Chinook - Hit Back Here
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WHOA!
Tandemrotor! You cannot compare the BOI with a TRIAL! The BOI is an inquiry, set out to ascertain the facts and reach a conclusion as to what went wrong. A trial does the same, except that the jury is required to decide who is guilty (if anyone). The judge then decides the sentence.
What went wrong here was that the Sen Offs concerned expressed an opinion (which they were perfectly entitled to do), but that a large volume of informed opinion agree that the conclusion they reached was in error, according to the laid down procedures (in the AP). Also, the BOI and/or the Sen Offs concerned are ENTITLED to find guilt, if the evidence warrants it. In such a case, the BOI procedure would trigger the preliminaries to Court martial.
By the very nature of the BOI and the environment in which it is held (ie it is an in-house procedure), everybody involved has a connection with the case, if for no other reason than the Board is composed of uniformed EXPERTS, some of whom will probably know, have worked with and socialised with the individuals involved.
No, I’m sorry old sport, to answer your question, there was no trial, therefore there can be no mis-trial. The best we can hope for is that someone of the calibre of our present CAS will stamp his feet and order a review, despite the s**t that would be slung his way by our political SERVANTS.
Tandemrotor! You cannot compare the BOI with a TRIAL! The BOI is an inquiry, set out to ascertain the facts and reach a conclusion as to what went wrong. A trial does the same, except that the jury is required to decide who is guilty (if anyone). The judge then decides the sentence.
What went wrong here was that the Sen Offs concerned expressed an opinion (which they were perfectly entitled to do), but that a large volume of informed opinion agree that the conclusion they reached was in error, according to the laid down procedures (in the AP). Also, the BOI and/or the Sen Offs concerned are ENTITLED to find guilt, if the evidence warrants it. In such a case, the BOI procedure would trigger the preliminaries to Court martial.
By the very nature of the BOI and the environment in which it is held (ie it is an in-house procedure), everybody involved has a connection with the case, if for no other reason than the Board is composed of uniformed EXPERTS, some of whom will probably know, have worked with and socialised with the individuals involved.
No, I’m sorry old sport, to answer your question, there was no trial, therefore there can be no mis-trial. The best we can hope for is that someone of the calibre of our present CAS will stamp his feet and order a review, despite the s**t that would be slung his way by our political SERVANTS.
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Lets not confuse ourselves with analogies between trials, tribunals and boards. Any legally constituted body or any body exercising a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative function in accordance with a power conferred by statute which affects the rights or legitimate expectations of others and acts in accordance with the rules of natural justice is susceptible to review. The Air Force Board of Enquiry rules and regulations are based in statute under the Air Force Constitution Act 1917. Therefore if the rules are not operated in accordance with the rules of natural justice then I would argue that the decision is reviewable. Whether or not the decision is made by one man, two men, three men or twelve is irrelevant. The Board and all the people confirming the decisions thereof have a duty to act fairly and to be seen to have acted fairly.
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To be fair to Flatiron I can tell you that AVM Day was convinced by his own argument. When I first got involved in the case he granted me an "off the record" interview - the only time he has ever spoken about the case outside of MOD circles. His arguments were very persuasive (so good, in fact, that I almost give up the case; he had me convinced). By all accounts he still gives the same brief to Ministers. It was not until I spoke to serving Chinook operators that I began to understand the flaws in his arguments.
As it was off the record I can't tell you what he said - Oh sod it -
He did say that he thought Andy Pulford was cowardly and had dodged making the big decision that Day himself then had to make.
In a very telling aside he also said that they had used the TANS as a "basic ADR" to reconstruct the flight. I think that this has really shaped the MODs thinking; they BELIEVE that they know what happened in the final seconds of flight. I've written a fairly comprehensive critique of the way the TANS was used; needless to say it is anything but an ADR, basic or otherwise.
To answer your question GICASI - no, I don't think he regrets it at all. He thinks he was right.
As it was off the record I can't tell you what he said - Oh sod it -
He did say that he thought Andy Pulford was cowardly and had dodged making the big decision that Day himself then had to make.
In a very telling aside he also said that they had used the TANS as a "basic ADR" to reconstruct the flight. I think that this has really shaped the MODs thinking; they BELIEVE that they know what happened in the final seconds of flight. I've written a fairly comprehensive critique of the way the TANS was used; needless to say it is anything but an ADR, basic or otherwise.
To answer your question GICASI - no, I don't think he regrets it at all. He thinks he was right.
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I am fascinated by the length of this thread and that John N is still there punching away - which I applaud.
However, I have a pertient question.
In spite of some compelling arguments against the great white chiefs and their minnions, jurors, etc., etc., etc., Could any of the above influence another 'trial' to get to the real truth which, on the face of it, is here right in this thread. Would/could the MOD be forced, coerced or whatever to re-open the case and make the fools look bigger fools than they already are? And then give a verdict that indicates EXACTLY what happened.
However, I have a pertient question.
In spite of some compelling arguments against the great white chiefs and their minnions, jurors, etc., etc., etc., Could any of the above influence another 'trial' to get to the real truth which, on the face of it, is here right in this thread. Would/could the MOD be forced, coerced or whatever to re-open the case and make the fools look bigger fools than they already are? And then give a verdict that indicates EXACTLY what happened.
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Flatiron,
I may be missing something, but I do not believe comparing the BOI to a civil court is valid.
As I understand it a civil jury finds guilty when it believes a case is proven "beyond reasonable doubt". I do not believe any civil jury would find guilty in this case if the yardstick of proof was "absolutely no doubt whatsoever".
I may be missing something, but I do not believe comparing the BOI to a civil court is valid.
As I understand it a civil jury finds guilty when it believes a case is proven "beyond reasonable doubt". I do not believe any civil jury would find guilty in this case if the yardstick of proof was "absolutely no doubt whatsoever".
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InFin,
An excellent point, and a one that has worried me for some time. If the highest authority in the land (The Def Sec and the PM) have said that they don't accept what seems to be a pretty convincing argument, where can you go?
Well, the idea of a Select Committee is still being examined though I presume its findings could also be rejected.
A juidicial review is a possibility though prohibitively expensive.
Any other thoughts?
An excellent point, and a one that has worried me for some time. If the highest authority in the land (The Def Sec and the PM) have said that they don't accept what seems to be a pretty convincing argument, where can you go?
Well, the idea of a Select Committee is still being examined though I presume its findings could also be rejected.
A juidicial review is a possibility though prohibitively expensive.
Any other thoughts?
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Thanks for all the comments.
I am not saying that a BOI equates to a trial - as I have said before, if the RAF wanted to discipline anyone after an accident investigation, it would have to initiate a separate Summary of Evidence first. The point I was trying to make was that Geoff Hoon can no more overturn the verdict of a properly and legally constituted BoI than Jack Straw can unilaterally overturn the verdict of a legally constituted civil jury.
Consequently, pleas to Geoff Hoon to 'quash' the Kintyre findings will get nowhere. That might work in a dictatorship, but not in the UK where there a distinct gulf between the executive and the judiciary. What you have to do is persuade him to get the inquiry re-opened. And this is best done by informed pressure, rather than personal slurs on anyone.
As an aside, much mention has been made of the BoI President, Andy Pulford. For the past two years, Gp Capt Pulford has been Personal Staff Officer to the Chief of Air Staff, which means he has been in-face-to- face contact with Dick Johns and Peter Squire for an average of 2 hours per day. I think it is safe to assume that if Gp Capt Pulford had had any doubts about the use to which the findings of his BoI were put, he would have had ample opportunity to express them at the highest level.
I am not saying that a BOI equates to a trial - as I have said before, if the RAF wanted to discipline anyone after an accident investigation, it would have to initiate a separate Summary of Evidence first. The point I was trying to make was that Geoff Hoon can no more overturn the verdict of a properly and legally constituted BoI than Jack Straw can unilaterally overturn the verdict of a legally constituted civil jury.
Consequently, pleas to Geoff Hoon to 'quash' the Kintyre findings will get nowhere. That might work in a dictatorship, but not in the UK where there a distinct gulf between the executive and the judiciary. What you have to do is persuade him to get the inquiry re-opened. And this is best done by informed pressure, rather than personal slurs on anyone.
As an aside, much mention has been made of the BoI President, Andy Pulford. For the past two years, Gp Capt Pulford has been Personal Staff Officer to the Chief of Air Staff, which means he has been in-face-to- face contact with Dick Johns and Peter Squire for an average of 2 hours per day. I think it is safe to assume that if Gp Capt Pulford had had any doubts about the use to which the findings of his BoI were put, he would have had ample opportunity to express them at the highest level.
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I believe Andy Pulford did once express his opinion to senior officers regarding the use to which his BOI has been put.
Corporal Pulford sends his regards to everyone who knows him, and says cleaning toilets at RAF Boulmer really isn't that bad after all.
Corporal Pulford sends his regards to everyone who knows him, and says cleaning toilets at RAF Boulmer really isn't that bad after all.
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At last a reply to my two letters, one to Blair and one to Hoon in response to the PAC Report:
Thank you for your letters of 2 December to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence about the Chinook accident on the Mull of Kintyre on 2 June 1994. Your letters have been passed to this Branch in the Ministry of Defence for response as we have responsibility for this matter and I hope you will accept this letter as a reply to both of them.
You refer to the media coverage following the publication of the Public Accounts Committee’s (PAC) 45t1’t Report on the acceptance of the Chinook Mark 2 into service, which links problems experienced during the Chinook acceptance process to the Mull of Kintyre accident. I should explain that the MOD had early sight of this report and we were disappointed to find that the Committee had accepted comprehensive and detailed briefing from those campaigning to overturn the finding of the Board of Inquiry into the Mull accident without giving due weight to the Departments views. We will respond formally to the specific points raised by the Committee on the acceptance of the Chinook Mk2 shortly. I would, however, point out that the Defence Committee in its 1998 report on lessons learnt from the Chinook accident, found that there was no compelling evidence of fundamental flaws in the design of the Chinook or its components.
It may help if I explain why the RAF Board of Inquiry, which was painstakingly thorough, reached the conclusion it did. Investigators from the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAJB) of the Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions, carried out a detailed technical investigation. The Inquiry concluded that there was no evidence of any technical malfunction that could possibly have caused the crash. However the Board of Inquiry established that about twenty seconds before the crash, the crew re-set their navigational computer, a telling indicator that they were not then grappling with an in-flight emergency as subsequent media speculation has suggested.
The MOD has always said that if new evidence were to come to light, it would be examined with scrupulous care, thoroughness and compassion. To date we have seen nothing that causes us to doubt the integrity of the verdict of the RAE Board of Inquiry, or would prompt us to hold a new Inquiry.
I hope this explains the position.
Any similarity to stiknrudda’s reply posted on 5 Jan is entirely to be expected as mine too was written by Miss V L U.
Her third paragraph would suggest that she has not actually read the ‘painstakingly thorough’ BOI report, which until the intervention of the reviewing officers found, as Tandemrotor explains so well, no reason to cite human failings as a cause. She obediently sticks to the MOD line (re-iterated in the 1998 defence committee report) that the BOI report and its reviewing officers’ remarks cannot be considered seperately, and that new evidence is required in order to reopen the Inquiry.
Why do these people willfully ignore the argument that our case is that sufficient doubt exists to overturn the original verdict. That requires no new evidence.
K52 and Flatiron,
I don’t know the lapse rate on the day. I simply put forward that it was almost certainly not possible within the clearance of the Chinook Mk 2 to complete this transit in IMC. Since their failure to do so is used as a stick to beat them by Wratten, that makes it pertinent.
As CICASI points out: No-one on this planet can affirm why that Chinook crashed on that day, to a standard of proof equal to 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever', and so the finding of gross negligence is unsafe in RAF law and common sense.
Thank you for your letters of 2 December to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence about the Chinook accident on the Mull of Kintyre on 2 June 1994. Your letters have been passed to this Branch in the Ministry of Defence for response as we have responsibility for this matter and I hope you will accept this letter as a reply to both of them.
You refer to the media coverage following the publication of the Public Accounts Committee’s (PAC) 45t1’t Report on the acceptance of the Chinook Mark 2 into service, which links problems experienced during the Chinook acceptance process to the Mull of Kintyre accident. I should explain that the MOD had early sight of this report and we were disappointed to find that the Committee had accepted comprehensive and detailed briefing from those campaigning to overturn the finding of the Board of Inquiry into the Mull accident without giving due weight to the Departments views. We will respond formally to the specific points raised by the Committee on the acceptance of the Chinook Mk2 shortly. I would, however, point out that the Defence Committee in its 1998 report on lessons learnt from the Chinook accident, found that there was no compelling evidence of fundamental flaws in the design of the Chinook or its components.
It may help if I explain why the RAF Board of Inquiry, which was painstakingly thorough, reached the conclusion it did. Investigators from the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAJB) of the Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions, carried out a detailed technical investigation. The Inquiry concluded that there was no evidence of any technical malfunction that could possibly have caused the crash. However the Board of Inquiry established that about twenty seconds before the crash, the crew re-set their navigational computer, a telling indicator that they were not then grappling with an in-flight emergency as subsequent media speculation has suggested.
The MOD has always said that if new evidence were to come to light, it would be examined with scrupulous care, thoroughness and compassion. To date we have seen nothing that causes us to doubt the integrity of the verdict of the RAE Board of Inquiry, or would prompt us to hold a new Inquiry.
I hope this explains the position.
Any similarity to stiknrudda’s reply posted on 5 Jan is entirely to be expected as mine too was written by Miss V L U.
Her third paragraph would suggest that she has not actually read the ‘painstakingly thorough’ BOI report, which until the intervention of the reviewing officers found, as Tandemrotor explains so well, no reason to cite human failings as a cause. She obediently sticks to the MOD line (re-iterated in the 1998 defence committee report) that the BOI report and its reviewing officers’ remarks cannot be considered seperately, and that new evidence is required in order to reopen the Inquiry.
Why do these people willfully ignore the argument that our case is that sufficient doubt exists to overturn the original verdict. That requires no new evidence.
K52 and Flatiron,
I don’t know the lapse rate on the day. I simply put forward that it was almost certainly not possible within the clearance of the Chinook Mk 2 to complete this transit in IMC. Since their failure to do so is used as a stick to beat them by Wratten, that makes it pertinent.
As CICASI points out: No-one on this planet can affirm why that Chinook crashed on that day, to a standard of proof equal to 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever', and so the finding of gross negligence is unsafe in RAF law and common sense.
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Four questions for our Secretary of State:
Your department consistently states that the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAJB) of the Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions, carried out a detailed technical investigation. The Inquiry
concluded that there was no evidence of any technical malfunction that could possibly have caused the crash.
Does an absence of evidence prove beyond all doubt that a technical malfunction did not occur?
As Secretary of State, does your department acknowledge crashes can occur with "no fault found"?
Was the AAIB able to say, beyond all doubt, that the 20% of ZD576 that was obliterated could not have provided the slightest clue to this accident?
What is your view of the post-impact position of the pilots' foot pedals?
Your department consistently states that the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAJB) of the Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions, carried out a detailed technical investigation. The Inquiry
concluded that there was no evidence of any technical malfunction that could possibly have caused the crash.
Does an absence of evidence prove beyond all doubt that a technical malfunction did not occur?
As Secretary of State, does your department acknowledge crashes can occur with "no fault found"?
Was the AAIB able to say, beyond all doubt, that the 20% of ZD576 that was obliterated could not have provided the slightest clue to this accident?
What is your view of the post-impact position of the pilots' foot pedals?
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Tandemrotor
re your post 10 Jan @2224.
I did not say that and I do not believe that anyone could assert that. To do so one would have to go through 83 years worth of accident enquiries at IFS, AHB and the PRO. A fair task given that in the 2 years leading up to November 1939 no less than 478 aircraft of Bomber Command forced landed due to the Pilots "losing their way". The same Command lost 8305 Aircrew due to flying training and other accidents during the war.
GICASI
As I said in my original post the BOI was being Staffed when I arrived at HQ1Gp. You are quite right that the 1Gp Flight Safety Office has gone, it disappeared when 1Gp moved from Benson to High Wycombe in 1996 - the FS1 post was disestablished and the GFSO post was absorbed into STC Flight Safety.
The FS staff distributed copies of the BOI to all relevant Departments within Gp as well as the Eng staff at HQ STC, IAM, SCSR etc for specialist comment. Replies were then collated by FS and forwarded through SASO to the AOC. I would not comment on ANY of the papers relating to ANY of the BOI's I saw as in some cases they were, in effect, discussion documents containing different perspectives. They were not meant for publication and were, in effect, " off the record".
Flatiron and FJJP are correct, the BOI is an administrative tool and the evidence, although give on oath, is priviliged. It cannot be used as evidence in any legal proceedings. To initiate legal proceedings a Summary of Evidence has to be taken.
I have been accused of being engrossed in trivia. That may be the perspective of some but my limited experience in the FS world, and somewhat larger experience of BOI's, showed me that the truth is often buried in the evidence. I can think of at least one crew who might be willing to buy me a beer for digging in to what was concealed in the pages of their BOI during my short time at 1 Gp.
A recent e-mail I received sums it all up, for me anyway; QUOTE I see that PULSE 1 has got the nub of it and he only has a PPL UNQUOTE.
The finding of negligence was for continuing to fly towards the Mull in conditions that precluded flight in VFR.
There is one point that I never understood. The BOI, if it feels that it unable to find a definite cause of the accident; has to give what, in its opinion, is the most likely cause and in this instance the BOI decided that the most likely cause was " selecting an inappropriate rate of climb."
I do not see how, if an aircraft is approaching a KNOWN OBSTACLE on its route and selects "an in appropriate rate of climb" to clear that obstacle it does not attract a finding of negligence.
re your post 10 Jan @2224.
I did not say that and I do not believe that anyone could assert that. To do so one would have to go through 83 years worth of accident enquiries at IFS, AHB and the PRO. A fair task given that in the 2 years leading up to November 1939 no less than 478 aircraft of Bomber Command forced landed due to the Pilots "losing their way". The same Command lost 8305 Aircrew due to flying training and other accidents during the war.
GICASI
As I said in my original post the BOI was being Staffed when I arrived at HQ1Gp. You are quite right that the 1Gp Flight Safety Office has gone, it disappeared when 1Gp moved from Benson to High Wycombe in 1996 - the FS1 post was disestablished and the GFSO post was absorbed into STC Flight Safety.
The FS staff distributed copies of the BOI to all relevant Departments within Gp as well as the Eng staff at HQ STC, IAM, SCSR etc for specialist comment. Replies were then collated by FS and forwarded through SASO to the AOC. I would not comment on ANY of the papers relating to ANY of the BOI's I saw as in some cases they were, in effect, discussion documents containing different perspectives. They were not meant for publication and were, in effect, " off the record".
Flatiron and FJJP are correct, the BOI is an administrative tool and the evidence, although give on oath, is priviliged. It cannot be used as evidence in any legal proceedings. To initiate legal proceedings a Summary of Evidence has to be taken.
I have been accused of being engrossed in trivia. That may be the perspective of some but my limited experience in the FS world, and somewhat larger experience of BOI's, showed me that the truth is often buried in the evidence. I can think of at least one crew who might be willing to buy me a beer for digging in to what was concealed in the pages of their BOI during my short time at 1 Gp.
A recent e-mail I received sums it all up, for me anyway; QUOTE I see that PULSE 1 has got the nub of it and he only has a PPL UNQUOTE.
The finding of negligence was for continuing to fly towards the Mull in conditions that precluded flight in VFR.
There is one point that I never understood. The BOI, if it feels that it unable to find a definite cause of the accident; has to give what, in its opinion, is the most likely cause and in this instance the BOI decided that the most likely cause was " selecting an inappropriate rate of climb."
I do not see how, if an aircraft is approaching a KNOWN OBSTACLE on its route and selects "an in appropriate rate of climb" to clear that obstacle it does not attract a finding of negligence.
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K52
I'm flattered that someone should be quoting me but surely, if the BoI HAS to offer the most LIKELY cause, this in itself implies a high degree of DOUBT. How then can the finding of "gross negligence" stand.
In my view you are clearly strengthening the argument for changing this finding. Thank you.
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"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
I'm flattered that someone should be quoting me but surely, if the BoI HAS to offer the most LIKELY cause, this in itself implies a high degree of DOUBT. How then can the finding of "gross negligence" stand.
In my view you are clearly strengthening the argument for changing this finding. Thank you.
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"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
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I have been following this thread for a while.
What puzzles me about the situation is MoD's intransigence on this matter. What harm would it do to admit that the pilots were not at fault? Not wishing to sound like a conspiracy nut, but do MoD have something to fear from a new enquiry being opened and therefore are determined not to overthrow the negligence verdict? Is there something they feel they have to hide (other than protecting the butt of a particular senior and still serving officer)?
As far as Hoon goes, he is nothing but a mouth piece for Blair; that is why he is in post. Robertson was too independently minded for TB to control therefore he puts in a yes-man. Blair is not known for following deeply unpopular causes so what is he up to?
Just my two pence worth.
What puzzles me about the situation is MoD's intransigence on this matter. What harm would it do to admit that the pilots were not at fault? Not wishing to sound like a conspiracy nut, but do MoD have something to fear from a new enquiry being opened and therefore are determined not to overthrow the negligence verdict? Is there something they feel they have to hide (other than protecting the butt of a particular senior and still serving officer)?
As far as Hoon goes, he is nothing but a mouth piece for Blair; that is why he is in post. Robertson was too independently minded for TB to control therefore he puts in a yes-man. Blair is not known for following deeply unpopular causes so what is he up to?
Just my two pence worth.
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John N, it seems to me after my last post and your obvious frustration, that a new line of attack is required, nay imperative. It also seems to me that a sort of "people's champion" is required. Someone who couldn't give a toss about the MOD, or the idiots who reached the conclusions they did. Those findings are clearly flawed and negligence has never been proved - "must have been negligent" would be slander in civil courts.
The findings of W&D should be declared biased, unfair and a new JUDICIAL review should be ordered with NO involvement by the MOD, or the Services but by a aviation man honest through and through who will get to the real truth.
Hiding behind a impenetrable screen is just the thing that those chosen to conduct the last enquiry would have predictably used to protect themselves, the military, and anyone else who was or is guilty of malpractice - of ANY kind or description.
Such a man exists. Who is he? David Mellor - not as mad as it sounds - he's a tenacious bugger. The CAA AIB under the aegis of the CAA and not the MOD would be my choice. And ALL those brilliant gentlemen would have carte blanche to investigate ALL records, and seek and find those that have, perhaps, been deliberately witheld or conveniently forgotten. And who will use intelligent and answer seeking questions and who will not jump to conclusions.
A select committee is NOT the answer in my view. The questions would be as good as next to nothing. Remember, "are you now, or have you ever been a member of the communist party?" a simple NO answers the question.
Mind you Mrs Dunwoody is good, but not aviation minded, and therefore good enough. Gerald Kaufman deters people giving answers by his demeanour and arrogance.
No, it needs an unbiased, independent review, with top level ministerial support, and only the PM will do. No interference, and penalities for non-coperation. It needs a man of iron who will not allow any crap.
A judicial review is the only way. One final way to get to the truth. It is owed to the Pilots whose names have been dragged back and forth in the mud, and it is certainly owed to the very special passengers on board. At the end of it there should then be a board to let it be known that Wratten and 'crew' were probably guilty of the most serious and wayward shortcomings.
Draconian? You betcha! But is there another way?
[This message has been edited by InFinRetirement (edited 14 January 2001).]
The findings of W&D should be declared biased, unfair and a new JUDICIAL review should be ordered with NO involvement by the MOD, or the Services but by a aviation man honest through and through who will get to the real truth.
Hiding behind a impenetrable screen is just the thing that those chosen to conduct the last enquiry would have predictably used to protect themselves, the military, and anyone else who was or is guilty of malpractice - of ANY kind or description.
Such a man exists. Who is he? David Mellor - not as mad as it sounds - he's a tenacious bugger. The CAA AIB under the aegis of the CAA and not the MOD would be my choice. And ALL those brilliant gentlemen would have carte blanche to investigate ALL records, and seek and find those that have, perhaps, been deliberately witheld or conveniently forgotten. And who will use intelligent and answer seeking questions and who will not jump to conclusions.
A select committee is NOT the answer in my view. The questions would be as good as next to nothing. Remember, "are you now, or have you ever been a member of the communist party?" a simple NO answers the question.
Mind you Mrs Dunwoody is good, but not aviation minded, and therefore good enough. Gerald Kaufman deters people giving answers by his demeanour and arrogance.
No, it needs an unbiased, independent review, with top level ministerial support, and only the PM will do. No interference, and penalities for non-coperation. It needs a man of iron who will not allow any crap.
A judicial review is the only way. One final way to get to the truth. It is owed to the Pilots whose names have been dragged back and forth in the mud, and it is certainly owed to the very special passengers on board. At the end of it there should then be a board to let it be known that Wratten and 'crew' were probably guilty of the most serious and wayward shortcomings.
Draconian? You betcha! But is there another way?
[This message has been edited by InFinRetirement (edited 14 January 2001).]
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There is no evidence to conclude that the pilots were in control of the Chinook when it crashed.
No one has been able to identify the Chinook with patchwork camouflage sighted near Portrush in North Antrim about 5:30 pm on the evening of the crash.
As for records, it is reported that tasking records for the period of the crash were destroyed three weeks before Christmas. This more or less coincides with the time that tasking records were mentioned following John Nichol's letter to the Times on December 5. The destruction of the records was described as routine.
No one has been able to identify the Chinook with patchwork camouflage sighted near Portrush in North Antrim about 5:30 pm on the evening of the crash.
As for records, it is reported that tasking records for the period of the crash were destroyed three weeks before Christmas. This more or less coincides with the time that tasking records were mentioned following John Nichol's letter to the Times on December 5. The destruction of the records was described as routine.
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Just a couple of points.
Infin. Another 'trial' would provide nothing new. It is a review of the Board reviewing officer's findings that needs to be addressed. All available evidence is there. It just fails to lend support to their verdict. They have also shown disregard for their own rules. That is what should be addressed and rectified.
K52. You say the finding of negligence was for continuing to fly towards the Mull. At what point on the route did it change from acceptable to negligent, and why. Where is your evidence to show that the pilots did absolutely nothing to avoid the accident.
Trailfinder. Welcome to the debate. I don't know why the MoD are reluctant. Might have something to do with rushed introduction of aircraft with dubious servicability (allegedly), or a sacrificial lamb was needed for the loss of such a valuable pax list (plus specialist crew). I would love to know why. Perhaps that are not saying as they know there will be a counter to their argument.
Infin (again). I believe the Select Committee being considered by Lord Chalfont may prove interesting. Especially if he chooses to get the two Air Marshals to make personal appearences. I don't know whether that is the case, but it is a pleasant thought. They were not called for either the FAI in Scotland or by the PAC, and I for one think they should have their turn in the hot seat.
Ben. Agree with your comment over whether the pilots were in control or fighting for control, but please, please forget this other Chinook. It has no bearing as far as I can see. I do not mean to be rude by this post either. Honest!!
Regards all
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Infin. Another 'trial' would provide nothing new. It is a review of the Board reviewing officer's findings that needs to be addressed. All available evidence is there. It just fails to lend support to their verdict. They have also shown disregard for their own rules. That is what should be addressed and rectified.
K52. You say the finding of negligence was for continuing to fly towards the Mull. At what point on the route did it change from acceptable to negligent, and why. Where is your evidence to show that the pilots did absolutely nothing to avoid the accident.
Trailfinder. Welcome to the debate. I don't know why the MoD are reluctant. Might have something to do with rushed introduction of aircraft with dubious servicability (allegedly), or a sacrificial lamb was needed for the loss of such a valuable pax list (plus specialist crew). I would love to know why. Perhaps that are not saying as they know there will be a counter to their argument.
Infin (again). I believe the Select Committee being considered by Lord Chalfont may prove interesting. Especially if he chooses to get the two Air Marshals to make personal appearences. I don't know whether that is the case, but it is a pleasant thought. They were not called for either the FAI in Scotland or by the PAC, and I for one think they should have their turn in the hot seat.
Ben. Agree with your comment over whether the pilots were in control or fighting for control, but please, please forget this other Chinook. It has no bearing as far as I can see. I do not mean to be rude by this post either. Honest!!
Regards all
Brian
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"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Brian,
You asked me "when did it become negligence."
The simplistic answer is once they failed to maintain the minimum criteria for VFR flight. However, aviation, like life, is rarely that simple. Several contributors to this thread have used the analogy "nibbled to death by ducks." I would put it slightly differently; I think that some of the ducks that they had been feeding turned round and bit them.
You will remember that the decision had been taken to utilise one crew for all the days tasking and give the other crew a "day off". The BOI decided that there was no administrative reason why this should not be the case, although it does not tell us when this decision was made. You will also remember that in my first post I questioned whether this was a judicious use of crew resources.
The morning tasking was scheduled to take 5 flying hours out of the 7 flying hours normally allowed in the NI crew duty period. This 7 hour limit could be extended by one hour by the 230 Sqn Duty Auth Sqn Ldr or further by SRAFONI. So if all went to plan they could do the round trip in the evening with the 1 hr extension from the Duty Auth, which was almost certain to be given. As far as normal authorisation was concerned the Chinook detatchment was self authorising.
The morning tasking actually took five and a half flying hours. This not only reduced the margins available in which to complete the evening sorties but reduced the time available to prepare for them. The Met briefing arrived by fax (no time to go to see Met for a face to face brief?)and the crew departed to see the Duty Auth to brief him on the sorties and negotiate a 1hr extension to flying duty time.
Unfortunately, the Duty Auth was tied up with another crew and departure time was looming. They photocopied their charts and left them for the Duty Auth and departed without obtaining the flying time extension they needed. The interesting thing about the photocopied charts is that the writing on them does not belong to either of the Pilots who were now doing the sortie. I understand that the other crew did the planning on the assumption that they would do the sortie as the first crew were already planned to do a 5 flying hour (out of a normal 7 allowed) task.
Jayteeto has told us that the Mk1 Chinook was U/S otherwise it would have done the task. Is it possible that the sortie was planned on the basis that the Mk1 would be used? If that was the case, and the planning was not adjusted by the crew of ZD576 in the light of the much more restrictive icing limitations of the Mk2, then perhaps the negligence started here.
Back at the aircraft they found that there were delays due to late arriving Pax and baggage. This was now threatening to impinge on the overall crew duty day period of 14 hrs if they were to complete the task and return to Aldergrove that evening. They also had the imponderables of how long it would take to offload Pax and Baggage at Inverness and how long would it take to refuel at Kinloss. (From personal experience I know that the latter could involve a considerable wait for a bowser outside normal office hours in those days).
Although not specifically stated in the BOI I have little doubt that the crew planned to return that evening. They did not take the F700 with them, they had not booked overnight accommodation - or parking - and the pilots had no overnight kit with them.
I would suggest that they now had three options:
1. Call for the other crew to do the task, which would involve further delay - and probably involve some embarrassing questions in the morning.
2. Request a crew duty extension or permision to nightstop out of theatre from SRAFONI. Ditto regarding questions.
3. Try to make up as much time as possible around the route.
They certainly did not plump for either option 1 or 2. The evidence suggests that they were implementing option 3.
I stand by my earlier posts; the distance from Aldergrove to the crash point is 43nm in a straight line and the aircraft was airborne for 17 minutes. That is an average groundspeed of 152kts but it does not allow for acceleration time after lift off. I do not know how quickly a Chinook accelerates but, if we assume that it takes one minute to get from zero to 120kts, then it will do so whilst covering 1nm. That would leave the remaining straight line distance of 42nm to be covered in 16 minutes - a required groundspeed of 158kts. We do know, however, that it did NOT travel directly to the Mull but departed initially to the east. I postulated in an earlier post that this could have added an extra track mileage of 3nm. If that were true then the required average groundspeed becomes 169 kts. Whatever calculation you make,the required groundspeed to cover the distance in the 17 minutes from lift-off to accident is considerably in excess of the planned 120kts.
There has been considerable debate in respect of SALT around the Mull and whether ZD576 could have safely climbed to SALT without infringing the icing limitations of the Mk2 Chinook. Initially it was maintained that SALT was contingent on the proximity of Ben Nevis. Ben Nevis is 95nm from the crash position - to base SALT on that feature is akin to basing SALT for London Heathrow on the height of the cranes in Boulogne or Calais Docks (93nm). The planned SALT for the first leg was based on a mast in Belfast and the 25nm SALT for the Mull is 2500ft. What none of those who claim to have access to the BOI (which contains both the Met forecast and the aftercast) have disclosed is the height of the +4 degree isotherm.
The final sighting of ZD576 was by the yachtsman when the aircraft was 2 miles from the fog enshrouded lighthouse. At that point they were already contravening the rules for VFR flight yet they continued without deviation as observed by the yachtsman.
OC RAF Odiham made the point in his comments that a climb at an IAS of 150kts was not " recognisable as a Chinook technique". But if you are trying to make up time, and don't appreciate the proximity of the Mull, then is it not at least a possibility?
Just one final point. We have been repeatedly told that the crew could not climb and operate in temperatures below plus 4 degrees C. We have even been told that draconian disciplinary action would be taken against them if they did deviate from the R to S. So, what was their planned route back from Kinloss?
You asked me "when did it become negligence."
The simplistic answer is once they failed to maintain the minimum criteria for VFR flight. However, aviation, like life, is rarely that simple. Several contributors to this thread have used the analogy "nibbled to death by ducks." I would put it slightly differently; I think that some of the ducks that they had been feeding turned round and bit them.
You will remember that the decision had been taken to utilise one crew for all the days tasking and give the other crew a "day off". The BOI decided that there was no administrative reason why this should not be the case, although it does not tell us when this decision was made. You will also remember that in my first post I questioned whether this was a judicious use of crew resources.
The morning tasking was scheduled to take 5 flying hours out of the 7 flying hours normally allowed in the NI crew duty period. This 7 hour limit could be extended by one hour by the 230 Sqn Duty Auth Sqn Ldr or further by SRAFONI. So if all went to plan they could do the round trip in the evening with the 1 hr extension from the Duty Auth, which was almost certain to be given. As far as normal authorisation was concerned the Chinook detatchment was self authorising.
The morning tasking actually took five and a half flying hours. This not only reduced the margins available in which to complete the evening sorties but reduced the time available to prepare for them. The Met briefing arrived by fax (no time to go to see Met for a face to face brief?)and the crew departed to see the Duty Auth to brief him on the sorties and negotiate a 1hr extension to flying duty time.
Unfortunately, the Duty Auth was tied up with another crew and departure time was looming. They photocopied their charts and left them for the Duty Auth and departed without obtaining the flying time extension they needed. The interesting thing about the photocopied charts is that the writing on them does not belong to either of the Pilots who were now doing the sortie. I understand that the other crew did the planning on the assumption that they would do the sortie as the first crew were already planned to do a 5 flying hour (out of a normal 7 allowed) task.
Jayteeto has told us that the Mk1 Chinook was U/S otherwise it would have done the task. Is it possible that the sortie was planned on the basis that the Mk1 would be used? If that was the case, and the planning was not adjusted by the crew of ZD576 in the light of the much more restrictive icing limitations of the Mk2, then perhaps the negligence started here.
Back at the aircraft they found that there were delays due to late arriving Pax and baggage. This was now threatening to impinge on the overall crew duty day period of 14 hrs if they were to complete the task and return to Aldergrove that evening. They also had the imponderables of how long it would take to offload Pax and Baggage at Inverness and how long would it take to refuel at Kinloss. (From personal experience I know that the latter could involve a considerable wait for a bowser outside normal office hours in those days).
Although not specifically stated in the BOI I have little doubt that the crew planned to return that evening. They did not take the F700 with them, they had not booked overnight accommodation - or parking - and the pilots had no overnight kit with them.
I would suggest that they now had three options:
1. Call for the other crew to do the task, which would involve further delay - and probably involve some embarrassing questions in the morning.
2. Request a crew duty extension or permision to nightstop out of theatre from SRAFONI. Ditto regarding questions.
3. Try to make up as much time as possible around the route.
They certainly did not plump for either option 1 or 2. The evidence suggests that they were implementing option 3.
I stand by my earlier posts; the distance from Aldergrove to the crash point is 43nm in a straight line and the aircraft was airborne for 17 minutes. That is an average groundspeed of 152kts but it does not allow for acceleration time after lift off. I do not know how quickly a Chinook accelerates but, if we assume that it takes one minute to get from zero to 120kts, then it will do so whilst covering 1nm. That would leave the remaining straight line distance of 42nm to be covered in 16 minutes - a required groundspeed of 158kts. We do know, however, that it did NOT travel directly to the Mull but departed initially to the east. I postulated in an earlier post that this could have added an extra track mileage of 3nm. If that were true then the required average groundspeed becomes 169 kts. Whatever calculation you make,the required groundspeed to cover the distance in the 17 minutes from lift-off to accident is considerably in excess of the planned 120kts.
There has been considerable debate in respect of SALT around the Mull and whether ZD576 could have safely climbed to SALT without infringing the icing limitations of the Mk2 Chinook. Initially it was maintained that SALT was contingent on the proximity of Ben Nevis. Ben Nevis is 95nm from the crash position - to base SALT on that feature is akin to basing SALT for London Heathrow on the height of the cranes in Boulogne or Calais Docks (93nm). The planned SALT for the first leg was based on a mast in Belfast and the 25nm SALT for the Mull is 2500ft. What none of those who claim to have access to the BOI (which contains both the Met forecast and the aftercast) have disclosed is the height of the +4 degree isotherm.
The final sighting of ZD576 was by the yachtsman when the aircraft was 2 miles from the fog enshrouded lighthouse. At that point they were already contravening the rules for VFR flight yet they continued without deviation as observed by the yachtsman.
OC RAF Odiham made the point in his comments that a climb at an IAS of 150kts was not " recognisable as a Chinook technique". But if you are trying to make up time, and don't appreciate the proximity of the Mull, then is it not at least a possibility?
Just one final point. We have been repeatedly told that the crew could not climb and operate in temperatures below plus 4 degrees C. We have even been told that draconian disciplinary action would be taken against them if they did deviate from the R to S. So, what was their planned route back from Kinloss?
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K52
Those of us who claim to have access to the AAIB and BOI reports can only use the information within, and the +4 isotherm is not included, only the sea level temp of +9 deg C. I have asked the Met Office for an aftercast, and recieved the reply that the freezing level that afternoon in western Scotland was 'about 5000ft'. From this we can only speculate (as would the crew that day) that the 4 dg C level would be about 2500ft. As for the SALT, that for the next leg would have been 5900ft based on Ben Nevis. Wratten comes up with a figure of 2800ft, but in any event, the climb to SALT was decidedly iffy for a Mk 2 Chinook.
You say that 'The final sighting of ZD576 was by the yachtsman when the aircraft was 2 miles from the fog enshrouded lighthouse. At that point they were already contravening the rules for VFR flight yet they continued without deviation as observed by the yachtsman.' As he states that the helicopter was clearly visible, as was the lighthouse, on what do you base your assertion that they were already contravening VFR?
The aircraft took off at 1742 and departed on a magnetic track of 027degrees (pretty well direct the Mull) and witnesses heard a dull thump at 'about 1800 hrs.' The 999 call was logged at 1804. About 20 minutes for 43 miles or 130 kts groundspeed. Not as accurate as your figures? Who knows the exact airborne time? Somewhere between your figure and mine? Still not convincingly outside of the VFR <140 Kts COCISS requirement is it?
As for the planned return route, that is utterly irelevant.
As GICASI points out, you are relying on speculation to come up with a cause. None of us will ever know what happened in the last moments of this flight, and because of the rules in force at the time the crew must be given the benefit of 'any doubt whatsoever' as to the cause of the crash. Any doubt whatsoever must make the finding of gross negligence unsafe.
Those of us who claim to have access to the AAIB and BOI reports can only use the information within, and the +4 isotherm is not included, only the sea level temp of +9 deg C. I have asked the Met Office for an aftercast, and recieved the reply that the freezing level that afternoon in western Scotland was 'about 5000ft'. From this we can only speculate (as would the crew that day) that the 4 dg C level would be about 2500ft. As for the SALT, that for the next leg would have been 5900ft based on Ben Nevis. Wratten comes up with a figure of 2800ft, but in any event, the climb to SALT was decidedly iffy for a Mk 2 Chinook.
You say that 'The final sighting of ZD576 was by the yachtsman when the aircraft was 2 miles from the fog enshrouded lighthouse. At that point they were already contravening the rules for VFR flight yet they continued without deviation as observed by the yachtsman.' As he states that the helicopter was clearly visible, as was the lighthouse, on what do you base your assertion that they were already contravening VFR?
The aircraft took off at 1742 and departed on a magnetic track of 027degrees (pretty well direct the Mull) and witnesses heard a dull thump at 'about 1800 hrs.' The 999 call was logged at 1804. About 20 minutes for 43 miles or 130 kts groundspeed. Not as accurate as your figures? Who knows the exact airborne time? Somewhere between your figure and mine? Still not convincingly outside of the VFR <140 Kts COCISS requirement is it?
As for the planned return route, that is utterly irelevant.
As GICASI points out, you are relying on speculation to come up with a cause. None of us will ever know what happened in the last moments of this flight, and because of the rules in force at the time the crew must be given the benefit of 'any doubt whatsoever' as to the cause of the crash. Any doubt whatsoever must make the finding of gross negligence unsafe.
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K52
Thank you for your recent posting. I am truly staggered by your apparent powers of recall on this subject, as you said you had had no contact with the case in recent years. Have you ever written a book on the power of memory? If not ,you should, because most of yours is vaguely accurate.
However, I feel obliged to echo the thoughts of GICASI. I find it a little depressing that you seem to attach so much importance to very debatable trivia, and then try to use this 'evidence' to somehow imply that the crew had been wreckless, or "injudicious" throughout the day. Indeed, perhaps the negligence began at breakfast, as only one pilot was witnessed partaking of that meal!(and you people seem to think that 'absence of evidence' equates to 'evidence of absence')
I had hoped that I could avoid the need to counter each and every one of the assertions you made in your first post. My overwhelming response to which was "so what!" But as you have now repeated them in a semi-factual manner, I guess ignoring them is no longer an option. But, I stress, to me it is utter trivia, and does absolutely nothing to help us understand this accident.
It is interesting isn't it, that the test to be satisfied is 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever', and yet the best any of the 'prosecution' can muster is to resort to highly debatable trivia to concoct a circumstantial case to undermine the professionalism of the crew, in an attempt to make a suggestion of negligence somehow more believable!
Why? Because there IS no other evidence.
Perhaps this is precisely what honourable men in the Royal Air Force suspected could befall those of it's servants unable to defend themselves, when they decided on the phrase "absolutely no doubt WHATSOEVER."
What say you?
Thank you for your recent posting. I am truly staggered by your apparent powers of recall on this subject, as you said you had had no contact with the case in recent years. Have you ever written a book on the power of memory? If not ,you should, because most of yours is vaguely accurate.
However, I feel obliged to echo the thoughts of GICASI. I find it a little depressing that you seem to attach so much importance to very debatable trivia, and then try to use this 'evidence' to somehow imply that the crew had been wreckless, or "injudicious" throughout the day. Indeed, perhaps the negligence began at breakfast, as only one pilot was witnessed partaking of that meal!(and you people seem to think that 'absence of evidence' equates to 'evidence of absence')
I had hoped that I could avoid the need to counter each and every one of the assertions you made in your first post. My overwhelming response to which was "so what!" But as you have now repeated them in a semi-factual manner, I guess ignoring them is no longer an option. But, I stress, to me it is utter trivia, and does absolutely nothing to help us understand this accident.
It is interesting isn't it, that the test to be satisfied is 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever', and yet the best any of the 'prosecution' can muster is to resort to highly debatable trivia to concoct a circumstantial case to undermine the professionalism of the crew, in an attempt to make a suggestion of negligence somehow more believable!
Why? Because there IS no other evidence.
Perhaps this is precisely what honourable men in the Royal Air Force suspected could befall those of it's servants unable to defend themselves, when they decided on the phrase "absolutely no doubt WHATSOEVER."
What say you?