Chinook - Hit Back Here
Guest
Posts: n/a
GICASI,
The glib reply would be that you seem to have spent more time counting the words than reading them.
However, it is clear from your posts that it is you that has missed the BASIS of the findings entirely. The findings of negligence by AOC1Gp, confirmed by AOCinC STC, were for the pilots actions BEFORE the accident.
Arkroyal,
From what you say the Met forecast did not give the height of the +4 degree isotherm. Surely for an "experienced professional crew" alledgedly worried about the icing clearance of the Mk2, and in the light of the forecast weather at the Mull, that would be an essential piece of information for their flight planning?
I agree that ACM Wratten gave the SALT for the Mull as 2800ft but, as I have pointed out before, that was the planned figure for that first leg based on a mast in Belfast. The 25nm SALT for the Mull is 2500ft. It would appear therefore that SALT was achievable in the extant icing clearance.
Regarding the timing of the crash, the BOI says that engine power down time was 1759. That is 17 minutes after take-off.
The weather at the Mull, as described by the Lighthouse Keeper and his wife standing outside the Lighthouse as they heard the Chinook approach, was foggy and had been for some time, There were several other witnesses on the Mull who provided the same information.
The glib reply would be that you seem to have spent more time counting the words than reading them.
However, it is clear from your posts that it is you that has missed the BASIS of the findings entirely. The findings of negligence by AOC1Gp, confirmed by AOCinC STC, were for the pilots actions BEFORE the accident.
Arkroyal,
From what you say the Met forecast did not give the height of the +4 degree isotherm. Surely for an "experienced professional crew" alledgedly worried about the icing clearance of the Mk2, and in the light of the forecast weather at the Mull, that would be an essential piece of information for their flight planning?
I agree that ACM Wratten gave the SALT for the Mull as 2800ft but, as I have pointed out before, that was the planned figure for that first leg based on a mast in Belfast. The 25nm SALT for the Mull is 2500ft. It would appear therefore that SALT was achievable in the extant icing clearance.
Regarding the timing of the crash, the BOI says that engine power down time was 1759. That is 17 minutes after take-off.
The weather at the Mull, as described by the Lighthouse Keeper and his wife standing outside the Lighthouse as they heard the Chinook approach, was foggy and had been for some time, There were several other witnesses on the Mull who provided the same information.
Guest
Posts: n/a
K52,
I offer these thoughts:
Timing – you suggest that the crew were in a hurry to get back because of crew duty time. I hypothesise that they may have wanted a nightstop. You say they had not prepared for that eventuality, I say neither would I. ‘Cos then you can claim you were caught unawares. Of course, we are both guessing.
SALT - I utterly dispute your SALT calculations. As I remember, SALT is calculated for each leg of the route. Not at specific points on that route. The SALT for the leg to the Mull is 2800ft and from the Mull to Corran it's 5900ft. Maybe some rotary mates can clarify this.
BOI – I don’t “claim” to have seen it. It’s on my desk, alongside the AAIB report, Sheriff’s report, Racal report, Boeing report, witness statements, pictures, Uncle Tom Cobbly and all.
+4 degree isotherm – Actually it’s not in the BOI as far as I can see. It came out in the Sheriff’s inquiry from Tony Cable of the AAIB. He used a surface temp of 9 degrees but could not say where he got that figure from. The aftercast (which itself, is guesswork) shows;
1000ft +9
2000ft +9
3000ft +8
5000ft +4
There is, as you might expect, a fatal flaw here. The crew didn’t have access to an aftercast (acurate or not) ‘cos they were dead.
So, if we go for the aftercast temp of +9 at sea level. Using the aviators ROT we get
1000ft +7
2000ft +5
3000ft +3
Using this model, your +4 degree isotherm is at 2500ft.
But wait, yet another problem. The only temp the crew have is on their OAT guage. Do you know what was on it? I don’t. Suppose it said +7 at 200ft? That would place their +4 isotherm at about 1500ft.
The point is we are guessing. Everything we are talking about is a theory. Every time we say “the crew would have” or “the crew’s intentions were”, we have to use the phrase probably or possibly.
I concur with GICASI; you cannot say why or how ZD576 crashed. You are entitled to an opinion, and for the most it is well argued. But I can offer an alternative to every step of your argument which you cannot say is wrong.
I am not arrogant enough to say that your opinion is incorrect. I am simply saying there is no evidence that it is right.
I offer these thoughts:
Timing – you suggest that the crew were in a hurry to get back because of crew duty time. I hypothesise that they may have wanted a nightstop. You say they had not prepared for that eventuality, I say neither would I. ‘Cos then you can claim you were caught unawares. Of course, we are both guessing.
SALT - I utterly dispute your SALT calculations. As I remember, SALT is calculated for each leg of the route. Not at specific points on that route. The SALT for the leg to the Mull is 2800ft and from the Mull to Corran it's 5900ft. Maybe some rotary mates can clarify this.
BOI – I don’t “claim” to have seen it. It’s on my desk, alongside the AAIB report, Sheriff’s report, Racal report, Boeing report, witness statements, pictures, Uncle Tom Cobbly and all.
+4 degree isotherm – Actually it’s not in the BOI as far as I can see. It came out in the Sheriff’s inquiry from Tony Cable of the AAIB. He used a surface temp of 9 degrees but could not say where he got that figure from. The aftercast (which itself, is guesswork) shows;
1000ft +9
2000ft +9
3000ft +8
5000ft +4
There is, as you might expect, a fatal flaw here. The crew didn’t have access to an aftercast (acurate or not) ‘cos they were dead.
So, if we go for the aftercast temp of +9 at sea level. Using the aviators ROT we get
1000ft +7
2000ft +5
3000ft +3
Using this model, your +4 degree isotherm is at 2500ft.
But wait, yet another problem. The only temp the crew have is on their OAT guage. Do you know what was on it? I don’t. Suppose it said +7 at 200ft? That would place their +4 isotherm at about 1500ft.
The point is we are guessing. Everything we are talking about is a theory. Every time we say “the crew would have” or “the crew’s intentions were”, we have to use the phrase probably or possibly.
I concur with GICASI; you cannot say why or how ZD576 crashed. You are entitled to an opinion, and for the most it is well argued. But I can offer an alternative to every step of your argument which you cannot say is wrong.
I am not arrogant enough to say that your opinion is incorrect. I am simply saying there is no evidence that it is right.
Guest
Posts: n/a
K52,
In my professional life, the people who worry me most are fools with lots of knowledge. You are obviously not a fool so the way you keep presenting your impressive knowledge while ignoring the fundamental question is beginning, in my mind, to look rather like you may have some sinister role in this campaign. (Re: your apparent ability to remember such detail after all this time?)
For goodness sake, please justify how even your arguments do not leave enough DOUBT to make the condemnation of two professional aircrew UNSAFE, particularly when they cannot defend themselves.
This is all anybody wants.As far as I can see, no-one is asking for a conclusion that says they were not being negligent.
------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
In my professional life, the people who worry me most are fools with lots of knowledge. You are obviously not a fool so the way you keep presenting your impressive knowledge while ignoring the fundamental question is beginning, in my mind, to look rather like you may have some sinister role in this campaign. (Re: your apparent ability to remember such detail after all this time?)
For goodness sake, please justify how even your arguments do not leave enough DOUBT to make the condemnation of two professional aircrew UNSAFE, particularly when they cannot defend themselves.
This is all anybody wants.As far as I can see, no-one is asking for a conclusion that says they were not being negligent.
------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
Guest
Posts: n/a
K52,
thanks again for your detailed reply. Your memory is amazing (are you sure you haven't got a copy of the board?).
I think most of the points have been addressed, certainly by people far better than I, so I won't repeat everything here.
However, you still offer no firm evidence which proves with "absolutely no doubt whatsoever" that the pilots were negligent. Remember-(I'm sure you will), that only 80% of the aircraft was available to examine, and not all of the 80% was in a condition to be examined thoroughly.
Our differences aside, thank you for presenting such a detailed point of view. It makes a change from individuals on your side of the fence.
Regards
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
thanks again for your detailed reply. Your memory is amazing (are you sure you haven't got a copy of the board?).
I think most of the points have been addressed, certainly by people far better than I, so I won't repeat everything here.
However, you still offer no firm evidence which proves with "absolutely no doubt whatsoever" that the pilots were negligent. Remember-(I'm sure you will), that only 80% of the aircraft was available to examine, and not all of the 80% was in a condition to be examined thoroughly.
Our differences aside, thank you for presenting such a detailed point of view. It makes a change from individuals on your side of the fence.
Regards
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Guest
Posts: n/a
K52
Okay, okay. I have given some thought to this, and I really don't think anyone would be interested to read a posting from me that counters every trivial, circumstantial, hypothetical allegation that you have made in the course of your recent postings. (By the way, you have changed your ground a little haven't you - from altimeters, and the point of negligence etc.) It really would have to be a long, not to mention, meandering response.
Would it be possible, do you think, to wrap up your case, in the most important 'bullet points', as you see them. Perhaps you would even like to end it with the way in which you are able to satisfy yourself that there is "absolutely no doubt WHATSOEVER" that the cause of this crash was negligence on the part of both pilots. I am sure this would clarify your position for many of our readers. Not least me.
Incidentally, you seemed quite reluctant to confirm my assertion that this case is indeed unique. In that, no other deceased pilots have EVER been found guilty of negligence in the circumstances of no positive evidence apparent in this one. But of course you couldn't deny it either. So I guess we will all have to assume that I am right. Unless, of course, you know better!
TTFN
Okay, okay. I have given some thought to this, and I really don't think anyone would be interested to read a posting from me that counters every trivial, circumstantial, hypothetical allegation that you have made in the course of your recent postings. (By the way, you have changed your ground a little haven't you - from altimeters, and the point of negligence etc.) It really would have to be a long, not to mention, meandering response.
Would it be possible, do you think, to wrap up your case, in the most important 'bullet points', as you see them. Perhaps you would even like to end it with the way in which you are able to satisfy yourself that there is "absolutely no doubt WHATSOEVER" that the cause of this crash was negligence on the part of both pilots. I am sure this would clarify your position for many of our readers. Not least me.
Incidentally, you seemed quite reluctant to confirm my assertion that this case is indeed unique. In that, no other deceased pilots have EVER been found guilty of negligence in the circumstances of no positive evidence apparent in this one. But of course you couldn't deny it either. So I guess we will all have to assume that I am right. Unless, of course, you know better!
TTFN
Guest
Posts: n/a
First things first,
Steadynote!!
I was not particularly concerned about remaining anonymous which is why I gave deails of my last posting, and exit date, and left the e-mail button available. I used K52 because it was my "first solo" on this site and that was my callsign for my "first solo" in Jet Provost Mk 3 XM474 from Acklington in 1965.
No doubt others have looked to see who I am. Some, like Brian Dixon, have had e-mail correspondence with me and have learnt my full name. All, up to now, have respected the rule of not posting anything "invasive of a person's privacy" - but as it was your first post, perhaps you didn't read that bit.
So, is this the start of some personal abuse or was it an innocent question? If the latter then you could have e-mailed me.
If it was a genuine mistake then I'm sorry for the acerbic reply. If it wasn't then I'm not!!
But what does it matter, I am a retired Spec Aircrew Flt Lt. We live in a 16th Century Cottage in a small village, next door to a Pub, and my Wife earns 50% more than I ever did.
John Nichol
I certainly take your point that we will never know for certain if they intended to nightstop at Kinloss. My apologies if I didn't make that clear. The evidence is circumstantial but, as I stated, in my opinion the lack of overnight kit; failure to book accommodation (or parking for the aircraft), and failure to take the F700 point to an intention to return that night. We will never know because of their failure to complete the mandatory out brief with the 230 Duty Auth. If they had intended to nightstop then where did they intend to record the A/F & B/F servicings, as well as the refuelling, because they left the F700 behind?
I have always agreed your point that the planned SALT for that leg was 2800ft, which incidentally several people have derided ACM Wratten for quoting. You also quoted the SALT as 5900ft in a previous post. My point is that the SALT of 2800ft was based on a obstacle some 35nm behind them, the 25nm SALT {the same radius as SALT's shown on TAP's} was 2500ft. If they had been flying the same route in reverse {Inverness to Aldergrove}, and had encountered the same conditions on the other side of the Mull, would you expect them to base their SALT on Ben Nevis 90nm behind them?
Regarding the Wx forecast and aftercast. There should be copies with the BOI,it is standard procedure to obtain them in the same way that it is standard procedure to impound relevant documentation such as engineering records and auth sheets etc.
As 2 different contributors have said that they don't have them then it is possible (assuming that those copies came from different sources) that those pages were missed out in the copying. Perhaps if you ask MoD politely?
If you want a chat e-mail me details, I might even buy you a pub lunch if you get out my way.
Pulse 1, Tandemrotor and Brian Dixon
Between the 3 of you the root cause of all the controversy surrounding this accident is readily apparent. The different perspectives that people apply to the same items of information:
Pulse 1 asks if I have a sinister motive. (NO)
Tandemrotor says my memory is "Vaguely accurate" (Thankyou)
Brian Dixon says my memory "is amazing" ( Thankyou Brian - I like you better) I don't have a copy of the BOI - but if someone would like to send me one? That includes MOD but if they don't have one to spare then what about a draft copy (hint).
Tandemrotor - you accused me of confirming something which I could not confirm. I do not know the answer - But, what about the Meteor(?) section leader who left 2,3 &4 embedded in Flamborough Head? Just a guess for starters.
K P
Steadynote!!
I was not particularly concerned about remaining anonymous which is why I gave deails of my last posting, and exit date, and left the e-mail button available. I used K52 because it was my "first solo" on this site and that was my callsign for my "first solo" in Jet Provost Mk 3 XM474 from Acklington in 1965.
No doubt others have looked to see who I am. Some, like Brian Dixon, have had e-mail correspondence with me and have learnt my full name. All, up to now, have respected the rule of not posting anything "invasive of a person's privacy" - but as it was your first post, perhaps you didn't read that bit.
So, is this the start of some personal abuse or was it an innocent question? If the latter then you could have e-mailed me.
If it was a genuine mistake then I'm sorry for the acerbic reply. If it wasn't then I'm not!!
But what does it matter, I am a retired Spec Aircrew Flt Lt. We live in a 16th Century Cottage in a small village, next door to a Pub, and my Wife earns 50% more than I ever did.
John Nichol
I certainly take your point that we will never know for certain if they intended to nightstop at Kinloss. My apologies if I didn't make that clear. The evidence is circumstantial but, as I stated, in my opinion the lack of overnight kit; failure to book accommodation (or parking for the aircraft), and failure to take the F700 point to an intention to return that night. We will never know because of their failure to complete the mandatory out brief with the 230 Duty Auth. If they had intended to nightstop then where did they intend to record the A/F & B/F servicings, as well as the refuelling, because they left the F700 behind?
I have always agreed your point that the planned SALT for that leg was 2800ft, which incidentally several people have derided ACM Wratten for quoting. You also quoted the SALT as 5900ft in a previous post. My point is that the SALT of 2800ft was based on a obstacle some 35nm behind them, the 25nm SALT {the same radius as SALT's shown on TAP's} was 2500ft. If they had been flying the same route in reverse {Inverness to Aldergrove}, and had encountered the same conditions on the other side of the Mull, would you expect them to base their SALT on Ben Nevis 90nm behind them?
Regarding the Wx forecast and aftercast. There should be copies with the BOI,it is standard procedure to obtain them in the same way that it is standard procedure to impound relevant documentation such as engineering records and auth sheets etc.
As 2 different contributors have said that they don't have them then it is possible (assuming that those copies came from different sources) that those pages were missed out in the copying. Perhaps if you ask MoD politely?
If you want a chat e-mail me details, I might even buy you a pub lunch if you get out my way.
Pulse 1, Tandemrotor and Brian Dixon
Between the 3 of you the root cause of all the controversy surrounding this accident is readily apparent. The different perspectives that people apply to the same items of information:
Pulse 1 asks if I have a sinister motive. (NO)
Tandemrotor says my memory is "Vaguely accurate" (Thankyou)
Brian Dixon says my memory "is amazing" ( Thankyou Brian - I like you better) I don't have a copy of the BOI - but if someone would like to send me one? That includes MOD but if they don't have one to spare then what about a draft copy (hint).
Tandemrotor - you accused me of confirming something which I could not confirm. I do not know the answer - But, what about the Meteor(?) section leader who left 2,3 &4 embedded in Flamborough Head? Just a guess for starters.
K P
Guest
Posts: n/a
K52
Hi there, I too regretted the fact that your monica had been included in a previous post. I guess it can, and should, be removed.
I was intrigued by your suggestion that, between Pulse 1, Brian, and myself, "the root cause of all the controversy surrounding this accident is readily apparent."
I genuinely would like to explore that idea more. Please would you elaborate.
I am also genuinely interested in the Meteor formation at Flamborough Head. Again, please would you tell us a little more, if only to allow us to ask relevant questions.
Cheers
PS. By the way, any chance of a pub lunch for me too, who knows, perhaps my 16th century cottage is right next door to yours?
[This message has been edited by Tandemrotor (edited 19 January 2001).]
Hi there, I too regretted the fact that your monica had been included in a previous post. I guess it can, and should, be removed.
I was intrigued by your suggestion that, between Pulse 1, Brian, and myself, "the root cause of all the controversy surrounding this accident is readily apparent."
I genuinely would like to explore that idea more. Please would you elaborate.
I am also genuinely interested in the Meteor formation at Flamborough Head. Again, please would you tell us a little more, if only to allow us to ask relevant questions.
Cheers
PS. By the way, any chance of a pub lunch for me too, who knows, perhaps my 16th century cottage is right next door to yours?
[This message has been edited by Tandemrotor (edited 19 January 2001).]
Guest
Posts: n/a
K52
You quote 3 different opinions of your motivation and/or the quality of your memory. There indeed is the rub. I dare say 50 aviators could look at the circumstances leading up to the Mull crash and all have different *opinions* as to the intention of the crew, which SALT was correct, whether they planned to return to Aldergrove, what happened in the immediate run-up to the crash etc, etc, etc.
That, I would contend is precisely why the RAF BofI rules stated that negligence (let alone gross negligence) on the part of deceased crew may only be found when there is no doubt whatsover that negligence was the cause.
I fail to see what possible bearing the crew's intention to return to Aldergrove or not has on this matter. No amount of speculation on the matters you raise changes the fact that no honest person can have *no doubt whatsoever* that negligence was the cause of this accident.
You quote 3 different opinions of your motivation and/or the quality of your memory. There indeed is the rub. I dare say 50 aviators could look at the circumstances leading up to the Mull crash and all have different *opinions* as to the intention of the crew, which SALT was correct, whether they planned to return to Aldergrove, what happened in the immediate run-up to the crash etc, etc, etc.
That, I would contend is precisely why the RAF BofI rules stated that negligence (let alone gross negligence) on the part of deceased crew may only be found when there is no doubt whatsover that negligence was the cause.
I fail to see what possible bearing the crew's intention to return to Aldergrove or not has on this matter. No amount of speculation on the matters you raise changes the fact that no honest person can have *no doubt whatsoever* that negligence was the cause of this accident.
Guest
Posts: n/a
K52,
A minor point - You get an award for stating the obvious. Of course any supposed negligence was alleged BEFORE the accident took place. A little late just after?
Please could you explain how you are so sure there is NO doubt that the VFR rules were broken at any one point in the flight? In the absence of an FDR there is no proof, only supposition.
It seems to me that the normal chains of command and authorisation sadly failed in this case but responsibilty for some of the "nibbling ducks" only moved downwards.
All those who could have stopped this flight or recalled it and are still around to draw their pay - one pace backwards MARCH! Oh, they did that already.
A minor point - You get an award for stating the obvious. Of course any supposed negligence was alleged BEFORE the accident took place. A little late just after?
Please could you explain how you are so sure there is NO doubt that the VFR rules were broken at any one point in the flight? In the absence of an FDR there is no proof, only supposition.
It seems to me that the normal chains of command and authorisation sadly failed in this case but responsibilty for some of the "nibbling ducks" only moved downwards.
All those who could have stopped this flight or recalled it and are still around to draw their pay - one pace backwards MARCH! Oh, they did that already.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Flamborough Head 1951
I have thought about the similarities between Kintyre and Flamborough Head. The facts of the latter incident were (to the best of my memory after 50 years!) as follows;-
In the summer of '51 203 AFS was flying from Carnaby (W. of Bridlingon) while the runway at Driffield was under repair. On the day in question the weather had been poor in the morning, but the stratus lifted after lunch and full flying was resumed. A formation took off, led by a very experienced instructor (a well-respected Master Pilot, I think)with two Dutch students as wing-men. The R Neth AF was buying Meteors and there was some pressure to pass these students out on time.
About 30 mins later stratus started to roll in again from the sea and a general recall was broadcast on Driffield Approach. The only approach aids available were a manual VHF/DF feeding into GCA. The manual homer required long transmissions (several seconds) to get a reliable bearing, so only about 5/6 aircraft could be handled at a time on a Controlled Descent (QGH). Driffield still used Meteor 4s which had an endurance of less than one hour (normal sorties were about 45 mins). Driffield approach was under pressure from solo aircraft declaring low fuel states. The formation leader therefore elected to do a free let-down with what help he could get from the Fighter Fixer Service (VHF/DF triangulation) and Carnaby Homer. he positioned his formation over the sea, well NE of Carnaby (so he thought) and began a descent through cloud on a southerly heading. His wingmen, although new to the meteor, were experienced fighter pilots and steady in formation. He expected to break cloud above 500ft over the sea, wait to obtain a True Bearing from Carnaby greater than 090 and then turn right onto West to run in over Bridlington, where the coast is low-lying. Unfortunately the winds at altitude were probably less strong than forecast and he started his descent closer to the coast than he thought. The coastline N of Flamborough Head trends NW/SE and the cliffs rise to about 250ft amsl. The leader did not gain contact with sea until about 150ft in poor visibility, unaware that he was closing with the cliffs at an angle. The leader saw the cliffs through the murk, yelled "pull up!" on the RT, scraped over the top himself, but his wingmen went in.
Inevitably, they threw the book at the leader. On reaching safety height, it was said, he should have declared an emergency, and if there was no alternate within range (there was not) he should have ordered his formation to bale out. However, since the Meteor 4 had no ejection seat, the chances of a successful bale-out (we had been told) were slight. It was always best to try to get the aircraft onto the ground, somewhere, somehow. I believe the instructor was acquitted of the main charge of negligence and found guilty of an alternative charge, for which he received a reprimand. He returned to flying duties with his honour unimpeached. But in this case, unlike the Kintyre accident, the leader survived to recount all the relevant mitigating circumstances.
PS I believe that in the morning I had been slated for this sortie myself, but it was cancelled due to weather. There but for the Grace...
------------------
presto digitate
I have thought about the similarities between Kintyre and Flamborough Head. The facts of the latter incident were (to the best of my memory after 50 years!) as follows;-
In the summer of '51 203 AFS was flying from Carnaby (W. of Bridlingon) while the runway at Driffield was under repair. On the day in question the weather had been poor in the morning, but the stratus lifted after lunch and full flying was resumed. A formation took off, led by a very experienced instructor (a well-respected Master Pilot, I think)with two Dutch students as wing-men. The R Neth AF was buying Meteors and there was some pressure to pass these students out on time.
About 30 mins later stratus started to roll in again from the sea and a general recall was broadcast on Driffield Approach. The only approach aids available were a manual VHF/DF feeding into GCA. The manual homer required long transmissions (several seconds) to get a reliable bearing, so only about 5/6 aircraft could be handled at a time on a Controlled Descent (QGH). Driffield still used Meteor 4s which had an endurance of less than one hour (normal sorties were about 45 mins). Driffield approach was under pressure from solo aircraft declaring low fuel states. The formation leader therefore elected to do a free let-down with what help he could get from the Fighter Fixer Service (VHF/DF triangulation) and Carnaby Homer. he positioned his formation over the sea, well NE of Carnaby (so he thought) and began a descent through cloud on a southerly heading. His wingmen, although new to the meteor, were experienced fighter pilots and steady in formation. He expected to break cloud above 500ft over the sea, wait to obtain a True Bearing from Carnaby greater than 090 and then turn right onto West to run in over Bridlington, where the coast is low-lying. Unfortunately the winds at altitude were probably less strong than forecast and he started his descent closer to the coast than he thought. The coastline N of Flamborough Head trends NW/SE and the cliffs rise to about 250ft amsl. The leader did not gain contact with sea until about 150ft in poor visibility, unaware that he was closing with the cliffs at an angle. The leader saw the cliffs through the murk, yelled "pull up!" on the RT, scraped over the top himself, but his wingmen went in.
Inevitably, they threw the book at the leader. On reaching safety height, it was said, he should have declared an emergency, and if there was no alternate within range (there was not) he should have ordered his formation to bale out. However, since the Meteor 4 had no ejection seat, the chances of a successful bale-out (we had been told) were slight. It was always best to try to get the aircraft onto the ground, somewhere, somehow. I believe the instructor was acquitted of the main charge of negligence and found guilty of an alternative charge, for which he received a reprimand. He returned to flying duties with his honour unimpeached. But in this case, unlike the Kintyre accident, the leader survived to recount all the relevant mitigating circumstances.
PS I believe that in the morning I had been slated for this sortie myself, but it was cancelled due to weather. There but for the Grace...
------------------
presto digitate
Guest
Posts: n/a
Can anyone out there prove me wrong? I am really beginning to believe now that this case is indeed unique. In other words, no other deceased aircrew ever HAVE been found guilty of negligence, without evidence from survivors, eye witnesses, FDRs, VCRs, radio calls etc.
Can that be right?
Can that be right?
Guest
Posts: n/a
Tandem, I stand ready to be corrected but I believe that the verdict of "gross negligence" has been passed on 2 crews:
1.The GR1 crash in the desert just before the war started. Don't really want to go into the details; if you know the accident you know what happened.
2.The F3 crash in Cyprus (steady descent into the sea).
Obviously, full ADR CVR evidence in both cases "proved" CFIT.
Can't find any others. Anyone know different?
1.The GR1 crash in the desert just before the war started. Don't really want to go into the details; if you know the accident you know what happened.
2.The F3 crash in Cyprus (steady descent into the sea).
Obviously, full ADR CVR evidence in both cases "proved" CFIT.
Can't find any others. Anyone know different?
Guest
Posts: n/a
I was forwarded a reply from John Spellar today by my MP. He questions my comment that the Chinook issue is having an effect on morale and recruiting after I supplied un named comments posted on the thread. Here's the section from the letter:
Mr Dixon suggests he has evidence that the Mull of Kintyre issue is directly influencing RAF recruitment levels and lowering morale. We do not have any evidence of this, and I should therefore be grateful if Mr Dixon would let me have any evidence so that we can examine the contention in more detail.
What I would like is for Spellar to be informed of exactly how this issue is affecting your morale or intent to join up. The more the merrier! Either write to him at:
MoD
Main Building
Whitehall
London SW1A 2HB
or e-mail me at the address below and I will compile them (again, no names if requested) and forward them on. Don't forget to tell you colleagues!
I'll keep you all informed.
Regards and thanks
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Mr Dixon suggests he has evidence that the Mull of Kintyre issue is directly influencing RAF recruitment levels and lowering morale. We do not have any evidence of this, and I should therefore be grateful if Mr Dixon would let me have any evidence so that we can examine the contention in more detail.
What I would like is for Spellar to be informed of exactly how this issue is affecting your morale or intent to join up. The more the merrier! Either write to him at:
MoD
Main Building
Whitehall
London SW1A 2HB
or e-mail me at the address below and I will compile them (again, no names if requested) and forward them on. Don't forget to tell you colleagues!
I'll keep you all informed.
Regards and thanks
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Guest
Posts: n/a
Well my emails to MP and MOD meant a reply by post was awaiting me after arrival back from business trip to USA.
Why does it take MOD one month and 10days to get their finger out and reply correctly.
I will not bother to write out the content of the letter from Mrs V J Bellchambers however suffice to say a serious matter like this does not need to have a templated letter same as sent to others with I believe the DAS ref indicating one of five of the same letter has been sent out.
Suffice to say a direct dial phone call will be made on Monday morning explaining I want answers to questions and not misjudged and misinformed low quality typed replies.
------------------
Why does it take MOD one month and 10days to get their finger out and reply correctly.
I will not bother to write out the content of the letter from Mrs V J Bellchambers however suffice to say a serious matter like this does not need to have a templated letter same as sent to others with I believe the DAS ref indicating one of five of the same letter has been sent out.
Suffice to say a direct dial phone call will be made on Monday morning explaining I want answers to questions and not misjudged and misinformed low quality typed replies.
------------------
Guest
Posts: n/a
Colin,
I am the lucky owner of three letters from Mrs Bellchambers. Each has the Ref DAS(Sec)58/1/5. I hope you have better luck that I did in telephoning. Please let me know how you get on.
With regard to the delay in replying to any letters, I am still waiting for a reply sent to the PM on 2 Dec 00!! Not even an acknowledgement this time. This is how much personal attention he gives the matter.
Don't forget to let me know if this is part of the morale issue.
Regards all
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
I am the lucky owner of three letters from Mrs Bellchambers. Each has the Ref DAS(Sec)58/1/5. I hope you have better luck that I did in telephoning. Please let me know how you get on.
With regard to the delay in replying to any letters, I am still waiting for a reply sent to the PM on 2 Dec 00!! Not even an acknowledgement this time. This is how much personal attention he gives the matter.
Don't forget to let me know if this is part of the morale issue.
Regards all
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Guest
Posts: n/a
Guys just a quickie - I have found that around where I live the Mull issue is seriously affecting people's opinions of and confidence in the Royal Air Force. This bothers me - a lot. It will be intersting to discover if this disquiet does in fact have a bearing on recruitment and retention.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Bad,
how can this be so?? Minister Spellar says that there is no evidence of this. Surely he knows best. After all, he appears to know more about the Chinook crash than anyone else (not that he's letting on). His confident appearence with Paxman should have told you that!
With regard to the confidence issue, see my posting a few entries higher up. If these people would either like to get in touch with me, or write direct to Minister Spellar expressing their concern, he may then have to accept the fact that there are indeed wider issues surrounding the crash.
Regards
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
how can this be so?? Minister Spellar says that there is no evidence of this. Surely he knows best. After all, he appears to know more about the Chinook crash than anyone else (not that he's letting on). His confident appearence with Paxman should have told you that!
With regard to the confidence issue, see my posting a few entries higher up. If these people would either like to get in touch with me, or write direct to Minister Spellar expressing their concern, he may then have to accept the fact that there are indeed wider issues surrounding the crash.
Regards
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Guest
Posts: n/a
There was a meeting of the Mull of Kintyre Group yesterday. As soon as I have an update of the meeting, I'll post it here.
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
