZD576 --- took off from RAF Aldergrove at 1742hrs and departed on a magnetic track of 027 degrees. --- The aircraft was observed by several witnesses to continue its 027 track at low level over the Antrim Hills to a coasting out point close to Carnlough. --- Chinook ZD576 was subsequently observed by an amateur yachtsman to be flying below cloud at a position 2 to 3 nm to the Southwest of the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse. It was seen to be flying in a level attitude and in a straight line, at a height estimated to be between 200-400ft ASL. The visibility at that point was approximately one mile in haze, with about 80% cloud cover.
At about 1800hrs a helicopter, which sounded like a Chinook, was heard by one of the two Mull of Kintyre lighthouse keepers to be approaching from the Southwest. It was also heard by several other witnesses who were in the vicinity of the lighthouse. --- At about 1800hrs several witnesses heard a dull thump followed by a whooshing sound. Two cyclists on the hillside were then enveloped in smoke, and the second lighthouse keeper, who was driving down the road to the lighthouse, saw an area of flames through the fog behind him on the hillside. --- ZD576 had crashed into the Mull of Kintyre at Grid Reference NR 593085 at an elevation of 810ft. The aircraft impacted at a groundspeed of approximately 150kts, in about a 30 degree nose-up attitude, and banked slightly left.”
It is only fair to point out that the evidence that the yachtsman gave, on oath, to the FAI more than a year later differed considerably from the evidence he gave, on oath, to the BOI in the immediate aftermath of the events.
With regard to the waypoints I will reproduce the relevant part of para 43b(2) dealing with SuperTans,GPS and Doppler which the Board considered would have been “ the primary navigation equipment in use”.
“ When power to the SuperTans was cut during the crash, navigation information was stored in its memory. This information indicated that the system had been switched on at RAF Aldergrove at 1706 hrs, and had remained on until, or fractionally after, the impact with the ground. The crew had programmed the system with a selection of waypoimts (WP) which corresponded to their planned route. These WPs had been programmed with no gross errors and to a sufficient accuracy for the planned VFR flight. However, on closer inspection of the co-ordinates used for WP A, the lighthouse on the Mull of Kintyre, the Board established that the WP had been programmed 280m from the true position of the lighthouse. The Board was of the opinion that the most likely cause of this inaccuracy was the plotting of the WP from a 1/500 000 scale chart. At power down of the SuperTans the system calculated position of the aircraft from the GPS sensor was approximately 200m south west of the impact position, and the aircraft position from the Doppler sensor was approximately 200m south east of the impact location.”
“ The board concluded that the accuracy of the aircraft navigation systems was not a factor in the accident.”
“ At the time of the impact, the SuperTans was selected to “Tac Steer” to WP B, Corran, on the western end of the Great Glen. This WP had been selected at a point on the track, 1.75 km before the impact point. Although the Board were unable to establish the SuperTans selection prior to this WP change, it is considered most likely that a “Tac Steer” to WP A was selected, as this was the first WP programmed into the SuperTans route and the first turning point on the crew’s plan.”
Para 48
“ it was determined that a WP change was recorded at a point very close to a direct track from RAF Aldergrove to the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse, 1.75km south west of the impact point, although the time at which this selection was made was not retained. The Board assessed that the magnitude of the small difference between the true impact point and the computed position at power down of the SuperTans was unlikely to have changed significantly in the small time period between WP change and impact. This estimation was supported by further power down position data stored within the memories of the SuperTans and Trimble 8000 systems, and power down final track information in the SuperTans. The estimated final track also correlated with the AAIB assessment of the impact parameters. It could not be proven that the aircraft flew in a straight line from the WP change point to impact but timing considerations and Doppler accuracy both indicated that there was little variation in heading throughout the flight.”
The BOI calculated that the heading change required at the time of the WP change would have been 14 degrees (approx). This would not have been sufficient to have avoided impact with the ground at the height at which they were operating.
Hope this has been of some help
Thanks for the comment and the question. The BOI report is basically a precis of events, and the Boards deliberations, with margin reference to the appropriate annex or witness statement. As I have said I do not have these but I will do my best to answer the Question. Please remember also that I received this out of the ether and it is 5 years since I saw the original It LOOKS all right, apart from some obvious typo’s. The typo’s in words I can probably spot but ones in the figures are far more difficult’
Regarding the track - I will precis the Narrative of Events reproducing the parts referring to the aircraft's track:-
“ Chinook ZD576 --- took off from RAF Aldergrove at 1742hrs and departed on a magnetic track of 027 degrees. --- The aircraft was observed by several witnesses to continue its 027 track at low level over the Antrim Hills to a coasting out point close to Carnlough. --- Chinook ZD576 was subsequently observed by an amateur yachtsman to be flying below cloud at a position 2 to 3 nm to the Southwest of the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse. It was seen to be flying in a level attitude and in a straight line, at a height estimated to be between 200-400ft ASL. The visibility at that point was approximately one mile in haze, with about 80% cloud cover.
At about 1800hrs a helicopter, which sounded like a Chinook, was heard by one of the two Mull of Kintyre lighthouse keepers to be approaching from the Southwest. It was also heard by several other witnesses who were in the vicinity of the lighthouse. --- At about 1800hrs several witnesses heard a dull thump followed by a whooshing sound. Two cyclists on the hillside were then enveloped in smoke, and the second lighthouse keeper, who was driving down the road to the lighthouse, saw an area of flames through the fog behind him on the hillside. --- ZD576 had crashed into the Mull of Kintyre at Grid Reference NR 593085 at an elevation of 810ft. The aircraft impacted at a groundspeed of approximately 150kts, in about a 30 degree nose-up attitude, and banked slightly left.”
It is only fair to point out that the evidence that the yachtsman gave, on oath, to the FAI more than a year later differed considerably from the evidence he gave, on oath, to the BOI in the immediate aftermath of the events.
With regard to the waypoints I will reproduce the relevant part of para 43b(2) dealing with SuperTans,GPS and Doppler which the Board considered would have been “ the primary navigation equipment in use”.
“ When power to the SuperTans was cut during the crash, navigation information was stored in its memory. This information indicated that the system had been switched on at RAF Aldergrove at 1706 hrs, and had remained on until, or fractionally after, the impact with the ground. The crew had programmed the system with a selection of waypoimts (WP) which corresponded to their planned route. These WPs had been programmed with no gross errors and to a sufficient accuracy for the planned VFR flight. However, on closer inspection of the co-ordinates used for WP A, the lighthouse on the Mull of Kintyre, the Board established that the WP had been programmed 280m from the true position of the lighthouse. The Board was of the opinion that the most likely cause of this inaccuracy was the plotting of the WP from a 1/500 000 scale chart. At power down of the SuperTans the system calculated position of the aircraft from the GPS sensor was approximately 200m south west of the impact position, and the aircraft position from the Doppler sensor was approximately 200m south east of the impact location.”
“ The board concluded that the accuracy of the aircraft navigation systems was not a factor in the accident.”
“ At the time of the impact, the SuperTans was selected to “Tac Steer” to WP B, Corran, on the western end of the Great Glen. This WP had been selected at a point on the track, 1.75 km before the impact point. Although the Board were unable to establish the SuperTans selection prior to this WP change, it is considered most likely that a “Tac Steer” to WP A was selected, as this was the first WP programmed into the SuperTans route and the first turning point on the crew’s plan.”
Para 48
“ it was determined that a WP change was recorded at a point very close to a direct track from RAF Aldergrove to the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse, 1.75km south west of the impact point, although the time at which this selection was made was not retained. The Board assessed that the magnitude of the small difference between the true impact point and the computed position at power down of the SuperTans was unlikely to have changed significantly in the small time period between WP change and impact. This estimation was supported by further power down position data stored within the memories of the SuperTans and Trimble 8000 systems, and power down final track information in the SuperTans. The estimated final track also correlated with the AAIB assessment of the impact parameters. It could not be proven that the aircraft flew in a straight line from the WP change point to impact but timing considerations and Doppler accuracy both indicated that there was little variation in heading throughout the flight.”
The BOI calculated that the heading change required at the time of the WP change would have been 14 degrees (approx). This would not have been sufficient to have avoided impact with the ground at the height at which they were operating.
Hope this has been of some help
Guest
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FJJP
I'm sorry but I totally disagree. What happened in the final 20 seconds was NOT the basis of the finding of negligence. The only happening in that period that can be ascertained was that the crew initiated a cyclic flare fractionally too late to avoid impact with the ground. Of course, if they had set the Rad Alt bugs properly they would have had more warning of imminent impact.
According to the BOI, at that time (20 seconds before impact) the aircraft was travelling at an IAS of 150kts and, as Ark Royal has pointed out, the calculated wind was 180/30 giving an approximate groundspeed of 180kts. The VFR requirements were 1000ft vertical and 1.5 km horizontal clearance from cloud with 5km visibility yet, as the BOI put it, " The weather in the area was very poor, with cloud extending from below lighthouse level(300ft) to at least the summit of Beinn na Lice(1400ft), the highest point on the southern tip of the Mull. The visiblity below the variable cloudbase close to the lighthouse was 400-500 metres."
The finding of negligence was because, whilst they were aware of the forecast poor weather and must have become aware of the actual bad weather, they flew the aircraft " both at high speed and low level directly towards the Mull, notwithstanding the obvious dangers of such an undertaking."
Irrespective of any conceivable malfunction, no matter how unlikely or bizarre, which may have occurred in the final 20 seconds of that flight, it does not alter the basis of the finding of " negligence to a gross degree."
Quite simply, they should not have been there, 20 seconds before impact, at that height and that speed - that was the negligence.
[This message has been edited by K52 (edited 05 March 2001).]
I'm sorry but I totally disagree. What happened in the final 20 seconds was NOT the basis of the finding of negligence. The only happening in that period that can be ascertained was that the crew initiated a cyclic flare fractionally too late to avoid impact with the ground. Of course, if they had set the Rad Alt bugs properly they would have had more warning of imminent impact.
According to the BOI, at that time (20 seconds before impact) the aircraft was travelling at an IAS of 150kts and, as Ark Royal has pointed out, the calculated wind was 180/30 giving an approximate groundspeed of 180kts. The VFR requirements were 1000ft vertical and 1.5 km horizontal clearance from cloud with 5km visibility yet, as the BOI put it, " The weather in the area was very poor, with cloud extending from below lighthouse level(300ft) to at least the summit of Beinn na Lice(1400ft), the highest point on the southern tip of the Mull. The visiblity below the variable cloudbase close to the lighthouse was 400-500 metres."
The finding of negligence was because, whilst they were aware of the forecast poor weather and must have become aware of the actual bad weather, they flew the aircraft " both at high speed and low level directly towards the Mull, notwithstanding the obvious dangers of such an undertaking."
Irrespective of any conceivable malfunction, no matter how unlikely or bizarre, which may have occurred in the final 20 seconds of that flight, it does not alter the basis of the finding of " negligence to a gross degree."
Quite simply, they should not have been there, 20 seconds before impact, at that height and that speed - that was the negligence.
[This message has been edited by K52 (edited 05 March 2001).]