Chinook - Hit Back Here
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Ben
Still don't understand where you're coming from.
The flight would have been authorised to fly either VFR or IFR as required. The duty authoriser would have given the authorisation in discussion with the crew based on all sorts of factors - available nav aids, weather etc. Once airborne the captain could have changed from VFR to IFR and back again depending on the conditions. Although the flight was 'tasked' to carry the set passengers from A to B, the tasking signal or whatever would not normally have specified the flight rules as these would usually be selected at the time by the authoriser and crew.
The crew would not have had freedom to change the task, but would have had freedom to achieve it within the parameters laid down by such things as fuel, weather, available diversions, whether or not the passengers turned up on time or wanted to be early or whatever.
I don't know, but from earlier posts it seems that the task was to be achieved by the RAF NI squadron, who even had the flexibility to decide Puma or Chinook. If, Ben, you'd ever seen one of these tasking notices (Heltasks)you would understand that it might just have said 'Fly 32 VIP pax from A to B, PUP 0000, arrive 0001'. It is a direct order, but as you can see there is a lot of scope for the crew to do their own thing. Actually, Ben, I've been on crews where we've had similar tasks, taken one look out of the window and decided not to go because of the weather. I've also been on a sortie where we've taken off and then ended up with an aircraft full of VIPs in a layby in Germany because we couldn't go any further (even the 4* smiled)!
The important thing, Ben, is that the crash happened and there is no way of knowing who or what was really to blame. The issues you raise are irrelevant to that point.
Still don't understand where you're coming from.
The flight would have been authorised to fly either VFR or IFR as required. The duty authoriser would have given the authorisation in discussion with the crew based on all sorts of factors - available nav aids, weather etc. Once airborne the captain could have changed from VFR to IFR and back again depending on the conditions. Although the flight was 'tasked' to carry the set passengers from A to B, the tasking signal or whatever would not normally have specified the flight rules as these would usually be selected at the time by the authoriser and crew.
The crew would not have had freedom to change the task, but would have had freedom to achieve it within the parameters laid down by such things as fuel, weather, available diversions, whether or not the passengers turned up on time or wanted to be early or whatever.
I don't know, but from earlier posts it seems that the task was to be achieved by the RAF NI squadron, who even had the flexibility to decide Puma or Chinook. If, Ben, you'd ever seen one of these tasking notices (Heltasks)you would understand that it might just have said 'Fly 32 VIP pax from A to B, PUP 0000, arrive 0001'. It is a direct order, but as you can see there is a lot of scope for the crew to do their own thing. Actually, Ben, I've been on crews where we've had similar tasks, taken one look out of the window and decided not to go because of the weather. I've also been on a sortie where we've taken off and then ended up with an aircraft full of VIPs in a layby in Germany because we couldn't go any further (even the 4* smiled)!
The important thing, Ben, is that the crash happened and there is no way of knowing who or what was really to blame. The issues you raise are irrelevant to that point.
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K52
I prostrate myself at the feet of our country's leading living meteorologist!
To correct my earlier posts, the met conditions of the day assuming a sea level temperature of 9deg and an ISA lapse rate of 1.98deg/1000' would have allowed a climb to 2525.25252525252525 feet and not 2500' as previously claimed. Sadly still below SALT!Your merit star is en route. Be careful where you put it as the points are sharp!
VFR speed, I am working from memory, but I thought it was 140 KIAS. if I am wrong I apologise.
Ben,
As Nilnos says, it would have been the crew's choice, but they simply had no choice due to the utterly pathetic icing (not) clearance of the Chinook Mk2.
GICASI, Well said. There is doubt and the crew must have the benefit of it.
I prostrate myself at the feet of our country's leading living meteorologist!
To correct my earlier posts, the met conditions of the day assuming a sea level temperature of 9deg and an ISA lapse rate of 1.98deg/1000' would have allowed a climb to 2525.25252525252525 feet and not 2500' as previously claimed. Sadly still below SALT!Your merit star is en route. Be careful where you put it as the points are sharp!
VFR speed, I am working from memory, but I thought it was 140 KIAS. if I am wrong I apologise.
Ben,
As Nilnos says, it would have been the crew's choice, but they simply had no choice due to the utterly pathetic icing (not) clearance of the Chinook Mk2.
GICASI, Well said. There is doubt and the crew must have the benefit of it.
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K52
Welcome to this forum. It is very valuable to have people such as yourself contributing to this thread, as it makes all of us re-examine the few known facts to assure ourselves that we are not simply willfull mischief makers.
You say at the beginning of your initial post that you hope your memory is still accurate. I would have to say that in the most general terms, your memory is loosely correct, but in specific terms your recollections are almost completely misleading.
It would be churlish to criticise everything you said, particularly, since I have had the benefit of frequent refreshers on the subject. However to pick a few points at random:
You made some observations about the subscale settings on the 2 pilots bar alts. Presumably as some kind of circumstantial evidence as to the competence of the operators. You may of course recall the comments of the President of the BOI, who said, "the pressure setting could also have been moved during the accident." (The AAIB report most definitely does not exclude this possibility in such a violent impact!) The president summarises the paragraph by saying, "The Board concluded that Bar Alt setting procedures were not a factor in the accident."
As far as the rad alt settings are concerned, a fairer description would probably be that, each setting would have been appropriate, but for different types of flight. However, since we can not know at what moment each was set, and what was going through the pilots minds, it is difficult to deduce with any certainty what the thought processes were. Though, to be fair, Wg Cdr Pulford did state, "the Rad Alt setting procedures used by the crew were a contributory factor in the accident."
You mention that a yachtsman saw the helicopter, 2 miles from the Mull of Kintyre, "just" below cloud. In actual fact, his statement to the Board reads, "The helicopter appeared to be in sunlight" and "well below cloud level, at no time whilst I observed it, did it move into cloud cover."
You also made mention of a holidaymakers video, taken at the Mull lighthouse very shortly before the accident. I have viewed this video, and indeed, out to sea, a rock is visible which we calculated was 400m away. However, looking out to sea, nothing else would be visible before the coast of NI. So all anyone can say is the visibility at 300'asl, in the base of the cloud was at least 400m.
Your calculations regarding groundspeeds is guesswork in the extreme. I could come up with something completely different simply by 'programming' in different factors, such as wind speed, but even if I did, what does it prove?
You seem to have recalled the rate of climb of the aircraft in the final second or so. May I ask what this proves? If you had told me that the crew were NOT doing everything possible to avoid ground contact, I might be more curious. It doesn't help one jot in our understanding as to HOW or WHY the aircraft came to be there.
Finally you gave examples of other BOIs, presumably in an attempt to suggest there was nothing unique about this one. I will offer you a challenge. I will throw the towel in on this one, if you can come up with one other RAF BOI, which found deceased aircrew negligent, without survivor's evidence, without eye witness evidence, without CVR evidence, without FDR evidence, without radar traces, and without radio recordings. The AAIB couldn't even say whether the wreck had been serviceable!
This one IS unique, and you know it, as does everyone else!
Please tell me where I am wrong.
Incidentally, if CAS does read this, he might like to get his ADC to ring me too, as I also have some ideas as to how this could be resolved. BT have my number!
[This message has been edited by Tandemrotor (edited 09 January 2001).]
Welcome to this forum. It is very valuable to have people such as yourself contributing to this thread, as it makes all of us re-examine the few known facts to assure ourselves that we are not simply willfull mischief makers.
You say at the beginning of your initial post that you hope your memory is still accurate. I would have to say that in the most general terms, your memory is loosely correct, but in specific terms your recollections are almost completely misleading.
It would be churlish to criticise everything you said, particularly, since I have had the benefit of frequent refreshers on the subject. However to pick a few points at random:
You made some observations about the subscale settings on the 2 pilots bar alts. Presumably as some kind of circumstantial evidence as to the competence of the operators. You may of course recall the comments of the President of the BOI, who said, "the pressure setting could also have been moved during the accident." (The AAIB report most definitely does not exclude this possibility in such a violent impact!) The president summarises the paragraph by saying, "The Board concluded that Bar Alt setting procedures were not a factor in the accident."
As far as the rad alt settings are concerned, a fairer description would probably be that, each setting would have been appropriate, but for different types of flight. However, since we can not know at what moment each was set, and what was going through the pilots minds, it is difficult to deduce with any certainty what the thought processes were. Though, to be fair, Wg Cdr Pulford did state, "the Rad Alt setting procedures used by the crew were a contributory factor in the accident."
You mention that a yachtsman saw the helicopter, 2 miles from the Mull of Kintyre, "just" below cloud. In actual fact, his statement to the Board reads, "The helicopter appeared to be in sunlight" and "well below cloud level, at no time whilst I observed it, did it move into cloud cover."
You also made mention of a holidaymakers video, taken at the Mull lighthouse very shortly before the accident. I have viewed this video, and indeed, out to sea, a rock is visible which we calculated was 400m away. However, looking out to sea, nothing else would be visible before the coast of NI. So all anyone can say is the visibility at 300'asl, in the base of the cloud was at least 400m.
Your calculations regarding groundspeeds is guesswork in the extreme. I could come up with something completely different simply by 'programming' in different factors, such as wind speed, but even if I did, what does it prove?
You seem to have recalled the rate of climb of the aircraft in the final second or so. May I ask what this proves? If you had told me that the crew were NOT doing everything possible to avoid ground contact, I might be more curious. It doesn't help one jot in our understanding as to HOW or WHY the aircraft came to be there.
Finally you gave examples of other BOIs, presumably in an attempt to suggest there was nothing unique about this one. I will offer you a challenge. I will throw the towel in on this one, if you can come up with one other RAF BOI, which found deceased aircrew negligent, without survivor's evidence, without eye witness evidence, without CVR evidence, without FDR evidence, without radar traces, and without radio recordings. The AAIB couldn't even say whether the wreck had been serviceable!
This one IS unique, and you know it, as does everyone else!
Please tell me where I am wrong.
Incidentally, if CAS does read this, he might like to get his ADC to ring me too, as I also have some ideas as to how this could be resolved. BT have my number!
[This message has been edited by Tandemrotor (edited 09 January 2001).]
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I have followed this fascinating thread since it started and became actively involved when I heard Hoon’s ridiculous response to the PAC and the interviews with Wratten. This active involvement has, so far, been limited to writing several times to my MP (not very effective so far) and to Hoon (no response at all). At the moment I want to continue to do whatever I can to support the campaign.
However, reading the most recent posts, I must admit to becoming less clear about the main issues and I get a bit concerned when I see what appear to be experienced pilots arguing about definitions of VFR.
As a humble PPL, I know that, had I been flying that route in my C172 under those conditions, I would have been legal when the yachtsman saw me, being clear of cloud and in sight of the surface and below 140 KIAS. However, in that weather, with no IR most of you would agree that I was being very stupid (read grossly negligent) whether I hit the ground or not. The fundamental question is – were the immensely more experienced and qualified Tapper and Cook being similarly negligent by putting themselves in that position, two miles from the Mull, and limited to VFR by icing constraints?
From his explanation published in Pilot, it appears that Wratten believes that they were being negligent AT THAT POINT (“like a motorcyclist riding in fog”
, which is the only time we KNOW what was going on. This appears to be the whole crux of his argument. That implies that, in his view, they were being negligent even if they had not hit the Mull.
If they were not being negligent under those circumstances, as anything which might have happened afterwards is pure speculation, Wratten should be overruled. Presumably, the very experienced Chinook pilots on the BoI did not agree that they were being negligent then and, at the moment, that is good enough for me. With my limited experience I could not possibly make a judgement on it but might find the opinions of experienced military aviators helpful in restoring my confidence to renew the battle, for whatever my efforts might be worth.
To Brian Dixon,
I have been trying to persuade my MP to support Lord Chalfont but he does not seem to see how he can. Can you give us some arguments to use. Particularly some details of the committee he is trying to set up. Thanks.
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"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
However, reading the most recent posts, I must admit to becoming less clear about the main issues and I get a bit concerned when I see what appear to be experienced pilots arguing about definitions of VFR.
As a humble PPL, I know that, had I been flying that route in my C172 under those conditions, I would have been legal when the yachtsman saw me, being clear of cloud and in sight of the surface and below 140 KIAS. However, in that weather, with no IR most of you would agree that I was being very stupid (read grossly negligent) whether I hit the ground or not. The fundamental question is – were the immensely more experienced and qualified Tapper and Cook being similarly negligent by putting themselves in that position, two miles from the Mull, and limited to VFR by icing constraints?
From his explanation published in Pilot, it appears that Wratten believes that they were being negligent AT THAT POINT (“like a motorcyclist riding in fog”
, which is the only time we KNOW what was going on. This appears to be the whole crux of his argument. That implies that, in his view, they were being negligent even if they had not hit the Mull.If they were not being negligent under those circumstances, as anything which might have happened afterwards is pure speculation, Wratten should be overruled. Presumably, the very experienced Chinook pilots on the BoI did not agree that they were being negligent then and, at the moment, that is good enough for me. With my limited experience I could not possibly make a judgement on it but might find the opinions of experienced military aviators helpful in restoring my confidence to renew the battle, for whatever my efforts might be worth.
To Brian Dixon,
I have been trying to persuade my MP to support Lord Chalfont but he does not seem to see how he can. Can you give us some arguments to use. Particularly some details of the committee he is trying to set up. Thanks.
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"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
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Pulse 1
Very good to hear this medium is an effective recruiting tool, I guess that's why we (and probably 'they') look upon this as being a reasonably important 'talking shop'.
One thing that may not have come across to anyone without military flying experience, is that this type of flying regularly occurs on the very margins of what is deemed to be acceptable weather.None more so than military low level helicopter operations. Crews are very well practiced at it, and almost invariably, very good at coping with such weather. Indeed members of this crew would have flown on operations, in other theatres, in which far less stringent minimum weather limits apply, only an overwhelming sense of self preservation dictate what is sensible, and what is not.
But, this is to overlook the key issue of this case, which is:
The ONLY eyewitness to have presented evidence to the BOI, or FAI, stated that the aircraft was flying in conditions of sunshine, and well below the cloud base, and at no time that he observed it did it move into cloud cover. As far as we know, nobody else saw the aircraft, and nobody this side of the Pearly Gates can tell us what the in flight visibility was from the cockpit.
This sighting possibly occured, very approximately, 40 seconds prior to impact. The widely quoted waypoint change may have occured, very approximately, 20 seconds later.
Was the aircraft in cloud then?
Who knows.
Were they transitioning from VFR to IFR in response to a deterioration in weather?
Who knows.
Had the negligence already occured?
Who knows.
When did the aircraft enter cloud?
Who knows.
Was the weather still suitable for a low level VFR transit up the West coast of the Mull, remaining below a cloudbase which was probably around 300'?
No evidence I have ever seen, precludes it, and the incredibly limited evidence available,can easily suggest that it COULD legally have been attempted.
So why did the aircraft crash at around 800' ASL, at high speed?
I do not know. Neither did the President of the BOI, neither did the first two reviewing officers, neither did the AAIB, neither did the Sheriff at the FAI, neither do senior members of the RAeS, neither apparently does the Public Accounts Committee.
Who does? and here's the rich bit, they have "absolutely no doubt whatsoever", well you are probably ahead of me already.
Only in the rareified atmosphere of the upper echelons of the MOD could such a level of "unwarrantable arrogance" exist that would allow such an opinion to persist.
Did you notice I didn't even mention 'conflict of interest'!
"Take me to your leader"
[This message has been edited by Tandemrotor (edited 10 January 2001).]
Very good to hear this medium is an effective recruiting tool, I guess that's why we (and probably 'they') look upon this as being a reasonably important 'talking shop'.
One thing that may not have come across to anyone without military flying experience, is that this type of flying regularly occurs on the very margins of what is deemed to be acceptable weather.None more so than military low level helicopter operations. Crews are very well practiced at it, and almost invariably, very good at coping with such weather. Indeed members of this crew would have flown on operations, in other theatres, in which far less stringent minimum weather limits apply, only an overwhelming sense of self preservation dictate what is sensible, and what is not.
But, this is to overlook the key issue of this case, which is:
The ONLY eyewitness to have presented evidence to the BOI, or FAI, stated that the aircraft was flying in conditions of sunshine, and well below the cloud base, and at no time that he observed it did it move into cloud cover. As far as we know, nobody else saw the aircraft, and nobody this side of the Pearly Gates can tell us what the in flight visibility was from the cockpit.
This sighting possibly occured, very approximately, 40 seconds prior to impact. The widely quoted waypoint change may have occured, very approximately, 20 seconds later.
Was the aircraft in cloud then?
Who knows.
Were they transitioning from VFR to IFR in response to a deterioration in weather?
Who knows.
Had the negligence already occured?
Who knows.
When did the aircraft enter cloud?
Who knows.
Was the weather still suitable for a low level VFR transit up the West coast of the Mull, remaining below a cloudbase which was probably around 300'?
No evidence I have ever seen, precludes it, and the incredibly limited evidence available,can easily suggest that it COULD legally have been attempted.
So why did the aircraft crash at around 800' ASL, at high speed?
I do not know. Neither did the President of the BOI, neither did the first two reviewing officers, neither did the AAIB, neither did the Sheriff at the FAI, neither do senior members of the RAeS, neither apparently does the Public Accounts Committee.
Who does? and here's the rich bit, they have "absolutely no doubt whatsoever", well you are probably ahead of me already.
Only in the rareified atmosphere of the upper echelons of the MOD could such a level of "unwarrantable arrogance" exist that would allow such an opinion to persist.
Did you notice I didn't even mention 'conflict of interest'!
"Take me to your leader"
[This message has been edited by Tandemrotor (edited 10 January 2001).]
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Having read my post above I was surprised to see that a smilie has appeared after my Wratten quote. I didn,t put it there as I have not worked out how to do it. Could be finger trouble but why did it just happen to go in the best possible place? Divine intervention (support) perhaps? I even tried to edit it out but couldn't because Capt Prune was doing some maintenance.
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"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
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"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
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Posts: n/a
Pulse,
Thanks for your continued support. If you drop me an e-mail, I'll give you the information requested regarding the Mull og Kintyre Group.
With regard to the smilie, what you need to do is click in the 'Disable smilies in this post' box underneath the reply window where you type.
Hope that helps. Look forward to hearing from you.
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Thanks for your continued support. If you drop me an e-mail, I'll give you the information requested regarding the Mull og Kintyre Group.
With regard to the smilie, what you need to do is click in the 'Disable smilies in this post' box underneath the reply window where you type.
Hope that helps. Look forward to hearing from you.
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Pulse 1
I too thank you for your support. Your MP seems as useful as mine (and an astray on a motorbike). Tandemrotor's reply to your post says it all. None of us claim to know with certainty that Wratten is wrong. We are, however, certain that he has come to his conclusions with insufficient evidence and deeply flawed logic.
He simply cannot claim to be certain beyond any doubt whatsoever that the accident was caused by the crew's negligence; and that is the only point we must press home to all who will listen (and those who won't).
a ; followed by a ) gives you a
I too thank you for your support. Your MP seems as useful as mine (and an astray on a motorbike). Tandemrotor's reply to your post says it all. None of us claim to know with certainty that Wratten is wrong. We are, however, certain that he has come to his conclusions with insufficient evidence and deeply flawed logic.
He simply cannot claim to be certain beyond any doubt whatsoever that the accident was caused by the crew's negligence; and that is the only point we must press home to all who will listen (and those who won't).
a ; followed by a ) gives you a
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Brian
Thankyou for your e-mail. I do not agree, as you know, with your viewpoint but I have nothing but admiration for the way that you are fighting for what you believe in.
Arkroyal
Thankyou, I'll tell Charlie (the Postman) to watch out for the pointy bits - but you didn't answer the question. What was the actual lapse rate and was there a temperature inversion (it was an early summer evening)?
I'm sure you appreciate the signifcant difference between "clear of cloud and in sight of the surface" and the requirement of "5km visibility and 1000ft vertically from cloud" in the context of this accident.
When last seen the Chinook was "2 miles" from the cloud enshrouded Mull - heading towards it in level flight. If its groundspeed exceeded 155kts (see reply to Tandemrotor below)it was already IMC in accordance with Military Flying Regulations.
I have had a look at a chart for the UK (and before anybody complains about misuse of Service Property by retired personnel - its my Wife's, she has a PPL) and I would suggest that the SALT for that leg was based on the mast 1755ft AMSL to the west of Belfast. SALT within 25nm of the Mull would have been 2500ft.
Incidentally, and here I go showing my ignorance again, I did not realise that there were different criteria for rotary and fixed wing as regards SALT in the RAF. As a fixed wing pilot my calculation would have been Ben Nevis + 2000ft rounded up to nearest 100 ft (obstacle greater than 3000ft AMSL). I know that civil aviation has different criteria.
Capt. Jack Broome DSC RN quoting in his book "Send a Signal" (we used to live in the next village from him)
Tug towing splash target to Frigate that has just straddled Tug rather than target:-
WE AIM TO PLEASE --- YOU AIM TOO - PLEASE!!!
Tandemrotor
Thankyou for your comments - I always new I had a use in life, despite what my 1369's used to say.
First let me say that I agree that what the AAIB investigation found cannot be regarded as an absolute. There were nearly a dozen people on the Mull - many of whom, in addition to the Emergency Services once they arrived, searched the wreckage in the forlorn hope that they may find someone still alive. It took several hours before the Kinloss MRT arrived to act as crash guard. It is inevitable that some wreckage was moved and possibly some evidence destroyed in this time.
I also agree that because AAIB found no evidence that an item had moved because of the impact did not prove it had not moved. Equally, the fact that there was an impact does not mean that an item probably moved. The Captains Barometric altimeter is the point you raised. It was found approx 10 mbs different from the RHS Pilots altimeter, and the BOI speculated that it had been left on Aldergrove QFE. As you say the BOI felt that they could not rule out movement during impact. However the digits do not move independently; which means that the subscale did one complete revolution of the lowest digit wheel ie it rotated through 10 digits. For the 10's digit counter to have moved independently it would have needed to have broken free, which would have been obvious to AAIB.
You accept that the BOI concluded that the Rad Alt warning settings contributed to the accident.
I must admit, however, to having severe difficulty with your comments on my calculations of groundspeed.
If the distance between Aldergrove and the impact point is 43nm and the time between take-off and power down was 17 minutes then that distance needs to be covered at a speed of 152kts (groundspeed). This has nothing to do with wind (speed or direction) except in so far as that affects the IAS that needs to be maintained to achieve that groundspeed.
Also, as you know, the Chinook did not proceed directly from lift - off to the Mull. Therefore track miles will increase as will required groundspeed to cover that distance in 17 minutes - again this has nothing to do with wind speed or direction. In addition, allowance has to be made for the time and distance covered in acceleration to cruising speed as this will inevitably increase the required groundspeed to cover the remaining distance in what is left of those 17 minutes.
I accept that we will never know what happened in those final 20 secs. The aircraft was last seen in straight and level flight approx 2 miles from the Mull. It crashed tail end first into rising ground. A pitch up of that magnitude, whether pilot induced or otherwise, would have had the effect of rapidly decaying IAS and therefore groundspeed. Yet the aircraft impacted at a groundspeed of 150 kts.
The computer projections produced a prerequiste 150kts IAS prior to the final manouvre - giving a groundspeed of 170-175kts. Yet above 155kts groundspeed they should have maintained 5 km visibility and 1000ft vertical seperation from cloud.
At the end of the day if an aircraft full of passengers is flown at low level, at a speed just below Vne, in IMC, directly at high ground which the crew believe they cannot clear by the minimum margin allowed and it all turns to worms - then there is no alternative but a finding of negligence.
Thankyou for your e-mail. I do not agree, as you know, with your viewpoint but I have nothing but admiration for the way that you are fighting for what you believe in.
Arkroyal
Thankyou, I'll tell Charlie (the Postman) to watch out for the pointy bits - but you didn't answer the question. What was the actual lapse rate and was there a temperature inversion (it was an early summer evening)?
I'm sure you appreciate the signifcant difference between "clear of cloud and in sight of the surface" and the requirement of "5km visibility and 1000ft vertically from cloud" in the context of this accident.
When last seen the Chinook was "2 miles" from the cloud enshrouded Mull - heading towards it in level flight. If its groundspeed exceeded 155kts (see reply to Tandemrotor below)it was already IMC in accordance with Military Flying Regulations.
I have had a look at a chart for the UK (and before anybody complains about misuse of Service Property by retired personnel - its my Wife's, she has a PPL) and I would suggest that the SALT for that leg was based on the mast 1755ft AMSL to the west of Belfast. SALT within 25nm of the Mull would have been 2500ft.
Incidentally, and here I go showing my ignorance again, I did not realise that there were different criteria for rotary and fixed wing as regards SALT in the RAF. As a fixed wing pilot my calculation would have been Ben Nevis + 2000ft rounded up to nearest 100 ft (obstacle greater than 3000ft AMSL). I know that civil aviation has different criteria.
Capt. Jack Broome DSC RN quoting in his book "Send a Signal" (we used to live in the next village from him)
Tug towing splash target to Frigate that has just straddled Tug rather than target:-
WE AIM TO PLEASE --- YOU AIM TOO - PLEASE!!!
Tandemrotor
Thankyou for your comments - I always new I had a use in life, despite what my 1369's used to say.
First let me say that I agree that what the AAIB investigation found cannot be regarded as an absolute. There were nearly a dozen people on the Mull - many of whom, in addition to the Emergency Services once they arrived, searched the wreckage in the forlorn hope that they may find someone still alive. It took several hours before the Kinloss MRT arrived to act as crash guard. It is inevitable that some wreckage was moved and possibly some evidence destroyed in this time.
I also agree that because AAIB found no evidence that an item had moved because of the impact did not prove it had not moved. Equally, the fact that there was an impact does not mean that an item probably moved. The Captains Barometric altimeter is the point you raised. It was found approx 10 mbs different from the RHS Pilots altimeter, and the BOI speculated that it had been left on Aldergrove QFE. As you say the BOI felt that they could not rule out movement during impact. However the digits do not move independently; which means that the subscale did one complete revolution of the lowest digit wheel ie it rotated through 10 digits. For the 10's digit counter to have moved independently it would have needed to have broken free, which would have been obvious to AAIB.
You accept that the BOI concluded that the Rad Alt warning settings contributed to the accident.
I must admit, however, to having severe difficulty with your comments on my calculations of groundspeed.
If the distance between Aldergrove and the impact point is 43nm and the time between take-off and power down was 17 minutes then that distance needs to be covered at a speed of 152kts (groundspeed). This has nothing to do with wind (speed or direction) except in so far as that affects the IAS that needs to be maintained to achieve that groundspeed.
Also, as you know, the Chinook did not proceed directly from lift - off to the Mull. Therefore track miles will increase as will required groundspeed to cover that distance in 17 minutes - again this has nothing to do with wind speed or direction. In addition, allowance has to be made for the time and distance covered in acceleration to cruising speed as this will inevitably increase the required groundspeed to cover the remaining distance in what is left of those 17 minutes.
I accept that we will never know what happened in those final 20 secs. The aircraft was last seen in straight and level flight approx 2 miles from the Mull. It crashed tail end first into rising ground. A pitch up of that magnitude, whether pilot induced or otherwise, would have had the effect of rapidly decaying IAS and therefore groundspeed. Yet the aircraft impacted at a groundspeed of 150 kts.
The computer projections produced a prerequiste 150kts IAS prior to the final manouvre - giving a groundspeed of 170-175kts. Yet above 155kts groundspeed they should have maintained 5 km visibility and 1000ft vertical seperation from cloud.
At the end of the day if an aircraft full of passengers is flown at low level, at a speed just below Vne, in IMC, directly at high ground which the crew believe they cannot clear by the minimum margin allowed and it all turns to worms - then there is no alternative but a finding of negligence.
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A personal message to CAS:
Sir,
You are the one person in uniform left to whom we can turn. No doubt you have been following this forum; some ideas and comments are decidedly questionable, but the main thrust of the matter is that Air Marshalls Day and Wratten had no basis for their negligence finding.
Despite the whole affair becoming distressingly political, it must surely be within your power (political dynamite that it may be) to order a review of the whole sorry saga. Be assured that this affair is not going to go away. It is only a matter of time before the Royal Air Force comes up with egg on its face.
Would it not be better to kill the whole thing stone dead now - never mind the arguments about FADEC and entry to Service. Just the retraction of the gross negligence finding would do.
Me? I have had nothing to do with this accident or had any connection with the family or Inquiry. I just want a wrong made right.
Sir,
You are the one person in uniform left to whom we can turn. No doubt you have been following this forum; some ideas and comments are decidedly questionable, but the main thrust of the matter is that Air Marshalls Day and Wratten had no basis for their negligence finding.
Despite the whole affair becoming distressingly political, it must surely be within your power (political dynamite that it may be) to order a review of the whole sorry saga. Be assured that this affair is not going to go away. It is only a matter of time before the Royal Air Force comes up with egg on its face.
Would it not be better to kill the whole thing stone dead now - never mind the arguments about FADEC and entry to Service. Just the retraction of the gross negligence finding would do.
Me? I have had nothing to do with this accident or had any connection with the family or Inquiry. I just want a wrong made right.
Guest
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K52
As a previous holder of the post FS(Flight Safety)1, thank you for confirming that this case is indeed unique, in that no other aircrew have EVER been found negligent, without any supporting evidence from survivors, eyewitnesses, CVRs, FDRs, or a positive declaration of the aircraft's serviceability.
In response to your final paragraph;
"At the end of the day if an aircraft full of passengers is flown at low level, at a speed just below Vne, in IMC, directly at high ground which the crew believe they cannot clear by the minimum margin allowed and it all turns to worms - then there is no alternative to a finding of negligence."
Could you explain what additional evidence you were able to draw upon that was not available to the President of the BOI, Wg Cdr Pulford - who after all, GATHERED all the available evidence, and who in contrast states;
"The Board was unable to positively determine the sequence of events leading up to the accident, and therefore concluded that although it is LIKELY that Flt Lt Tapper made an Error of Judgement (nb This has a VERY specific meaning) in the conduct of the attempted climb over the Mull of Kintyre, it would be INCORRECT TO CRITICISE HIM FOR HUMAN FAILINGS BASED ON THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE."
In consideration of the co-pilot, he said, "As Flt Lt Cook would have been fully occupied at the time with flying the aircraft over the sea in deteriorating weather conditions, and as it is unlikely that he would have had any reason to doubt the actions of his experienced captain, the Board concluded that Flt Cook could not be criticised for failing to identify any errors. THE BOARD CONCLUDED THAT THERE WERE NO HUMAN FAILINGS WITH REGARD TO FLT LT COOK."
As an aside, I did notice that you do not claim to have any relevant helicopter flying experience. For the benefit of our readership, Wg Cdr Pulford was probably one of the most experienced Chinook pilots in the RAF at the time.
It is interesting to note isn't it, that EVERY SINGLE TIME this case has been reviewed outside the MOD, the conclusion reached has been very similar to that of Wg Cdr Pulford, and very dissimilar to that of yourself and two Air Marshals whose names are rather better known now than they used to be.
I wonder how long it will take?
As a previous holder of the post FS(Flight Safety)1, thank you for confirming that this case is indeed unique, in that no other aircrew have EVER been found negligent, without any supporting evidence from survivors, eyewitnesses, CVRs, FDRs, or a positive declaration of the aircraft's serviceability.
In response to your final paragraph;
"At the end of the day if an aircraft full of passengers is flown at low level, at a speed just below Vne, in IMC, directly at high ground which the crew believe they cannot clear by the minimum margin allowed and it all turns to worms - then there is no alternative to a finding of negligence."
Could you explain what additional evidence you were able to draw upon that was not available to the President of the BOI, Wg Cdr Pulford - who after all, GATHERED all the available evidence, and who in contrast states;
"The Board was unable to positively determine the sequence of events leading up to the accident, and therefore concluded that although it is LIKELY that Flt Lt Tapper made an Error of Judgement (nb This has a VERY specific meaning) in the conduct of the attempted climb over the Mull of Kintyre, it would be INCORRECT TO CRITICISE HIM FOR HUMAN FAILINGS BASED ON THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE."
In consideration of the co-pilot, he said, "As Flt Lt Cook would have been fully occupied at the time with flying the aircraft over the sea in deteriorating weather conditions, and as it is unlikely that he would have had any reason to doubt the actions of his experienced captain, the Board concluded that Flt Cook could not be criticised for failing to identify any errors. THE BOARD CONCLUDED THAT THERE WERE NO HUMAN FAILINGS WITH REGARD TO FLT LT COOK."
As an aside, I did notice that you do not claim to have any relevant helicopter flying experience. For the benefit of our readership, Wg Cdr Pulford was probably one of the most experienced Chinook pilots in the RAF at the time.
It is interesting to note isn't it, that EVERY SINGLE TIME this case has been reviewed outside the MOD, the conclusion reached has been very similar to that of Wg Cdr Pulford, and very dissimilar to that of yourself and two Air Marshals whose names are rather better known now than they used to be.
I wonder how long it will take?
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Many good points have been made since I last wrote, and all aircrew have been given much food for thought. However, the oft-repeated tendency to abuse air officers has tended to mask one crucial point. We all agree that the spirit and the letter of BoI rules in the Manual of Flight Safety are that no negligence finding should be found against deceased aircrew if there is any doubt. But that does not mean that 50 million people should have no doubt. Many of us have sat through civil court proceedings and come up with a different verdict from that found by a jury. That is just tough. If every civil case had to be re-tried until everyone agreed a verdict, the upshot would be chaos.
Like it or not, the chain of command that convened and adjudicated on the Chinook BoI was the properly authorised 'jury'. And that 'jury' was left in no doubt. Saying you don't agree with their opinion will get you nowhere, because the UK legal system would collapse under the implications.
K52 is quite right to flag up the point that BoI findings don't contain everything that goes into the final decision. Moreover, none of us have any legal right to know all the background, just as it is forbidden for jury members to reveal their deliberations.
In my humble opinion as a former FS 2, you will only stand a chance of overturning this negligence finding by working with the system rather than throwing spanners into its workings. Which means one of two things. Either you unearth meaningful new evidence, which means more than trying to imply that some very dedicated professionals in the SH force, HQ 1 Gp, HQ STC, IFS and MOD (PE) were all out to lunch, or you must show that the RAF violated its established precedents and procedures. I would incline to the latter.
Finally, a word on tactics. Those of ue who have worked in outer offices know that sending snottygrams to the PM or SofS only alienates those in high places who might otherwise be inclined to help you.
Like it or not, the chain of command that convened and adjudicated on the Chinook BoI was the properly authorised 'jury'. And that 'jury' was left in no doubt. Saying you don't agree with their opinion will get you nowhere, because the UK legal system would collapse under the implications.
K52 is quite right to flag up the point that BoI findings don't contain everything that goes into the final decision. Moreover, none of us have any legal right to know all the background, just as it is forbidden for jury members to reveal their deliberations.
In my humble opinion as a former FS 2, you will only stand a chance of overturning this negligence finding by working with the system rather than throwing spanners into its workings. Which means one of two things. Either you unearth meaningful new evidence, which means more than trying to imply that some very dedicated professionals in the SH force, HQ 1 Gp, HQ STC, IFS and MOD (PE) were all out to lunch, or you must show that the RAF violated its established precedents and procedures. I would incline to the latter.
Finally, a word on tactics. Those of ue who have worked in outer offices know that sending snottygrams to the PM or SofS only alienates those in high places who might otherwise be inclined to help you.
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And your legal training is? Actually writing to the S of S sometimes gets you invited to have tea and biccies in his outer office to explain your side of the story. Trust me, I've done it! (Micheal Portillo's era). Not everyone takes offence and some would rather get to the bottom of things, rather than let them fester.
My own letters in this matter have been couched in polite and respectful manner, mostly to people I know personally. I'm sure most of the others have too.
My own letters in this matter have been couched in polite and respectful manner, mostly to people I know personally. I'm sure most of the others have too.
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Flatiron,
It is helpful to draw the analogy of the jury system to gain greater understanding of what is going on here, but you stop short where it is convenient for your argument to do so.
If course we can disagree with the verdict of the "jury"; it happens all the time in our courts and appeals are frequently lodged by Crown and Defence and also in Civil cases. And the UK legal system is far from collapsing under the implications of these appeals.
Those who cannot accept the finding of culpable negligence on the Chinook pilots wish for the matter to be re-considered. That's all.
It is helpful to draw the analogy of the jury system to gain greater understanding of what is going on here, but you stop short where it is convenient for your argument to do so.
If course we can disagree with the verdict of the "jury"; it happens all the time in our courts and appeals are frequently lodged by Crown and Defence and also in Civil cases. And the UK legal system is far from collapsing under the implications of these appeals.
Those who cannot accept the finding of culpable negligence on the Chinook pilots wish for the matter to be re-considered. That's all.
Guest
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Flatiron,
Nobody is suggesting that the vast majority of professionals who have gathered and assessed the evidence on this matter are 'out to lunch'. The Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons did more work and researched more material than anyone else and they think that Day and Wratten are wrong. The Wg Cdr who chaired the BOI by definition disagrees with the ACMs as do the 2 Gp Capts who perused the papers before they reached them.
The legal system of our country is robust and allows of appeals from almost every court and tribunal. Typically a case could start in the Magistrates Court, progress to the Divisional Court, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. Very few do that. The option is there, but the vast majority of cases are accepted at first instance. The same applies in the civil system. Where people feel that there is still an injustice then they ask their elected representatives to support them. Many famous cases have included interventions by the Home Secretary.
The civil servants, or in the military, staff officers, prepare responses to letters. If they are upset about having to answer detailed letters, couched in a polite fashion, just because the views of the writers do not accord with their own or because they will have to challenge preconceived ideas then so be it. Every civil servant and military officer is the paid employee of each and every elector. MPs are elected to represent all of their constituents regardless of their beliefs and without fear or favour. If they are the characters you describe, Flatiron, then might I respectfully suggest that they are in the wrong job. There are in my experience many such people in the RAF system who are doing the job because it is a promotion step and not because they want to look after the people who pay their salaries. If a staff officer has to answer a PE and sits up all night doing it then 'tough'. If the staff officer has to rewrite his whole report because someone has deigned to challenge his conclusions then likewise 'tough'. At the end of the day Wratten, Day, Squire etc could have not bothered with ISS, OCC, C etc and could have tried to become good enough at flying to be considered for Spec Aircrew. Heavy lies the head that wears the crown..
If a Minister is upset because he receives hundreds of letters on a particular subject then he should quit. The volume of correspondence shows the strength of feeling. If individuals, in large numbers, perceive that there has been an injustice then they have every right to campaign by whatever legal means they feel. So far none of us has dug up the hallowed turf of Headingley to make our point. Interestingly the Birmingham Six and Guildford Four campaigns continued for much longer than this one has so far. They had the active support of Members of Parliament even though many of them were citizens of a foreign country. They were acquitted and compensated. The legal system continues as before. Under Flatiron's rules they would have resigned themselves to 30 years behind bars lest they upset any senior police officers or Home Office civil servants.
Still no reply from my MP!
[This message has been edited by Nil nos tremefacit (edited 11 January 2001).]
Nobody is suggesting that the vast majority of professionals who have gathered and assessed the evidence on this matter are 'out to lunch'. The Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons did more work and researched more material than anyone else and they think that Day and Wratten are wrong. The Wg Cdr who chaired the BOI by definition disagrees with the ACMs as do the 2 Gp Capts who perused the papers before they reached them.
The legal system of our country is robust and allows of appeals from almost every court and tribunal. Typically a case could start in the Magistrates Court, progress to the Divisional Court, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. Very few do that. The option is there, but the vast majority of cases are accepted at first instance. The same applies in the civil system. Where people feel that there is still an injustice then they ask their elected representatives to support them. Many famous cases have included interventions by the Home Secretary.
The civil servants, or in the military, staff officers, prepare responses to letters. If they are upset about having to answer detailed letters, couched in a polite fashion, just because the views of the writers do not accord with their own or because they will have to challenge preconceived ideas then so be it. Every civil servant and military officer is the paid employee of each and every elector. MPs are elected to represent all of their constituents regardless of their beliefs and without fear or favour. If they are the characters you describe, Flatiron, then might I respectfully suggest that they are in the wrong job. There are in my experience many such people in the RAF system who are doing the job because it is a promotion step and not because they want to look after the people who pay their salaries. If a staff officer has to answer a PE and sits up all night doing it then 'tough'. If the staff officer has to rewrite his whole report because someone has deigned to challenge his conclusions then likewise 'tough'. At the end of the day Wratten, Day, Squire etc could have not bothered with ISS, OCC, C etc and could have tried to become good enough at flying to be considered for Spec Aircrew. Heavy lies the head that wears the crown..
If a Minister is upset because he receives hundreds of letters on a particular subject then he should quit. The volume of correspondence shows the strength of feeling. If individuals, in large numbers, perceive that there has been an injustice then they have every right to campaign by whatever legal means they feel. So far none of us has dug up the hallowed turf of Headingley to make our point. Interestingly the Birmingham Six and Guildford Four campaigns continued for much longer than this one has so far. They had the active support of Members of Parliament even though many of them were citizens of a foreign country. They were acquitted and compensated. The legal system continues as before. Under Flatiron's rules they would have resigned themselves to 30 years behind bars lest they upset any senior police officers or Home Office civil servants.
Still no reply from my MP!
[This message has been edited by Nil nos tremefacit (edited 11 January 2001).]
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Nice reasoned stuff Flatiron.
The point is that the families HAVE shown that the RAF violated its own procedures.
There was doubt, of this simple fact there is no doubt. The BOI president said so, the 2 Group Captains said so, a judge (sheriff) said so and the Commons' PAC said so. What more does one need?
New evidence? Don't need it! The evidence layed down in the BOI shows that there is tons of doubt, masses of it, $hit loads in fact.
Violated its precedents? Yup, shown how they have done that. I have written reports on 7 other BOIs that cleared the various crews of any negligence despite far more compelling evidence. As a former FS2 (do I know you?) you will know the ones I mean.
On the question of the "jury", of course Sir Bill is entitled to his opinion, indeed as "our judge" his opinion became the verdict. But, and it is a big but, most people think he was wrong. Indeed, every independant person who has read and understood the evidence thinks he is wrong.
You seem to be saying that simply because he WAS the jury, because he was a senior officer, that doesn't matter, his rank entitles him to be right. Regardless of his wrongness.
Any other pointers for us?
The point is that the families HAVE shown that the RAF violated its own procedures.
There was doubt, of this simple fact there is no doubt. The BOI president said so, the 2 Group Captains said so, a judge (sheriff) said so and the Commons' PAC said so. What more does one need?
New evidence? Don't need it! The evidence layed down in the BOI shows that there is tons of doubt, masses of it, $hit loads in fact.
Violated its precedents? Yup, shown how they have done that. I have written reports on 7 other BOIs that cleared the various crews of any negligence despite far more compelling evidence. As a former FS2 (do I know you?) you will know the ones I mean.
On the question of the "jury", of course Sir Bill is entitled to his opinion, indeed as "our judge" his opinion became the verdict. But, and it is a big but, most people think he was wrong. Indeed, every independant person who has read and understood the evidence thinks he is wrong.
You seem to be saying that simply because he WAS the jury, because he was a senior officer, that doesn't matter, his rank entitles him to be right. Regardless of his wrongness.
Any other pointers for us?
Guest
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Can any of you 'legal eagles' out there answer a question for me?
If a juror was subsequently found to have had a significant connection with a case he had considered, would that be grounds for a mis-trial?
And by the way, what if there WERE only two jurors, and they BOTH could be vulnerable to criticism if the case went against them?
Hey, I guess it just goes to show, some examples are more DIFFERENT than SIMILAR.
Hey ho.
If a juror was subsequently found to have had a significant connection with a case he had considered, would that be grounds for a mis-trial?
And by the way, what if there WERE only two jurors, and they BOTH could be vulnerable to criticism if the case went against them?
Hey, I guess it just goes to show, some examples are more DIFFERENT than SIMILAR.
Hey ho.
Guest
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TR
1. Yes. Masses of case law somewhere, but not to hand in my study.
2. Likewise, yes.
Nemo judex in causa sua - no-one may be judge in his own cause - springs to mind. Most famous recent case was when a member of the House of Lords was disbarred from hearing the appeal on the Pinochet extradition matter, when it was noted that he was a paid up member of Amnesty International.
I suppose that the matter could be referred to a judicial review, but all other legal avenues have to be exhausted first. You only have 3 months to react from the final decision. One or other of the Cook/Tapper families would have sufficient interest to bring such a review. If it's less than 3 months from the date of Hoon's refusal to react to the PAC report then I would argue that it would be acceptable to file an application for permission to seek a judicial review of that decision. Michael Fordham would be the best counsel to advise on this matter since he wrote the exceptionally good judicial review handbook.
Hope this helps.
1. Yes. Masses of case law somewhere, but not to hand in my study.
2. Likewise, yes.
Nemo judex in causa sua - no-one may be judge in his own cause - springs to mind. Most famous recent case was when a member of the House of Lords was disbarred from hearing the appeal on the Pinochet extradition matter, when it was noted that he was a paid up member of Amnesty International.
I suppose that the matter could be referred to a judicial review, but all other legal avenues have to be exhausted first. You only have 3 months to react from the final decision. One or other of the Cook/Tapper families would have sufficient interest to bring such a review. If it's less than 3 months from the date of Hoon's refusal to react to the PAC report then I would argue that it would be acceptable to file an application for permission to seek a judicial review of that decision. Michael Fordham would be the best counsel to advise on this matter since he wrote the exceptionally good judicial review handbook.
Hope this helps.
Guest
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Hi Flatiron.
Thanks for your post. grateful if you could advise me who to contact with regard an appeal against conviction. What?? This is not possible?? Goodness me, what a poor state of affairs. We just have to accept what we are told do we?
I seem to recall some bloke, now what was his name....Tench, yes, that was it. He wasn't convinced of the procedure and wrote about it. Appears that his report failed to make it to the publishers. Hardly fair now is it.
To use your legal analogy, I would point out that the "jury" (Wg Cdr Pulford + 2) reached a not guilty verdict. The "Judge" chose a different verdict.
I have absolutely no problem with anyone having a different view to that of my own. However, if you put forward an argument please support it with evidence and fact, as opposed to just "live with it". It makes for a more interesting debate.
Regards
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Thanks for your post. grateful if you could advise me who to contact with regard an appeal against conviction. What?? This is not possible?? Goodness me, what a poor state of affairs. We just have to accept what we are told do we?
I seem to recall some bloke, now what was his name....Tench, yes, that was it. He wasn't convinced of the procedure and wrote about it. Appears that his report failed to make it to the publishers. Hardly fair now is it.
To use your legal analogy, I would point out that the "jury" (Wg Cdr Pulford + 2) reached a not guilty verdict. The "Judge" chose a different verdict.
I have absolutely no problem with anyone having a different view to that of my own. However, if you put forward an argument please support it with evidence and fact, as opposed to just "live with it". It makes for a more interesting debate.
Regards
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook