Chinook - Hit Back Here
Guest
Posts: n/a
FJJP,
Well said!
Have been following this thread periodically over the last while and a recent accident in my Air Force made me revisit it.
You may or may not have heard about the RNZAF Skyhawk pilot killed in Australia, while conducting a "plugged barrel roll". If your unfamiliar, this involves 2 skyhawks carrying out a barrel roll while connected by the AAR hose, although no fuel is transferred.
Well the formation lead managed to hit the ground during the 2nd half of the manoeuvre. The aircraft in the basket managed to recover (just). While the BOI is still under way, it surprised me that the skyhawks were about to fly the following day. Although CFIT may be suspected, I don't believe that we can say that he didn't attempt to eject and the seat malfunctioned, or that he was distracted or hindered by another emergency or aircraft fault.
In your case it may be that the pilot error answer was the easiest way out, when no other evidence was observed and we all know that this may be absolutely incorrect. I hope we don't see a similar outcome here.
Regards
Well said!
Have been following this thread periodically over the last while and a recent accident in my Air Force made me revisit it.
You may or may not have heard about the RNZAF Skyhawk pilot killed in Australia, while conducting a "plugged barrel roll". If your unfamiliar, this involves 2 skyhawks carrying out a barrel roll while connected by the AAR hose, although no fuel is transferred.
Well the formation lead managed to hit the ground during the 2nd half of the manoeuvre. The aircraft in the basket managed to recover (just). While the BOI is still under way, it surprised me that the skyhawks were about to fly the following day. Although CFIT may be suspected, I don't believe that we can say that he didn't attempt to eject and the seat malfunctioned, or that he was distracted or hindered by another emergency or aircraft fault.
In your case it may be that the pilot error answer was the easiest way out, when no other evidence was observed and we all know that this may be absolutely incorrect. I hope we don't see a similar outcome here.
Regards
Guest
Posts: n/a
Touchin'Down
I read about the Skyhawk accident through this site, and the links to the NZ Herald. Display flying carries its own unique risks; however, every step possible is taken to minimise those risks. Murray was clearly held in high regard by the NZ aviation community, and would never have been cleared to display fly if he were not competent to do so. So why did he crash?
The BOI will do their best to try to figure out what happened, reaching their conclusions based on technical evidence and sound reasoning. It is rare for those up the command chain to overrule the BOI findings - in fact, I cannot remember an instance where this has occured, apart from the Chinook crash. There have been some where the AOC or CinC has added weight to the praise/condemnation of the pilot where the findings warranted it (such as an uncontroversial finding of gross negligence connected with a breach of flying discipline). We await the findings of the Skyhawk Board with interest.
Perhaps you could keep your ear to the ground and let us know the outcome (as a new topic) when the report is published?
Rgds
FJJP
I read about the Skyhawk accident through this site, and the links to the NZ Herald. Display flying carries its own unique risks; however, every step possible is taken to minimise those risks. Murray was clearly held in high regard by the NZ aviation community, and would never have been cleared to display fly if he were not competent to do so. So why did he crash?
The BOI will do their best to try to figure out what happened, reaching their conclusions based on technical evidence and sound reasoning. It is rare for those up the command chain to overrule the BOI findings - in fact, I cannot remember an instance where this has occured, apart from the Chinook crash. There have been some where the AOC or CinC has added weight to the praise/condemnation of the pilot where the findings warranted it (such as an uncontroversial finding of gross negligence connected with a breach of flying discipline). We await the findings of the Skyhawk Board with interest.
Perhaps you could keep your ear to the ground and let us know the outcome (as a new topic) when the report is published?
Rgds
FJJP
Guest
Posts: n/a
meonmeown,
It is easy to see why you are indeed me on me own. You have nothing constructive to add, apart from moving this thread to the top of the page.
Revoltingcrewman,
Pray you are never in the situation where your family need the support and help that we are trying to provide.
It is easy to see why you are indeed me on me own. You have nothing constructive to add, apart from moving this thread to the top of the page.
Revoltingcrewman,
Pray you are never in the situation where your family need the support and help that we are trying to provide.
Guest
Posts: n/a
TRC and Meon,
welcome to the thread. I'm not interested in having a public slanging match with either of you. What I would ask is that you both read the thread from the beginning before just writing everyone else's contribution off.
The argument regarding FADEC passed many pages ago and the main point is that no-one knows exactly what happened prior to impact. Also, is being distracted by an Eng Fail caption (and presumably trying to do something about it) to be regarded as negligent? Not all the aircraft was recovered for examination, and no matter how remote, there are elements of doubt regarding the crash. Therefore, according to rules at the time, the verdict of negligence is not only unsustainable, it is against the RAF's own rules. Wratten himself admitted that there was inevitably going to be a degree of speculation. That is simply not good enough for absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
Touchin' Down,
Welcome to you too. I am sorry to hear about the death of the RNZAF pilot. I hope his family do not have to go through the same as Rick and Jon's families.
Would you be in a position to advise me why the RAAF had grounded its Chinook fleet several months ago? I have e-mailed the Australian Defence Dept, but have not had a reply.
Regards all
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
welcome to the thread. I'm not interested in having a public slanging match with either of you. What I would ask is that you both read the thread from the beginning before just writing everyone else's contribution off.
The argument regarding FADEC passed many pages ago and the main point is that no-one knows exactly what happened prior to impact. Also, is being distracted by an Eng Fail caption (and presumably trying to do something about it) to be regarded as negligent? Not all the aircraft was recovered for examination, and no matter how remote, there are elements of doubt regarding the crash. Therefore, according to rules at the time, the verdict of negligence is not only unsustainable, it is against the RAF's own rules. Wratten himself admitted that there was inevitably going to be a degree of speculation. That is simply not good enough for absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
Touchin' Down,
Welcome to you too. I am sorry to hear about the death of the RNZAF pilot. I hope his family do not have to go through the same as Rick and Jon's families.
Would you be in a position to advise me why the RAAF had grounded its Chinook fleet several months ago? I have e-mailed the Australian Defence Dept, but have not had a reply.
Regards all
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Guest
Posts: n/a
TRC,
I apologise for my remarks - you hit a raw nerve. I do not really want to get into a slanging match (BD Apologies also). TRC, I think this topic has become a fight for justice - to clear the names of 2 fellow aircrew who have been defiled without due cause.
I hope you will read the whole thing - a big task, I grant you, but you will then see why many of us feel so strongly about it. I believe we are hoping to swing someone at high level to come out of the closet and re-visit the whole sorry saga, and give the families peace of mind.
It matters not a jot to me personally the rights and wrongs of the case, but as I said, having dealt with a family who lost the head of household to an aircraft crash, the whole affair is a tragedy which should not be compounded by the insensitive remarks and unecessary findings of a couple of V. Senior officers.
Rgds
FJJP
I apologise for my remarks - you hit a raw nerve. I do not really want to get into a slanging match (BD Apologies also). TRC, I think this topic has become a fight for justice - to clear the names of 2 fellow aircrew who have been defiled without due cause.
I hope you will read the whole thing - a big task, I grant you, but you will then see why many of us feel so strongly about it. I believe we are hoping to swing someone at high level to come out of the closet and re-visit the whole sorry saga, and give the families peace of mind.
It matters not a jot to me personally the rights and wrongs of the case, but as I said, having dealt with a family who lost the head of household to an aircraft crash, the whole affair is a tragedy which should not be compounded by the insensitive remarks and unecessary findings of a couple of V. Senior officers.
Rgds
FJJP
Guest
Posts: n/a
Ark Royal,
Thankyou for your opening comment.
I agree that ADF is of little use in "mundane" tasks in NI, but this was not a routine task.Moreover, Flt Lt Tapper HAD queried the operation of the GPS during the morning sortie and asked for a functional check to be carried out. It remains my opinion that it would have been prudent to use the secondary nav aids to back up the GPS, paricularly in the vicinity of the Mull where the Wx was forecast to be poor - a forecast borne out by the actual the crew were given for Machrihanish.
Regarding the frequency selections I was pointing out an apparent inconsistancy in the Boards findings.
Tamdemrotor
I do not think that, in the current security climate, it is a good idea to broadcast the real names of personnel who have served in NI on this thread. A simple job description would have sufficed - and you do have my e-mail address. However, your post has confirmed information which had been e-mailed to me.
Are you seriously suggesting that Flt Lt Tapper would have left a false document with the Ops clerk in order to satisfy the outbrief requirements?!!
As the other crew were flying in the afternoon of 1 Jun 94 I take it that the tasking came in during the morning and the other crew did the initial planning on the assumption that they would do the Inverness task because of the crew duty implications for Flt Lt Tappers crew after a planned 6 1/2 hour morning task.
You say it has been suggested that Flt Lt Tapper decided to do all the tasking on 2 Jun to ensure the other crew had their day off. Is it not possible, though, that the decision was based on Flt Lt Tappers crew having the Friday off? Whoever did the second task on 2 Jun was unlikely to get back to Aldergrove much before 2130. If the other crew did the Inverness task there could have been minimum crew rest implications in the event of an early task on 3 Jun which would have required Flt Lt Tappers crew to do that early task.
Regarding meals. The RAF likes to have lots of rules thes days. Things that used to be left to common sense are now regulated because too many people failed to exercise any common sense. Thus it is a requirement for aircrew to have breakfast before flying and the RAF provides in flight rations to provide sustenance for the crew whilst operating ane denotes maximum periods between main meals for operating crews. Under their Terms of Reference (Part 1 para 2e) the Board were required to " Ascertain if all relevant orders and instructions were complied with".
In a much earlier post (1 Jul 00), after some slightly disparaging comments on the AAIB investigation and the computer models prepared for the Board, you quote the Yachtsmans estimate of the Chinooks speed as it approached the Mull (60-90 kts). You then state "No other evidence whatsoever, real or imagined, exists to tell us what speed the a/c was flying at as it approached the Mull".
According to the ATC evidence the crew "requested to leave the Aldergrove Approach Radar frequency slightly before the Control Zone Boundary, and concluded its ATC service with Belfast International Airport at 1747hrs". The distance between the CTR boundary and the impact point is approx 33nm yet engine power dowm was recorded at 1759hrs - just 12 minutes later. That implies a mean groundspeed of 165 kts and with a forecast wind of 180/20kts implies an IAS approaching vne. At such a speed the VFR requirements were 1000ft vertical and 1.5km horizontal clearance from cloud with a visibility of 5km (slightly less than 2.7nm)
Irrespective of his subsequent evidence to the FAI several months later the yachtsmans evidence to the board was that he saw the Chinook "below cloud at a position 2 to 3nm to the Southwest of the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse --flying in a level attitude and in a straight line at a height estimated to be between 200 - 400 ASL. The visibility at that point was approximately one mile in haze"
They were at that time IMC - yet they took no action to rectify the situation. The did not climb to SALT or turn away to regain VMC.
Which brings me to:-
Meonmeown
If you are going to come in supporting me then you will have to get used to the flak.
Thankyou for your opening comment.
I agree that ADF is of little use in "mundane" tasks in NI, but this was not a routine task.Moreover, Flt Lt Tapper HAD queried the operation of the GPS during the morning sortie and asked for a functional check to be carried out. It remains my opinion that it would have been prudent to use the secondary nav aids to back up the GPS, paricularly in the vicinity of the Mull where the Wx was forecast to be poor - a forecast borne out by the actual the crew were given for Machrihanish.
Regarding the frequency selections I was pointing out an apparent inconsistancy in the Boards findings.
Tamdemrotor
I do not think that, in the current security climate, it is a good idea to broadcast the real names of personnel who have served in NI on this thread. A simple job description would have sufficed - and you do have my e-mail address. However, your post has confirmed information which had been e-mailed to me.
Are you seriously suggesting that Flt Lt Tapper would have left a false document with the Ops clerk in order to satisfy the outbrief requirements?!!
As the other crew were flying in the afternoon of 1 Jun 94 I take it that the tasking came in during the morning and the other crew did the initial planning on the assumption that they would do the Inverness task because of the crew duty implications for Flt Lt Tappers crew after a planned 6 1/2 hour morning task.
You say it has been suggested that Flt Lt Tapper decided to do all the tasking on 2 Jun to ensure the other crew had their day off. Is it not possible, though, that the decision was based on Flt Lt Tappers crew having the Friday off? Whoever did the second task on 2 Jun was unlikely to get back to Aldergrove much before 2130. If the other crew did the Inverness task there could have been minimum crew rest implications in the event of an early task on 3 Jun which would have required Flt Lt Tappers crew to do that early task.
Regarding meals. The RAF likes to have lots of rules thes days. Things that used to be left to common sense are now regulated because too many people failed to exercise any common sense. Thus it is a requirement for aircrew to have breakfast before flying and the RAF provides in flight rations to provide sustenance for the crew whilst operating ane denotes maximum periods between main meals for operating crews. Under their Terms of Reference (Part 1 para 2e) the Board were required to " Ascertain if all relevant orders and instructions were complied with".
In a much earlier post (1 Jul 00), after some slightly disparaging comments on the AAIB investigation and the computer models prepared for the Board, you quote the Yachtsmans estimate of the Chinooks speed as it approached the Mull (60-90 kts). You then state "No other evidence whatsoever, real or imagined, exists to tell us what speed the a/c was flying at as it approached the Mull".
According to the ATC evidence the crew "requested to leave the Aldergrove Approach Radar frequency slightly before the Control Zone Boundary, and concluded its ATC service with Belfast International Airport at 1747hrs". The distance between the CTR boundary and the impact point is approx 33nm yet engine power dowm was recorded at 1759hrs - just 12 minutes later. That implies a mean groundspeed of 165 kts and with a forecast wind of 180/20kts implies an IAS approaching vne. At such a speed the VFR requirements were 1000ft vertical and 1.5km horizontal clearance from cloud with a visibility of 5km (slightly less than 2.7nm)
Irrespective of his subsequent evidence to the FAI several months later the yachtsmans evidence to the board was that he saw the Chinook "below cloud at a position 2 to 3nm to the Southwest of the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse --flying in a level attitude and in a straight line at a height estimated to be between 200 - 400 ASL. The visibility at that point was approximately one mile in haze"
They were at that time IMC - yet they took no action to rectify the situation. The did not climb to SALT or turn away to regain VMC.
Which brings me to:-
Meonmeown
If you are going to come in supporting me then you will have to get used to the flak.
Guest
Posts: n/a
K52,
Having flown and operated SH in NI, I think you will find that the weather conditions you have quoted are not necessarily IMC. Some RAF theatre SH wx limits are extremely low. How does 500 metres visibility and 100 ft cloudbase sound to you? We were required to operate VMC in those conditions in Germany.
There is no proof that the aircraft was IMC at the time of the accident, only speculation - which you are trying to call proof.
What is very strange about the evidence is the very high speed at which the aircraft apparently hit the ground whilst climbing. The aircraft would not normally be capable of this performance. Undoubtedly, something very unusual happened. This was commented on by the BOI but has been forgotten since.
It stands out a mile that it was probably more convenient and less potentially career damaging to someone higher in the management chain (who should have known better than to allow this trip to take place at all in an unserviceable aircraft) to attempt to put a lid on it by blaming the pilots.
Sad day for the integrity of the RAF.
Having flown and operated SH in NI, I think you will find that the weather conditions you have quoted are not necessarily IMC. Some RAF theatre SH wx limits are extremely low. How does 500 metres visibility and 100 ft cloudbase sound to you? We were required to operate VMC in those conditions in Germany.
There is no proof that the aircraft was IMC at the time of the accident, only speculation - which you are trying to call proof.
What is very strange about the evidence is the very high speed at which the aircraft apparently hit the ground whilst climbing. The aircraft would not normally be capable of this performance. Undoubtedly, something very unusual happened. This was commented on by the BOI but has been forgotten since.
It stands out a mile that it was probably more convenient and less potentially career damaging to someone higher in the management chain (who should have known better than to allow this trip to take place at all in an unserviceable aircraft) to attempt to put a lid on it by blaming the pilots.
Sad day for the integrity of the RAF.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Oh dear
where to begin?
Perhaps with the allegation that I have somehow 'outed' a certain officer connected to this case, in response to a direct question from K52. Since the Lt in question named himself sometime ago during the course of a very supportive TV interview, and was named in just about every national newspaper during the course of the FAI, forgive me if I do not share your horror.
Secondly, I am very struck by the way K52 is so keen to believe the yachtsman's evidence given to the BOI regarding visibility (inspite of the fact that this differed markedly from his sworn evidence given to the FAI, when he stated that he believed the pilots would have been able to see the area of the lighthouse as well as he!)
Yet you appear to ignore his assessment of the aircraft's speed. Is it just me, or are you being selective? Was his evidence reliable - in which case the pilots were operating in accordance with VFR, or was it not reliable, in which case, what's your point?
As far as calculations of the AVERAGE speed of the aircraft is concerned, this requires an assumption of the AVERAGE winds experienced during the flight. It most definitely DOES NOT allow anyone to predict the speed of the aircraft in the 50 seconds or so from yachtsman's sighting (in sunlight) to impact. At least, not unless you are prepared to make some pretty big assumptions. My question is this. Where else would guesses be allowed to condem individuals who are totally unable to defend themselves? Well, you know the answer!
As far as your horror that an apparently innaccurate map may have been left with the DAO is concerned. There was no requirement to leave any map AT ALL, never mind a corrected one. It was simply a commendable attempt to give the busy DAO an overview of the planned route, in his forced absence.
I ask again, what is your point?
As far as cuddly L4 is concerned. Are you now a moderator? Telling me what I can or cannot write. As it happens, In the last seven years, I have had a gutfull of pompous ignoramuses, making pronouncements on this case with the luxury of utter ignorance, so forgive me if, on occasion, I fail to welcome them with open arms.
(K52 you obviously do not fall into this category - at least you give me food for thought)
where to begin?
Perhaps with the allegation that I have somehow 'outed' a certain officer connected to this case, in response to a direct question from K52. Since the Lt in question named himself sometime ago during the course of a very supportive TV interview, and was named in just about every national newspaper during the course of the FAI, forgive me if I do not share your horror.
Secondly, I am very struck by the way K52 is so keen to believe the yachtsman's evidence given to the BOI regarding visibility (inspite of the fact that this differed markedly from his sworn evidence given to the FAI, when he stated that he believed the pilots would have been able to see the area of the lighthouse as well as he!)
Yet you appear to ignore his assessment of the aircraft's speed. Is it just me, or are you being selective? Was his evidence reliable - in which case the pilots were operating in accordance with VFR, or was it not reliable, in which case, what's your point?
As far as calculations of the AVERAGE speed of the aircraft is concerned, this requires an assumption of the AVERAGE winds experienced during the flight. It most definitely DOES NOT allow anyone to predict the speed of the aircraft in the 50 seconds or so from yachtsman's sighting (in sunlight) to impact. At least, not unless you are prepared to make some pretty big assumptions. My question is this. Where else would guesses be allowed to condem individuals who are totally unable to defend themselves? Well, you know the answer!
As far as your horror that an apparently innaccurate map may have been left with the DAO is concerned. There was no requirement to leave any map AT ALL, never mind a corrected one. It was simply a commendable attempt to give the busy DAO an overview of the planned route, in his forced absence.
I ask again, what is your point?
As far as cuddly L4 is concerned. Are you now a moderator? Telling me what I can or cannot write. As it happens, In the last seven years, I have had a gutfull of pompous ignoramuses, making pronouncements on this case with the luxury of utter ignorance, so forgive me if, on occasion, I fail to welcome them with open arms.
(K52 you obviously do not fall into this category - at least you give me food for thought)
Guest
Posts: n/a
Tandem,
I forgive you, my point was that others should be allowed to make their views known, however contary to your own, on this thread without fear of a public pillory. I've read many an excellent point by yourself on this and other threads - keep it up. I agree people should read through a thread before wading in - some of us know just as much as you about this case but don't feel the need to shoot down honest contributors with varying views.
I forgive you, my point was that others should be allowed to make their views known, however contary to your own, on this thread without fear of a public pillory. I've read many an excellent point by yourself on this and other threads - keep it up. I agree people should read through a thread before wading in - some of us know just as much as you about this case but don't feel the need to shoot down honest contributors with varying views.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Sorry if this has already been covered, but 1. does anyone know of another CFIT, incident where the BOI concluded the pilot was negligent??
2. Can someone outline the following points for me:
a. Is it suggested the Crew was lost, or un-aware of their location?
b. Were they flying in cloud?
c. Did they have cartography(real or software) indication the terrain saftey height for the area?
I've no point to prove here, but it seems a lot of people are talking at completely cross purposes for just for the sake of it and we gain no real insight into what happened, or any new information.
2. Can someone outline the following points for me:
a. Is it suggested the Crew was lost, or un-aware of their location?
b. Were they flying in cloud?
c. Did they have cartography(real or software) indication the terrain saftey height for the area?
I've no point to prove here, but it seems a lot of people are talking at completely cross purposes for just for the sake of it and we gain no real insight into what happened, or any new information.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Low and Slow:
1. 2 other CFIT BOIs proclaimed gross negligence. The GR1 just before the start of Granby and the F3 off Cyprus. Needless to say full evidence from ADR & CVR was available.
2a. Lost? - No suggestion. Unaware of location? - Depends on your point of view. If you believe in the negligene then they must have been unaware of position unless they decided to deliberately fly into the Mull.
2b. Flying in cloud? Last person to see the cab said that they were flying below the cloudbase with the Mull visable (see Tandem's points). Everything else is speculation and guesswork.
2c. SALT has become a big discussion point. The map showed the SALT for the leg to the Mull and then the leg to Corran - perfectly in order as I understand it.
I don't accept that people are talking "just for the sake of it". But you are right about "no new info". The fact is that no new info is required.
Without the evidence of ADR/CVR, witnesses, survivors, radio or radar everything after the yachtman saw the Chinook is speculation & theory. K52 makes some very good points but he "speculates" as to the importance and interpretation of those points. Meonmeown says, "flying low level in cloud below SALT" is negligent. Indeed it is. But unless he has more info than me I have not seen one jot of EVIDENCE to say that Tapper & Cook were doing that.
I have seen no EVIDENCE that the aircraft was 100% servicable on impact. I have seen no EVIDENCE that shows a lose artcle was not present. I have seen no EVIDENCE that one of the pax didn't go mad or have a death wish. I have seen no EVIDENCE that shows there was no software fault. I could go on. I am not saying any of these conditions did or did not exist - but neither can anyone else.
That's why this debate is so important.
1. 2 other CFIT BOIs proclaimed gross negligence. The GR1 just before the start of Granby and the F3 off Cyprus. Needless to say full evidence from ADR & CVR was available.
2a. Lost? - No suggestion. Unaware of location? - Depends on your point of view. If you believe in the negligene then they must have been unaware of position unless they decided to deliberately fly into the Mull.
2b. Flying in cloud? Last person to see the cab said that they were flying below the cloudbase with the Mull visable (see Tandem's points). Everything else is speculation and guesswork.
2c. SALT has become a big discussion point. The map showed the SALT for the leg to the Mull and then the leg to Corran - perfectly in order as I understand it.
I don't accept that people are talking "just for the sake of it". But you are right about "no new info". The fact is that no new info is required.
Without the evidence of ADR/CVR, witnesses, survivors, radio or radar everything after the yachtman saw the Chinook is speculation & theory. K52 makes some very good points but he "speculates" as to the importance and interpretation of those points. Meonmeown says, "flying low level in cloud below SALT" is negligent. Indeed it is. But unless he has more info than me I have not seen one jot of EVIDENCE to say that Tapper & Cook were doing that.
I have seen no EVIDENCE that the aircraft was 100% servicable on impact. I have seen no EVIDENCE that shows a lose artcle was not present. I have seen no EVIDENCE that one of the pax didn't go mad or have a death wish. I have seen no EVIDENCE that shows there was no software fault. I could go on. I am not saying any of these conditions did or did not exist - but neither can anyone else.
That's why this debate is so important.
Guest
Posts: n/a
K52
Regarding the ADF, I didn't say that it was of no use in 'mundane NI tasks', I said it was of no use in VFR SH operations. Believe me, it is not! At best a bearing with an accuracy of + or - 5 degrees, which will need to be plotted on a chart for a cross-cut. Useless, especially in the area of the Mull, where I can find two beacons.
1. The ‘AH’ on Rathlin Island, (which you have mentioned) a marine beacon freq 294.2 KHz. This would almost certainly be invisible to an aircraft receiver, which will only tune to the nearest 0.5 KHz and in any case transmits every 6 minutes!
2. The ‘LAY’, the Locater for Islay Airport. 395 KHz. Readable if within range, but the aircraft was outside its promulgated range of 25nm, and to use it would have been unwise to say the least.
So there you are. The ADF; as useful as an ahstray on a motorbike to the SH pilot, and left tuned to a pop station, and not being listened to at the time of the accident. Evidence of negligence? I think not.
What else, pray, would the crew have at their disposal, other than a GPS/Doppler Tans, which had obviously been tested and found serviceable between the sorties.(Otherwise they would have cancelled).
Tandemrotor and Shytorque have made the rest of my points, thanks.
I ask you again, on what evidence do you find beyond any doubt whatsoever that the crew of ZD576 was negligent.
By the way, if you are looking for an ally, I would suggest trawling for a few more brain cells than are being exhibited by the three clowns who have recently invaded this thread. To all serious debaters, I would suggest ignoring them entirely, as I will from now on. (Unless of course they come up with a reasoned and polite argument).
Regarding the ADF, I didn't say that it was of no use in 'mundane NI tasks', I said it was of no use in VFR SH operations. Believe me, it is not! At best a bearing with an accuracy of + or - 5 degrees, which will need to be plotted on a chart for a cross-cut. Useless, especially in the area of the Mull, where I can find two beacons.
1. The ‘AH’ on Rathlin Island, (which you have mentioned) a marine beacon freq 294.2 KHz. This would almost certainly be invisible to an aircraft receiver, which will only tune to the nearest 0.5 KHz and in any case transmits every 6 minutes!
2. The ‘LAY’, the Locater for Islay Airport. 395 KHz. Readable if within range, but the aircraft was outside its promulgated range of 25nm, and to use it would have been unwise to say the least.
So there you are. The ADF; as useful as an ahstray on a motorbike to the SH pilot, and left tuned to a pop station, and not being listened to at the time of the accident. Evidence of negligence? I think not.
What else, pray, would the crew have at their disposal, other than a GPS/Doppler Tans, which had obviously been tested and found serviceable between the sorties.(Otherwise they would have cancelled).
Tandemrotor and Shytorque have made the rest of my points, thanks.
I ask you again, on what evidence do you find beyond any doubt whatsoever that the crew of ZD576 was negligent.
By the way, if you are looking for an ally, I would suggest trawling for a few more brain cells than are being exhibited by the three clowns who have recently invaded this thread. To all serious debaters, I would suggest ignoring them entirely, as I will from now on. (Unless of course they come up with a reasoned and polite argument).
Guest
Posts: n/a
John-
1. Yes the debate is important, but I feel it has really run it's course. What more have we to gain by hypothesising? I know the media is SPECULATION driven but surely 'we' are beyond that. (not comfortable using we, but their you go
)
2. I believe, based on the all the evidence at hand, that this was a CFIT accident. I know there are other possibilites but this is the one that fits the version of the facts as I understand them. Am I very wrong?
3. Do they deserve to be found guilty of GN? NO-WAY, because there are gaps in the evidence chain, and to do so would be unjust, as was the Wratten descison (IMO)
But that's just my opinion....
[This message has been edited by Low and Slow (edited 26 February 2001).]
1. Yes the debate is important, but I feel it has really run it's course. What more have we to gain by hypothesising? I know the media is SPECULATION driven but surely 'we' are beyond that. (not comfortable using we, but their you go
)2. I believe, based on the all the evidence at hand, that this was a CFIT accident. I know there are other possibilites but this is the one that fits the version of the facts as I understand them. Am I very wrong?
3. Do they deserve to be found guilty of GN? NO-WAY, because there are gaps in the evidence chain, and to do so would be unjust, as was the Wratten descison (IMO)
But that's just my opinion....
[This message has been edited by Low and Slow (edited 26 February 2001).]