Chinook - Hit Back Here
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Sorry all if my last post seemed to ignore some earlier contributions, but I have only just found page 46.
Low and slow,
As you seem to agree that a gross injustice has been done here, you have answered your own question. 'We' are not speculating, simply asking for anyone with the required level of evidential proof to show us it. As Brian says, 'justice has no expiry date'. He is right, and until the injustice is put right the campaign goes on.
Low and slow,
As you seem to agree that a gross injustice has been done here, you have answered your own question. 'We' are not speculating, simply asking for anyone with the required level of evidential proof to show us it. As Brian says, 'justice has no expiry date'. He is right, and until the injustice is put right the campaign goes on.
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Ark Royal,
Thanks for that, as I think I have mentioned before I only have a 1 million chart these days; it shows the beacons but not frequencies etc. Pesonally I would have had LAY selected in case of an emergency requiring an immediate diversion.
I'm not looking for allies, just warning in view of the ridicule and abuse that has been directed at other contributors to this thread.
John Nichol
Thanks for the comment but sometimes you have to speculate to accumulate. We already know that the Yachtsman gave different evidence to the BOI in the immediate aftermath of the Accident to that which he gave to the FAI over a year later. Now we find that the statement in the BOI that Flt Lt Tapper "carried out the flight planning for the Inverness flight during the evening of 1 Jub 94" appears to be incorrect. Was this a typo, a genuine mistake by the board in assuming that he did the planning for that flight because he was seen preparing maps or is it a case of different evidence being given at the FAI? I believe you have all the annexes; any chance of an e-mail to let me know?
Tandemrotor
You know as well as I do that in his evidence to the BOI, which differs considerably from his evidence to the FAI, the yachctsman did indeed say that he could see up to the lighthouse but that was at 1730 whilst the Chinook was still on the ground at Aldergrove and the yacht was only 3/4 mile from the coast. His evidence on visibility given to the FAI appears to be at variabce with the evidence of all the people on the Mull at the time of the accident, including a lighthouse keeper and his wife who were standing outside the lighthouse in the fog.
With regard to his estimate of speed, which again is significantly different to that he gave to the BOI, let us presume for the moment that he is correct. In which case as we have a time from Belfast ATC for the Chinook leaving the CTR and a time for the impact of the crash (calculated from engine power down) 12 minutes later; to be able to get to that position and the speed band described the the Chinook would have had to transit at vne AND have at least a 30kt tail component to make it.
[This message has been edited by K52 (edited 27 February 2001).]
Thanks for that, as I think I have mentioned before I only have a 1 million chart these days; it shows the beacons but not frequencies etc. Pesonally I would have had LAY selected in case of an emergency requiring an immediate diversion.
I'm not looking for allies, just warning in view of the ridicule and abuse that has been directed at other contributors to this thread.
John Nichol
Thanks for the comment but sometimes you have to speculate to accumulate. We already know that the Yachtsman gave different evidence to the BOI in the immediate aftermath of the Accident to that which he gave to the FAI over a year later. Now we find that the statement in the BOI that Flt Lt Tapper "carried out the flight planning for the Inverness flight during the evening of 1 Jub 94" appears to be incorrect. Was this a typo, a genuine mistake by the board in assuming that he did the planning for that flight because he was seen preparing maps or is it a case of different evidence being given at the FAI? I believe you have all the annexes; any chance of an e-mail to let me know?
Tandemrotor
You know as well as I do that in his evidence to the BOI, which differs considerably from his evidence to the FAI, the yachctsman did indeed say that he could see up to the lighthouse but that was at 1730 whilst the Chinook was still on the ground at Aldergrove and the yacht was only 3/4 mile from the coast. His evidence on visibility given to the FAI appears to be at variabce with the evidence of all the people on the Mull at the time of the accident, including a lighthouse keeper and his wife who were standing outside the lighthouse in the fog.
With regard to his estimate of speed, which again is significantly different to that he gave to the BOI, let us presume for the moment that he is correct. In which case as we have a time from Belfast ATC for the Chinook leaving the CTR and a time for the impact of the crash (calculated from engine power down) 12 minutes later; to be able to get to that position and the speed band described the the Chinook would have had to transit at vne AND have at least a 30kt tail component to make it.
[This message has been edited by K52 (edited 27 February 2001).]
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Although I could not put point 2 so strongly, I agree with Low and Slow. For me this forum has provided a lot of useful information and impressive argument which has helped me do what little I can to support the campaign. Until something better comes along I hope it will go on providing a valuable means of communication for those who are actively trying to re-open the enquiry.
The main reason I would be more doubtful about CFIT is that I still find it difficult to believe that such a highly trained and well equipped crew could fly into the FIRST bit of high ground they come across, within a minute or two of knowing their position. It is rare for PPL’s like me to do that, even though CFIT is the biggest single killer of PPL’s.
If it was CFIT, several previous posts suggest to me that a lot of military helicopter flying takes place under these conditions, with the belief that superior training makes it alright. In most cases, results show that it obviously does, but it must mean that the risks are high. It also must mean that most of you who do it are also exposed to the risk of being condemned as grossly negligent. This is one of the reasons I fight on. We suffer enough from blame culture in the real world. I would hope that those of you who take high risks for our benefit would be protected from that.
I quote two of the posts:
TandemRotor
“One thing that may not have come across to anyone without military flying experience, is that this type of flying regularly occurs on the very margins of what is deemed to be acceptable weather.None more so than military low level helicopter operations. Crews are very well practiced at it, and almost invariably, very good at coping with such weather. Indeed members of this crew would have flown on operations, in other theatres, in which far less stringent minimum weather limits apply, only an overwhelming sense of self preservation dictate what is sensible, and what is not”.
Safely Single
“As a helo operator(yellow not green) I am forever flying around in dodgy weather, at low level certainly near a lot of cumulo granite. I have been caught out a couple of times when you say 'lets have a look at this valley' only to find that the cloud suddenly gets you. In fact some of my more terrifying experiences have been as a result. Do I consider myself negligent.....NO. As long as you have your escape routes and the like then you can reasonably keep the aircraft and crew safe. So much for operational flying, even on training when our limits are much more strict it is still possible to get caught out as cloud can easily be undefineable(I think that that is a word) and creeps up on you”.
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"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
The main reason I would be more doubtful about CFIT is that I still find it difficult to believe that such a highly trained and well equipped crew could fly into the FIRST bit of high ground they come across, within a minute or two of knowing their position. It is rare for PPL’s like me to do that, even though CFIT is the biggest single killer of PPL’s.
If it was CFIT, several previous posts suggest to me that a lot of military helicopter flying takes place under these conditions, with the belief that superior training makes it alright. In most cases, results show that it obviously does, but it must mean that the risks are high. It also must mean that most of you who do it are also exposed to the risk of being condemned as grossly negligent. This is one of the reasons I fight on. We suffer enough from blame culture in the real world. I would hope that those of you who take high risks for our benefit would be protected from that.
I quote two of the posts:
TandemRotor
“One thing that may not have come across to anyone without military flying experience, is that this type of flying regularly occurs on the very margins of what is deemed to be acceptable weather.None more so than military low level helicopter operations. Crews are very well practiced at it, and almost invariably, very good at coping with such weather. Indeed members of this crew would have flown on operations, in other theatres, in which far less stringent minimum weather limits apply, only an overwhelming sense of self preservation dictate what is sensible, and what is not”.
Safely Single
“As a helo operator(yellow not green) I am forever flying around in dodgy weather, at low level certainly near a lot of cumulo granite. I have been caught out a couple of times when you say 'lets have a look at this valley' only to find that the cloud suddenly gets you. In fact some of my more terrifying experiences have been as a result. Do I consider myself negligent.....NO. As long as you have your escape routes and the like then you can reasonably keep the aircraft and crew safe. So much for operational flying, even on training when our limits are much more strict it is still possible to get caught out as cloud can easily be undefineable(I think that that is a word) and creeps up on you”.
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"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
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Thanks to everyone for their recent contributions (regardless of which side of the debate you are from). It helps to keep this important matter at, or near the top of the threads.
Just for information:
Lord Chalfont has been given Monday March 5th as the date to submit his motion for a Select Committee hearing. Should the Government try to stop him (for whatever reason) he will put a motion to a vote of the House. If he gains a majority, then the Select Committee will be established.
Updates as and when.
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Just for information:
Lord Chalfont has been given Monday March 5th as the date to submit his motion for a Select Committee hearing. Should the Government try to stop him (for whatever reason) he will put a motion to a vote of the House. If he gains a majority, then the Select Committee will be established.
Updates as and when.
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Guest
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K52
You make some interesting points, but your branch of aviation is obviously significantly different from the SH operation under discussion. A couple of points:
Meals - no one routinely logs you in at breakfast, or any other meal, in the mess. In-flight rations are available only after almost prohibitive administration, and often subject to a lead-time greater than the tasking-notice. In 13 years of SH flying I've never heard of the 'maximum times between meals' mentioned in your thread, I suspect it's a truckie thing.
The ADF - Your support for this device is commendable, but very flawed indeed. The LAY is about 27 miles from the impact point, which by my 1 in 60 rule gives a bearing change of about 2 deg per NM, and 2.12 deg by trigonometry. The needle on a chinook ADF oscillates either side of its bearing by about 4 to 7 degrees, thus its use as a position check would have been very difficult, and if the crew had tried it they would probably have flown into the water before reaching the Mull! Tuning the ADF to LAY as the nearest diversion would also be a waste of time, as TAPs for Islay are not published by the RAF, and even if they were the MDH would almost certainly be well above the minima required for VFR flight in a helicopter, which by the good book is Clear of Cloud and in Sight of Surface, amended by the not-so-good book to 250' cloudbase and 1000m viz.
You make some interesting points, but your branch of aviation is obviously significantly different from the SH operation under discussion. A couple of points:
Meals - no one routinely logs you in at breakfast, or any other meal, in the mess. In-flight rations are available only after almost prohibitive administration, and often subject to a lead-time greater than the tasking-notice. In 13 years of SH flying I've never heard of the 'maximum times between meals' mentioned in your thread, I suspect it's a truckie thing.
The ADF - Your support for this device is commendable, but very flawed indeed. The LAY is about 27 miles from the impact point, which by my 1 in 60 rule gives a bearing change of about 2 deg per NM, and 2.12 deg by trigonometry. The needle on a chinook ADF oscillates either side of its bearing by about 4 to 7 degrees, thus its use as a position check would have been very difficult, and if the crew had tried it they would probably have flown into the water before reaching the Mull! Tuning the ADF to LAY as the nearest diversion would also be a waste of time, as TAPs for Islay are not published by the RAF, and even if they were the MDH would almost certainly be well above the minima required for VFR flight in a helicopter, which by the good book is Clear of Cloud and in Sight of Surface, amended by the not-so-good book to 250' cloudbase and 1000m viz.
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K52
I think Pub User has said it. The ADF is of no use whatsoever to the SH environment, and as he says, your thinking shows a total lack of understanding of such operations. If you can imagine your erstwhile truckie mates being judged by the SH fraternity, who know nothing of their operation, you may begin to realise our frustration with the way our fellows were judged very harshly by Wratten, who patently knows Jack about the SH world he presided over.
Care to comment on the likelihood that local orders modified the definition of VFR for the theatre?
I will ask you again: on what evidence do you find beyond any doubt whatsoever that the crew of ZD576 was negligent.
Remember that this is not a 'balance of probabilities', it is not even 'beyond reasonable doubt'. By the RAFs own rules, which you are fond of quoting, it is a burden of proof beyond any doubt whatsoever.
I think Pub User has said it. The ADF is of no use whatsoever to the SH environment, and as he says, your thinking shows a total lack of understanding of such operations. If you can imagine your erstwhile truckie mates being judged by the SH fraternity, who know nothing of their operation, you may begin to realise our frustration with the way our fellows were judged very harshly by Wratten, who patently knows Jack about the SH world he presided over.
Care to comment on the likelihood that local orders modified the definition of VFR for the theatre?
I will ask you again: on what evidence do you find beyond any doubt whatsoever that the crew of ZD576 was negligent.
Remember that this is not a 'balance of probabilities', it is not even 'beyond reasonable doubt'. By the RAFs own rules, which you are fond of quoting, it is a burden of proof beyond any doubt whatsoever.
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Pub User
Thanks for that. I did suggest originally LAY because it was their nearest diversion and qualified the suggestion of the AH by saying " IF they could receive it". The reason I suggested LAY was (1) it was the closest (2) Prestwick was farther and direct track would have been across the fog evshrouded hills. I accept the point about TAP's but the were supposed to be flying VFR.
In addition Machrihanish provides a radar service for Islay.
Ark Royal
Thought you might be interested in an e-mail I have had from "a current SH operator" which says "a good operator makes use of all available navaids: ADF, TACAN or VOR if they can be of use".
A further quote is "modification of local theatre orders is invalid as the crew were operating on the mainland at the time of the crash".
As I have said before - from crossing the Belfast CTR boundary at 1747 (as recorded by ATC) to impact at 1759 (power down) required a mean groundspeed of 165kts. With the forecast wind this would have required an IAS of 150-155kts which correlates remarkably well with the profile prepared by Boeing and DRA which showed a climb at 150kts IAS followed by a flare to 30 degrees nose up. During this flare the aircraft would naturally lose speed yet the impact was at a groundspeed calculated by AAIB to have been 151kts.
I confess that I find it exceedingly difficult to accept Tandemrotor's proposition that we accept the Yachtsmans evidence of the aircraft at 2-400 ft at 60 - 90kts (ground speed obviously) at a range of 2-3 nms from impact to the aircraft crashing at 810ft ASL in a 30 degree nose up attitude at a ground speed of 151kts. Of course I may have found that evidence more worthy if it had not changed between the BOI and the FAI.
Thanks for that. I did suggest originally LAY because it was their nearest diversion and qualified the suggestion of the AH by saying " IF they could receive it". The reason I suggested LAY was (1) it was the closest (2) Prestwick was farther and direct track would have been across the fog evshrouded hills. I accept the point about TAP's but the were supposed to be flying VFR.
In addition Machrihanish provides a radar service for Islay.
Ark Royal
Thought you might be interested in an e-mail I have had from "a current SH operator" which says "a good operator makes use of all available navaids: ADF, TACAN or VOR if they can be of use".
A further quote is "modification of local theatre orders is invalid as the crew were operating on the mainland at the time of the crash".
As I have said before - from crossing the Belfast CTR boundary at 1747 (as recorded by ATC) to impact at 1759 (power down) required a mean groundspeed of 165kts. With the forecast wind this would have required an IAS of 150-155kts which correlates remarkably well with the profile prepared by Boeing and DRA which showed a climb at 150kts IAS followed by a flare to 30 degrees nose up. During this flare the aircraft would naturally lose speed yet the impact was at a groundspeed calculated by AAIB to have been 151kts.
I confess that I find it exceedingly difficult to accept Tandemrotor's proposition that we accept the Yachtsmans evidence of the aircraft at 2-400 ft at 60 - 90kts (ground speed obviously) at a range of 2-3 nms from impact to the aircraft crashing at 810ft ASL in a 30 degree nose up attitude at a ground speed of 151kts. Of course I may have found that evidence more worthy if it had not changed between the BOI and the FAI.
Guest
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K52,
Your last reply to Ark avoided answering his main point, as usual, and referred him to an e-mailed comment about what a 'good SH operator' does. May I respectfully further add that a 'better SH operator' filters out what is useless (NDB on an unavailable freq, out of range, coastal effect and so forth) and ignores it? As the crew in this case 'appears' to have done. I say 'appears', because in this sad case there is still absolutely no clear evidence what caused the Mull crash.
Your last reply to Ark avoided answering his main point, as usual, and referred him to an e-mailed comment about what a 'good SH operator' does. May I respectfully further add that a 'better SH operator' filters out what is useless (NDB on an unavailable freq, out of range, coastal effect and so forth) and ignores it? As the crew in this case 'appears' to have done. I say 'appears', because in this sad case there is still absolutely no clear evidence what caused the Mull crash.
Guest
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Thud,
Crikey, up early! Thanks for your support. I begin to think K52 is a politician, so well does he avoid the direct question. His economy with the actuality is also reminiscent of the breed.
K52 computes that in 12 minutes, the aircraft required an IAS of 150 – 155 Kts, intending, I suppose to convey a picture of men in a hurry, men who are putting speed before safety, men who are being negligent. He bases his figures on an unspecified ‘forecast wind’ and an unspecified distance, the more to sound authoritative. Remember that the flight took place in the actual conditions; and not those forecast. For the record forecast wind was 180/20kts [BOI], whilst actual was 170/30kts approx [AAIB].
ZD576 took off at 1742 [logged by ATC] and proceeded on a track of 027 deg to the zone boundary. According to the BOI ‘The aircraft requested to leave the Aldergrove Approach Radar frequency slightly before the Control Zone Boundary, and concluded its ATC service with Belfast International Airport at 1747 hrs’. This final call was logged by ATC at 17:46:30 BST [AAIB]. K52 has construed from this that, ZD576 crossed the exact zone boundary at 1747, and his calculations are based on this flawed hypothesis and the forecast wind rather than the actual, which provided some extra 10kys of tailwind.
The crash occurred at ‘about 1800hrs’ [BOI]. (I am unable just now to find any reference to the 1759 power down, but am quite willing to believe it exists). Were all events timed by the same timepiece, then accurate calculations could be made. They were not.
I said in reply to K52’s calculations back around page 40:
"The aircraft took off at 1742 and departed on a magnetic track of 027degrees (pretty well direct the Mull) and witnesses heard a dull thump at 'about 1800 hrs.' The 999 call was logged at 1804. About 20 minutes for 43 miles or 130 kts groundspeed. Not as accurate as your figures? Who knows the exact airborne time? Somewhere between your figure and mine? Still not convincingly outside of the VFR <140 Kts COCISS requirement is it?"
K52’s insistence that the aircraft crossed the exact zone boundary at precisely 1747 and covered 33 miles to the crash site in precisely 12 minutes nicely fits his version of the events in order to imply negligence (still no proof). His calculations are based on flawed data, skewed deliberately to reinforce a weak case.
Now, K52, put away your calculator, and answer my question, which I put again: on what evidence do you find beyond any doubt whatsoever that the crew of ZD576 was negligent.
Remember that this is not a 'balance of probabilities', it is not even 'beyond reasonable doubt'. By the RAF’s own rules, which you are fond of quoting, it is a burden of proof beyond any doubt whatsoever.
edited for finger trouble
[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 28 February 2001).]
Crikey, up early! Thanks for your support. I begin to think K52 is a politician, so well does he avoid the direct question. His economy with the actuality is also reminiscent of the breed.
K52 computes that in 12 minutes, the aircraft required an IAS of 150 – 155 Kts, intending, I suppose to convey a picture of men in a hurry, men who are putting speed before safety, men who are being negligent. He bases his figures on an unspecified ‘forecast wind’ and an unspecified distance, the more to sound authoritative. Remember that the flight took place in the actual conditions; and not those forecast. For the record forecast wind was 180/20kts [BOI], whilst actual was 170/30kts approx [AAIB].
ZD576 took off at 1742 [logged by ATC] and proceeded on a track of 027 deg to the zone boundary. According to the BOI ‘The aircraft requested to leave the Aldergrove Approach Radar frequency slightly before the Control Zone Boundary, and concluded its ATC service with Belfast International Airport at 1747 hrs’. This final call was logged by ATC at 17:46:30 BST [AAIB]. K52 has construed from this that, ZD576 crossed the exact zone boundary at 1747, and his calculations are based on this flawed hypothesis and the forecast wind rather than the actual, which provided some extra 10kys of tailwind.
The crash occurred at ‘about 1800hrs’ [BOI]. (I am unable just now to find any reference to the 1759 power down, but am quite willing to believe it exists). Were all events timed by the same timepiece, then accurate calculations could be made. They were not.
I said in reply to K52’s calculations back around page 40:
"The aircraft took off at 1742 and departed on a magnetic track of 027degrees (pretty well direct the Mull) and witnesses heard a dull thump at 'about 1800 hrs.' The 999 call was logged at 1804. About 20 minutes for 43 miles or 130 kts groundspeed. Not as accurate as your figures? Who knows the exact airborne time? Somewhere between your figure and mine? Still not convincingly outside of the VFR <140 Kts COCISS requirement is it?"
K52’s insistence that the aircraft crossed the exact zone boundary at precisely 1747 and covered 33 miles to the crash site in precisely 12 minutes nicely fits his version of the events in order to imply negligence (still no proof). His calculations are based on flawed data, skewed deliberately to reinforce a weak case.
Now, K52, put away your calculator, and answer my question, which I put again: on what evidence do you find beyond any doubt whatsoever that the crew of ZD576 was negligent.
Remember that this is not a 'balance of probabilities', it is not even 'beyond reasonable doubt'. By the RAF’s own rules, which you are fond of quoting, it is a burden of proof beyond any doubt whatsoever.
edited for finger trouble
[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 28 February 2001).]
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K52
You're still missing the point about LAY. It would only have been of interst to them as a diversion if it had been a valid IFR diversion following a pull-up. As a VFR helicopter they do not need an airfield as an emergency diversion - they can land anywhere. If Machrihanish could provide a useful radar service to get them into Islay I'd be very suprised, and if they'd been open at that time of day, and the crew were able to establish comms with them at low-level, then I'm sure they would have.
Lots of ifs.
You're still missing the point about LAY. It would only have been of interst to them as a diversion if it had been a valid IFR diversion following a pull-up. As a VFR helicopter they do not need an airfield as an emergency diversion - they can land anywhere. If Machrihanish could provide a useful radar service to get them into Islay I'd be very suprised, and if they'd been open at that time of day, and the crew were able to establish comms with them at low-level, then I'm sure they would have.
Lots of ifs.
Guest
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Just for accuracy, if memory serves, the expression goes: 'only in cases of absolutely no doubt whatsoever are deceased aircrew to be found negligent'.
Bear in mind that this was probably staffed, about 25 years ago, by some poor IFS chap who was trying to do the right thing; he could just have easily gone the army route of 'beyond reasonable doubt' which would have changed the picture entirely.
[This message has been edited by SteadyNote (edited 28 February 2001).]
Bear in mind that this was probably staffed, about 25 years ago, by some poor IFS chap who was trying to do the right thing; he could just have easily gone the army route of 'beyond reasonable doubt' which would have changed the picture entirely.
[This message has been edited by SteadyNote (edited 28 February 2001).]
Guest
Posts: n/a
Thanks, Steady.
But he didn't, and it hasn't.
For absolute accuracy, the wording is this, lifted from the Defence Committee report:
The RAF’s regulations state that “only in cases where there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever should deceased aircrew be found negligent”.
Very clear and the rules at the time.
But he didn't, and it hasn't.
For absolute accuracy, the wording is this, lifted from the Defence Committee report:
The RAF’s regulations state that “only in cases where there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever should deceased aircrew be found negligent”.
Very clear and the rules at the time.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Pub User
Thanks for that. I appreciate that a helicopter can land (almost) anywhere but with the prevailing Wx at the Mull where was it going to land? The wife of the Lighthouse Keeper remarked in her evidence that when she heard the helicopter she expressed the hope that it wasn't going to try to land at the nearby Heli-Pad. According to the BOI " The weather in this area was very poor, with cloud and hill fog extending from below the lighthouse level (300ft) to at least the summit of Beinn na Lice (1400ft), the highest point on the southern tip of the Mull. The visibility below the variable cloudbase close to the lighthouse was 400-500 metres. The wind on the hillside was blustery and strong, but close to the lighthouse it was almost calm".
Machrihanish weather was also very poor and the direct track to Prestwick would have entailed a climb over the mist enshrouded Mull. It was my thought that an aid which would have given an immediate rough track to a VFR diversion would have been more use than a commercial radio station. I appreciate that it would have been of no use if the imperative was "LAND IMMEDIATELY".
Ark Royal
Yes, I did take the time of release of the Chinook by Belfast ATC from the BOI time. I fully accept that it may have been 30 seconds earlier but then it was "slightly before the Control Zone Boundary".
The "power down" time came from the post crash interrogation of the SuperTans and the Trimble 8000 GPS which corresponded. I believe the GPS gets its time information via satellite from the atomic clock. As for Belfast ATC I confess I do not know. In days of yore when I used to Duty Instructor during my penance in Traing Command the ATC clerk used to ring the speaking clock every morning to get a time check. I have, therfore, e-mailed Aldergrove ATC to ask them how they do it these days.
Regarding the wind quoted from the AAIB of 180/30 (approx). Was this not the wind derived by AAIB from their crash investigation ie interpolating from the witness marks giving IAS and Heading at impact with their calculated track and groundspeed from the wreckage spread?
Yes, I did use the abacus to work out that 33nm in 12 minutes meant an average groundspeed of 165 kts Oddly the BOI seem to have made remarkably similar calculations. Referring to the unanswered call to Scottish Military in Pt 2 para 50 they state "This call was made 4 minutes before impact and, BASED ON GROUNDSPEED CALCULATIONS (my emphasis), at a point approximately mid way between NI and the Mull". As the Chinook costed out at Carnlough 21nm from the impact point I suggest that this implies a groundspeed of 157.5kts (approx).
You, on the other hand, believe differently and quote the (revised) evidence of the Yachtsman the the Chinook was travelling at between 60 and 90 kts(Groundspeed). Now if you are saying that you believe that this was the transit speed of the aircraft, then you will have to agree that the wife of the Lighthouse Keeper was remarkably prescient in that(taking the higher groundspeed of 90kts)she dialled 999 approx 5 minutes before the aircraft could have reached the Mull. You are also dismissing the evidence of the AAIB investigation.
Or are you saying that the Chinook initially travelled at a much higher groundspeed and slowed down to pass the Yacht? How did they know it was there? The corollary to this would be that, having passed the yacht, in order to meet the AAIB parameters; the crew would have had to accelerate rapidly on an undeviating track towards the cloud shrouded Mull until the manouvre that preceeded the cyclic flare.
Regretably I have too stop there to attend to something urgent. I will continue this a little later. Part 2 will be transmitted as soon as possible.
Thanks for that. I appreciate that a helicopter can land (almost) anywhere but with the prevailing Wx at the Mull where was it going to land? The wife of the Lighthouse Keeper remarked in her evidence that when she heard the helicopter she expressed the hope that it wasn't going to try to land at the nearby Heli-Pad. According to the BOI " The weather in this area was very poor, with cloud and hill fog extending from below the lighthouse level (300ft) to at least the summit of Beinn na Lice (1400ft), the highest point on the southern tip of the Mull. The visibility below the variable cloudbase close to the lighthouse was 400-500 metres. The wind on the hillside was blustery and strong, but close to the lighthouse it was almost calm".
Machrihanish weather was also very poor and the direct track to Prestwick would have entailed a climb over the mist enshrouded Mull. It was my thought that an aid which would have given an immediate rough track to a VFR diversion would have been more use than a commercial radio station. I appreciate that it would have been of no use if the imperative was "LAND IMMEDIATELY".
Ark Royal
Yes, I did take the time of release of the Chinook by Belfast ATC from the BOI time. I fully accept that it may have been 30 seconds earlier but then it was "slightly before the Control Zone Boundary".
The "power down" time came from the post crash interrogation of the SuperTans and the Trimble 8000 GPS which corresponded. I believe the GPS gets its time information via satellite from the atomic clock. As for Belfast ATC I confess I do not know. In days of yore when I used to Duty Instructor during my penance in Traing Command the ATC clerk used to ring the speaking clock every morning to get a time check. I have, therfore, e-mailed Aldergrove ATC to ask them how they do it these days.
Regarding the wind quoted from the AAIB of 180/30 (approx). Was this not the wind derived by AAIB from their crash investigation ie interpolating from the witness marks giving IAS and Heading at impact with their calculated track and groundspeed from the wreckage spread?
Yes, I did use the abacus to work out that 33nm in 12 minutes meant an average groundspeed of 165 kts Oddly the BOI seem to have made remarkably similar calculations. Referring to the unanswered call to Scottish Military in Pt 2 para 50 they state "This call was made 4 minutes before impact and, BASED ON GROUNDSPEED CALCULATIONS (my emphasis), at a point approximately mid way between NI and the Mull". As the Chinook costed out at Carnlough 21nm from the impact point I suggest that this implies a groundspeed of 157.5kts (approx).
You, on the other hand, believe differently and quote the (revised) evidence of the Yachtsman the the Chinook was travelling at between 60 and 90 kts(Groundspeed). Now if you are saying that you believe that this was the transit speed of the aircraft, then you will have to agree that the wife of the Lighthouse Keeper was remarkably prescient in that(taking the higher groundspeed of 90kts)she dialled 999 approx 5 minutes before the aircraft could have reached the Mull. You are also dismissing the evidence of the AAIB investigation.
Or are you saying that the Chinook initially travelled at a much higher groundspeed and slowed down to pass the Yacht? How did they know it was there? The corollary to this would be that, having passed the yacht, in order to meet the AAIB parameters; the crew would have had to accelerate rapidly on an undeviating track towards the cloud shrouded Mull until the manouvre that preceeded the cyclic flare.
Regretably I have too stop there to attend to something urgent. I will continue this a little later. Part 2 will be transmitted as soon as possible.
Guest
Posts: n/a
K52, As much as I enjoy this sparring, do, please pay attention:
At no time have I made reference to the yachtsman’s speed estimate, only the observation that he could see the helicopter, clear of cloud, and the lighthouse.
My reference to the timing at the zone boundary was simply to show that we cannot be exact. ‘Slightly before the zone boundary’ is too vague to start extrapolating speed calculations, and in any case was where the call requesting a frequency change was made. By the time the concluding call was made, who can say where the aircraft was with reference to the boundary?. The average speed over the whole trip is more relevant, but at around 130 to 140 kts groundspeed, this would not support your increasingly shaky case.
Please pay attention one more time: The ADF is absolutely no use to VFR SH operations. On Tans there is a little button which calls up the nearest airports (can’t remember how many) so who would use a wartime wireless aid, with no beacons within its range, in preference to 90s GPS? Were it tuned to Radio4, you might be more sympathetic, but in any case the evidence shows that no one was listening to it.
Of course the crew had no intention of landing at the mull lighthouse. Because the keeper’s wife mentions the possibility, does not make it relevant. SH helicopters fly below weather, and when the going gets tough they fly around it. Diversion airfields are not required.
Your calculation of speed based on the call to Scottish ATC is laughable. The call was estimated to have been made midpoint. Could have been made anywhere on route, so a speed calculated to 0.5kts based on this is, as I say, a joke!
My wind figure is taken from the AAIB report. How they obtained it I know not, but I would think they could be trusted to be more accurate than the forecast.
I look forward to Part 2. I somehow fear that pulse1 and the rest of us are going to be disappointed if we expect an answer to my direct question of the last few posts, because there is not a shred of positive evidence to support the finding of gross negligence in this case. You know it; the minutia of the various reports provides none, for if it was there, you would have found it.
edited for finger trouble (early start this morning)
[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 01 March 2001).]
[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 01 March 2001).]
At no time have I made reference to the yachtsman’s speed estimate, only the observation that he could see the helicopter, clear of cloud, and the lighthouse.
My reference to the timing at the zone boundary was simply to show that we cannot be exact. ‘Slightly before the zone boundary’ is too vague to start extrapolating speed calculations, and in any case was where the call requesting a frequency change was made. By the time the concluding call was made, who can say where the aircraft was with reference to the boundary?. The average speed over the whole trip is more relevant, but at around 130 to 140 kts groundspeed, this would not support your increasingly shaky case.
Please pay attention one more time: The ADF is absolutely no use to VFR SH operations. On Tans there is a little button which calls up the nearest airports (can’t remember how many) so who would use a wartime wireless aid, with no beacons within its range, in preference to 90s GPS? Were it tuned to Radio4, you might be more sympathetic, but in any case the evidence shows that no one was listening to it.
Of course the crew had no intention of landing at the mull lighthouse. Because the keeper’s wife mentions the possibility, does not make it relevant. SH helicopters fly below weather, and when the going gets tough they fly around it. Diversion airfields are not required.
Your calculation of speed based on the call to Scottish ATC is laughable. The call was estimated to have been made midpoint. Could have been made anywhere on route, so a speed calculated to 0.5kts based on this is, as I say, a joke!
My wind figure is taken from the AAIB report. How they obtained it I know not, but I would think they could be trusted to be more accurate than the forecast.
I look forward to Part 2. I somehow fear that pulse1 and the rest of us are going to be disappointed if we expect an answer to my direct question of the last few posts, because there is not a shred of positive evidence to support the finding of gross negligence in this case. You know it; the minutia of the various reports provides none, for if it was there, you would have found it.
edited for finger trouble (early start this morning)
[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 01 March 2001).]
[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 01 March 2001).]
Guest
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Ark Royal
Sorry about the break - aftermath of the flooding I'm afraid; people want to inspect the damage. I must confess though that I took the opportunity for a small libation and a sandwich at a local Hostelry - this retired life is hell.
Part 2
Where were we - oh yes
You, in your previous post, implied that I am portraying the crew as "men in a hurry, men who are putting speed before safety, men who are being negligent." Well, if Flt Lt Tapper was planning to return to Aldergrove that evening he may of felt pressure to complete the sortie as quickly as possible,and this may have been a contibutory factor in the accident.***
In your post of 27th February you also attacked my credentials and, by implication, my ability to comment on this accident as it was an SH operation of which I, as I have freely admitted from the first, have no experience.
The BOI state at Pt 2 para 5 that this was a "passenger flight" rather than an SH flight. AOC 1 Gp concurs and describes it as planned to be "a low level, daytime, passenger carrying transit flight flown clear of cloud under Visual Flight Rules" A previous contributor demanded to know why this flight was carrying " every VIP in NATO".
Now, I can claim to have a modest knowledge of flying passengers and even VIP's. ( I know that under normal rules none of the passengers could be described as "VIP" because they were not at least 3 star - but given the circumstances of their roles I agree with the description).
Prior to my appointment at HQ 1 Gp I had spent 14 years (in 2 tours)of the previous 18 years as an Aircraft Captain on No 32 Sqn. In that that time I had been, variously; a Training Captain, Flight Instructor and Local Examiner/IRE. During 2 of the 4 years I was not on No 32 Sqn I was Deputy Flt Cdr and Training Captain of the Bae 146 Evaluation Flight. During that time I always tryed to teach people that the aim was the get the passengers, irrespective of status, to their destination "Safely, Comfortably and On Time" - IN THAT ORDER.
Lets take that in reverse order.
ON TIME. The passengers had "no firm arrival time to meet at their destination". Time, therefore, should not have been a factor. However, as is only too obvious, it WAS a factor because of self imposed constraints on the crew to meet the Crew Duty limitations.
From the moment the tasking for that day came in it would have been obvious that it was exceedingly unlikely that a single crew could complete both tasks within the constraints of Crew Duty even utilising the 1 hr extension available through the 230 Sqn Duty Auth. Yet at no time in the 24hrs or so from receiving the tasking to departure was any request made to SRAFONI for a further 2 hr extension nor were any approaches made to HQNI regarding a nightstop out of Theatre.
Thus, when they took off from Aldergrove that fateful evening, they did not have enough Crew Duty time left to complete the task.
This, of course, brings us back to the statement above that I marked ***. Those were not my words - they were the words of the BOI in para 30c. In addition, at para 59, the BOI also state " it is possible that the crew may have been reluctant to reduce speed for the climb in order to complete the task with a minimum overfly of their Crew Duty limits." Note there that the BOI appear to have conceeded that the crew would exceed the limits.
In my opinion the oft repeated statement that " they were within crew duty limits at the time of the accident" is a total irrelevance. It is the effect on their decision making and performance because of potential " overfly of their Crew Duty limits" that is the important factor.
COMFORTABLY
Probably more a question of the degree of discomfort being the variable, but a more measured speed at low level would probably have been more comfortable than a high speed transit because time was of the essence for the crew. Note that:- the flight was for the benifit of the passengers but it was self imposed crew considerations that would denote their level of comfort.
SAFELY
I think everyone knows my views on this by now. Incorrectly set barometric and Rad altimeters ( the latter being judged a contributory factor in the accident). Only one attempt to contact Scottish Miltary ( and we will all have experienced failure to obtain a reply from a ground station first go - did you give up?). The undeviating approach to bad weather and, finally, the failure to execute an IF abort procedure in which they were fully practised.
I apologise for the length of this but, as I have said before in my original post, in my opinion they were nibbled to death by ducks that they had been feeding.
Sorry about the break - aftermath of the flooding I'm afraid; people want to inspect the damage. I must confess though that I took the opportunity for a small libation and a sandwich at a local Hostelry - this retired life is hell.
Part 2
Where were we - oh yes
You, in your previous post, implied that I am portraying the crew as "men in a hurry, men who are putting speed before safety, men who are being negligent." Well, if Flt Lt Tapper was planning to return to Aldergrove that evening he may of felt pressure to complete the sortie as quickly as possible,and this may have been a contibutory factor in the accident.***
In your post of 27th February you also attacked my credentials and, by implication, my ability to comment on this accident as it was an SH operation of which I, as I have freely admitted from the first, have no experience.
The BOI state at Pt 2 para 5 that this was a "passenger flight" rather than an SH flight. AOC 1 Gp concurs and describes it as planned to be "a low level, daytime, passenger carrying transit flight flown clear of cloud under Visual Flight Rules" A previous contributor demanded to know why this flight was carrying " every VIP in NATO".
Now, I can claim to have a modest knowledge of flying passengers and even VIP's. ( I know that under normal rules none of the passengers could be described as "VIP" because they were not at least 3 star - but given the circumstances of their roles I agree with the description).
Prior to my appointment at HQ 1 Gp I had spent 14 years (in 2 tours)of the previous 18 years as an Aircraft Captain on No 32 Sqn. In that that time I had been, variously; a Training Captain, Flight Instructor and Local Examiner/IRE. During 2 of the 4 years I was not on No 32 Sqn I was Deputy Flt Cdr and Training Captain of the Bae 146 Evaluation Flight. During that time I always tryed to teach people that the aim was the get the passengers, irrespective of status, to their destination "Safely, Comfortably and On Time" - IN THAT ORDER.
Lets take that in reverse order.
ON TIME. The passengers had "no firm arrival time to meet at their destination". Time, therefore, should not have been a factor. However, as is only too obvious, it WAS a factor because of self imposed constraints on the crew to meet the Crew Duty limitations.
From the moment the tasking for that day came in it would have been obvious that it was exceedingly unlikely that a single crew could complete both tasks within the constraints of Crew Duty even utilising the 1 hr extension available through the 230 Sqn Duty Auth. Yet at no time in the 24hrs or so from receiving the tasking to departure was any request made to SRAFONI for a further 2 hr extension nor were any approaches made to HQNI regarding a nightstop out of Theatre.
Thus, when they took off from Aldergrove that fateful evening, they did not have enough Crew Duty time left to complete the task.
This, of course, brings us back to the statement above that I marked ***. Those were not my words - they were the words of the BOI in para 30c. In addition, at para 59, the BOI also state " it is possible that the crew may have been reluctant to reduce speed for the climb in order to complete the task with a minimum overfly of their Crew Duty limits." Note there that the BOI appear to have conceeded that the crew would exceed the limits.
In my opinion the oft repeated statement that " they were within crew duty limits at the time of the accident" is a total irrelevance. It is the effect on their decision making and performance because of potential " overfly of their Crew Duty limits" that is the important factor.
COMFORTABLY
Probably more a question of the degree of discomfort being the variable, but a more measured speed at low level would probably have been more comfortable than a high speed transit because time was of the essence for the crew. Note that:- the flight was for the benifit of the passengers but it was self imposed crew considerations that would denote their level of comfort.
SAFELY
I think everyone knows my views on this by now. Incorrectly set barometric and Rad altimeters ( the latter being judged a contributory factor in the accident). Only one attempt to contact Scottish Miltary ( and we will all have experienced failure to obtain a reply from a ground station first go - did you give up?). The undeviating approach to bad weather and, finally, the failure to execute an IF abort procedure in which they were fully practised.
I apologise for the length of this but, as I have said before in my original post, in my opinion they were nibbled to death by ducks that they had been feeding.
Guest
Posts: n/a
K52,
You say that this is your opinion, and very reasonable and well argued it is. But, do YOU have absolutely NO DOUBT whatsoever that your interpretation is correct. I know that once you have honestly answered this frequently asked question, your justification for carrying on a very informative debate might cease, but this must be such a serious issue, at least for the families of the deceased, that they deserve an honest answer from someone who can so powerfully argue the case against their interests.
If you genuinely do not have any doubt whatsoever, and say so, I await your continued argument with interest.
------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
You say that this is your opinion, and very reasonable and well argued it is. But, do YOU have absolutely NO DOUBT whatsoever that your interpretation is correct. I know that once you have honestly answered this frequently asked question, your justification for carrying on a very informative debate might cease, but this must be such a serious issue, at least for the families of the deceased, that they deserve an honest answer from someone who can so powerfully argue the case against their interests.
If you genuinely do not have any doubt whatsoever, and say so, I await your continued argument with interest.
------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
Guest
Posts: n/a
K52
True to type, rather than answer my question, you raise a few more.
OK, It was indeed a passenger flight. Were there any particular rules pertaining to the operation of this kind of flight? I doubt it, since all SH flights would be operated to the rules in force for the theatre, unless the mission was specifically authorised otherwise. I have seen no evidence that this flight was treated any differently than any other that the Chinook Flight operated during their tour. It should have been treated very differently by the very people who later castigated the crew. IMHO they were negligent in not treating it so.
Your credentials are impressive, and I apologise if any of my comments have caused offence. I stand by my conviction that your status does not qualify you to judge the actions of an SH crew on speculation and ‘how you would have done it’.
My credentials are as impressive as yours, but were gained entirely within the SH environment. I would not presume to judge a 32 squadron incident by the practices of the SH world any more than I would fly my civilian jet to SH rules (fun though that would be).
At no time have I said categorically that Jon and Rick made no mistakes on that terrible evening. The whole point is that negligence has a specific meaning which requires, quite rightly, an astoundingly high level of proof. That proof simply does not exist
I have heard it said that the finding was in part to placate the families of the deceased passengers. Knowing such a person, she finds that assertion an insult to her intelligence. Injustice piled on grief is no help to them. Justice, and a laying to rest of the whole affair would suit all (with the exception of Wratten’s misplaced pride) better than this constant argument.
Pulse1 has asked again as I do now:If you are certain beyond any doubt whatsoever that the crew was guilty of gross negligence, then show your evidence. So far your theories have shown that they might have been. Not good enough by several degrees of evidence.
True to type, rather than answer my question, you raise a few more.
OK, It was indeed a passenger flight. Were there any particular rules pertaining to the operation of this kind of flight? I doubt it, since all SH flights would be operated to the rules in force for the theatre, unless the mission was specifically authorised otherwise. I have seen no evidence that this flight was treated any differently than any other that the Chinook Flight operated during their tour. It should have been treated very differently by the very people who later castigated the crew. IMHO they were negligent in not treating it so.
Your credentials are impressive, and I apologise if any of my comments have caused offence. I stand by my conviction that your status does not qualify you to judge the actions of an SH crew on speculation and ‘how you would have done it’.
My credentials are as impressive as yours, but were gained entirely within the SH environment. I would not presume to judge a 32 squadron incident by the practices of the SH world any more than I would fly my civilian jet to SH rules (fun though that would be).
At no time have I said categorically that Jon and Rick made no mistakes on that terrible evening. The whole point is that negligence has a specific meaning which requires, quite rightly, an astoundingly high level of proof. That proof simply does not exist
I have heard it said that the finding was in part to placate the families of the deceased passengers. Knowing such a person, she finds that assertion an insult to her intelligence. Injustice piled on grief is no help to them. Justice, and a laying to rest of the whole affair would suit all (with the exception of Wratten’s misplaced pride) better than this constant argument.
Pulse1 has asked again as I do now:If you are certain beyond any doubt whatsoever that the crew was guilty of gross negligence, then show your evidence. So far your theories have shown that they might have been. Not good enough by several degrees of evidence.
Guest
Posts: n/a
I may be somewhat niaive, but can someone please explain the difference between 'gross negligence' and 'CFIT'. I ask this because, if you read a few accident reports relating to CFIT, it seems to me that the Kintyre accident could easily have fallen into this category.
Smoothy
(PS. Apologies if this angle has been covered in the previous 46 pages)
[This message has been edited by smooth approach (edited 01 March 2001).]
Smoothy
(PS. Apologies if this angle has been covered in the previous 46 pages)
[This message has been edited by smooth approach (edited 01 March 2001).]
Guest
Posts: n/a
K52,
I am somewhat bemused that you to continue to theorise and comment at length on a subject on which you admit you have no experience, as if you were an authority. You actually sound like a Wratten stool pigeon to me, especially as he also has NO operational SH experience. You have actually come up with nothing new. It has all been said before, all well chewed over by the BOI who WERE all highly experienced in Support Helicopter Operations, and of course by many others since. My own experience is 20 or so years of helicopter operations, most of it RAF SH, some of it in that theatre, quite a bit of it at low level in marginal weather. I was a QHI on an SH type. I also flew fixed wing and was a QFI. I held a master green instrument rating on both rotary and fixed wing and taught instrument flying on both types. I now have civilian professional fixed wing and rotary licences but still fly military fixed wing aircraft on occasions.
My OPINION of what PROBABLY and finally caused the accident, like yours, is irrelevant but the initial BOI were completely correct in their findings, having considered all the available EVIDENCE. No-one will ever know what actually happened towards the end of that tragic flight and "cause not known" or similar would therefore have been a fair and adequate verdict.
OPINION has no real standing in legal matters. Mr Wratten has made the error of allowing his own strong opinion to get in the way of correct and fair judgement. The outcry is because he has been allowed to do so to the detriment of the bereaved families.
The crew did NOT order the flight. They were ordered to make it against their better judgement and against their will. The authorising officer and those above him did not stop the flight from taking place despite the fact that they were aware of the weather, the crew's duty hours, the state of the aircraft and the implications of making the flight.
The disgraceful and vindictive over-ruling of the BOI removes the onus of responsibility from where it truly belongs.
MANAGEMENT ERROR was surely the true main cause of this accident. If one or both of the pilots had survived to give the full story someone else would surely have taken their fair share of the blame.
This unfortunate crew were ordered to make a VFR over-water flight in an untried, potentially unsafe and unserviceable aircraft, with no proper IFR option and unreliable nav kit, in marginal weather.
The squadron management undoubtedly felt obliged to send them because of prior negligence at the highest level and because no-one had big enough balls to step in and say NO!.
You are missing the real point of this thread. The flight SHOULD have taken place in one of your shiny 32 squadron jets instead. If a proper management decision had taken place, all of the deceased would have been alive today.
[This message has been edited by ShyTorque (edited 02 March 2001).]
I am somewhat bemused that you to continue to theorise and comment at length on a subject on which you admit you have no experience, as if you were an authority. You actually sound like a Wratten stool pigeon to me, especially as he also has NO operational SH experience. You have actually come up with nothing new. It has all been said before, all well chewed over by the BOI who WERE all highly experienced in Support Helicopter Operations, and of course by many others since. My own experience is 20 or so years of helicopter operations, most of it RAF SH, some of it in that theatre, quite a bit of it at low level in marginal weather. I was a QHI on an SH type. I also flew fixed wing and was a QFI. I held a master green instrument rating on both rotary and fixed wing and taught instrument flying on both types. I now have civilian professional fixed wing and rotary licences but still fly military fixed wing aircraft on occasions.
My OPINION of what PROBABLY and finally caused the accident, like yours, is irrelevant but the initial BOI were completely correct in their findings, having considered all the available EVIDENCE. No-one will ever know what actually happened towards the end of that tragic flight and "cause not known" or similar would therefore have been a fair and adequate verdict.
OPINION has no real standing in legal matters. Mr Wratten has made the error of allowing his own strong opinion to get in the way of correct and fair judgement. The outcry is because he has been allowed to do so to the detriment of the bereaved families.
The crew did NOT order the flight. They were ordered to make it against their better judgement and against their will. The authorising officer and those above him did not stop the flight from taking place despite the fact that they were aware of the weather, the crew's duty hours, the state of the aircraft and the implications of making the flight.
The disgraceful and vindictive over-ruling of the BOI removes the onus of responsibility from where it truly belongs.
MANAGEMENT ERROR was surely the true main cause of this accident. If one or both of the pilots had survived to give the full story someone else would surely have taken their fair share of the blame.
This unfortunate crew were ordered to make a VFR over-water flight in an untried, potentially unsafe and unserviceable aircraft, with no proper IFR option and unreliable nav kit, in marginal weather.
The squadron management undoubtedly felt obliged to send them because of prior negligence at the highest level and because no-one had big enough balls to step in and say NO!.
You are missing the real point of this thread. The flight SHOULD have taken place in one of your shiny 32 squadron jets instead. If a proper management decision had taken place, all of the deceased would have been alive today.
[This message has been edited by ShyTorque (edited 02 March 2001).]