Chinook - Hit Back Here
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Valid point mr p.
Another reply from a Hoon minion today, yet again missing the point entirely, this time from a Mrs Bellchambers:
'Thank you for your further letter of 15 January to the Secretary of State for Defence about the tragic Chinook accident on the Mull of Kintvre. As with your previous letter of 2 December. which my colleague Miss Underdown answered, this has been passed to this branch for attention.
I am sorry that you found Miss Underdown’s letter of 11 January unsatisfactory. I would however re-emphasise that the Government’s position is that to date, nothing has been seen that causes us to doubt the integrity of the RAF Board of Inquiry, or would prompt us to hold a new inquiry. Were real new evidence to come to light this would be examined with scrupulous care, thoroughness and compassion.'
The letter to which this reply is supposed to be an answer stated quite clearly that the BOI finding had been tampered with, and that it needs no new evidence to overturn a finding which is unsustainable.
I shall try again, as the point must eventually get through.
[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 17 February 2001).]
Another reply from a Hoon minion today, yet again missing the point entirely, this time from a Mrs Bellchambers:
'Thank you for your further letter of 15 January to the Secretary of State for Defence about the tragic Chinook accident on the Mull of Kintvre. As with your previous letter of 2 December. which my colleague Miss Underdown answered, this has been passed to this branch for attention.
I am sorry that you found Miss Underdown’s letter of 11 January unsatisfactory. I would however re-emphasise that the Government’s position is that to date, nothing has been seen that causes us to doubt the integrity of the RAF Board of Inquiry, or would prompt us to hold a new inquiry. Were real new evidence to come to light this would be examined with scrupulous care, thoroughness and compassion.'
The letter to which this reply is supposed to be an answer stated quite clearly that the BOI finding had been tampered with, and that it needs no new evidence to overturn a finding which is unsustainable.
I shall try again, as the point must eventually get through.
[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 17 February 2001).]
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Brian
Apologies for not posting this last week, when I received it. This is the response my MP received when he wrote to the MoD on my behalf:
Thank you for your letter of 18 December to Lewis Moonie enclosing one from your constituent, Mrs ..., about the Chinook accident on the Mull of Kintyre. I am replying as this matter falls within my area of responsibility as Minister of State for the Armed Forces.
I am sorry that Mrs ... disagrees with the stance taken by the Secretary of State and Sir William Wratten in response to the Public Account Committee's report. However, as seen from here, the Committee accepted a mass of advice from elsewhere, and yet failed to give equal consideration to the Department's arguments. Neither Sir John Day or Sir William Wratten, the two senior reviewing officers of the RAF Board of Inquiry, were called to give evidence. Had they been called, Sir John and Sir William would have been able to provide more balance to the other evidence that the Committee had. You will also appreciate that the Public Accounts Committee's conclusions run contrary to those reached by the Defence Committee, in 1998 following their own inquiry into lessons learnt from the accident, that there was no compelling evidence of fundamental flaws in the design of the Chinook or its components.
I appreciate that as the wife of retired RAF aircrew, Mrs ... enjoys a common bond with other RAF wives whose husbands are aviators. The anguish felt by the families who lost loved ones in this tragic accident must seem particularly real to her. However I can assure you that the investigation carried out by the RAF Board of Inquiry following the accident could not have been more thorough. The exhaustive, detailed and professional process of the accident investigation revealed no evidence of any technical malfunction. Moreover, the reviewing officers considered all the circumstances of the flight, its planning and execution, the weather conditions and the serviceability of the aircraft, before reaching their conclusion. This was that the pilots made a fatal error when they flew their serviceable aircraft into bad weather which they had been warned to expect, and which they failed to take any action to avoid. In allowing the aircraft to do this the pilots had not exercised the skill, care or judgement they were known to possess. They were therefore held to be negligent.
To date nothing has been put forward which undermines the original finding of the Board of Inquiry although the MOD has examined, in depth, all the arguments and theories put forward to explain this tragic crash. Although the Board of Inquiry concluded that the pilots were to blame for the accident, this has not precluded the payment of compensation to the families of all those who died in the accident, including the pilots. By 1999, all this compensation had been paid in full.
Ministers and officials have gone to unprecedented lengths to explain the rationale behind the finding of the Board of Inquiry and have consistently confirmed the Department's readiness to consider, very carefully, anything presented that claims to be new evidence. This remains the position.
One final point, Mrs ... also wrote to the Prime Minister in the same terms as she wrote to you. This letter has been passed to the Department for attention, and I would be grateful if you could ask her to accept this reply as an aswer to both her letters.
John Spellar MP
Don't you just love being patronised. I wasn't going to vote Labour in the next General Election anyway. Chances are I shall most likely be actively campaigning against them.
Back to the top.
Apologies for not posting this last week, when I received it. This is the response my MP received when he wrote to the MoD on my behalf:
Thank you for your letter of 18 December to Lewis Moonie enclosing one from your constituent, Mrs ..., about the Chinook accident on the Mull of Kintyre. I am replying as this matter falls within my area of responsibility as Minister of State for the Armed Forces.
I am sorry that Mrs ... disagrees with the stance taken by the Secretary of State and Sir William Wratten in response to the Public Account Committee's report. However, as seen from here, the Committee accepted a mass of advice from elsewhere, and yet failed to give equal consideration to the Department's arguments. Neither Sir John Day or Sir William Wratten, the two senior reviewing officers of the RAF Board of Inquiry, were called to give evidence. Had they been called, Sir John and Sir William would have been able to provide more balance to the other evidence that the Committee had. You will also appreciate that the Public Accounts Committee's conclusions run contrary to those reached by the Defence Committee, in 1998 following their own inquiry into lessons learnt from the accident, that there was no compelling evidence of fundamental flaws in the design of the Chinook or its components.
I appreciate that as the wife of retired RAF aircrew, Mrs ... enjoys a common bond with other RAF wives whose husbands are aviators. The anguish felt by the families who lost loved ones in this tragic accident must seem particularly real to her. However I can assure you that the investigation carried out by the RAF Board of Inquiry following the accident could not have been more thorough. The exhaustive, detailed and professional process of the accident investigation revealed no evidence of any technical malfunction. Moreover, the reviewing officers considered all the circumstances of the flight, its planning and execution, the weather conditions and the serviceability of the aircraft, before reaching their conclusion. This was that the pilots made a fatal error when they flew their serviceable aircraft into bad weather which they had been warned to expect, and which they failed to take any action to avoid. In allowing the aircraft to do this the pilots had not exercised the skill, care or judgement they were known to possess. They were therefore held to be negligent.
To date nothing has been put forward which undermines the original finding of the Board of Inquiry although the MOD has examined, in depth, all the arguments and theories put forward to explain this tragic crash. Although the Board of Inquiry concluded that the pilots were to blame for the accident, this has not precluded the payment of compensation to the families of all those who died in the accident, including the pilots. By 1999, all this compensation had been paid in full.
Ministers and officials have gone to unprecedented lengths to explain the rationale behind the finding of the Board of Inquiry and have consistently confirmed the Department's readiness to consider, very carefully, anything presented that claims to be new evidence. This remains the position.
One final point, Mrs ... also wrote to the Prime Minister in the same terms as she wrote to you. This letter has been passed to the Department for attention, and I would be grateful if you could ask her to accept this reply as an aswer to both her letters.
John Spellar MP
Don't you just love being patronised. I wasn't going to vote Labour in the next General Election anyway. Chances are I shall most likely be actively campaigning against them.
Back to the top.
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First. Thank you to whoever it was that sent me a copy of the findings of the BOI. Hotmail is wonderful - think of a "nom de plume" and send something - then never bother to use that e-mail address again.
Ark Royal
You say that the findings of the Board had "been tampered with". From this I assume that you mean the Reviewing Officers differed in their assessment, in regard to Human Failings, from the view of the Board.
I would point out that you have also, and quite vociferously, differed in your assessments from those of the Board. You have stated that the aircraft was quite legitimately being flown VFR "in sight of land or water" when the Board specifically state at para 16e "The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."
You have further stated that it was impossible for the aircraft to be climbed to Safety Altitude because the icing limitations precluded this option. The Board state specifically at para 30c " in the forecast icing conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre, and an IFR transit to Prestwick or Glasgow."
Given that you differ from the assessment of the Board on two such fundamental matters, how can you justify such a statement in regard of the Reviewing Officers decision on Human Failings.
I would also point out that ALL the Senior Officers who had the remit to comment on the findings of the Board in respect of the actions of the Pilots differed, independently, in their assessments from those of the Board. Only OC RAF Aldergrove did not comment in such a way because he did not have administrative control over the crew and it was not in his remit to offer comments on such matters. He, quite properly, confined his comments to those matters within his remit.
Thus OC RAF Odiham, AOC 1 Gp, AOC in C STC and (unusually but not surprisingly due to the Media and Political interest in the findings) CAS; ALL differed from the view of the Board in their assessments.
Given that the Reviewing Officers, with the exception of OC RAF Odiham, all had copious inputs from their Staffs and reached the same conclusions, how can you be justify the charge thet the findings were "tampered with"?
Ark Royal
You say that the findings of the Board had "been tampered with". From this I assume that you mean the Reviewing Officers differed in their assessment, in regard to Human Failings, from the view of the Board.
I would point out that you have also, and quite vociferously, differed in your assessments from those of the Board. You have stated that the aircraft was quite legitimately being flown VFR "in sight of land or water" when the Board specifically state at para 16e "The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."
You have further stated that it was impossible for the aircraft to be climbed to Safety Altitude because the icing limitations precluded this option. The Board state specifically at para 30c " in the forecast icing conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre, and an IFR transit to Prestwick or Glasgow."
Given that you differ from the assessment of the Board on two such fundamental matters, how can you justify such a statement in regard of the Reviewing Officers decision on Human Failings.
I would also point out that ALL the Senior Officers who had the remit to comment on the findings of the Board in respect of the actions of the Pilots differed, independently, in their assessments from those of the Board. Only OC RAF Aldergrove did not comment in such a way because he did not have administrative control over the crew and it was not in his remit to offer comments on such matters. He, quite properly, confined his comments to those matters within his remit.
Thus OC RAF Odiham, AOC 1 Gp, AOC in C STC and (unusually but not surprisingly due to the Media and Political interest in the findings) CAS; ALL differed from the view of the Board in their assessments.
Given that the Reviewing Officers, with the exception of OC RAF Odiham, all had copious inputs from their Staffs and reached the same conclusions, how can you be justify the charge thet the findings were "tampered with"?
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Mistress,
thanks for sight of your letter. As you say, there's nothing quite like being patronised. I had a letter advising me that all my questions had been answered, so they didn't feel it necessary to provide further answers. Wrong!!! Letter straight back requesting the answers and not a bland statement. I'll keep you informed.
K52,
I'm pleased that you now have a copy of the BoI, although I'm still not convinced you needed it due to your amazing powers of recollection. I take it from your posting that there is nothing in it that would cause you to change your opinion. No problem, as you provide an opposing view which helps keep the thread balanced. I will, of course, continue to disagree with you though!
Regards all
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
thanks for sight of your letter. As you say, there's nothing quite like being patronised. I had a letter advising me that all my questions had been answered, so they didn't feel it necessary to provide further answers. Wrong!!! Letter straight back requesting the answers and not a bland statement. I'll keep you informed.
K52,
I'm pleased that you now have a copy of the BoI, although I'm still not convinced you needed it due to your amazing powers of recollection. I take it from your posting that there is nothing in it that would cause you to change your opinion. No problem, as you provide an opposing view which helps keep the thread balanced. I will, of course, continue to disagree with you though!
Regards all
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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CAS, PLEASE READ THIS
This thread is not going to go away. I am a serving officer in the Royal Air force and I am ashamed that nothing has been done by the hierarchy to correct this wrong.
There is no dispute over the findings of the BOI. A very experienced President came to the only conclusion that he could, given the evidence placed before him.
The AP makes it quite clear that findings of negligence should only be considered where there is uncontroversial proof.
There is none to suggest that those men failed in their duty. Yes, they failed to avoid hitting the ground (but was it CFIT?). However, and leaving aside all the speculation and hogwash talked about in many of the posts about the fitness of the aircraft, NOBODY KNOWS WHAT HAPPENED IN THE LAST 30 SECONDS OF THAT FATAL FLIGHT. All the experts in all the world can speculate until hell freezes over, but there is not one shred of evidence to support the comments of the AOC and CinC.
The more things are left the more the Royal Air Force which I loyally serve is being hurt. You have the power to change things and clear the names of these 2 fine fellow aviators. I know what it is like for widows who have lost their loved ones - God knows, as effects officer, a month of looking after a family with small kids who lost their head of household was a totally devastating experience for me. Can you imagine the trauma of the crews’ families to be told that their husbands killed themselves and all those passengers?
I am not interested in any witchhunt or criticism of the Air Officers. If for no other reason than to let the families grieve in peace, DO SOMETHING.
With respect,
FJJP
This thread is not going to go away. I am a serving officer in the Royal Air force and I am ashamed that nothing has been done by the hierarchy to correct this wrong.
There is no dispute over the findings of the BOI. A very experienced President came to the only conclusion that he could, given the evidence placed before him.
The AP makes it quite clear that findings of negligence should only be considered where there is uncontroversial proof.
There is none to suggest that those men failed in their duty. Yes, they failed to avoid hitting the ground (but was it CFIT?). However, and leaving aside all the speculation and hogwash talked about in many of the posts about the fitness of the aircraft, NOBODY KNOWS WHAT HAPPENED IN THE LAST 30 SECONDS OF THAT FATAL FLIGHT. All the experts in all the world can speculate until hell freezes over, but there is not one shred of evidence to support the comments of the AOC and CinC.
The more things are left the more the Royal Air Force which I loyally serve is being hurt. You have the power to change things and clear the names of these 2 fine fellow aviators. I know what it is like for widows who have lost their loved ones - God knows, as effects officer, a month of looking after a family with small kids who lost their head of household was a totally devastating experience for me. Can you imagine the trauma of the crews’ families to be told that their husbands killed themselves and all those passengers?
I am not interested in any witchhunt or criticism of the Air Officers. If for no other reason than to let the families grieve in peace, DO SOMETHING.
With respect,
FJJP
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K52
Sorry for the late reply, but duty called.
I too am glad that you now have a copy of the BOI report, and before accusing you of being selective with its contents in order to bolster your views, I must be careful not to do the same.
You say that I have “...quite vociferously, differed in your assessments from those of the Board” in that I disagree with them over the questions of whether the flight was legitimately flown under VFR; and in that the weather conditions precluded a climb to SALT.
VFR vs IFR
You quote para 16e [The board concludes that:] "The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."
This is extracted from the Board’s conclusions, and is not a criticism of the planning carried out by the crew. Indeed the Board state in para 30c ‘Flight Planning Considerations’: “Flt Lt TAPPER’s decision not to plan to fly to Inverness under IFR was correct.” I agree. As to whether the aircraft was actually in VMC just before the crash, I do not know. Nor do you. Remember it was seen in sunlight and clear of cloud by the yachtsman just before the accident
SALT
You quote from para 30c ‘Flight Planning Considerations’: " in the forecast icing conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre, and an IFR transit to Prestwick or Glasgow."
Before I go on, let me put your quote in context by including its preceding sentence. The whole quote is:
" The Board determined from this information that, in the forecast conditions, the Chinook Mk2 icing clearance would most likely have precluded flight in IMC above safety altitude over the highlands of Scotland, and that Flt Lt TAPPER’s decision not to plan to fly to Inverness under IFR was correct. Nevertheless in the forecast icing conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre, and an IFR transit to Prestwick or Glasgow."
I base my assertion that a climb was out of the question on the same rule of thumb that the crew would have used, based on a sea level temperature of +9 deg C and a lapse rate of about 2 deg/1000ft.
The Board gave no indication as to how they arrived at their view that a climb was possible within the Chinook’s clearance; but they do concede that (para 30c continued): “Nevertheless, the Board considered that if Flt Lt TAPPER had mentally dismissed the possibility of flight in IMC, it may have reduced his willingness, if only for a brief period, to convert from VFR to IFR flight on encountering bad weather....”
I make that one minor disagreement with the Board, which I would be pleased to retract if given evidence that the actual 4 deg C level at the time did indeed allow a climb to SALT.
I could speculate that a reluctance to climb into expected icing conditions did indeed delay the decision to climb ‘for a brief period’, but I will not, as speculation is worthless.
The Board of Inquiry diligently carried out its investigation, mindful that a finding of negligence would require proof ‘beyond any doubt whatsoever’. They failed to find the required evidence, (and neither did the Scottish Fatal Accident Enquiry) and although alluding to some errors, quite rightly (in my opinion) found no one cause of the crash.
The reviewing officers (with the exception of OC Aldergrove) chose to ignore the requirement that a finding of negligence required such a high degree of proof, and in the absence of proof of any other cause, chose to blame the crew (and it is this that the PAC find so unpalatable).
It is not even as if the final reviewing officer (Wratten) is at all sure himself. He opens: “Without the irrefutable evidence which is provided by an ADR and a CVR, there is inevitably a degree of speculation as to the precise detail of the events in the minutes and seconds immediately prior to impact.”
Bearing in mind that ‘irrefutable evidence’ is exactly what he requires, he is wrong, by his own admission. If that is not tampering, I would like to know what you would call it.
Edited for typos
[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 22 February 2001).]
Sorry for the late reply, but duty called.
I too am glad that you now have a copy of the BOI report, and before accusing you of being selective with its contents in order to bolster your views, I must be careful not to do the same.
You say that I have “...quite vociferously, differed in your assessments from those of the Board” in that I disagree with them over the questions of whether the flight was legitimately flown under VFR; and in that the weather conditions precluded a climb to SALT.
VFR vs IFR
You quote para 16e [The board concludes that:] "The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."
This is extracted from the Board’s conclusions, and is not a criticism of the planning carried out by the crew. Indeed the Board state in para 30c ‘Flight Planning Considerations’: “Flt Lt TAPPER’s decision not to plan to fly to Inverness under IFR was correct.” I agree. As to whether the aircraft was actually in VMC just before the crash, I do not know. Nor do you. Remember it was seen in sunlight and clear of cloud by the yachtsman just before the accident
SALT
You quote from para 30c ‘Flight Planning Considerations’: " in the forecast icing conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre, and an IFR transit to Prestwick or Glasgow."
Before I go on, let me put your quote in context by including its preceding sentence. The whole quote is:
" The Board determined from this information that, in the forecast conditions, the Chinook Mk2 icing clearance would most likely have precluded flight in IMC above safety altitude over the highlands of Scotland, and that Flt Lt TAPPER’s decision not to plan to fly to Inverness under IFR was correct. Nevertheless in the forecast icing conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre, and an IFR transit to Prestwick or Glasgow."
I base my assertion that a climb was out of the question on the same rule of thumb that the crew would have used, based on a sea level temperature of +9 deg C and a lapse rate of about 2 deg/1000ft.
The Board gave no indication as to how they arrived at their view that a climb was possible within the Chinook’s clearance; but they do concede that (para 30c continued): “Nevertheless, the Board considered that if Flt Lt TAPPER had mentally dismissed the possibility of flight in IMC, it may have reduced his willingness, if only for a brief period, to convert from VFR to IFR flight on encountering bad weather....”
I make that one minor disagreement with the Board, which I would be pleased to retract if given evidence that the actual 4 deg C level at the time did indeed allow a climb to SALT.
I could speculate that a reluctance to climb into expected icing conditions did indeed delay the decision to climb ‘for a brief period’, but I will not, as speculation is worthless.
The Board of Inquiry diligently carried out its investigation, mindful that a finding of negligence would require proof ‘beyond any doubt whatsoever’. They failed to find the required evidence, (and neither did the Scottish Fatal Accident Enquiry) and although alluding to some errors, quite rightly (in my opinion) found no one cause of the crash.
The reviewing officers (with the exception of OC Aldergrove) chose to ignore the requirement that a finding of negligence required such a high degree of proof, and in the absence of proof of any other cause, chose to blame the crew (and it is this that the PAC find so unpalatable).
It is not even as if the final reviewing officer (Wratten) is at all sure himself. He opens: “Without the irrefutable evidence which is provided by an ADR and a CVR, there is inevitably a degree of speculation as to the precise detail of the events in the minutes and seconds immediately prior to impact.”
Bearing in mind that ‘irrefutable evidence’ is exactly what he requires, he is wrong, by his own admission. If that is not tampering, I would like to know what you would call it.
Edited for typos
[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 22 February 2001).]
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Ark Royal,
I too have to apologise for a tardy reply but in my case I cannot plead duty merely being Bl**dy cold. We got flooded twice earlier this month and we still have no central heating. Still, on the bright side, the County Council did clear, on monday of this week, the blocked culvert I informed them about before we got the first flood.
When quoting from the "Board" it is impossible not to be selective because it is itself a selective narrative: a precis of the deliberations of the "Board" referring to the exhibits, evidence and reports that THEY have decided to include in the proceedings. It does not include ALL the evidence produced for the "Board". One example is the return plan from Kinloss to Aldergrove. This is not included in the proceedings even though the "Board" concluded that it was "most likely that at the time of the accident, Flt Lt Tapper was planning to return to Aldergrove that evening". It would, therefore, be germane to considerations about Flight Planning and Crew Duty. In conjunction with this they do not define the overall crew duty day, only the maximum flying hours: nor is there any mention of the proposed tasking for 3 Jun - would it have allowed the crew to night-stop at Inverness or Kinloss?
The "Board" also introduce evidence that they do not follow through to a conclusion. One case in point is what the crew had to eat that day. We are told quite specicifically in para 5 that "During the evening of 1 Jun, Flt Lt Tapper and Flt Lt Cook took dinner in the Officers Mess, finishing at 1910hrs." There is no mention of the Rear Crew members in this respect.
In para 6 we are told " On the morning of 2 Jun 94 Flt Lt Cook was served breakfast in the Officers Mess, and MALM Forbes and Sgt Hardie took breakfast in the Sergeants Mess. The Board were unable to ascertain whether breakfast was taken by Flt Lt Tapper." Why? Was no record available in the Officers Mess? If Flt Lt Tapper did not take breakfast in the dining room, did he have facilities in his room to provide a light breakfast in order to comply with GASO's? We do not know because no comment is made upon it.
At para 27 the the "Board" noted "that the crew had little opportunity to take a proper meal during their duty period and had probably only eaten a limited amount of confectionary and biscuits". No evidence is produced as to what in the way of In-Flight rations had been provided prior to their morning task.
What we are left with from the evidence produced by the "Board" in the Proceedings is the PROBABILITY that, when they departed Aldergrove at 1742, the Co Pilot and the Rear Crew had not had a proper meal for approx 9 hrs and the DISTINCT POSSIBILITY that the Captain had not had a meal for 22 1/2 hrs. If this were indeed the case then why is there no discussion of it in the proceedings and medical evidence as to the effect on crew performance? Would they not have been able to ascertain information from the report by IPTM?
I also have some difficulty with the "Boards" discussions regarding the secondary navigation equipment. Flt Lt Tapper had asked the groundcrew, following the morning sortie, to check the SuperTans computer because he felt it was giving "unusual GPS satellite tracking data" and no fault was found. In my own opinion it would have been, to say the least, prudent during the evening sortie to have utilised the secondary navigation equipment to back up the primary aid.
The Tacan was selected to Machrihanish and I have no problem with that. The VOR was selected to 115.2 DCS and the "Board" was of the opinion " that this beacon would have been out of range throughout the flight, and that it was likely that the frequency selection was moved during the crash." I submit it is just as likely that the VOR had originally been selected to 116.2 BEL and that once the aircraft had travelled out of range of the beacon the frequency was deliberately deselected by 1 Mhz to stop the needles wandering.
Finally the ADF. Should this not have been tuned to the LAY (Islay) which would have been their closest diversion given the Machrihanish weather; or perhaps to Prestwick or Glasgow in the event an IFR transit was forced upon them? The most useful beacon however would, in my opinion, have been the AH (Rathlin Island) bearing due magnetic west of their turning point at a range of 12nm. IF they could receive that beacon then it would have given them a secondary means of assessing their distance from the lighthouse with a change of bearing of 5 degrees for each 1nm travelled. One thing that I am certain of is that the ADF should not have been selected to the frequency on which it was found - Atlantic 252, a commercial radio station!!
Finally, a question for those who do have access to the annexes. Whose is the writing on the planning chart? It never looked to me as though it belonged to either of the Pilots.
I too have to apologise for a tardy reply but in my case I cannot plead duty merely being Bl**dy cold. We got flooded twice earlier this month and we still have no central heating. Still, on the bright side, the County Council did clear, on monday of this week, the blocked culvert I informed them about before we got the first flood.
When quoting from the "Board" it is impossible not to be selective because it is itself a selective narrative: a precis of the deliberations of the "Board" referring to the exhibits, evidence and reports that THEY have decided to include in the proceedings. It does not include ALL the evidence produced for the "Board". One example is the return plan from Kinloss to Aldergrove. This is not included in the proceedings even though the "Board" concluded that it was "most likely that at the time of the accident, Flt Lt Tapper was planning to return to Aldergrove that evening". It would, therefore, be germane to considerations about Flight Planning and Crew Duty. In conjunction with this they do not define the overall crew duty day, only the maximum flying hours: nor is there any mention of the proposed tasking for 3 Jun - would it have allowed the crew to night-stop at Inverness or Kinloss?
The "Board" also introduce evidence that they do not follow through to a conclusion. One case in point is what the crew had to eat that day. We are told quite specicifically in para 5 that "During the evening of 1 Jun, Flt Lt Tapper and Flt Lt Cook took dinner in the Officers Mess, finishing at 1910hrs." There is no mention of the Rear Crew members in this respect.
In para 6 we are told " On the morning of 2 Jun 94 Flt Lt Cook was served breakfast in the Officers Mess, and MALM Forbes and Sgt Hardie took breakfast in the Sergeants Mess. The Board were unable to ascertain whether breakfast was taken by Flt Lt Tapper." Why? Was no record available in the Officers Mess? If Flt Lt Tapper did not take breakfast in the dining room, did he have facilities in his room to provide a light breakfast in order to comply with GASO's? We do not know because no comment is made upon it.
At para 27 the the "Board" noted "that the crew had little opportunity to take a proper meal during their duty period and had probably only eaten a limited amount of confectionary and biscuits". No evidence is produced as to what in the way of In-Flight rations had been provided prior to their morning task.
What we are left with from the evidence produced by the "Board" in the Proceedings is the PROBABILITY that, when they departed Aldergrove at 1742, the Co Pilot and the Rear Crew had not had a proper meal for approx 9 hrs and the DISTINCT POSSIBILITY that the Captain had not had a meal for 22 1/2 hrs. If this were indeed the case then why is there no discussion of it in the proceedings and medical evidence as to the effect on crew performance? Would they not have been able to ascertain information from the report by IPTM?
I also have some difficulty with the "Boards" discussions regarding the secondary navigation equipment. Flt Lt Tapper had asked the groundcrew, following the morning sortie, to check the SuperTans computer because he felt it was giving "unusual GPS satellite tracking data" and no fault was found. In my own opinion it would have been, to say the least, prudent during the evening sortie to have utilised the secondary navigation equipment to back up the primary aid.
The Tacan was selected to Machrihanish and I have no problem with that. The VOR was selected to 115.2 DCS and the "Board" was of the opinion " that this beacon would have been out of range throughout the flight, and that it was likely that the frequency selection was moved during the crash." I submit it is just as likely that the VOR had originally been selected to 116.2 BEL and that once the aircraft had travelled out of range of the beacon the frequency was deliberately deselected by 1 Mhz to stop the needles wandering.
Finally the ADF. Should this not have been tuned to the LAY (Islay) which would have been their closest diversion given the Machrihanish weather; or perhaps to Prestwick or Glasgow in the event an IFR transit was forced upon them? The most useful beacon however would, in my opinion, have been the AH (Rathlin Island) bearing due magnetic west of their turning point at a range of 12nm. IF they could receive that beacon then it would have given them a secondary means of assessing their distance from the lighthouse with a change of bearing of 5 degrees for each 1nm travelled. One thing that I am certain of is that the ADF should not have been selected to the frequency on which it was found - Atlantic 252, a commercial radio station!!
Finally, a question for those who do have access to the annexes. Whose is the writing on the planning chart? It never looked to me as though it belonged to either of the Pilots.
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K52, Sorry to hear of you flooding woes.
Haven't got time to go too deeply into your post as duty calls again.
I take it from your comments that you would discredit the Board's thoroughness in that they appear to have left some avenues of investigation unexplored. As you point out, not all of their work is presented in the report.
What is important is that they did not find evidence of negligence. If your comments about the crew's meal arrangements are meant to imply negligence in that they they failed to take proper sustenance, then you show your lack of understanding of Support Helicopter ops. You eat what you can when you can, and carry on. That is normal, not negligence. I agree that this particular sortie should have been flown to a different set of rules, but it wasn't; and that would bring us back to the real negligence in this sorry case, that at a higher level than Tapper and Cook.
Your discussions concerning the tuning of the radio navaids are interesting. Again deriving useful information from ADFs and VORs would require a lot of head down plotting. This is simply not the way SH operate. At low level, the VOR beacons are at best unreliable, and most usually blanked. ADF is simply not accurate enough for pinpoint Nav. GPS Tans and Mk 1 eyeball were the order of the day. They were flying VFR in VMC.
What went wrong we can speculate on until forever. They may have gone into IMC and quite negligently flew on regardless into the Mull. They may have suffered an unknown failure. What none of us will be able to do is to state "with absolutely no doubt whatsoever", what DID occur.
Haven't got time to go too deeply into your post as duty calls again.
I take it from your comments that you would discredit the Board's thoroughness in that they appear to have left some avenues of investigation unexplored. As you point out, not all of their work is presented in the report.
What is important is that they did not find evidence of negligence. If your comments about the crew's meal arrangements are meant to imply negligence in that they they failed to take proper sustenance, then you show your lack of understanding of Support Helicopter ops. You eat what you can when you can, and carry on. That is normal, not negligence. I agree that this particular sortie should have been flown to a different set of rules, but it wasn't; and that would bring us back to the real negligence in this sorry case, that at a higher level than Tapper and Cook.
Your discussions concerning the tuning of the radio navaids are interesting. Again deriving useful information from ADFs and VORs would require a lot of head down plotting. This is simply not the way SH operate. At low level, the VOR beacons are at best unreliable, and most usually blanked. ADF is simply not accurate enough for pinpoint Nav. GPS Tans and Mk 1 eyeball were the order of the day. They were flying VFR in VMC.
What went wrong we can speculate on until forever. They may have gone into IMC and quite negligently flew on regardless into the Mull. They may have suffered an unknown failure. What none of us will be able to do is to state "with absolutely no doubt whatsoever", what DID occur.
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K52,
I also offer my sympathies with regard to your flooding. Hope it is now resolved and you don't get a recurrence of the problem.
You mention about the writing on the planning chart not belonging to the pilots. Although I have not seen the map, I would suggest that it would be easy to identify the individual. Handwriting samples could be taken from all crews in the Province at the time, and could also be compared against samples from documents that had been completed by the deceased crew. The BoI mentioned that MALM Forbes had been seen preparing maps for the trip. It may have been his writing.
Perhaps this is another issue where the Board could have expanded further. Or maybe they were in receipt of the answer and did not think it useful to enter in the final document. Either way, it does not amount to evidence of negligence. Just speculation as to the intention of the crew. Speculation proves nothing beyond all doubt.
Stay dry!
Regards
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
I also offer my sympathies with regard to your flooding. Hope it is now resolved and you don't get a recurrence of the problem.
You mention about the writing on the planning chart not belonging to the pilots. Although I have not seen the map, I would suggest that it would be easy to identify the individual. Handwriting samples could be taken from all crews in the Province at the time, and could also be compared against samples from documents that had been completed by the deceased crew. The BoI mentioned that MALM Forbes had been seen preparing maps for the trip. It may have been his writing.
Perhaps this is another issue where the Board could have expanded further. Or maybe they were in receipt of the answer and did not think it useful to enter in the final document. Either way, it does not amount to evidence of negligence. Just speculation as to the intention of the crew. Speculation proves nothing beyond all doubt.
Stay dry!
Regards
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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K52 - re yr last, and apologies for the rather disjoint nature of this but I've not passed this location in a few weeks, a couple of trivial points spring up; as an ex serving officer you should realise that it is a DISTINCT POSSIBILITY that there is no record of some meals that John Tapper may have taken and, the quickest way of changing VOIR fqs to stop the needle wandering would have been to go up or down by .05 rather than a whole mhz - must go now Spotter Alert chin chin
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Mmmmnice,
I agree with you on both points; however it would have been highly likely, in my opinion, that the BEL was the intial VOR selection. My point was that the Board raised the issues in the Proceedings and didn't follow them through. With regard to the Nav equipment the Board say it was "likely the VOR frequency selection was moved during the crash" and that the IFF Mode 3A "may also have been moved during the crash". They make no such comment regarding the ADF and Tacan selections. With regard to the ADF being selected to a commercial radio station the "Board considered the distraction that could have been caused by this radio but as the ADF volume on both pilot's audio selector panels was selected off, dismissed this as a possibility". How can it be "likely to have moved" or "may also have been moved by the crash" in regards to some equipment yet the position of a control on another piece allows them to "dismiss" the possibility of distraction? There is, I suggest, a level of inconsistancy in these findings.
Ark Royal
Thank you for your commiserations.
Despite my demonstrable, and freely admitted, lack of knowledge of SH operations it is you, I believe, who are missing the point. The findings of the "Board" were the collective interpretation by the President(Wg Cdr GD/P) and 2 members(1 Sqn Ldr GD/P and 1 Sqn Ldr Eng) of the evidence that they had selected as important in the determination of the causes of the accident. The findings were not carried down from the mountain carved on tablets of stone and are not immutable.
Brian,
Thank you also for your commiserations
Regarding the chart. It was only my opinion that the writing on the chart differed from that of both pilots; I am not a graphologist!! I agree that it could have been that of MALM Forbes but that would then call into question the specific statement by the Board that Flt Lt Tapper "carried out the flight planning for the Inverness flight during the evening of 1 Jun 94".
Have to leave it there because I think I have just heard the boiler fire up. If true I will go and cuddle a radiator for a couple of hours!!!
I agree with you on both points; however it would have been highly likely, in my opinion, that the BEL was the intial VOR selection. My point was that the Board raised the issues in the Proceedings and didn't follow them through. With regard to the Nav equipment the Board say it was "likely the VOR frequency selection was moved during the crash" and that the IFF Mode 3A "may also have been moved during the crash". They make no such comment regarding the ADF and Tacan selections. With regard to the ADF being selected to a commercial radio station the "Board considered the distraction that could have been caused by this radio but as the ADF volume on both pilot's audio selector panels was selected off, dismissed this as a possibility". How can it be "likely to have moved" or "may also have been moved by the crash" in regards to some equipment yet the position of a control on another piece allows them to "dismiss" the possibility of distraction? There is, I suggest, a level of inconsistancy in these findings.
Ark Royal
Thank you for your commiserations.
Despite my demonstrable, and freely admitted, lack of knowledge of SH operations it is you, I believe, who are missing the point. The findings of the "Board" were the collective interpretation by the President(Wg Cdr GD/P) and 2 members(1 Sqn Ldr GD/P and 1 Sqn Ldr Eng) of the evidence that they had selected as important in the determination of the causes of the accident. The findings were not carried down from the mountain carved on tablets of stone and are not immutable.
Brian,
Thank you also for your commiserations
Regarding the chart. It was only my opinion that the writing on the chart differed from that of both pilots; I am not a graphologist!! I agree that it could have been that of MALM Forbes but that would then call into question the specific statement by the Board that Flt Lt Tapper "carried out the flight planning for the Inverness flight during the evening of 1 Jun 94".
Have to leave it there because I think I have just heard the boiler fire up. If true I will go and cuddle a radiator for a couple of hours!!!
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K52
I know you are familiar with my views on your attempts to make a circumstantial case for negligence against the two pilots. I have also stated previously that the clear reason yourself and others have to resort to this rather distasteful method of besmirching the names of the two officers (who each had utterly exemplary service, and flying records) is that you cannot offer ANY other evidence. It simply does not exist.
Neither you, nor I, nor anyone this side of the Pearly gates, has any idea what the crew's intentions were, regarding remaining out of theatre overnight, or returning. One thing IS irrefutable. At the time of the accident, they were well within ANY duty limits you care to mention. PERIOD.
As far as eating is concerned. Isn't this more a criticism of the organisation, and the operation of Her Majesty's Air Force, rather than the two individuals at the end of the line? In any case, AGAIN, nobody knows what these individuals did, or did not eat that day. If it was such a big issue, why weren't their stomach contents examined?
I'll tell you why. Because it is only now that people feel the need to 'find' very second rate circumstantial evidence to support a discredited judgement!
Finally, you have been very interested previously in the preparation of the crew maps. I assume you will again attempt to 'rubbish' the crew's preparation, by suggesting it was somehow imperfect. So let's put this one to bed here and now.
I am 99.9% certain that the photocopied map of the route left at the Auth desk by the crew in a commendable attempt to fulfil their requirement to brief the duty auth (Flt Lt Tapper self authorised the trip)
was prepared the previous evening by Lt K******n RN, an exchange officer flying the Chinook in NI that day.
The reason it was prepared by him, and not the crew who flew the sortie, was that there were only two Chinook crews in NI. they operated a 'day on, day off' basis. The tasking came through on the 1st of June, while Tapper and Cook were sitting in the mess, on their day off, presumably stuffing their fat little faces.
The reason suggested for Flt Lt Tapper's decision to fly the long days tasking on the 2nd June was to preserve Lt K******n's crew's day off.
So, if there were any errors on the map subsequently photocopied, and included in the BOI, those minor errors are likely to be Lt K******n's. As far as I am aware, he has not been charged!
But, here's the rub. The BOI made no attempt to discover when that map was copied. Was it on the previous evening, was it on the morning of the accident, or just before they left? Who knows. In any event, were any corrections made to Lt K******n's map by Flt Lt Tapper, after copying, but prior to flight. Meaning the copy was wrong, but the actual map was not!
We don't even know if Tapper was using that map at all!
So please now explain your interest in 'the map.'
Finally, if you think helicopter crews operating at low level have nothing more important to do than scrutinise their charts for the frequency of the nearest suitable NDB, you really should get out more!
[This message has been edited by Tandemrotor (edited 25 February 2001).]
I know you are familiar with my views on your attempts to make a circumstantial case for negligence against the two pilots. I have also stated previously that the clear reason yourself and others have to resort to this rather distasteful method of besmirching the names of the two officers (who each had utterly exemplary service, and flying records) is that you cannot offer ANY other evidence. It simply does not exist.
Neither you, nor I, nor anyone this side of the Pearly gates, has any idea what the crew's intentions were, regarding remaining out of theatre overnight, or returning. One thing IS irrefutable. At the time of the accident, they were well within ANY duty limits you care to mention. PERIOD.
As far as eating is concerned. Isn't this more a criticism of the organisation, and the operation of Her Majesty's Air Force, rather than the two individuals at the end of the line? In any case, AGAIN, nobody knows what these individuals did, or did not eat that day. If it was such a big issue, why weren't their stomach contents examined?
I'll tell you why. Because it is only now that people feel the need to 'find' very second rate circumstantial evidence to support a discredited judgement!
Finally, you have been very interested previously in the preparation of the crew maps. I assume you will again attempt to 'rubbish' the crew's preparation, by suggesting it was somehow imperfect. So let's put this one to bed here and now.
I am 99.9% certain that the photocopied map of the route left at the Auth desk by the crew in a commendable attempt to fulfil their requirement to brief the duty auth (Flt Lt Tapper self authorised the trip)
was prepared the previous evening by Lt K******n RN, an exchange officer flying the Chinook in NI that day.
The reason it was prepared by him, and not the crew who flew the sortie, was that there were only two Chinook crews in NI. they operated a 'day on, day off' basis. The tasking came through on the 1st of June, while Tapper and Cook were sitting in the mess, on their day off, presumably stuffing their fat little faces.
The reason suggested for Flt Lt Tapper's decision to fly the long days tasking on the 2nd June was to preserve Lt K******n's crew's day off.
So, if there were any errors on the map subsequently photocopied, and included in the BOI, those minor errors are likely to be Lt K******n's. As far as I am aware, he has not been charged!
But, here's the rub. The BOI made no attempt to discover when that map was copied. Was it on the previous evening, was it on the morning of the accident, or just before they left? Who knows. In any event, were any corrections made to Lt K******n's map by Flt Lt Tapper, after copying, but prior to flight. Meaning the copy was wrong, but the actual map was not!
We don't even know if Tapper was using that map at all!
So please now explain your interest in 'the map.'
Finally, if you think helicopter crews operating at low level have nothing more important to do than scrutinise their charts for the frequency of the nearest suitable NDB, you really should get out more!
[This message has been edited by Tandemrotor (edited 25 February 2001).]
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K52
Hope you are warmer,
I'm not sure which point I am missing. Agreed, the BOI Report is the collected thoughts and conclusions of the three appointed officers. They collected, sifted and reported on a lot of evidence. Obviously the potted report is not exhaustive, but if the three were trusted to carry out the inquiry, then their findings should also be trusted as relevant and acceptable.
The ADF may have been tuned to Atlantic 252, probably quite routine in NI for the more mundane tasks within the province. The ADF is of no use in VFR SH operations, and it would appear that the Board were satisfied that none of the crew was actually listening to the station at the time of the crash. Not knowing precisely what kind of knobs/sliders are fitted to the various radio aid controllers and the transponder in the Chinook, I would not comment on which could be adjusted or not by impact. I trust that the Board used their better knowledge to come to an honest conclusion.
The reviewing officers decided that the Board was not to be trusted in its findings and over-ruled them.
I simply ask how they, and you can categorically state that, on the available evidence, the crew were guilty, 'beyond any doubt whatsoever' of negligence.
If you/they cannot, then the finding is unsafe.
Hope you are warmer,
I'm not sure which point I am missing. Agreed, the BOI Report is the collected thoughts and conclusions of the three appointed officers. They collected, sifted and reported on a lot of evidence. Obviously the potted report is not exhaustive, but if the three were trusted to carry out the inquiry, then their findings should also be trusted as relevant and acceptable.
The ADF may have been tuned to Atlantic 252, probably quite routine in NI for the more mundane tasks within the province. The ADF is of no use in VFR SH operations, and it would appear that the Board were satisfied that none of the crew was actually listening to the station at the time of the crash. Not knowing precisely what kind of knobs/sliders are fitted to the various radio aid controllers and the transponder in the Chinook, I would not comment on which could be adjusted or not by impact. I trust that the Board used their better knowledge to come to an honest conclusion.
The reviewing officers decided that the Board was not to be trusted in its findings and over-ruled them.
I simply ask how they, and you can categorically state that, on the available evidence, the crew were guilty, 'beyond any doubt whatsoever' of negligence.
If you/they cannot, then the finding is unsafe.
Guest
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44 pages and counting...no doubt were not even half-way there. Let's face it guys, unless you're in a UEFA cup match the referee's not going to change his mind. Can we put it to bed now? They were distracted, probably by a spurious Eng Fail caption, and they flew into a hill. All this FADEC hypothesising gets us nowhere.
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TRC
It grieves me to reply to your post, but I feel strongly enough about it to do so. I doubt whether you have read the forum from start to finish. If you had, you would undoubtedly have gauged the feeling of fellow aviators who feel strongly that an injustice has been done to the crew involved.
I hope to God that you never have to get involved with the family of mates who have died - I have, and it is not an experience that I will ever forget. It is bad enough to lose one's husband, but to be told that the death of his crew and passengers is down to his negligence is more than any widow should have to bear.
If you have nothing constructive to contribute to this debate, shut up and stay off - it is not compusory to add your comments. Someone like you (a veteran of 1 (that is ONE) post) clealy has little to add - I am sure that the rest of us would be quite happy to roll along through life without your fatuous remarks.
Goodbye. Hope I don't see you again on the forum.
It grieves me to reply to your post, but I feel strongly enough about it to do so. I doubt whether you have read the forum from start to finish. If you had, you would undoubtedly have gauged the feeling of fellow aviators who feel strongly that an injustice has been done to the crew involved.
I hope to God that you never have to get involved with the family of mates who have died - I have, and it is not an experience that I will ever forget. It is bad enough to lose one's husband, but to be told that the death of his crew and passengers is down to his negligence is more than any widow should have to bear.
If you have nothing constructive to contribute to this debate, shut up and stay off - it is not compusory to add your comments. Someone like you (a veteran of 1 (that is ONE) post) clealy has little to add - I am sure that the rest of us would be quite happy to roll along through life without your fatuous remarks.
Goodbye. Hope I don't see you again on the forum.
